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Abstract 
There is a growing recognition that current energy systems are unsustainable and require 
fundamental restructuring. While this is a significant engineering challenge it is not a matter of 
replacing one set of technologies with another. Technologies are embedded in a wider set of 
political, social and economic institutions which means that the transition from one energy 
system to another also requires an understanding of the interactions between the technical and 
non-technical. This thesis contributes to knowledge in this area by paying specific attention to 
energy distribution networks; the pipes and wires which deliver our energy services.  
It is argued that existing approaches to the study of transitions in energy systems have largely 
black-boxed the network components, tending to concentrate on production and demand. 
However, infrastructure networks have unique technical and institutional characteristics which 
require a more systematic treatment. Therefore the aim of the thesis is to make more visible the 
interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in reproducing and transforming energy 
distribution networks. 
For this purpose a novel analytical framework is developed which draws from economics and 
science and technology studies and incorporates insights from the governance literature. The 
framework is applied to the cases of electricity and heat distribution in the UK. It is found that 
following the liberalisation of energy systems, the governance of distribution networks has been 
siloed from the mainstream energy regime which has focused on promoting competition in other 
segments of the value chain. Therefore efforts to decarbonise energy supply in the UK have 
tended to be market based with a short term focus, rather than integrated solutions which 
recognise the role that flexible distribution networks can play in this transition. A number of 
policy recommendations are made which inform debates surrounding the development of local 
heat infrastructures and the reconfiguration of electricity distribution systems. 
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1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to explore and explain the dynamics of contemporary energy 
systems with specific attention being paid to distribution networks - the pipes and wires which 
deliver our energy services. It is often the case that distribution networks are hidden from view 
beneath the streets of our cities or in out of the way places, often being treated as technical 
objects rather than socio-technical systems which are reproduced and transformed by ongoing 
interactions between actors, institutions and technologies. The central aim of this thesis is to 
uncover these complex socio-technical processes taking place in contemporary distribution 
networks and to explore implications for the long term transition to a low carbon energy system. 
Currently in industrialised countries the infrastructures which deliver essential energy services 
to homes and businesses are highly carbon intensive and in need of significant reinvestment. In 
the UK for example, much of the energy infrastructure was designed and constructed in the 
decades following the Second World War in order to power a highly industrialised economy 
and the consumer boom of the 50s and 60s. During the 1970s a slowdown in economic growth 
and successive oil crises began to undermine this expansionary model and the discovery of 
fossil fuel reserves in the North Sea saw a trend towards the use of gas for heating and later 
electricity supply.  Today the UK is no longer an industrialised economy and its gas reserves are 
in decline, having recently become a net importer. The rationales which underpinned the 
development of these large scale energy infrastructures are therefore no longer as salient and as 
a consequence flexibility, efficiency and decentralisation have been emphasised in recent 
decades.  
The example of the UK shows that energy systems are never static but change and evolve, being 
influenced by such things as the relative prices and availability of different fuels, the social and 
political environment in which they operate, and technological innovation - this has been the 
case since the industrial revolution of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. However, contemporary 
energy systems face a unique challenge; the scientific consensus surrounding anthropogenic 
climate change means that there are growing calls for the rapid decarbonisation of energy 
production and end use in order to prevent dangerous levels of greenhouse gases from entering 
into the earth‘s atmosphere. This creates a dilemma for the governance of energy systems 
because although relatively rapid technological transitions have taken place in the past, these 
have generally not been planned or predicted. There is therefore a need to develop a greater 
understanding not only of the technical and engineering challenges involved in decarbonising 
entire energy systems, but also how the social and technical interact in this process.  
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In recent years a body of literature known as socio-technical transitions theory (Verbong and 
Geels, 2007, Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008) has developed which seeks to do just that. The aim 
of the thesis is to contribute to this growing body of literature by emphasising the particular case 
of energy distribution networks. These pipes and wires are the arteries of the systems which 
transport energy, whether it is electricity, gas or heat, to end customers and therefore form a key 
link in the energy chain. However, analyses of energy transitions have tended to black-box the 
network components of infrastructures, focusing instead on the more visible areas of energy 
systems such as renewable generation technologies, nuclear power plants and the way energy is 
used. It is argued that, although having a less direct impact on carbon emissions, the 
development of flexible distribution systems will be crucially important in enabling and 
facilitating more sustainable production and consumption patterns.  
In order to achieve this aim two in-depth cases of distribution networks in the UK are 
developed. The first looks at electricity distribution systems which have been in place for many 
years and are operated by incumbent energy companies; the second focuses on district heating 
networks which are a niche technology in the UK and are typically operated by local authorities 
who are not mainstream actors in the energy industry.  It is proposed that these contrasting case 
studies can provide valuable insights into the nature of the interplay between actors, institutions 
and technologies in reproducing and transforming contemporary energy distribution systems. 
Theories from new institutionalism, evolutionary economics and science and technology studies 
are drawn upon in order to develop an analytical framework which can analyse the complex 
socio-technical interactions taking place. The framework pays particular attention to the 
changing governance patterns of socio-technical systems at a macro level and how this affects 
the structure of energy distribution sectors at the meso and micro levels.  
The thesis makes two key contributions to the study of long term structural change in energy 
systems and the transition towards a secure and sustainable energy system. Firstly, as an 
empirical contribution the study focuses on the socio-technical dynamics of the electricity and 
heat distribution sectors in the UK which, as argued, have received less attention than other 
sectors such as energy generation and demand. In doing so a second, more theoretically 
orientated contribution is made where the study develops a novel analytical framework which 
uncovers the socio-technical and governance dynamics of the distribution pipes and wires which 
have unique technical and institutional characteristics. 
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1.1 Innovation, Industry and Environmental Sustainability 
In order to situate this thesis and the transitions approach within a broader context it is useful to 
discuss the ways in which researchers have explored the nexus between technical change, 
industry and the environment.  
Arthur Mol in his study of the ecological modernisation of the Dutch Chemical Industry (Mol, 
1995) identifies three successive waves of environmental concern in industrialised societies. 
The first took place in the early twentieth century which ‗focused mainly on the degradation of 
‗natural‘ landscapes due to increasing industrialisation and the expansion of cities‘ (ibid: p.1). 
This led to the conservationist movement and the creation of vast nature reserves and protected 
areas. It did not however see a fundamental questioning of the relationship between the 
environment and the rapid industrialisation which was underway at the time. In the 1960s and 
1970s a new wave of environmental activism emerged which recognised more explicitly the 
need to redress this relationship. This led to the institutionalisation of environmental issues in 
government departments, planning laws and environmental regulations; however ‗the ecology-
inspired demand for social change in the early seventies resounded only to a limited extent in 
the institutions of industrial society‘ (Mol, 1995: p.1).  In the late twentieth and early 21st 
centuries, a third wave of environmental concern has been identified. This is more explicit about 
the need for a fundamental restructuring of industrial society, or ‗transformations of the 
industrial order‘, which are more structural in their nature (Mol, 1995: p.2). This widening of 
the scope of environmental concern and its effect on the structures of industrialised society are 
generally reflected in various strands of the technology and innovation studies literature (Smith 
et al., 2010).  
For example, ecological modernisation theory, which has grown in prominence in the past 
number of decades, seeks to integrate economic and environmental goals by advancing the 
diffusion of cleaner technologies and reorienting macro-economic/sector structures to promote 
environmentally benign economic development  (Mol, 1995, Hajer, 1995, Mol et al., 2009). 
Gouldson and Murphy (1998) summarise: 
―…ecological modernisation seeks to shift the emphasis of the macro-
economy away from energy and resource-intensive industries towards value 
and knowledge-intensive industries (…) ecological modernisation seeks to 
encourage structural change in the macro-economy and technological and 
organisational change in the micro-economy‖ (Gouldson and Murphy, 1998: 
p.3) 
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In terms of its approach to technology and innovation it seeks to make productive links between 
the second and third waves of environmental concern by promoting the diffusion of clean 
technologies and techniques, as oppose to control technologies and end-of pipe solutions. This 
involves the integration and embedding of environmental concerns in the strategies of firms and 
decision making processes surrounding technological investments. In doing so, a key aim is to 
harness ‗the forces of entrepreneurship for environmental gain‘ (Gouldson and Murphy, 1998) 
and to produce win-win solutions which improve competitiveness.  
Similar efforts to promote a synergistic relationship between technical change, industry and the 
environment are present in the literature on industrial ecology (Ayres and Simmonis, 1994) and 
eco-innovation (Rennings, 2000, Freeman, 1992). A key argument that is made is that eco-
innovations, or clean technologies, face a double externality problem (Rennings, 2000):  The 
first is that, similar to conventional technologies, environmentally friendly innovation will be 
under-supplied by the market because the benefits of investment in R&D can be appropriated, 
and as a result there will not be adequate incentives in place for individual actors to engage in 
innovation (Foxon, 2006). The second externality is specific to eco-innovations; because the 
environmental costs of incumbent technologies and the positive external effects of eco-
innovations are rarely priced, firms face an added disincentive to invest (Rennings, 2000).  
The transitions approach broadens the analytical perspective from industrial production and 
markets to entire systems of production and consumption; termed socio-technical systems. 
These underpin basic societal services such as food, energy, hygiene etc., and as the figure 
below shows, markets are embedded within these wider regimes or sets of institutional relations. 
Figure 1.1: Meta-coordination through socio-technical regimes 
 
Source (Geels, 2004) 
Transitions research moves beyond arguments which propose that a lack of innovation is a 
market failure which can be addressed through the pricing of externalities. Rather, it adopts a 
wider and more systemic approach to innovation (Edquist et al., 1998, Lundvall, 1988) where 
technical change is seen as an inherently evolutionary process whose outcomes cannot be 
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predicted ex-ante. The process involves complex interactions taking place between a wide range 
actors and social groups, of which market and industrial actors (customers and firms) are a 
subset. The approach explicitly deals with persistent environmental problems whose urgency 
necessitate rapid and fundamental changes to the structures of a number of socio-technical 
systems which, it is argued, are locked-in to unsustainable trajectories and require a 
reorientation of their entire systems of production and consumption. Frank Geels, one of the key 
proponents of a transitions approach, refers to these as ‗New Environmental Problems‘: 
―New Environmental problems, such as climate change, biodiversity and 
resource depletion, gained prominence on the political agenda in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. These pervasive problems differ in scale and complexity 
from the environmental problems of the 1970s and 1980s, such as water 
pollution, acid rain, local air pollution and waste problems. While many of 
these problems could be addressed with end-of-pipe solutions (e.g. catalysts 
in cars, scrubbers on power stations) or clean technologies, new 
environmental problems such as climate change are more difficult to address 
and will require social as well as technical changes. Achieving cuts of 50-80 
per cent in CO2 emissions will require shifts to new kinds of systems in 
transport, energy and agri-food domains. Such transitions entail not only new 
technologies but also changes in markets, user practices, infrastructures, 
cultural discourses, policies and governing institutions‖ (Geels, 2011: p.13) 
The literature on socio-technical transitions seeks to understand the process of transformation in 
industrial sectors of the economy and adopts an explicitly normative stance that radical 
innovation which produces more sustainable and environmentally benign outcomes can and 
should be encouraged. This ‗broadening of the problem framing‘ has led to an associated 
‗broadening of the analytical framework‘ (Smith et al., 2010) to consider how structural 
transformations in sectors of the economy, and not just individual technologies, can be induced 
and rapidly accelerated: 
‗Ecological restructuring of production and consumption patterns will 
require not so much a substitution of old technologies by new ones, but 
radical shifts in technological systems or technological regimes including a 
change in consumption patterns, user preferences, regulations, and artefacts‘ 
(Hoogma et al., 2002: p.5) 
Due to the nature of modern energy systems as high polluting and highly interconnected 
configurations which are prone to inertia, the transitions approach has been widely drawn upon 
to analyse how long term structural transformations to renewable and low carbon energy 
systems can be governed (Raven, 2005, Verbong et al., 2008, van der Vleuten and Raven, 2006, 
Raven and Verbong, 2007, Foxon et al., 2010, Foxon and Pearson, 2008, Verbong and Geels, 
2010). The following section will discuss in more detail socio-technical transitions in energy 
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systems and the need to give more explicit consideration to the dynamics of infrastructure 
networks in these processes. 
1.2 Socio-Technical Transitions and Infrastructure Networks 
The main argument of this thesis is that infrastructure networks – pipes and wires – have unique 
characteristics which have been neglected or downplayed in analyses of socio-technical 
transition processes in energy systems. As the unit of analysis of transitions research has 
expanded to incorporate entire systems of production and consumption, it has often been the 
case that the technical and institutional characteristics of specific sub-systems, such as 
distribution networks, are treated as part of the wider system as a whole. As a result emphasis 
tends to be placed on either (or both) the supply (generation) and demand side (how energy is 
used), with the networks often being black-boxed. Although the structure of distribution 
systems have played a key role in shaping modern energy systems (Hughes, 1987) they tend to 
be neglected because they are often less visible than generation technologies such as nuclear 
plants and wind turbines, and have less direct impact on carbon emissions than energy use 
patterns. While the highly aggregated system level framing may have been appropriate when 
energy industries were integrated under public ownership, in a liberalised context there are both 
competitive and non-competitive parts of energy systems which have quite different 
institutional characteristics and therefore require separate treatments in analysis. 
The distribution network component of energy systems have similar attributes to a number of 
other ‗network industries‘ such as telecoms, water and transport which are infrastructure based 
(Groenewegen and Künneke, 2005). These industries have the following unique features:  
 In many cases the services that these industries provide are essential to everyday life 
and are therefore classed as public utilities or social goods 
 Due to the physical and economic characteristics of infrastructure networks they tend to 
be natural monopolies which means that they are non-competitive  
 Parallel networks rarely compete against one another therefore the services they provide 
are not traded in markets but are subject to some form of state influence e.g. through 
economic regulation or public ownership  
 Infrastructure networks are large scale technical systems which have a defined 
geographical scope 
 Infrastructure networks are complex systems and their successful operation requires the 
mutual interaction between large numbers of individual components. In order to achieve 
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this technical complementarity institutional arrangements which coordinate a range of 
both public and private actors are required 
The aim of this thesis is to show that the dynamics of infrastructure networks require systematic 
attention in analyses of socio-technical transitions in energy systems. The study pays particular 
attention to electricity and heat distribution networks which have traditionally not been a 
particularly prominent part of centralised energy systems. However, it is likely that for different 
reasons – e.g. more flexible electricity distribution networks will be required and heat networks 
promote energy efficiency - they will become a much more important part of energy systems in 
the future (chapter 4 will explain this in greater detail). Thus, it is proposed that the thesis can 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of transition processes in energy systems leading to 
policy recommendations for a low carbon energy transition in the UK and other industrialised 
countries. 
1.3 Governance, the State and Energy Systems 
As proposed in the introduction to this chapter, developing an understanding of transition 
processes - how they can be directed and accelerated - will necessitate an appreciation of the 
non-technical or social aspects of energy systems. In a number of recent contributions to 
research in this area it has been argued that there is a particular need to develop a greater 
understanding of the political and governance dimensions of energy sector transformation 
(Smith and Stirling, 2007, Kern, 2009, Shove and Walker, 2007, Meadowcroft, 2011, Scrase 
and Smith, 2009). Largely due to its roots in economics and innovation studies, there has been a 
tendency to present transitions as unproblematic and uncontested processes which are largely 
characterised in terms of technical change (Smith et al., 2005); however, in reality, energy 
systems are deeply embedded in wider political, economic and social institutions.  
In her study of renewable energy policy in the UK, Catherine Mitchell (Mitchell, 2008) has 
argued that attempts to promote the transition to a low carbon energy system have largely been 
shaped by the changing nature of the state‘s involvement in the governance of the energy sector 
and the economy more broadly. It is proposed that the governance of the energy industry in the 
UK has been closely bound up with the state and its approach to economic regulation. Drawing 
on the work of Michael Moran (Moran, 2003), Mitchell argues that this nexus has been 
paradigmatically structured, with the post-war welfare state – characterised by managerialism 
and the socialisation of risk -  being followed by a move towards liberalisation where state 
involvement is based on the promotion of economic efficiency thorough market mechanisms – 
this has been termed the Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP). Mitchell and others (Helm, 2004) 
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have proposed that energy institutions and decision making in the UK has been shaped by 
changing political paradigms with a long period of public ownership being ended by the 
Thatcher government of the 1980s and the privatisation of a number of network industries 
including electricity and gas. In recent years efforts to promote decarbonisation of energy 
supply have been channelled through this paradigm with emphasis being placed on competition, 
incentives to promote marginal efficiency, and the use of prices to correct market failures 
(Mitchell, 2008). However, there remains a great degree of uncertainty regarding the 
appropriateness of the RSP and its application to an energy system which requires fundamental 
and rapid transformation. For the case of renewable energy, Mitchell argues that the existing 
energy institutional framework promotes incremental rather than radical structural changes; the 
RSP being similar to a ‗band of iron‘ which constrains the agency of decision makers and 
favours existing technologies and incumbent actors. This points to an underlying paradox at the 
heart of UK energy policy where efforts to promote a transition to a low carbon energy system 
run parallel to the day to day practices and institutions of governance which often reinforce 
existing technologies and practices.  
Therefore, in order to uncover these complex socio-technical processes, a central concern is the 
changing role of the state in the governance of energy systems. It is argued that an exploration 
of the socio-technical dynamics of energy distribution networks presents a particularly 
interesting and underexplored forum for these debates. As discussed in the section above, 
distribution networks are one of a number of network industries which have particular technical 
and institutional features – such as natural monopoly – which mean that they are not 
conventional market goods; rather they require an institutional architecture which is coherent 
with their unique technical characteristics and can deliver social as well as economic objectives. 
It will be argued in chapter two that the literatures which have dealt with the governance of 
network industries and energy systems in a liberalised context have tended to down-play or 
under-theorise the role of the state in shaping the institutions of distribution sectors. By drawing 
on various strands of the governance literature a theoretical contribution that this thesis makes is 
to pay particular attention the changing role of the state in economic governance and how this 
contextualises and shapes meso or sector level dynamics in energy systems.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The main argument of this thesis is that infrastructure networks, such as energy distribution 
systems, have specific technical and institutional characteristics which require more systematic 
analysis in the study of energy transitions. It is proposed that distribution networks will become 
an increasingly important part of energy systems in the future and that as the transition to a low 
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carbon energy system unfolds it will reveal new forms of interplay between actors, institutions 
and technologies in these sectors which the thesis aims to explore. The guiding research 
question of the study is therefore as follows: 
What is the nature of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in 
reproducing and transforming contemporary energy distribution systems? 
It is proposed to use a qualitative case study methodology to address this research question. The 
rationale for taking this approach and choosing the electricity and heat distribution networks in 
the UK as case studies is outlined in chapter three.  
The following sub-research questions address particular aspects of this interplay: 
1. How do the liberalisation and climate change agendas interact to influence this 
interplay? 
Over the past twenty to thirty years, the UK has been a leading proponent of the liberalisation 
and privatisation of network industries and this has shaped the current governance structure of 
energy distribution networks. In more recent years efforts to address climate change at a 
national level in the UK have increasingly begun to influence various aspects of energy policy. 
It has been argued elsewhere that there are incompatibilities between these two agendas, 
particularly in relation to accelerating the deployment of renewable generation technologies and 
more efficient demand side behaviours which have tended to be pursued through a market-led 
framework (Mitchell and Woodman, 2010, Mitchell, 2008, Woodman and Mitchell, 2011, 
Helm, 2005, Foxon and Pearson, 2008). The study explores the co-evolving relationship 
between these two agendas for the specific case of distribution pipes and wires in order to shed 
light on potential areas of coherence and conflict in the governance of energy networks.  
2. What is the role of the state in the governance of energy networks and how is this 
changing? 
As outlined above, a key contribution which this thesis aims to make is to uncover the changing 
role of the state in the governance of energy systems, paying particular attention to distribution 
networks. It is proposed that the technical and institutional characteristics of infrastructure 
networks can illuminate the nexus between public and private actors and can provide insights 
into the state‘s role in the governance of contemporary energy systems.   
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3. How are socio-technical transition processes in energy systems likely to be affected 
by the specific dynamics of distribution networks? 
It was argued in the section above that analyses of socio-technical transition processes have not 
paid adequate attention to the characteristics of distribution systems and network industries 
more generally. By asking this question the aim is to explore in more explicit terms the 
particular dynamics of long term socio-technical change in network industries and to develop 
insights which are relevant to policy makers in the UK. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 investigates the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in distribution 
sectors through the lens of a number of literatures which have been previously drawn upon to 
explain structural changes in infrastructure sectors. These are broadly divided into two main 
categories; economic approaches which stress the importance of institutions and socio-technical 
approaches which are more actor-centric. The chapter interrogates the literatures in terms of 
their framing of institutions and institutional change and the interplay between actors and their 
wider environment in shaping technical change. It is argued that while these existing literatures 
provide useful insights to address the main research question, they lack a satisfactory discussion 
of the role of the state in the governance of infrastructure sectors (research question 3). In order 
to fill this gap, the final section of the chapter introduces and discusses the governance literature 
which seeks to understand relationships between the state, the market and civil society. Two 
strands of this literature are explored in further detail - state theory and governmentality - which 
delve more deeply into the nature of the state and its changing form. Potential implications for 
the governance of distribution networks are discussed. 
Chapter 3 draws on these insights and develops a novel analytical framework for the analysis of 
the socio-technical dynamics of energy distribution networks. The framework brings together 
insights from the previous chapter and draws more widely from sociological understandings of 
institutions in order to frame the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies as a 
process of governance involving interventions, interactions and outcomes taking place in the 
context of a national level governance regime. Governance outcomes are assessed in terms of 
three analytical dimensions – physical, relational and structural. The chapter also outlines the 
research design and methodology.  
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Chapter 4 outlines the contextual background to each of the two case studies. This covers the 
technical and institutional structure of the electricity and heat distribution sectors and a brief 
history of their evolution. It also outlines how the key concepts in the analytical framework can 
be operationalised for each of the cases. 
Chapter 5 & 6 are the main empirical chapters of thesis. Chapter 5 applies the analytical 
framework to the electricity distribution sector in the UK and Chapter 6 looks at heat 
distribution. Each of the chapters outline the interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies as an evolving process by exploring the outcomes of sector level interventions and 
interactions which are taking place within the context of national level structures, termed a 
governance regime. These chapters pay particular attention to the co-evolution between the 
liberalisation and climate change agendas during the 2000s and how this has influenced the 
uptake of various technologies and practices in each of the cases.    
Chapter 7 is a cross-case analysis which is designed to extrapolate from the context specific 
knowledge which was developed in the empirical chapters to provide more generalizable 
insights regarding the socio-technical dynamics of energy distribution networks. A number of 
causal mechanisms which have influenced the interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies in each of the cases are identified and discussed. This shows how the study can 
inform the existing literature but also how the analytical framework has uncovered a number of 
novel mechanisms which develop knowledge in this area.  
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter where each of the research questions which have been 
outlined above are addressed in turn. The policy implications of the research are discussed and a 
number of concrete policy recommendations are made. The chapter also reflects on the main 
contributions of the thesis, its limitations and potential avenues for future research. 
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2 Theoretical Perspectives on the Dynamics of 
Infrastructure Networks 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literatures which deal with the topic of 
infrastructure networks and their socio-technical dynamics, thus addressing the central research 
question regarding the interplay between technologies, actors and institutions. Due to the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of infrastructure systems, a large number of literatures have 
dealt with the topic from different perspectives ranging from engineering to sociology. In the 
interests of precision, literatures which broadly analyse structural changes in energy systems 
and the nature of the relationship between the technical and non-technical dynamics of 
infrastructures are discussed; these tend to take a multi-disciplinary approach.  
The chapter is sub-divided into three main sections; the first two comprise a review of the 
existing literature on the dynamics of infrastructure networks while the third incorporates 
insights from a range of governance approaches to address the gap in the literature regarding the 
changing role of the state in the governance of energy systems. Section 2.1 explores economic 
and institutional approaches to infrastructures, focusing on new-institutional and evolutionary 
economics. What these approaches have in common is that they highlight the role of institutions 
in the dynamics of infrastructure networks; however they adopt different stances on the nature 
of institutional change with new-institutional economics stressing the importance of transaction 
costs while evolutionary economics places a greater degree of emphasis on technology and 
innovation as a source of institutional change. Section 2.2 is a discussion of a broad range of 
socio-technical approaches to the analysis of infrastructure networks which tend to be rooted in 
science and technology studies. These take a more actor-centric or constructivist stance, 
stressing the contested nature of technical change and the multiple framings and meanings that 
different actors and social groups attribute to technology. These literatures are not confined to 
one particular infrastructure sector and throughout the chapter the electricity, heat and other 
sectors will be referred to.  
It is proposed that these two areas of theorising can provide useful insights into processes of 
change in distribution networks as they emphasise in different ways the relative importance of 
both structures (institutions) and agency (actors‘ framings, choices and motivations etc.). An 
understanding of both of these opposing forces (stability and change) is key to revealing the 
paradox which is at the heart of contemporary energy systems i.e. efforts to promote long term 
structural change running parallel to the ongoing interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies which often reinforce existing structures. Section 2.3 of the chapter develops the 
-14- 
 
 
 
argument which was introduced in the previous chapter regarding the changing role of the state 
in the governance of energy systems and how this is currently poorly conceptualised in the 
existing literatures. Various strands of the governance literature are discussed with a view to 
developing an analytical framework in chapter 3 which can reveal the underlying processes of 
governance which are influencing structural change in socio-technical systems and energy 
distribution networks in particular.  
2.1 Economic and Institutional approaches 
In this section approaches based on various strands of the economics literature which link 
institutions with infrastructure sectors are discussed; the focus being on dynamics at both the 
firm and industry sector levels. The study of institutions had been intermittently in vogue within 
various strands of the economics, sociology and political science literatures since the late 19th 
century with contributions from prominent authors as Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber and Alfred 
Marshall. As a result there are a wide range of definitions of institutions such as; ‗general habits 
of action and thought‘ (Thorstein Veblen), ‗the rules of the game‘ (Douglas North), and ‗modes 
of governance‘ (Oliver Williamson) (Nelson and Nelson, 2002). Broadly however, institutions 
in the economic sphere generally refer to the formal and informal rules which constitute both 
market and non-market incentive structures. Economists who draw on institutional theory tend 
to share in common a critique of conventional neo-classical approaches which presume that 
actors are perfectly rational and that incentives in the market determine behaviour. This is 
particularly relevant to the study of infrastructure networks as they possess a number of 
attributes which make conventional micro-economic analysis less relevant and thus provide an 
interesting site of application for institutional theory.  
Firstly, in the language of neo-classical economics, there are number of ‗market failures‘ 
associated with infrastructure networks (Finger et al., 2005). Network externalities occur when 
the benefits to individual users of a network increase as the size of the network itself increases
1
; 
this means that infrastructures benefit from economies of scale. Also, because there tends to be 
large fixed cost investments with long asset lives in these sectors; over time they tend to display 
natural monopoly characteristics where one actor dominates the market place. Therefore, rather 
than being a price taker, as in an equilibrium market (i.e. ‗where price equals the marginal 
production costs‘ (Vivet and Coppens, 2004)), in a monopoly situation the production costs fall 
as output increases thus making it more economical for one network to dominate (Vivet and 
                                                     
1
 Kunneke (1999) notes that ‗a classical example of network externality is the telephone network, in 
which the beneﬁt to end-users directly depends on the number of subscribers to the grid‘ 
-15- 
 
 
 
Coppens, 2004). There are also external effects associated with infrastructures because it is 
difficult to allocate the costs and benefits to individual parties of network services. As outlined 
in the introduction, infrastructures such as transport, energy and communications produce 
positive (e.g. economic growth) and negative (e.g. visual and noise pollution) effects which 
make it difficult to disaggregate costs and benefits into an appropriate pricing regime. These 
factors lead to a situation where; 
―Traditional market organization is not possible or largely restricted. Often, 
strong governmental regulation is warranted to provide suitable economic 
conditions for the development of these sectors. It is very well known from 
textbook economics that under the circumstances of market failures private 
investments will not occur, or in the best case will be realized at an inferior 
level. Regulation or public funding is necessary to develop infrastructures 
under these conditions. As a consequence, traditionally the sector 
organization is characterized by monopolistic market structures and a high 
degree of vertical integration.‖ (Finger et al., 2005) 
A second feature of infrastructure networks is that due to the fact that networks involve 
interactions between a vast array of technical components and actors, a wide range of both 
market and non-market coordinating mechanisms are required. This makes institutions a key 
explanatory factor in accounting for stability and change within these sectors. Two approaches 
which deal with the relationship between infrastructures and institutions are discussed below. 
2.1.1 New Institutional Economics 
One approach to institutions which has been applied to the analysis of various infrastructure 
sectors is a branch of New Institutional Economics (NIE) called Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE). TCE focuses on ‗how specific types of transactions can best be coordinated in specific 
types of governance structures‘ (Finger et al., 2005) and it has been applied to the analysis of 
the ways in which infrastructure sectors can be organised. The basic premise is that because the 
behaviour of economic actors cannot be predicted ex-ante due to information asymmetries 
between agents, there are various costs associated with market based transactions. Institutions, 
particularly formal institutions such as legal contracts which ‗bind participants in economic 
exchanges‘ (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1998), become important as they can address these 
information asymmetries and reduce the uncertainties involved in market based transactions. 
Proponents of TCE argue that, depending on the nature of transactions taking place, there is an 
optimal mode of organisation or governance structure which can economize on or reduce the 
costs of transacting. If market based transactions prove to be too costly
2
, a firm will tend to 
                                                     
2
 The costs of enforcing contracts and exchanges between actors 
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carry out its activities ‗in-house‘ through hierarchical governance structures, or alternatively it 
will transact with external actors where the price mechanism is relied upon to coordinate its 
activities.  
TCE therefore recognises that markets are not alone in economic coordination and that there are 
a range of non-market based modes of governance based on alternative ways of organising 
transactions. A transaction in this sense may refer to ‗the transfer of a physical good, a 
commodity, a legal right or a natural resource between actors‘ (Andrews-Speed, 2010: p.5/6) 
and the purpose of an institutional framework or governance structure is to maintain the 
integrity of the transactions taking place. Underlying this is a basic presumption that economic 
agents choose the most efficient governance structures i.e. they economize on transactions costs 
depending on the nature of those transactions. As will be discussed at the end of this section, 
this presumption has proved to be problematic, particularly in the analysis of long term 
dynamics in infrastructures, due to the implication that institutional change conforms to some 
abstract notion of efficiency in a functional manner. Despite this issue however, TCE has 
proved to be a useful tool for the analysis of network industries because it moves beyond 
notions of perfect rationality and provides an analytical tool to identify the heterogeneous ways 
in which coordination can be achieved within these sectors. The framework has been applied to 
the analysis of large scale technical systems such as energy networks, in particular regarding 
questions of how to most efficiently coordinate complex technical functions e.g. through a 
vertically integrated structure (hierarchy) or a more disaggregated one which relies on market 
based transactions to achieve the required coordination.  
The origins of TCE stem from Ronald Coase‘s theories regarding the nature of the firm (Coase, 
1937). Traditional classical approaches posited that firms operate in an economic environment 
where outcomes are determined by the price mechanism and can thus be treated as ‗production 
units that result from demand for a product and from the economies of scale needed to produce 
that product efficiently‘ (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1998: p.107). Coase questioned why, if ‗the 
price system perfectly coordinated the provision of goods and services, we would have units 
called firms and individuals called managers, supplying still more coordination‘ (Granovetter, 
1998: p.67)? In the theory he distinguished as separate governance structures between markets – 
where the price mechanism organises activity - and firms – which are based on centralised 
hierarchical decision making. It was proposed that transacting in a market is not a costless 
activity, rather in involves frictions or transaction costs, as described above, and due to the 
presence of transaction costs firms exist as alternative modes of coordination to markets and the 
price mechanism, thus allowing economic agents to make efficient ‗make or buy‘ decisions in 
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the provision of goods and services. Succinctly put ‗when it is costly to transact, institutions 
matter‘ (Coase, 1937).  
In the following quote from his Nobel Prize winning speech, Coase points to costs associated 
with discovering prices and to the costs of negotiating and agreeing contracts.  
―What the prices are need to be discovered. There are negotiations to be 
undertaken, contracts have to be drawn up, inspections have to be made (…) 
It was the avoidance of the costs of carrying out transactions through the 
market that could explain the existence of the firm in which the allocation of 
factors came about as the result of administrative decisions‖ (Coase, 1993: 
Quote from Granovetter, 1998) 
Since Coase‘s initial hypotheses regarding the firm as an alternative mode of governance to the 
market, Oliver Williamson‘s work has been key to advancing the transaction cost approach. His 
work is a key pillar of what has become known as New Institutional Economics (Williamson, 
1985, Williamson, 1998, Williamson, 1979). Firstly, Williamson elucidated the behavioural 
assumptions which underpin transaction costs arguments. Drawing on the work of Herbert 
Simon (Simon, 1957) he argued that actors posses bounded rationality i.e. since ‗the quantity of 
relevant information is great relative to the ability of humans to deal with information (…) 
humans often cannot deal with the entire set of relevant information, they have no alternative 
but to deal with only a subset‘ (Fransman, 1998: p.148/149). Also, Williamson stressed the fact 
that along with problems of asymmetric information, actors can behave opportunistically which 
he defines as ‗self-interest seeking with guile‘ (Williamson, 1985). Therefore the source of 
transaction costs emerge from the ‗imperfect subjective models of the players as they attempt to 
understand the complexities of the problems they confront‘ (North, 1990: p.8) and can lead to 
inefficient allocation in a market context. By drawing on a diverse set of literatures ranging 
from political science, law, sociology and cognitive science, Williamson has developed his 
approach to provide new insights into the dynamics of industrial organisation more broadly 
where ‗…the modern corporation is mainly to be understood as the product of a series of 
organizational innovations that have had the effect of economizing on transaction costs‘ 
(Williamson, 1985: p.275).  
There are a number of characteristics of his approach (Williamson, 1985): 
 The firm is a governance structure rather than a production function 
 There are non-market interactions and complex forms of contracting 
 Institutions economize on transaction costs and the unit of analysis is the transaction. 
‗Transaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which differ in their 
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attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated costs of 
which differ) in a discriminating way‘ (ibid: p.18)  
 Problems are reduced to contractual issues which involve prices, hazards (e.g. 
opportunism) and safeguards (e.g. legal contracts) 
TCE insights regarding the distinction between markets and hierarchies and its emphasis on 
problems of governing transactions have been utilised in order to explain the dynamics of 
network industries in a number of ways which are described below. 
Vertical Integration and Network Regulation 
The concepts outlined above relating to the distinction between markets and hierarchies have 
been operationalised in order to account for structural dynamics in network industries. In 
particular this is in the context of the ongoing processes of liberalisation and privatization which 
has seen the unbundling of previously integrated value chains in sectors such as telecoms, water 
and electricity. The figure below shows this process for the case of the electricity industry: 
Figure 2.1: The electricity value chain 
 
Source: (Künneke and Fens, 2007) 
Traditionally, network industries such as electricity were organised on a hierarchical basis 
where all of the technical functions were centrally coordinated. For example, in the case of the 
electricity industry in the UK, generation plants and the networks of transmission and 
distribution were all owned and operated by publicly owned organisations who then planned 
and operated the system in a coordinated and integrated fashion. This is known as vertical 
integration; ‗where a single ownership entity spans both sides of the transaction‘ (Williamson, 
1985: p.78). In more recent decades there has been a trend towards the privatisation and 
liberalisation of such industries and this has necessitated the unbundling or separation of the 
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different technical functions in order to separate the natural monopoly segments (networks) 
from the areas where competition is possible (generation, metering and retail).  
It is generally recognised that for the case of network segments of such value chains, typical 
market based transactions where prices can be revealed cannot occur. Viewed through the lens 
of TCE, the transactions which take place in these infrastructure sectors tend to be more 
complex than typical market based transactions. This is because they are characterised by asset 
specificity or ‗investments actors make specifically for the transaction at hand‘ (Finger et al., 
2005). Many transactions in infrastructure sectors are dependent on the presence and operation 
of a physical network e.g. a new electricity generator seeking connection to a distribution 
network or a potential customer seeking access to a heating network. This means that unlike 
market based transactions where actors can freely trade standardized goods and services, 
infrastructure sectors are characterised by what is known as the ‗hold-up‘ problem i.e. parties to 
a transaction become reliant upon each other, thus increasing the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviour. In order to illustrate the approach in more detail, the table below which was 
developed by Williamson, identifies governance arrangements which are best suited to different 
types of transaction based on their frequency (occasional or recurrent) and whether they are 
made more complex by asset specificity i.e. they are idiosyncratic.  
Table 2.1: Types of Transactions and governance structures 
 
Source: (Oerlemans et al., 1993). Originally from Williamson (1985) 
Some argue that due to the non-standardized nature of transactions taking place in infrastructure 
sectors and the need for technical complementarities in order to ensure the functioning of the 
system as a whole, vertical integration or unified governance is the most efficient mode of 
coordination in some infrastructure sectors (Michaels, 2006 for the case of electricity). On the 
other hand, proponents of liberalization would argue that exposing segments of the value chain 
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where possible to competition promotes more efficient investment decisions and system 
operation. The figure below identifies some of these arguments for the case of infrastructure 
sectors. 
Figure 2.2: Transactions and modes of coordination in infrastructures 
 
There are a number of implications of taking a TCE perspective when analysing the governance 
and dynamics of network industries in a liberalized context. Firstly, prominent neo-classical 
economists had argued that it is possible to deal with the problems of natural monopoly through 
ex-ante measures such as franchise bidding, i.e. competition for monopoly, therefore avoiding 
the need to regulate such sectors (Demsetz, 1968). TCE suggests that because of asset 
specificity and the significant risks of opportunistic behaviour in infrastructure investments, 
‗Competitive pressure is important in both ex ante (before the contract is signed) and ex post 
(after the contract is signed) situations‘ and therefore ‗Post-contractual competition is important 
to prevent the supplier from opportunism‘ (Finger et al., 2005). Using TCE arguments, 
Williamson (1976) notes that depending on the nature of transactions taking place, the 
regulation of natural monopoly may in fact be the least costly way of coordinating such 
industries due to the potential risks associated with market based transactions. These investment 
risks include the risks to private investors of government opportunism (the benefits of an 
investment may be passed on to customers in the form of lower prices rather than shareholders) 
and the risks to customers of monopoly pricing (as there is typically only one network) – the 
independence of a regulator is therefore often highlighted. Along with distributing economic 
rents, a second implication of TCE is that in some circumstances network regulation can help to 
reveal information and prices in a more effective way than market based arrangements. As we 
will see in the case of the governance of electricity distribution systems in the UK, these issues 
relating to investment risk, the role of an independent regulator and unbundling have become an 
important part of the regulatory landscape in a liberalized environment.  
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Assessing the performance of Infrastructures 
A second operationalisation of NIE theory has been in assessing the technical performance of 
infrastructures, particularly in the light of a number of technical failures which have occurred in 
network industries e.g. electricity blackouts in Italy and the north eastern states in the US, and a 
number of rail accidents in the UK during the 1990s. While the application of TCE to issues of 
sector organisation which were discussed above concentrate on investment decisions, the 
following application of TCE is more focused on technical and operational issues.  
It has been noted within the literature that TCE approaches to infrastructures have tended to 
neglect the technical characteristics of the different networks under study:    
―…this [TCE] is mostly a partial analysis, i.e., an analysis where the 
transactions are analyzed in isolation from the technological and socio-
political system. Technology comes into the analysis mainly in terms of asset 
specificity, but not as a system element, which coevolves with the institutional 
governance structure (Finger et al., 2005) 
It is of course important for a comparative analysis of socio-technical dynamics in electricity 
and heat distribution networks to take into account the technical features of each of the systems. 
One important difference with electricity systems is that in order to retain system integrity there 
must be a real-time balance between supply and demand, and this is made more difficult as it is 
difficult and costly to store electricity. Heating systems do not have this technical requirement 
however there are complexities involved with CHP-DH systems as they serve both local heat 
markets and electricity markets which operate at a national scale in the UK – this makes the 
transactions involved more complex.  
A number of researchers have proposed a co-evolutionary framework which looks in more 
detail at the interplays between technical functions of a system and the institutional 
arrangements which govern the system in question (Finger et al., 2005, Künneke et al., 2010, 
Künneke, 2008). The hypothesis is that ‗the technical functioning of infrastructures needs to be 
supported by suitable institutional regimes in order to perform satisfactorily‘ (Finger et al., 
2005: p.229) and that the restructuring of network industries has brought about ‗a tension 
between the technical requirements for system coordination and the economic organization of 
liberalized infrastructures‘ (ibid: p.231). The focus is firmly on ensuring the technical integrity, 
service quality and safety of networked infrastructures and achieving a balance between the 
economic and social good outputs of networks in the context of a liberalised governance 
structure where networks are owned and operated by private actors. A framework based on 
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achieving coherence between these requirements which is based on a number of critical 
technical transactions is outlined in the figure below:  
Figure 2.3: Coherence Framework 
 
Source: (Finger et al., 2005) 
The critical technical transactions they outline can be summarised as follows (Finger et al., 
2005): 
 Interoperability: This is achieved ‗if mutual interactions between network elements are 
enabled in order to facilitate systems‘ complementarity‘. Standardization (e.g. of 
voltage and frequencies in an electricity system) is a key variable in this critical 
transaction as it ensures that the various individual components of the network can 
operate in a coherent manner.  
 Interconnection: This deals with ‗the physical linkages of different networks that 
perform similar or complementary tasks‘. A case in point is a CHP-DH system where a 
CHP plant inputs to both an electricity and heat network and often relies on a gas grid 
for energy input, in this case there needs to be adequate interfaces between a number of 
different networks. 
 Capacity management: Capacity is the valuable economic commodity of a network. In a 
liberalised environment, capacity management, which refers to ‗the allocation of this 
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scarce network capacity to certain users or appliances‘, has become crucially important. 
There is often a mixture between market based allocation (e.g. wholesale electricity 
markets) and centralised management based on hierarchy (e.g. a system operator), 
depending on the technical requirements of the system and the governance regime.  
 System management: This ‗pertains to the question of how the overall system (e.g., the 
flow between the various nodes and links) is being managed and how the quality of 
service is safeguarded‘. In the electricity system for example real-time balancing 
between supply and demand is required, while in the case of CHP-DH schemes, issues 
can arise where local systems need to operate in a coherent manner with national level 
electricity markets. Due to the large scale nature of infrastructure networks and the 
trend towards unbundling and fragmentation, coordination between a wide range of 
actors is crucially important.  
These critical transactions ‗are essential for guaranteeing the technical functioning of the 
system, thus imposing constraints on the mode of organization‘ (Künneke et al., 2010: p.499). 
Institutions need to be designed in order to fulfil these technical requirements, whether this is a 
centralised top-down design (vertical integration) or more reliant on bi-lateral contracts or 
market based real-time transactions. As Oliver Williamson notes, the aim is to align transactions 
and institutions ‗in a discriminating way‘ (Williamson 1985: p.385).  
Summary of the TCE approach 
This TCE framework provides a useful analytical tool to uncover the specific micro-economic 
characteristics of network industries and provides insights into the range of governance models 
which can be adopted to coordinate activity in such sectors. The operationalisation of TCE for 
these purposes highlights the importance of recognising the technical characteristics of different 
infrastructure sectors and the specific nature of transactions taking place. In the next chapter, the 
analytical framework which is to be adopted for the comparative analysis draws on a number of 
these insights, particularly in relation to the need to achieve a necessary level of technical 
coordination. Also, as has been noted with regard to issues of environmental governance, NIE 
‗is based on the concept of interdependence rather than that of externality‘ (Paavola, 2007) and 
thus provides a useful analytical tool for the analysis of sectors involving technical 
complementarities and coordination between a range of actors. 
However, because the purpose of this research is to analyse the long term dynamics of 
distribution networks, this framework alone cannot be relied upon. Firstly, as briefly outlined 
above, TCE assumes that institutional change occurs in a functional manner where actors 
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choose the most efficient governance structure. As will be discussed below, a number of studies 
have shown that institutional and technical change in network industries, particularly when 
viewed from a longer term perspective, does not conform to some abstract notion of efficiency 
such as economizing on transaction costs. The following quote from Granovetter and McGuire‘s 
study of long run dynamics in the US electricity supply industry illustrates the difficulties in 
using theoretical models such as TCE in isolation to predict the outcomes of complex socio-
technical processes: 
―One implication of our approach is that at several historical junctures quite 
different outcomes might have emerged, and had this occurred it would likely 
have been argued, as it has for actual outcomes, that those were the most 
economically or technically efficient‖(Granovetter and McGuire, 1998) 
Therefore, while TCE analysis is a useful micro-analytical tool to study short term dynamics in 
infrastructure sectors such as energy distribution, it loses some of its explanatory power as the 
time horizon lengthens. Also, because NIE tends to focus on short run static efficiencies, it does 
not incorporate the undoubted influence of technological innovation, particularly processes of 
radical innovation which characterise more fundamental transitions in broader socio-technical 
systems (Geels, 2004, Foxon, 2003). It is recognised however that a number of significant 
contributions to the NIE literature have sought to move away from this functional perspective 
and explore the embededness of economic institutions of broader socio-institutional 
environments (Williamson, 1998) and the influence of more informal institutions such as culture 
in processes of long term economic change (North, 1990). These more recent studies tend to 
take a more long term evolutionary perspective to processes of change – this perspective is 
outlined in the following section.   
2.1.2 Evolutionary Approaches: Incorporating Technical Change 
The central thesis behind the evolutionary economics perspective is that economies are 
‗complex adaptive systems‘ which operate out of equilibrium and are populated by agents with 
heterogeneous capabilities (Foxon, 2010). Markets are not seen as deterministic, rather they 
form part of a wider selection environment. Changes in industries or sectors are underpinned by 
an evolutionary logic which is characterised by generic processes of variation (across a 
population of agents or firms), selection and retention, and rather than being functional and 
predictable, economic change is characterised by periods of stability/inertia, and shorter periods 
of more radical change.  The work of the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 
1939, Schumpeter, 1934) has informed much of this literature in a number of ways, in particular 
his insights into the innovation process. Schumpeter proposed that innovations, which can be 
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‗new combinations‘ of technologies, materials, organisational models or processes, are the 
engine of growth in a capitalist system and he argued that technological competition between 
firms within a sector is as important as price based competition: 
― … in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
that kind of competition that counts but the competition from the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization ( … ) - competition which commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs 
of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives‖ 
(Schumpeter, 1954: p.84. Quoted from (Fagerberg, 2009)) 
Malerba (2002) distinguishes between two types of innovation in Schumpeter‘s writings: The 
first is brought about by entrepreneurs (individuals or new firms) who, rather than being 
inventors in a conventional sense, fulfil this function of combining existing knowledge with 
new ideas to bring about ‗creative destruction‘ – Malerba terms this Schumpeter Mark I. The 
second, or Schumpeter Mark II, is characterised by a process of accumulation rather than 
creative destruction, with ‗large established firms and the presence of relevant barriers to 
entry‘(Malerba, 2002). Freeman and Perez (1988) have argued that over time the interplay 
between these two types of innovation - radical and incremental - characterise structural 
changes within economies, or technological revolutions such as the industrial revolution or the 
information age (See also: Freeman and Louçã, 2001, Perez, 2002). These two types of 
innovation are of course both relevant to distribution networks; for example, CHP-DH systems 
in the UK are not mainstream technologies and rely on a dispersed set of local actors who act in 
an entrepreneurial fashion. Electricity distribution sectors on the other hand are characterised by 
incumbent actors which are mainly large multi-national firms. It is therefore highly likely that 
the nature of innovation and the diffusion process across the two cases will differ along these 
lines as outlined by Franco Malerba.  
This approach would argue therefore that dynamics in infrastructure sectors, such as changes to 
the value chains, should be considered in a more systemic way involving ongoing changes in 
the technological, organisational and institutional selection environment of such sectors - rather 
than solely focusing on changes to the nature of transactions taking place. Richard Langlois 
summarises this dynamic view of industrial change: 
―Industrial structure is thus an evolutionary design problem.  It is also a 
continually changing problem, one continually posed in new ways by factors 
like population, real income, and the changing technology of production and 
transaction‖ (Langlois, 2003) 
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Another strand of evolutionary economics places the focus on the characteristics of the firm. 
Similar to NIE, evolutionary approaches reject notions of the firm existing solely as a 
production function (Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, rather than seeing the firm as a 
governance structure or a ‗response to information-related problems‘ as in TCE, a firm is 
viewed as a ‗repository of knowledge‘ (Fransman, 1998). Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed 
that firms are constituted by organisational routines or ‗relatively simple decision rules and 
procedures‘ similar to search heuristics which are ‗used to guide action‘ (ibid: p.139). Contrary 
to neo-classical approaches therefore, a firm‘s choice set is constrained, not only by limited 
ability process information, but also by its ability to develop and store knowledge.  
Informed by a resource based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959), the concept of the routine has 
been forwarded (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Nelson and Sampat, 2001). Routines, or search 
heuristics, are developed by a firm through learning processes in order to enable them to engage 
in complex processes and to survive in a dynamic selection environment. Such cognitive 
processes define the capabilities of firms and act as a key source of variation within 
organisations and across sectors of the economy. These routines are stores of knowledge which 
allow firms to engage in complex processes and to ‗render predictable…the response of a firm 
to its changing environment‘ (Fransman, 1998). For example, in the event of an electrical fault 
on an electricity distribution line, a network operator will have written procedures which will be 
followed in order to address the issue e.g. by rapidly dispatching a team of line workers and 
dealing with safety issues. Over time, as these procedures are refined they will most likely 
become less formal and eventually develop into rules of thumb based on tacit knowledge which 
allow an operator to carry out multiple such complex procedures. However, routines can also be 
a source of inertia if new technologies or processes cannot be incorporated into the existing 
organisation. It has been found that successful firms can gain competitive advantage by 
adapting their routines in increasingly dynamic environments where the pace of technical 
change is rapid (Teece and Pisano, 1998).  
These concepts provide useful insights for the analysis of distribution networks because 
infrastructure sectors are characterised by complex technical processes and dynamic 
institutional environments. For example, although local actors who develop heat networks may 
be characterised as innovative entrepreneurs, in the long run they will need to develop their 
knowledge and routines through learning processes in order to operate and survive in a 
competitive and complex institutional environment. Also, the ongoing processes of the de-
integration of infrastructure value chains could be viewed in terms of large multi-national 
energy corporations seeking to gain competitive advantage by specialising on one particular 
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function rather than spreading their scarce resources across the whole value chain, resulting in 
an alternative form of division of labour in a more complex technical and selection environment 
(Langlois, 2003, Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Long Term Institutional Change in Infrastructures 
One implication of taking this longer term or evolutionary view involving dynamic interactions 
between new technologies and organisational forms, is that institutional change is not viewed as 
an efficient or predictable process but in terms of ‗the path-dependencies and unintended 
consequences that result from such historical development‘ (Schmidt, 2010). As noted above, 
institutions such as organisational routines within firms do not necessarily change in a rational 
objective manner; rather their options are constrained by their limited and unique capabilities 
and uncertainty regarding the external selection environment. Sector level structures are 
therefore fluid and continually being shaped and redefined by technical and organisational 
change. Evolutionary theorists propose that such ongoing and contemporary dynamics cannot 
be studied in isolation, this is because the historical chain of events tend to have a bearing on the 
future directions or paths of institutional change i.e. ‗preceding steps in a particular direction 
induce further movement in the same direction‘ and where the ‗probability of further steps along 
the same path increases with each move down that path‘ (Pierson, 2000). This perspective, 
known as path dependency (David, 1985) or historical institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010, Hall and 
Taylor, 1996), is summarised in the following quote from one of its originators, Paul David: 
―A path-dependent  sequence  of  economic changes is one  of  which 
important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally  
remote events, including happenings  dominated  by  chance  elements  rather 
than  systematic  forces.  Stochastic  processes like  that  d o  not  converge  
automatically  to a fixed-point  distribution of  outcomes (…) ‗Historical 
accidents‘ can neither be ignored, nor  neatly  quarantined  for  the  purpose  
of economic analysis; the dynamic process itself takes on an   essentially  
historical  character‖ (David, 1985) 
This has important implications for the analysis of institutional change: First, actors cannot 
simply switch between alternatives in order to achieve an efficient outcome in the objective 
sense, as proposed in NIE or rational choice models, and second, that seemingly unimportant 
events along a chain can have ‗unintended consequences‘ which can constrain future decision 
making and potentially lead to sub-optimal outcomes. The classic example of this is the 
QWERTY keyboard interface which David argues has persisted despite the presence of 
competition from more efficient alternatives (David, 1985). In a later paper, David and Bunn 
(1988) make similar arguments for the emergence of centralised electricity systems; they argue 
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that the so called ‗battle of the systems‘ between d.c and  a.c network standards during a short 
period during the 1880s had a large part to play in shaping the future structure of centralised 
electrical power systems which persist to this day.  
In a number of influential contributions recently made by Gregory Unruh (Unruh, 2000, Unruh, 
2002), the argument has been forwarded that due to processes of path dependency, modern 
industrial systems such as energy infrastructures have become locked in to  a high carbon 
emitting trajectory or pathway. Unruh draws on the work of Brian Arthur
3
 (Arthur, 1989, 
Arthur, 1994) to argue that contrary to conventional technical diffusion models, where due to 
the competitive process technologies experience decreasing returns over time, in certain cases 
technologies can benefit from increasing returns due to scale economies, learning effects, 
adaptive expectations and network economies which create positive feed-back loops between a 
technical system and its environment. It is argued that as a result of these processes a dominant 
design such as a fossil fuel based energy infrastructure emerges and over time is reinforced by 
organisational and institutional changes to create a stable system which perpetuates a lock-in to 
a carbon intensive trajectory. This process is explained in the figure below for the case of an 
electricity system: 
                                                     
3
 Arthur discusses the adaptation of technologies under competition. He proposes a model where, rather 
than an optimal process with a stable and predictable equilibrium (under a presumption of diminishing 
returns), technological change under competition can display multiple equilibria and the potential for 
multiple outcomes under increasing returns. In the model, random events, timing, and strategy can 
contribute to the uptake of a potentially inferior technology where ‗the more they are adopted, the more 
experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved‘. There are a number of contributory 
factors to the presence of such positive externalities including scale economies, learning economies, 
adaptive expectations and network economies (Arthur, 1994).  
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Figure 2.4: Lock-in to carbon intensive energy systems 
 
Source: (Foxon, 2003); originally sourced from (Unruh, 2000) 
This coevolutionary process resulting in carbon lock-in is termed a Techno-Institutional 
Complex (TIC) which is summarised as follows: 
―TIC arise because large technological systems, like electricity generation, 
distribution and end-use, cannot be fully understood as a set of discrete 
technological artefacts but have to be seen as complex systems of 
technologies embedded in a powerful conditioning social context of public 
and private institutions‖ (Unruh, 2000: p.818) 
This concept of a TIC is important for the analysis of socio-technical dynamics of 
infrastructures as it shows how large scale technical systems such as distribution networks, if 
understood in this systemic fashion, tend to become paradigmatically structured (Dosi, 1982) 
along potentially technically and/or socially sub-optimal trajectories where choice or switching 
between alternatives is constrained.  
Understanding Innovation Processes 
A second application of evolutionary thinking to infrastructures is developing a greater 
understanding of the nature of the innovation process itself. In order to understand the 
implications of different types of innovation various strands of the evolutionary based literature 
have developed early Schumpeterian hypotheses regarding the uncertainty of the innovation 
processes and uneven diffusion patterns to outline an industry lifecycle model (Klepper, 1997, 
Henderson and Clark, 1990, Abernathy and Clark, 1985). They propose that in the early stages 
of an industry lifecycle there are a large number of competing firms engaged in radical 
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innovation processes which are typically involved in the development of new products. Over 
time however, as described in the literature on path dependency and lock-in, a dominant design 
emerges which becomes institutionalised as firms pursue a particular technological trajectory 
(Dosi, 1982) which is characterised by technical standards (Garud et al., 2002) and engineering 
practices (Nelson and Winter, 1977).  The nature of innovation in this phase tends to be 
incremental and process orientated rather than product type innovations. As the process 
continues, an industry ‗shakeout‘ occurs where the market becomes increasingly concentrated 
leading to the emergence of a small number of large firms.  
These processes are particularly relevant to large scale technical systems such as energy 
distribution networks which involve a design hierarchy with components, sub-systems and 
systems (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). In this model ‗incumbent firms are rarely the source of 
radical innovations…it is entrepreneurial entrants that challenge and overthrow an existing 
dominant design‘ (Unruh, 2000: p.822). This ongoing interplay between incumbents (associated 
with a dominant design) and entrepreneurial actors will be an important factor the long term 
dynamics of energy systems (Verbong and Geels, 2007). For example there will likely be a 
good deal variation in terms of technologies and practices adopted in different district heating 
schemes in the UK while it is more likely that electricity distribution companies will be more 
focused on exploiting an existing technical system using process innovations.  
Interestingly, Christensen (1997) proposes that established firms and industries can become de-
institutionalised following the emergence of ‗disruptive technologies‘ which are similar to 
anomalies in changing scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). In some cases these disruptive 
technologies can lead to the creation of new technical paradigms (Dosi, 1982); for example the 
development microprocessors has been central to the creation of new ICT based industries and 
has fundamentally changed the characteristics of infrastructure sectors such as 
telecommunications (Perez, 2002).  The extent to which such disruptive technologies can affect 
incumbent firms in established industries is related to the impact they have at different levels of 
the design hierarchy (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). For example, in some cases incorporating a 
new technology may simply involve a reorientation of a small number of system components 
thus allowing a firm to reorientate its routines and adapt. On the other hand, if a new technology 
cannot be accommodated by existing systems and necessitates changes higher up on the design 
hierarchy, the core competencies and value networks of firms dominating an industry can be 
fundamentally undermined leading to structural changes (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). 
A potential example of such a disruptive technology is decentralised energy generation which in 
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many ways alters the systemic characterises of energy systems, but it is as yet unclear as to what 
impact their diffusion will have on the overall structure of energy sectors.  
In order to utilise these insights for analysing the socio-technical dynamics of energy networks, 
Bolton and Foxon (2011) have proposed a typology of innovation types which occur in 
infrastructure networks – this draws from the innovation typology of Henderson and Clark 
(1990): 
Figure 2.5: Characterising forms of innovation in infrastructures
4
 
 
Source: (Bolton and Foxon, 2011); Adapted from (Henderson and Clark, 1990) 
 Incremental innovation: This type of innovation involves updating or improving 
existing network components which builds on existing practices and an established 
knowledge base e.g. like for like asset replacements and network reinforcement.  
 Modular innovation: This involves changing or adding components to the system but 
maintaining the design philosophy and engineering principles which underpin the 
architecture of the network e.g. expanding the system through an interconnector. Often 
modular innovations are carried out in a piecemeal or niche basis and do not 
substantially affect the core competencies or practices of dominant market players. 
 Radical innovation: Component level innovations involving technologies which 
typically would not be associated with existing networks e.g. deploying ICT based 
control systems. Christensen (1997) notes that, depending on whether radical 
innovations challenge the market dominance and competencies  of incumbent players, 
                                                     
4
 This figure and the explanation below draw from Bolton and Foxon (2011) 
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radical innovations are often confined to market niches but periodically can benefit 
from dramatic performance improvements and overturn previously dominant systems.  
 Architectural innovation: This occurs when radical innovations change the existing 
network architecture or value network (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995) i.e. the 
relationship between technical and non-technical components of the system. For 
example, as outlined by David and Bunn (1988),  the invention of the AC transformer 
and the rotary converter in the 19th century prompted a move away from small urban 
DC electrical systems towards large scale AC synchronous systems (Hughes, 1983). 
Such innovation is often controversial as it undermines sunk investments in 
infrastructures and embedded competencies. A dominant architectural innovation only 
emerges after a period of intense competition as in the transition from town gas systems 
to electric lighting in the late 19th century. 
In the case of infrastructures and energy systems in general, these types of innovation processes 
cannot be analysed solely in the context competitive forces between private actors as might be 
the case in conventional industrial sectors. The socio-economic characteristics of network 
industries mean that these innovation processes will be shaped by a wide array of both public 
(e.g. various government departments, regulatory bodies, local authorities etc.) and private 
(network operators, multi-national energy companies, sub-contractors, and engineering 
companies) actors.  
The innovation systems strand of the evolutionary literature provides some insights into how 
these interactions might work and the types of relationships which emerge between these 
different innovation processes and institutions. Lundvall (1992) defines an innovation system 
(IS) as; ―the elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of 
new, and economically useful knowledge‖. The concept - to create the conditions necessary for 
knowledge diffusion and innovation to occur - has been applied at the national (Nelson, 1993, 
Lundvall, 1992), sectoral (Malerba, 2002), and individual technological levels (Stankiewicz and 
Carlsson, 1991).  Firstly, the IS literature expands earlier innovation models which viewed 
innovation as a linear flow from basic scientific R&D to commercialisation, and broadened 
Schumpeter‘s earlier distinction between inventions, innovation and diffusion to consider the 
wider systemic interactions that take place between a range of actors - as described by the 
innovation chain: 
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Figure 2.6: The Innovation Chain 
Source: (Foxon, 2003) 
The traditional neo-classical economic approach to innovation had argued that due to 
knowledge spillovers and the ability to appropriate new technologies, investment in R&D is a 
market failure warranting public support as individual actors such as private firms lack 
sufficient incentives to invest (Foxon, 2006). The systems approach expands upon this argument 
and proposes that innovation systems are highly dynamic and complex institutional 
environments; thus in many circumstances successful R&D does not necessarily lead to 
commercialisation, often due to an institutional selection environment which favours incumbent 
technologies. It has been argued that for cases where innovation may be beneficial to society as 
a whole, e.g. low carbon technologies, this provides a rationale for expanding publically funded 
R&D programs to support new technologies along different stages the innovation chain (Foxon, 
2003).   
Hendry and Harbourne (2011) note that: ‗These insights contribute much to the understanding 
of innovation as a complex uncertain non-linear process, and underline the deficiencies of 
R&D-led technology push‘. Studies of the diffusion of renewable technologies in different 
countries  (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Foxon et al., 2005, Negro, 2007) have shown how the 
creation of an institutional context or a suitable selection environment for technical change is 
essential for the uptake of energy technologies and gives us some insight into the roles that 
different actors can play in this. Within this field of research scholars have identified mutually 
dependent system functions which, within successful innovation systems, interact to create the 
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conditions necessary for new technologies to move along the innovation chain from R&D to 
commercialisation. In a 2004 paper by Jacobsson and Bergek (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) it 
was proposed that the successful uptake of renewable technologies in Germany can be attributed 
to interactions between five functions which created the conditions necessary for mass 
diffusion: 
1. ‗The creation and diffusion of ‗new‘ knowledge‘ 
2. To ‗Guide the direction of the search process among users and suppliers of technology‘ 
i.e. influencing how firms and users make decisions regarding new technologies 
3. To ‗Supply Resources‘ e.g. capital and competencies 
4. To ‗create positive external economies‘ across an industry by creating linkages, 
exchanging information and knowledge through networks; thus reducing uncertainty, 
risk and creating synergies.  
5. The ‗formation of markets‘ for new technologies 
The IS framework elucidates the innovation characteristics of energy systems and gives us some 
insight into the interactions between public and private actors and the causal links between 
institutions and technical change.  
Summary of the Evolutionary Approach 
The various strands of the evolutionary economics literature outlined above provide a number of 
insights which are relevant to the analysis of socio-technical dynamics in energy network 
contexts. By focusing on the dynamic interactions between technologies and organisations 
rather than solely on short-term responses to changes in transaction costs, the evolutionary 
approach draws attention to the path dependent nature of long run institutional change and the 
potential for lock-in and sub-optimal outcomes. This is in contrast to the TCE approach where 
institutional change is predictable and functional, in that it conforms to an objective efficiency 
criterion. It is proposed that the evolutionary account of institutional change provides a more 
realistic framework as it recognises that there are different types of actors or firms (incumbents 
and entrepreneurs) who engage in a range of innovation processes. An analysis of energy 
distribution networks should take into account these ongoing and dynamic interactions between 
actors, institutions and technologies and also outline the historical context within which they are 
occurring.  
It is argued however, that evolutionary approaches tend to reify technology as a source of 
change and do not recognise sufficiently the fact that sources of variation often emerge from 
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political and institutional dynamics; this is particularly the case for sectors such as energy 
networks which have social good characteristics. Within this framing, actors tend to be 
presented as being passive and subject to the inevitable forces of creative destruction where 
radical technical changes emerges from ‗left-field‘ rather than being shaped by the strategic 
actions of both public and private actors. Also, there is often a tendency to present institutions in 
binary terms as either barriers or enablers to innovation or as neutral dependent variables which 
are subject to change by technologies e.g. institutions need to ‗catch-up‘ with the increasingly 
rapid pace of technical change. This view is illustrated in the following quote which proposes 
that the organisational changes occurring in the 1950s and 60s which led to the development of 
large corporations
5
  can be attributed to ‗needs‘ of technology: 
―The managerial revolution Chandler chronicles was the result of such an 
imbalance, in this case between the coordination needs of high-throughput 
technologies and the abilities of contemporary markets and contemporary 
technologies of coordination to meet those needs.‖ (Langlois, 2003) 
This argument will be developed in the next chapter where, drawing on insights from science 
and technology studies and sociological approaches to institutions, a deeper and more 
comprehensive view of the dialectic between infrastructures and institutions is developed. 
2.2 Socio-Technical Approaches 
The second section of the review discusses a set of literatures which broadly stem from a branch 
of Science and Technology Studies (STS) termed the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) – 
this field of research can be categorised as socio-technical approaches. Although the NIE and 
evolutionary economics literatures outlined above provided valuable insights into processes of 
change and inertia in energy distribution sectors, the emphasis tended to be placed on structural 
and institutional mechanisms rather than the micro level conflicts and commonalities which will 
emerge between a wide array of both public and private stakeholders with individual 
perspectives and framings. While it is important to analyse overarching institutional dynamics 
such as the liberalisation of network industries and the ensuing technical changes which are 
occurring, this cannot be properly analysed in isolation from the various motivations and 
strategies of a diverse array of actors. Frank Geels outlines the basic premise behind a socio-
technical approach which distinguishes it from economic or technology orientated treatments.  
―Artefacts by themselves have no power, they do nothing. Only in association 
with human agency and social structures and organisations do artefacts fulfil 
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functions. In real-life situations (e.g. organisations, houses, cities) we never 
encounter artefacts ‗per se‘, but artefacts-in-context. For the analysis of 
functioning artefacts, it is the combination of ‗the social‘ and ‗the technical‘ 
that is the appropriate unit of analysis‖ (Geels, 2005: p.365) 
Although the evolutionary literature did highlight the fact that firms differ in their capabilities to 
innovative, it perhaps does not offer adequate insight into the contested nature of technical 
change and the roles of non-firm actors such as the state.  It is undoubtable that due to the 
economic and social importance of infrastructure sectors, a process such as the liberalisation and 
privatisation of energy sectors is the emergent outcome of social processes and is an ongoing 
fluid processes - rather than a static outcome - which is continually being shaped and reshaped 
by the contested nature of socio-technical dynamics.  
A central motivation behind the development of the socio-technical literature has been a 
rejection of technical determinism
6
  i.e. where ‗Technologies change, either because of 
scientific advance or following a logic of their own; and they then have effects on society‘ 
(Mackenzie and Wacjman, 1999: p.3); rather proponents seek to promote a more actor centric 
view. Following our discussion of evolutionary and NIE approaches to the analysis of the 
dynamics of infrastructures, it is proposed that while they cannot be accused of technological 
determinism in its purest sense per sae, socio-technical approaches can offer some valuable 
insights, particularly with respect to the emergence of infrastructures and the interface between 
the technological systems and wider society. For example, a number of studies have highlighted 
the ways in which infrastructure sectors have been shaped by social forces - the following 
quotes from two historical studies of the emergence of electricity systems highlight this:  
 ―…most large, multi-component and multi-agent network systems did not 
emerge full-blown in the forms that they have come to assume. Only rarely 
will such systems be found to have fully and faithfully realized the initial 
integrated design concept of some single sponsoring agent. Rather, systems 
such as the railroads, electric-light and power utilities, and telephone 
networks should be regarded as both society-shaping and ‗socially 
constructed‘.‖ (David and Bunn, 1988) 
 ―We conclude that the electric utility industry was born not of Benthamite 
Equations or optimizing rationality, but longstanding friendships, similar 
experiences, common dependencies, corporate interlocks, and active creation 
of new social relations.‖ (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998) 
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 This refers to conformity to a particular form of rationality e.g. technical or market. Technological 
determinism assumes that technology imposes itself in a linear manner on society according to some 
inherent inner logic. 
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And for the case of heating systems, Jane Summerton outlines how a small number of local 
actors interacted with the incumbent energy sector in developing a CHP-DH scheme in a 
Swedish town in the 1980s: 
―At first glance, heat plants and pipelines per sae may seem of little interest 
from a social science perspective. What makes them truly intriguing is what 
they embody: the tensions and tactics behind their emergence, the complexity 
of the social organization that supports them, and their long-term 
implications for the actors they link and the communities they serve‖ 
(Summerton, 1992: p.62) 
Although there are some similarities here with the evolutionary approach, in particular the 
notion of path dependency, the socio-technical approach tends to emphasise to a greater degree 
the importance of agency and the contextual development of a particular technology, rather than 
underlying processes of economic or institutional change. This is summarised by Edge and 
Williams: 
―In contrast to traditional approaches which only addressed the outcomes or 
'impacts' of technological change, this work examines the content of 
technology and the particular processes involved in innovation‖ (Edge and 
Williams, 1996) 
The socio-technical approach is not a single unified theory; rather it is a research agenda which 
seeks to present contextualised accounts of technical change where contingency and agency are 
central to the analysis. A number of strands of this literature have discussed the dynamics of 
infrastructures more explicitly.  
2.2.1 Social Construction of Technology 
There are quite a number of approaches in this strand of the literature (see Edge and Williams 
(1996) for a useful overview) however in common they reject technological determinism and 
argue that technical change tends to be the outcome of a political processes rather than simply a 
question of cost or efficiency advantages. One prominent approach to this is the social 
construction of technology (SCOT). This explicitly rejects notions of a directionality ascribed to 
processes of technical change e.g. trajectories or paradigms
7
  (Bijker, 1995, Bijker and Law, 
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 Notions of paradigms and trajectories proposed by evolutionary theorists are problematic within SST as 
they are ‗predicated upon the maintenance of a stable set of social, economic and technical forces, which 
serve to generate the necessary uni-directionality of technological development‘. The work of Chris 
Freeman and Carlota Perez on techno-economic paradigms has attracted criticism in this respect ‗for its 
tendency to treat technology in an over-generalised way, and sometimes to see technological change, 
deterministically, as the motor of socio-economic change‘ (Edge and Williams, 1996). However later 
work by Freeman and Louçã (2001) has been more sensitive to interactions between technology, culture 
and society. It may also be noted that questions over the salience of trajectories or paradigms are 
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1992, Pinch and Bijker, 1987); rather they argue that technical change is a ‗garden of forking 
paths‘ (Edge and Williams, 1996) with multiple alternatives. An example that is often cited is 
the emergence of the bicycle where Pinch and Bijker (1987) outline how the negotiation process 
which took place between different social groups who had shared meanings of a technology 
played an active part in shaping alternative designs. Each of these social groups possessed what 
is called interpretive flexibility in that there were different meanings attributed by social actors 
to a particular technology and its social function. These moments of ambiguity mark the 
branching points where ‗one interpretation rather than another succeeded‘; thus ‗every stage in 
the generation and implementation of new technologies involves a set of choices between 
different technical options‘ (Edge and Williams, 1996).  
For example, in the early stages of the evolution of the bicycle, influential actors placed a great 
degree of emphasis on speed as a function while later in the process of social construction 
concerns over safety emerged from different social groups. Joseph Murphy argues that 
interpretive flexibility has been a key factor in the shaping of sustainability issues surrounding 
GM crops; where ‗some claim that this technology is a threat to sustainable agriculture, and 
others argue that it is a route to it‘ (Murphy, 2006b: p.9). Following a period of negotiation 
between social groups which involved an interactive process between sometimes conflicting 
interpretations, a degree of closure was achieved where there is convergence on a shared 
interpretation or meaning. This sense of closure is not a permanent one as over time issues and 
conflicts can resurface, one contemporary example of this is the debate over the safety of 
nuclear power (Murphy, 2006b).  Similar processes are of course at play in energy networks, in 
particular due to the economic and social importance of these technical systems and presence of 
natural monopoly they will involve interactions between different public and private actors who 
will undoubtedly possess different goals which will come into conflict at different stages. It 
must be noted however that while taking a purely constructivist perspective may be appropriate 
for analysing how individual components of a system may change such as generation 
technologies, the characteristics of the overall system may be less amenable to these ongoing 
processes as over long periods of time they become institutionally embedded in power relations.  
The work of Langdon Winner is a useful counter point to some of the relativist tendencies 
within SCOT. Winner (1977, 1980) proposes that technological artefacts can reflect power 
relations and certain inequalities within society itself i.e. ‗technologies are not neutral, but are 
                                                                                                                                                           
dependent on ones unit of analysis. For example if viewed at an industry level, the emergence of the 
bicycle – a much cited example of the social construction of technological artefacts - can be seen as part 
of a wider trend towards mechanization which took place in the 19
th
 century (see Rosenberg, 1963).  
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fostered by groups to preserve or alter social relations‘ (Edge and Williams, 1996). Winner 
proposes that the material characteristics of artefacts ‗can contain political properties‘ (Winner, 
1980: p.123). He gives the example of how overhanging highway bypasses in Long Island were 
specifically designed in order to discourage use by busses which typically were used by the poor 
and black communities, thus limiting access to nearby Jones‘ Beach to a middle-class white 
community. Graham and Marvin (2001) make similar arguments regarding the ways in which 
‗the biased configuration of technology‘ (Graham, 2002) in infrastructures reflect deeply 
embedded social and economic inequalities in large third world cities.  
2.2.2 Systems Approach 
Since the early 1980s a body of literature has developed which seeks to understand the 
emergence and long term evolution of infrastructure systems which adopts a socio-technical 
approach - termed large technical systems (LTS). This emerged from the work of the historian 
of technology Thomas Hughes and in particular from his account of the development of 
electricity systems in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (Hughes, 1983). Hughes‘ approach was 
unique in that rather than treating large scale technical systems as purely technical artefacts, his 
account of electricity systems in the first half of the twentieth century outlines the role that 
politics, geography, and particular individuals played in shaping the early emergence of these 
systems. The following quote summarises the contribution that Hughes made to the analysis of 
large scale infrastructure systems.   
―For a long time, social studies of technology have focused on individual 
technologies (for example, the assembly line, the automobile), explaining 
their invention, diffusion, and political regulation and their impact on 
working conditions, individual lives, etc. Primarily historical studies of 
technology can take credit for partially reconciling this narrow focus by 
conceptualizing networked infrastructures as sociotechnical systems.‖ 
(Monstadt, 2009: p.1927) 
The approach therefore differs from the  evolutionary or institutional literatures because it takes 
an explicitly systemic approach where the components of the system ‗can be both technical (e.g. 
power stations, transmission lines) and non-technical (distribution companies, environmental 
laws)‘ (Sauter and Watson, 2007) and constitute a ‗seamless web‘ which ‗embody a multitude 
of scientific, economic, political and institutional components‘ (Summerton, 1992: p.64). These 
components can mutually influence each other and cannot be considered in isolation i.e. 
‗changes in one component can often lead to changes in others‘ (Sauter and Watson, 2007: 
p.112). Hughes summarises the systems approach as follows: 
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―Large scale technology, such as electric light and power systems, 
incorporate not only technical and physical things such as generators, 
transformers and high-voltage transmission lines, but also utility companies, 
electrical manufacturers and reinforcing institutions such as regulatory 
agencies and laws‖ (Hughes 1983: p2. Quoted from: Sauter and Watson, 
2007) 
Although Hughes‘ study is mainly a historical account of technological change in electrical 
power systems, he does seek to generalise some of his observations to develop hypotheses 
regarding the dynamics of large technical systems more generally and their (inter)relationship 
with societal change. This process of evolution is characterized by a number of concepts and 
themes that Hughes develops, these concepts characterize an LTS in its various stages: 
System Builder: In its formative years an LTS is developed by what Hughes terms a ‗system 
builder‘. System builders are innovators, similar to Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, who build a 
bridge ‗between resources and demand‘ (Hughes, 1983; p.20). In order to build systems they 
must overcome technical barriers but also face organisational, political, cultural and social 
challenges in their attempts to have their technologies adopted. They not only invent and 
commercialise individual technologies or components, but also develop the systems within 
which they are deployed. A prominent example is that of Thomas Edison who pioneered the 
development and commercialisation of DC electricity systems in the late 1870s and 1880s.  
The System and its Environment: Hughes drew from systems theorists such as Talcott Parsons 
(1968) and Ludwig Von Bertalanffy (1968) to frame an LTS as an evolving system which 
interacts with its environment. In this way the LTS literature also seeks to link micro-level 
interactions between technical and non-technical components of a system with its macro 
environment (Mackenzie, 1987).  
Technical Styles: The ways in which a particular system interacts with its environment produces 
technical styles which differ according to context. In his cross country/city comparison of 
London, Berlin and Chicago, Hughes (1983) showed how cultural, political and social 
differences between countries were reflected in the technologies that were adapted. For 
example, London‘s slow process in modernising its electricity network, compared to Berlin and 
Chicago, was attributed to the hegemony of the independent local authorities who saw 
centralisation as a threat to their power. Hughes noted that the different technical styles which 
emerged in each of his case studies were influenced by their individual contexts: 
―The style of each system was found to be based on entrepreneurial drive and 
decisions, economic principles, legislative constraints or supports, 
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institutional structures, historical contingencies, and geographical factors, 
both human and natural‖ (Hughes 1983, p.462) 
He also notes that once institutionalised, technology transfer takes place across national 
boundaries making systems more uniform in a trans-national sense.  
Technological Momentum: As a system evolves and grows it becomes a more coherent set of 
technologies and institutions; system builders are replaced by managers and financiers and 
technical knowledge becomes codified with specific engineering tasks becoming routinized. 
Momentum within a system has a number of determinants e.g. sunk investments in fixed assets 
and the skills and knowledge base associated with a particular set of technologies. Hughes 
outlined that momentum in systems is characterised by a particular system goal e.g. a drive for 
achieving economies of scale in electricity generation and aggregating loads (load factor)
 8
. This 
‗soft determinism‘ (Hughes, 1994) is an interesting aspect of the Hughesian systems approach 
which appears to contradict some of the central tenants of SCOT as it ascribes a directionality to 
technical change; however, this is most likely due to the more aggregated system level unit of 
analysis (Woodman, 2003).  
Reverse Salient: A breakdown in system momentum is characterised by a reverse salient which 
focuses attention on one particular critical (technical) problem within the system e.g. high losses 
on electricity lines. For a period there can be conflict between different solutions to a critical 
problem e.g. alternating current and direct current
9
. A system regains its momentum once such 
conflicts have been resolved; Hughes gives the example of the mass diffusion of synchronous 
AC electrical systems and the development of the universal electricity system. These reverse 
salients are similar to the periods of interpretive flexibility described in the SCOT approach 
above where multiple outcomes are possible. It is often the case that these barriers to system 
expansion can be overcome by incremental changes at the components level, however, in some 
cases they can result in more architectural type innovations and become the ‗nucleus of a new 
system‘ (Hughes, 1983: p.81, Sauter and Watson, 2007).  
Since Hughes‘ study a number of academics have developed the LTS approach; for example, 
Coutard  (1999) develops our understanding of the governance of large systems and introduces 
a number of empirical studies; McGowan (1999) discusses the regulatory implications of the 
internationalisation of telecommunications and energy infrastructures while Guy et al. (1999) 
discuss the liberalization of the UK utilities and the spatial implications for urban development; 
                                                     
8
 Ratio of average and maximum system output 
9
 See David and Bunn (1988) for a historical account of the ‗Battle of the Systems‘. 
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they argue that liberalisation will result in a move away from standardisation and homogeneity 
in service provision and to the emergence of a new logic of network management which focuses 
on the demand side. Summerton (1994) broadened the analysis of how systems which have 
become characterised by momentum and inertia can change. Using insights from the social 
shaping literature (e.g. Pinch and Bijker (1987)) Summerton argued that the ‗undoing of 
closure‘ in systems can result from three sources; system expansion due to the 
internationalisation of infrastructure e.g. interconnection of electricity systems, the blurring of 
functional boundaries between infrastructures e.g. the convergence of electricity and heating 
systems in CHP-DH schemes, or radical institutional changes e.g. privatisation and 
liberalization. In addition to this, Davies (1996) and Nightingale et al. (2003) argue that a key 
factor in changing the momentum of LTSs has been innovations in ICT based control 
technologies which have changed the economic rationale behind system evolution, away from 
achieving economies of scale towards economies of system i.e. evolving towards a more 
efficient system rather than a ‗bigger‘ one.  
The LTS approach is particularly useful for the study of infrastructure sectors for a number of 
reasons; firstly because the unit of analysis is at the system level the analytical framework can 
be applied to all infrastructures thus serving as a useful tool for cross case analysis of such 
systems. Secondly, the framework stresses the socio-technical nature of LTSs and the co-
dependency of technical and non-technical components whilst recognising the context 
dependent nature of their evolution. These aspects will be developed in the analytical section 
where it is proposed that greater analytical clarity with regards to the systems environment is 
needed; the Hughesian approach tends to lack clarity regarding the nature of a systems 
environment and the boundaries between it and the system. Also, the LTS perspective was 
primarily developed in order to explain the emergence and growth of systems; it is argued that 
contemporary sociotechnical dynamics involve more subtle processes such as decentralisation.  
Insights from Actor Network Theory 
One particular study in the Hughesian vein that is worthy of note is Jane Summerton‘s analysis 
of the development of a district heating network in a small town called Mjölby in Sweden 
(Summerton, 1992). Summerton adopts the LTS framework and incorporates insights from 
actor-network theory (ANT). ANT, which can be seen as a complementary approach to the LTS 
perspective, focuses the analytical lens on central actors, known as ‗engineer-sociologists‘, who 
seek to enrol other actors using various strategies and tactics (Callon, 1986). These central 
actors have the capacity to ‗construct a world (…) to define its constituent elements, and to 
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provide for it a time, a space, and a history‘ (Callon, 1986: p.21). This is termed an actor-
network; ‗a highly interconnected set of entities that have been successfully linked to each other 
by an actor (…) who thereby is able to act with their support and on their behalf‘ (Summerton, 
1992: p.69). 
To illustrate the concept of an actor-network, Callon gives the example of the French energy 
company, EdF, who sought to enlist or enrol actors into their proposal for moving to electrified 
vehicles. EdF developed a futuristic vision of a post-industrial urban society within which 
conventional vehicles are framed as ‗the offspring of an industrial civilisation that is behind us‘ 
thus being replaced by a new electric car which ‗could lead to a new era in public transport in 
the hands of new social groups‘ (Callon, 1986: p.21). EdF, by seeking to construct the future in 
this way, sought to enrol and coordinate a heterogeneous set of actors such as component 
manufacturers, governments and transport users in order to shape a new actor-network. Rather 
than evolving with an external environment, as in the systems approach described above, by 
constructing these actor-worlds, engineer-sociologists seek to simplify a complex reality within 
which it is the central actor. Influential actors who construct these actor worlds use tactics and 
strategies such as interessement, whereby an engineer-sociologist intervenes in existing 
relationships thus ‗interrupting competitive links and manipulating the interests of others in 
order to create new allies‘ (Summerton, 1992: p69). The composition of an actor-network not 
only consists of the relationships between entities in terms of standard sociological interactions 
such as legal contracts and power relationships, but also by the interactions between human and 
non-human entities e.g. ‗electric currents or electromagnetic forces‘ (Callon, 1986). Callon 
notes that ‗the solidity of the whole results from an architecture in which every point is at the 
intersection of two networks: one that it simplifies and another that simplifies it‘ (Callon, 1987). 
By incorporating this approach to the analysis of a CHP-DH scheme in Mjölby, Summerton 
describes how a group of influential local actors constructed both a physical network but also an 
‗invisible grid‘ of institutions and organisations whereby stability and coherence was brought 
about within the actor-network. Also, to a greater degree than the systems approach, the analysis 
of CHP-DH in Mjölby emphasises the role of conflict in shaping socio-technical change
10
. 
However, in his review of Summerton‘s work, Russell (1994) points to some of the deficiencies 
of ANT when discussing such large scale infrastructures. He argues that because of the 
characteristics of infrastructure networks they typically involve a greater degree of 
interdependencies and systemness than conventional technologies; therefore the central role of 
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the engineer-sociologist tends to be downplayed. He also notes that the ‗microsociological 
approach seems to have steered her [Summerton] away from connecting the detailed action to 
its context more effectively‘. By jettisoning the concept of an environment external to the 
system
11
 and taking the approach of ‗follow the actors‘ (Geels, 2007), Summerton‘s analysis 
lacks a structural framing which makes it less amenable to generalisation – the following quote 
summaries: 
―The tradition of participation and consultation in Sweden, and the major 
role that local government has in energy planning, are evident throughout the 
account, and provide a strong contrast with other countries. But again we are 
given no way of understanding the importance of these in explaining the 
widespread adoption of district heating‖ (Russell, 1994). 
This study is therefore worthy of note as it highlights some of the deficiencies of relying on 
actor-centric approaches (such as ANT and SCOT) for studies of infrastructures i.e. technical 
systems which are deeply embedded within societal structures and persist for long periods of 
time. Returning to Edge and Williams (1996), the following quote highlights the fact that ANT 
presents a flat ontology which, although providing some useful concepts, is an unsuitable 
overarching framework for the analysis of infrastructures which, as described in the previous 
section, develop in a path dependent manner: 
―Thus actor-network theorists…are remorselessly sceptical about the nature 
and influence of pre-existing, large-scale social structures such as class and 
markets - and, in particular, in the prior attribution of social interests… And 
they, in turn, have been criticised for eschewing existing social theory, 
leaving them poorly equipped to explain particular developments, and open to 
criticism for 'empiricism' - offering mainly descriptive work and post-hoc 
explanations. To their critics, they run the risk of ceding too much power and 
autonomy to individual actors, rather than to existing structures of power and 
interests … (Edge and Williams, 1996)  
Drawing more from a Hughesian ontological perspective, presented below is an approach which 
seeks to provide a more structural account of socio-technical change using a multi-level 
approach. 
2.2.3 The MLP and Transition Pathways 
A strand in this literature which was briefly discussed in the previous chapter is known as socio-
technical transitions research. This emphasises many of the aspects of SST but more explicitly 
incorporates ideas of structures and constraints on agency such as notions of paradigms and 
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trajectories. Similar to the LTS approach, the emphasis is on longer term trends in technical 
change at the higher levels of the design hierarchy, rather than to individual components or 
artefacts. The aim of the approach is to describe structural changes or systemic innovations i.e. 
changes in sector level structures (or systems of production and consumption) ‗made up by a 
cluster of elements, involving technology, science, regulation, user practices, markets, cultural 
meaning, infrastructure, production and supply networks (…) This cluster of elements forms a 
sociotechnical system‘ (Geels and Kemp, 2007: p.441). This group of researchers, mainly 
historians, have noted two important characteristics of socio-technical transition processes: 
1. Socio-technical systems are embedded in a wider set of regimes e.g. technological, 
science, user and market, policy and socio-cultural regimes (Geels, 2004). These 
coalesce to form stable configurations, known as socio-technical regimes, to provide 
coordination to systems. These socio-technical regimes are prone to inertia and path 
dependency and thus tend to be obdurate. 
2. Changes in socio-technical systems tend to emerge from practices which take place 
outside of this stable configuration. Transitions theorists characterise these spaces of 
change as niches, practices which take place within these niche spaces are less 
constrained that those within the regime. Niches are less structured spaces with more 
scope for agency and, using a biological analogy, they can foster more variations within 
a less deterministic selection environment. Experimentation and learning are the key 
processes within niches (Raven, 2005). 
Developed by a group of Dutch researchers, it builds upon a number of historical studies of past 
transitions where it is argued that structural changes in sectors, or periods of 
systemic/architectural  innovation, tend to stretch out over long periods of time, approximately 
50 years, and are characterised by different patterns of transformation called transition pathways 
(Geels and Schot, 2007). Examples of their studies include the transition from sailing ships to 
steam ships (Geels, 2002), and the development of urban water infrastructures in the 
Netherlands (Geels, 2005).  
These basic hypotheses regarding the nature of socio-technical transitions have been framed 
within a micro-meso-macro multi-level framework, which is commonly referred to as the Multi-
Level Perspective (MLP), as displayed in the figure below: 
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Figure 2.7: The Multi-Level Perspective on Transitions 
 
Source: (Geels, 2002) 
The MLP, described as a ‗nested hierarchy of structuring processes‘ (Smith et al., 2010), is 
constituted by three levels of increasing stability (Geels, 2004): The meso or regime level is a 
particular sector which provides a societal function e.g. the provision of energy services. Socio-
technical regimes are heavily influenced by selection pressures and are a ‗stable and dominant 
way of realising a particular societal function‘ (Smith et al., 2010: p.441). At the micro level are 
niches  which are less dependent on selection pressures which influence the regime, there is 
therefore more scope for radical innovation to occur as ‗the norms of the niche are different 
compared to the rules in the regime but tend to be less established and relatively stable‘ (Smith 
et al., 2010: p.441). Often niches require some form of protection, for example subsidies, but 
eventually need to interact with regime actors for resources and legitimacy. Finally, at the macro 
level is the landscape which is similar in its conception to a system‘s environment: ‗The content 
of the sociotechnical landscape is heterogeneous and may include aspects such as economic 
growth, broad political coalitions, cultural and normative values, environmental problems and 
resource scarcities. The landscape metaphor is used to emphasise the large-scale material 
context of society, e.g. the material and spatial arrangements of cities, pervasive technologies 
that affect all of society (...)The material landscape is changing very slowly‘ (Geels and Kemp, 
2007).  
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Unlike actor based approaches such as ANT or SCOT, the MLP outlines a ‗deep‘ ontology 
where processes of innovation and transformation are analysed in the context of embedded 
structures at the regime and landscape levels (Geels, 2007). The MLP has been utilised to frame 
a wide range of energy sector transformations (van der Vleuten and Raven, 2006, Raven and 
Verbong, 2009, Coenen et al., 2010, Verbong et al., 2008) and a notable outcome of these 
studies is that the presence of a meso level as an analytical category provides scope to analyse 
how emerging practices confront and engage with incumbent regime structures. The framework 
also provides a platform by which useful insights from the evolutionary-institutionalist 
literatures, which were introduced earlier in the chapter, can be incorporated. Here change 
within the MLP is characterised by both an evolutionary and an enactment logic (Geels, 2011): 
 An enactment logic – Within the niche and regime levels patterns of behaviour can be 
discerned from ‗social (inter)actions with semi-coherent rule structures that are 
recursively reproduced and incrementally adjusted by ongoing actions‘ (Geels, 2011: 
p.16). This draws heavily from Giddens‘ structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) where 
action and structure are co-constructed.  
 An evolutionary logic – Between the levels, processes of strategic selection occur where 
the broader selection environment at the landscape and regime levels strategically select 
practices at the niche level which are the sources of variation. This ‗not only involves 
market processes, but also depends on the fit of niche innovations with regulations, 
infrastructure and cultural meaning‘ (Geels, 2011: p.16).  
Examining the framework from a SST perspective, it retains basic presumptions regarding 
contingency and agency in technical change whilst incorporating more structural processes such 
as institutional embededness and path dependency. A number of these studies have analysed 
process of structural change in terms of alternative pathways which involve different types of 
interaction between and within levels, these have been both generalised (Geels and Schot, 2007, 
Smith et al., 2005) and more contextualised for the specific case of the UK (Foxon et al., 2010). 
In terms of analysing infrastructures, this pathways approach provides a means by which 
processes of change can be uncovered which expand upon the linear trajectory presented in the 
Hughesian approach where system building leads to system momentum. To illustrate the 
pathways approach, three patterns of transition are outlined by Geels and Kemp (2007): 
 Reproduction: Dynamics are confined to the regime level leading to a process of 
incremental change where ‗the existing socio-technical system and regime form a stable 
context for (inter)action of social groups. Existing rules are reproduced by the 
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incumbent actors, and elements in the socio-technical system are reﬁned‘ (Geels and 
Kemp, 2007). 
 Transformation: Due to pressure exerted from the landscape level regime level actors 
successful re-orientate their strategies and practices in the absence of niche level 
sources of more radical variation. This would result in modular type innovations. 
 Transition: A transition or ‗shift from one socio-technical system to another‘ occurs 
when, faced with landscape pressures, regime level actors fail to re-orientate their 
routines successfully. This creates a favourable selection environment and a window of 
opportunity for new sources of variation which emerge from niche level and become 
institutionalised (as shown in figure 2.7). For the case of an infrastructure sector this 
would involve processes of architectural innovation at the system level of the design 
hierarchy.  
The MLP has been adopted by policy orientated researchers who propose that by providing 
temporary and targeted protection to niches (termed strategic niche management (Raven, 2005, 
Smith, 2006)), along with altering the broader landscape and selection environment at the meso-
macro levels, novel technologies and practices can be diffused and transitions can be managed 
or governed in a particular normative direction e.g. sustainability (Rotmans and Loorbach, 
2008). Unsurprisingly, the practical and political feasibility of managing such transitions in this 
way has been called into question. It has been argued that Transitions Managements (TM) often 
under-represents the political and contested nature of technical change (Shove and Walker, 
2007, Kern and Smith, 2008) which is present in the ANT literature for example (Genus and 
Coles, 2008). Also, it is unclear how sources of variation emerge at the niche level; for example, 
Hughes‘ insights regarding the emergence of different technological styles depending on 
contextual factors such as geography and scale seems to be absent. However, the MLP does 
provide a useful framework which recognises the deep ontology of infrastructure sectors and the 
multiple ways in which processes of change can occur; this will be drawn upon in the next 
chapter. 
2.2.4 Splintering Urbanism 
As noted, the MLP provides a framework whereby the role of embedded institutions in shaping 
practices and innovation processes can be systematically analysed; however, it has been 
observed that the concept of the landscape in particular, which tends to encapsulate a wide range 
of external variables which influence regimes, tends to be under theorised. For the case of 
infrastructure networks, it is noted that structural changes within society such as the shift from a 
Keynesian welfare state towards liberalisation have often characterised the socio-technical 
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dynamics of these sectors (Mitchell, 2008). A literature known as Splintering Urbanism, which 
draws from urban studies and critical perspectives on political economy, provides useful 
insights into the relationships between these broader social and economic structures and 
distribution networks – this is illustrated in the following quote: 
 ―...from the late 1970s a quadruple movement of political, economic, 
technological and socio-spatial decentralizations, combined with a 
‗decollectivization‘ of certain societal functions and meanings, has 
increasingly challenged the traditional forms of organization and governance 
of large networked systems. This evolution has included the emergence of 
more polycentric and multilevel forms of political governance; the application 
of neo-liberal reforms, including privatization and liberalization; the 
technological ‗stasis‘ (Hirsh 2003) of centralized infrastructure and the 
concurrent downscaling of systems of service provision…‖ (Coutard and 
Rutherford, 2011: p.108) 
In their 2001 book ‗Splintering Urbanism‘, Graham and Marvin (2001), from the perspective of 
urban studies, offer new insights into the relationship between the unbundling of infrastructure 
networks and the spatial evolution of large cities. Seeking to contribute to the urban studies 
literature they argue that ‗treatments of the materialities of infrastructure and technology remain 
marginal within critical urban and social science‘ (Graham, 2002). They seek to explore the 
dialectic between changes in the nature of infrastructure provision and consumption, urban 
planning, and ‗the restructuring of urban space‘ (Graham, 2002) .  
Opening up the black box of the system‘s ‗environment‘ or  ‗landscape‘, it is argued that 
infrastructures ‗and the financial, engineering and governance practices that support them‘ are 
‗embedded within the broader power relations of global capitalism‘ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 
p.190/1). Drawing on the work of political geographers (Harvey, 1985, Swyngedouw, 1993) 
they argue that in order to serve the needs of ‗capital accumulation‘ networks are important in 
linking and coordinating ‗widely dispersed sites of production, consumption and exchange‘ and 
to ‗link spaces and times together‘ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: p.192/3). However, because 
infrastructure networks are embedded within space and require large amounts of capital to be 
invested, over long periods of time a disconnect can develop between this inherent inflexibility 
and the continuous cycle of capitalist dynamism i.e. ‗Crises emerge where older infrastructure 
networks (…) become barriers to later rounds of capitalist accumulation‘ (Graham and Marvin, 
2001: p.194).  Similar to arguments proposed by Langdon Winner described above, they argue 
that social biases are deeply embedded in the material and spatial configuration of infrastructure 
networks.  
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Central to the splintering urbanism thesis is the shift away from what they term the ‗integrated 
ideal‘ of nationally interconnected systems based on Fordist mass production and distribution 
principles and balanced by ‗Keynesian models of state policy and demand management‘ (p.74 
Book) and cross-subsidisation
12
 - they describe this as follows: 
―…democratically accessible and homogenous infrastructure grids, usually 
under public ownership or control…(to) help realise the social, economic and 
environmental benefits of mass production, distribution and consumption, 
integrated through the mediating powers of new infrastructure networks‖ 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001: p.52) 
The rationality behind this network logic, they argue, was to bring about cohesion and order to 
the urban form and was underpinned by notions of technical determinism, modernity and 
comprehensive urban planning. The provision of public goods
13
 in this unified and integrated 
way has however undergone significant changes in the last number of decades. This has been 
prompted by a changing political economy where ‗governments are easing restrictions on 
private entry into previously monopolistic infrastructure markets‘ (ibid: p.96). They argue that it 
is likely that such investment will ‗focus on low-risk, lucrative projects with short-term, 
demonstratable profitability‘ leading to splintering or unbundling of the previous integrated 
monopolies, organisationally, geographically and technically. This is creating ‗premium 
network spaces‘ (Graham, 2000) where more reliable and sophisticated network services are 
tailored to the needs of certain areas within the city, such as financial districts, resulting in new 
forms of ‗territorial inequalities‘ (Offner, 2000). The resulting uneven development has 
implications for the spatial characteristics of cities as ‗relationships between infrastructure 
networks and urban spaces, seem to embody powerfully the changing dynamics of global 
political economies and societies‘ (Graham and Marvin: p.16).  
These developments have also prompted new technical innovations which in different ways 
have undermined traditional assumptions surrounding service provision through public 
monopolies e.g. technologies which further reduce economies of scale, promote decentralisation 
and flexibility. The underlying rationale behind these technologies is to reduce the barriers to 
market entry and ‗facilitate the division of integrated networks into monopolistic and non-
monopolistic segments‘; examples include ‗complex control, monitoring and data management 
                                                     
12
 Where lower-income users and less profitable services are subsidised through generalised tariffs or 
taxation (Graham, 2000) 
13
 They outline four characteristics of a public good (ibid: p.80): 1) Non-rivalrousness (provide for one or 
all at the same cost), 2) non-excludability (once supplied cannot prevent user from using), 3) 
spillovers/externalities (positive and negative externalities), 4) non-rejectibility (once supplied must be 
equally consumed by all). 
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systems‘ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: p.139). These changing technologies and network logics 
are also altering the relationship between the users and providers of network services –as 
illustrated by the following quotation: 
―These technologies therefore challenge the assumption that relations 
between users and providers are standardised and homogenous. Instead the 
interface becomes much more complex: users may be enrolled by producers 
to shift the timing and level of demand; new pricing technologies can send 
real-time economic signals to shift consumption patterns; and new 
intermediaries such as logistics specialists, energy and water conservation 
agencies, and property developers, increasingly manage relations between 
network users and providers‖ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: p.140) 
This tendency towards disaggregation leads to the creation of niche markets for network 
services where private firms can ‗…selectively connect together the most favoured users and 
places‘ (ibid: p.15). The consequence of this ‗infrastructural consumerism‘ (Graham, 2000) has 
been the construction of consumer identities and branding where ‗differentiating among goods, 
services, and tariffs is a crucial tool for achieving managers‘ goals of targeting and satisfying 
privileged users‘ (Summerton, 2004: p.490). Guy et al. (1999) characterise this process of 
creating niche markets and targeting specific users as ‗cherry picking‘ and ‗social dumping‘ or 
‗the easing out of economically marginal domestic markets‘.  
In a number of respects the Splintering Urbanism thesis provides useful insights into the 
relationships between infrastructures and society. Firstly, it opens the black box of the system‘s 
environment (Hughes, 1983) where it is shown how infrastructure development is ‗closely 
bound up with wider sociotechnical, political and cultural complexes‘ (Graham and Marvin, 
2001: p.11) such as ‗contemporary societal shifts towards globalisation, liberalisation, 
privatisation and general scepticism about centralised bureaucracies‘ (Graham and Marvin, 
2001: p.183). This provides insights into the different network logics which underpin their 
material and spatial evolution and how these logics are closely connected to structural changes 
within society; e.g. how processes such as ‗global-localisation‘ (Guy et al., 1999) explain 
changes in the capitalist accumulation regime and their effect on urban infrastructures.  
This perspective provides useful insights into the changing role of the nation state in the 
governance of infrastructures
14
. Also, their critical stance provides a cautionary note to those 
who seek to promote innovation and technical change in infrastructure networks in order to 
                                                     
14
 Although it will be argued in the next chapter that Splintering Urbanism tends to underplay the 
contemporary role of the state in the move away from the Keynesian ‗Infrastructure Ideal‘ and it often 
neglects the day-to-day processes of governing which are heavily influenced by the state e.g. economic 
regulation.  
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achieve certain social objectives e.g. transitions to sustainability. Because of the essential 
importance of infrastructure networks to everyday life and to the functioning of economies, 
there are potential distributional and spatial consequences of innovation in these sectors which 
are often not recognised in the transitions literature (Coutard and Rutherford, 2011). Promoting 
innovation as a means to an end neglects the consequences of unbundling and decentralisation 
for ‗urban cohesion and equality‘ and also that the sources of this emerging technological and 
organisational paradigm lie in ‗the restless workings of global capitalism‘ (Coutard and 
Rutherford, 2011). For example, a recent contribution to this strand research has argued that the 
emergence of climate change and energy strategies in large ‗World Cities‘ reflects ‗a constant 
search for innovation to be and remain competitive predicated in the first instance on the 
ideology of mobile capital rather than more specific local priorities‘ (Hodson and Marvin, 2011: 
p.23). Efforts to steer or manage transitions in infrastructures should therefore be aware of the 
underlying relations of power and the wider structures within which they are embedded. 
However, the spatially sensitive nature of Splintering Urbanism does provide some useful 
insights to the transitions approach as it uncovers much of the contemporary sources of 
variation and innovation in distribution network sectors which emanate from the uneven 
development of infrastructures, their changing relationship with territories, and the plurality of 
urban responses to the move towards a post-Fordist accumulation regime. This refers back to 
the earlier historical literature which highlighted the role of multiple scales of decision making 
(in cities, regions, nations) in the emergence of these large technical systems in the first 
instance
15
 (Hughes, 1983, Tarr and Dupuy, 1988). An analysis of contemporary dynamics in the 
electricity and heat distribution sectors must consider how they are linked to changes in the 
broader societal governance regimes, and also take into account the spatial implications and the 
relationships between different scales and tiers of governing which might result. 
2.3 Summary of the Literature on Infrastructure Networks 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the purpose of the review was to explore the 
existing literatures which broadly address the research questions outlined in the introduction. 
This is with a view to developing an analytical framework which can be applied and tested 
across the two case studies and, if successful, can inform theoretical and policy debates 
surrounding the contemporary dynamics of energy distribution networks. It was argued that 
each of the literatures contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of infrastructures with 
economic and socio-technical approaches tending to place different degrees of emphasis on the 
                                                     
15
 For example, Thomas Hughes‘ concept of Technical Styles described above. 
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relative importance of institutions, technical change, and agency in processes of change.  It is 
also noted that they have different ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning 
them. For example, TCE proposes that actors can choose efficient governance arrangements so 
as to economize on transaction costs, while the evolutionary approach argues that capabilities 
differ between actors within a sector and as a consequence they will have different responses. 
The table below synthesises some of the main features of these literatures and the key causal 
mechanisms which are forwarded to explain structural changes in infrastructure networks – 
these will be drawn upon in chapter 7 as part of the cross-case analysis. 
Table 2.2: Synthesis of Literature Review and Identification of Causal Mechanisms 
Approach Causal Mechanisms 
New-Institutional Economics Vertical Dynamics: The nature of transactions taking place determines the dynamic 
between integration (hierarchies) and de-integration (markets) in a network 
industry value chain  
Evolutionary Economics Innovation: The nature and pattern of technical change - whether this is 
incremental or disruptive - and the response of firms strongly influences sectoral 
dynamics 
 Path dependency and Lock-in: Institutional change is not a process of optimisation 
at the margin but is influenced by the historical trajectory of change. 
SCOT/ ANT Social Construction: Technical change is a contested process which is 
characterised by the multiple framings and interpretations of different actors and 
groups of actors. 
Large Technical Systems/ANT System Evolution: Technical systems evolve with their environment initially being 
shaped by influential system builders but over time develop momentum and 
become prone to inertia. Different technical styles emerge as systems evolve. 
Multi-Level Perspective Multi-level dynamics: Interactions between niche, regime and landscape levels lead 
to different types of socio-technical patterns or pathways – reproduction, 
transformation or transition. 
Splintering urbanism Scalar Dynamics: In the context of liberalisation and globalisation the notion of 
nationally integrated infrastructures has been diminished and new spaces of agency 
are being opened up at different scales 
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2.3.1 Critique of the Literature 
There are two specific critiques of the literature which this thesis seeks to explore in more 
detail. The first is on the nature of the relationship between infrastructures and institutions. 
Although institutions are discussed in the NIE and evolutionary literatures, it is argued that there 
are often inconsistencies in how institutions and institutional change are conceptualised in the 
literature. Because distribution networks and the services they provide cannot be categorised as 
conventional goods which are traded in a market, institutions are an important analytical tool as 
they can characterise the interdependencies involved in energy networks and provide a useful 
analytical tool to explore various aspects of how these sectors are structured and coordinated. It 
is argued that while the TCE and evolutionary approaches provide useful insights, their framing 
of institutions can be problematic at times. Firstly, TCE‘s functional account of institutional 
change - between markets and hierarchies - is unsuitable for the analysis of longer run dynamics 
in infrastructure sectors, and although there is a more dynamic view presented in evolutionary 
economics, institutions tend to be viewed in simplistic terms as either barriers or enablers to 
technical change. Contributions from the socio-technical literatures suggest that a) institutions 
should be seen as actively shaping and moulding technical change in these sectors, b) 
institutional change in infrastructure sectors occurs in the context of broader societal structures, 
and c) that the influence of a wide array of actors and groups of actors, both public and private, 
in this ongoing process needs to be recognised. This critique will be developed in the next 
chapter where it is proposed that institutions must be considered as embedded in every aspect of 
infrastructures, in their technical configuration and operation, in how actors interact and 
influence change, and in the broader structural patterns which influence sector level structures. 
Three analytical categories are elucidated which describe the physical, relational and structural 
dimensions of the relationship between infrastructure networks and institutions and provide a 
more systematic and ontologically coherent way of analysing the interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies in these sectors. 
The second critique focuses on the specific role of the state in the governance of infrastructure 
sectors. As has been outlined in the introductory chapter, due to the technical and institutional 
features of infrastructures, institutional change in these sectors will involve different types of 
interplay between both public and private actors. Although the Splintering Urbanism literature 
does discuss the changing role of the state in this regard, it is argued that this is from a structural 
perspective which does not capture the more subtle and strategic ways in which the involvement 
of the state in the governance of these sectors is changing. In the next section this argument is 
developed by incorporating insights from a broad range of governance literatures. 
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2.4 Revealing the role of the State in the Governance of 
Infrastructure Networks 
In the introductory chapter it was argued that socio-technical transitions and the dynamics of 
energy distribution sectors must be considered in the context of a wider set of socio-political 
structures which are characterised by the changing nature and role of the state in economic 
governance. A small number of recent studies (Mitchell, 2008, Helm, 2004) have shown that 
energy policy in the UK cannot be decoupled from the state and its role in influencing the 
institutions of energy systems. For example, Catherine Mitchell (Mitchell, 2008) has argued that 
in recent years efforts to promote renewable energy have largely been shaped and defined by a 
Regulatory State Paradigm which tends to favour marginal rather than long term efficiencies 
and incumbent technologies and actors. This has led to a poor diffusion rate for low carbon 
technologies in the UK as the RSP promotes incremental rather than radical or architectural 
technical change and is largely incompatible with the need to fundamentally restructure energy 
systems for the transition to a low carbon economy. Despite these studies the changing 
influence of the state in energy governance is an underexplored area for studies of transitions 
and structural changes in energy systems and therefore has been a key motivation for the 
formulation of the research questions of this thesis; in particular questions 2 and 3.  
Questioning the role of the state in this regard is particularly salient in the case of network 
industries such as distribution systems due to their technical and institutional characteristics 
which mean that they are not traded in markets in a conventional sense but are characterised by 
some form of non-market governance (Groenewegen and Künneke, 2005). It must be the case 
that observable technical dynamics in infrastructures sectors, such as interconnection across 
national boundaries, decentralisation, and the development of localised infrastructures, are 
bound up with the dynamics of nation-states through processes of privatization, the articulation 
of national energy policy priorities, and the changing relationships between different tiers of 
government at the local, regional, national and international levels. Following a discussion of 
the ways in which states have been represented in the literatures that were reviewed in the 
sections above, debates surrounding the changing role of the state in economic governance will 
be engaged with. 
2.4.1 Representations of the State in the Literature 
Within the different strands of the literature introduced in the sections above, the state and its 
role with regard to infrastructures and socio-technical systems is conceptualised in a number of 
ways. Within the institutional and economics literatures, debates surrounding the ongoing 
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liberalisation and privatisation of network industries have often framed governance in terms of a 
binary distinction between the ‗market‘/‘hierarchy‘ or ‗public/private‘. For example, the role of 
the state in the governance of electricity distribution networks tends to be relegated to a passive 
one where ‗independent‘ sector regulators and private network operators are the key actors, 
removed from political influence. The role of government is often viewed in binary terms as 
changing from being ‗interventionist‘ prior to privatisation to being ‗non-interventionist‘, and 
not an active participant in the everyday reproduction and transformation of these sectors. This 
binary perspective is illustrated in the following quote from Karen Bakker in the context of the 
water sector: 
―Policy debates tend to rely on the assumptions of utilitarian liberalism, in which the 
distinction between public and private equates with that between governmental and 
nongovernmental…From this perspective, the distinction between ―public‖ or state 
authority and ―private‖ individual activity is assumed to be clear. Debate over the 
scope of state and market activity is thus essentially a debate over jurisdiction, 
adjudicated via utilitarian standards of performance‖ (Bakker, 2010: p.29/30) 
Typically, this view is forwarded in arguments surrounding the privatization and liberalization 
of network industries where the state‘s role is framed in terms of ownership of assets e.g. 
nationalisation or privatisation. This is particularly prevalent in NIE based studies which present 
an unrealistically clear distinction between governance transformations between markets and 
hierarchies which, as Campbell and Lingberg (1991b) note, ‗relegates the state and state actors 
to a subordinate position, relative to economic and technological factors, as causes of 
governance transformations‘ (ibid: p.364). Although the role of the state in defining property 
rights regimes and facilitating the establishment of monopolies in network industries is widely 
recognised (Campbell and Lingberg, 1991b, Fox-Penner, 2010, Hughes, 1983); following the 
wide scale privatization and liberalization of network industries, governments are often viewed 
as passive actors whose functions have been outsourced to an independent sector regulator 
where the state is ‗standing outside and above society‘ (Jessop, 2007a). It is proposed that this 
framing of the state‘s role solely in terms of ownership relies on a narrow view of the state and 
neglects the more subtle ways in which states exert their influence in the ongoing reproduction 
and transformation of network industries.  
From a reading of the literatures presented in the previous sections, a similar representation of 
the state is presented in the Splintering Urbanism literature where the state is becoming less 
relevant as a result of wider shifts in society, often framed in terms of post-Fordism and the 
crisis of Keynesianism. Here, as a result of these societal dynamics, the nation-state has been 
bypassed and a neo-liberal governance regime based on an emerging relationship between 
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global flows of capital and urban entrepreneurialism (termed ‗glocalism‘) has emerged (Guy et 
al., 1999). This has largely displaced integrated infrastructures and the pursuit of energy policy 
goals at the national level. It is undoubtedly the case that these macro level political and 
economic dynamics have seen the emergence of new forms and processes of governance where 
‗infrastructure development increasingly centres on seamlessly interconnecting highly valued 
local spaces and global networks to support new vectors of flow‘ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 
p.100). The traditional role of the nation state, ‗to support the shift to regulated, near universal 
access to infrastructure networks‘ (ibid: p.73), has become less relevant as a new network logic 
based on liberalisation and the profit motive has emerged. However, this presents a view of state 
involvement in these sectors as diminishing or failing to exerting influence which, as Offner 
(2000) argues, fails to take into account the more subtle ways in which public authorities exert 
their influence; of particular relevance is the growing importance of sector regulators (Moran, 
2003, Majone, 1994, Hood et al., 2001, Scott, 2004, Levi-Faur and Sharon, 2004). Also, by 
focusing on the urban or city scale as a unit of analysis, this body of literature tends to downplay 
the importance of broader policy goals and regimes which, in the case of energy, are largely 
pursued at the nation-state level in the UK.  
The socio-technical transitions literature has more recently sought to explore the potential roles 
that states can play in the governance of longer term transitions to sustainability (Rotmans and 
Loorbach, 2008). As Florian Kern outlines governments can stimulate ‗the development of 
shared visions of the future, the setting up of stakeholder transition arenas and conducting 
transition experiments to explore possible pathways towards more sustainable systems‘ (Kern, 
2009). However, proponents of this approach ‗have prescribed an important role for government 
in steering such transitions without explicitly recognising and conceptualising the politics of 
such processes‘ (Kern, 2009). Although there have been some questions raised as to whether 
this perspective adequately takes into account the complexities of the policy making process 
(Kern and Smith, 2008), it does at least have some recognition of the important relationship 
between the state and socio-technical systems and to some extent recognises the 
interdependencies involved. This effort to ‗bring the state back in‘ has been termed Transitions 
Management (TM) (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008, Loorbach, 2007) and draws from the MLP 
and the innovation system literature which both advocate public intervention along the 
innovation chain (Foxon, 2006). A central feature of the TM approach is that states can play a 
key role in ascribing a normative directionality to technical and institutional innovation within 
sectors of the economy, particularly those which are locked-in to unsustainable trajectories e.g. 
high carbon energy systems. This is achieved by facilitating processes of variation (in protected 
spaces or niches) and altering structures at the regime level in order to de-institutionalise 
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existing (unsustainable) modes of production and consumption. However, while the approach 
prescribes a more active role for the state in directing the long term future of systems, it does 
not provide a critical account of the ways in which states are deeply embedded in the day to day 
operation of socio-technical systems and infrastructure networks. For example, in her analysis 
of the emerging low-energy housing sector in the UK, Heather Lovell argues that because 
governments; 
―…tend to be deeply embedded within socio-technical systems, they face difficulties in 
bringing about radical changes, and policies are therefore typically aimed towards 
encouraging incremental or conservative innovations. The findings from research into 
low-energy housing in the UK similarly highlight the ad hoc, unstrategic and political 
nature of socio-technical change in practice.‖ (Lovell, 2007: p.37) 
This lack of recognition of the political interdependencies between governments and socio-
technical systems, such as low-carbon housing, she argues, can result in programs such as TM 
becoming a useful policy tool for governments but which can become subsumed into the wider 
set of governance regimes: 
―…the politics of sociotechnical system change need to be considered in more depth. 
There are reasons why policies to encourage niches might appeal to governments  more 
than sector-wide regulatory changes, in particular because niches are  less likely to 
threaten  powerful interests embedded within the existing socio-technical system.‖ 
(Lovell, 2007) 
TM therefore lacks an ‗analysis of the variety of ways in which niches originate and are used by 
governments‘ (Lovell, 2007). This lack of subjectivity in the approach to analysing these socio-
technical governance interventions is also observed by Smith and Stirling (2007): 
―…the manner in which governance processes may realize sustainable socio-technical 
systems depends on the general way in which each is conceptualized in relation to the 
other. Too often in the socio-technical systems literature, these conceptualizations 
remain implicit and confused….there needs to be greater appreciation of the internal 
loci of governance processes within the socio-technical systems themselves‖(Smith and 
Stirling, 2007: p.369) 
While it is recognised that TM has potential to offer a useful prescriptive framework for the 
relationship between the state and energy systems in transition, it is proposed that it does not 
recognise the ways in which a wide array of functions and strategies of nation states are closely 
intertwined with the day-to-day functioning of energy networks and socio-technical systems 
more generally – the central paradox which was referred to in the introductory chapter. The 
argument that ‗government is not a unitary actor and is deeply embedded in existing structures 
of current socio-technical regimes‘ (Kern, 2009) is developed below for the case of 
infrastructure sectors.  
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2.4.2 Governance Perspectives 
In order to explore in more depth the changing relationship between the state and distribution 
networks, the literature on governance offers a useful entry point into the discussion on the 
nature and role of the state in this regard and how it can be conceptualised. In the literature, an 
ongoing trend within society has been observed involving a shift from hierarchical 
‗government‘, based on the concentration of power at the level of nation-states and the exercise 
of coercion, towards flatter forms of ‗governance‘ which are based on ‗self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks‘ (Rhodes, 1996) and power inter-dependencies. Governance in this 
context refers to ‗a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of 
governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is 
governed‘ (Rhodes, 1996) 16. Governance studies approach this trend from a number of different 
perspectives ranging from public administration, international relations and comparative politics 
(Davies, 2008). Broadly, these  literatures have applied the governance concept in three 
different ways (Adger and Jordan, 2009); as an empirical phenomenon of changing state-society 
relations,  as a theory or ‗an explanatory framework‘ (Murphy and Yanacopulos, 2005) which 
explores how diverse inter-organisational networks achieve policy goals through mechanisms of 
self-steering (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) and thirdly, as a prescriptive framework e.g. ‗good 
governance‘ which prescribes ‗openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and 
coherence‘ (CEC, 2001: Quoted from Davies (2008: p.27)). Also worthy of note are more 
critical perspectives on governance which propose that the underlying dynamic behind the shift 
from government to governance is to ‗channel capitalism in novel directions‘ (Paterson, 2009) 
or as a response to a legitimacy deficit of the state (Murphy, 2006a) e.g. as ‗the acceptable face 
of spending cuts‘ (Stoker, 1994: Referenced in Rhodes (1996: p.653)).  
Regardless of the differing perspectives and views on governance, they share a basic premise 
regarding the changing relationship between the state and society, as outlined by Albert Weale: 
 ―…the historic assumption was that concentrated patterns of authority produced 
adequate solutions to the policy problems that political systems faced. To say that there 
has been a transition from government to governance is a way of saying that this 
assumption can no longer be made‖ (Weale, 2009: p.59)  
In its treatment of the state, a governance perspective rejects ‗ideas of the nation-state as a 
single site of political power, as a unified and discrete entity, and as territorially sovereign in the 
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 This should be distinguished from the use of term in the NIE literature where governance tends to refer 
to achieving some form of coordination or collective action - an outcome rather than a process (Stoker 
1998) – we are more interested in the process of governance. 
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traditional Westphalian sense‘ (Bulkeley et al., 2007: p.2734). In the context of the UK, debates 
surrounding governance emerged from a rejection of the ‗Westminster model‘ which 
emphasised ‗parliamentary sovereignty, strong cabinet government and accountability through 
elections‘ (Stoker, 1998: p.19), towards a perspective which focuses the analytical lens on ‗new 
processes of governing‘ described by Roderick Rhodes as ‗…self-organising, 
interorganizational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the 
game and significant autonomy from the state‘ (Rhodes, 1997: p.15). This marks a shift from 
governments exerting power through coercion, moving towards inter-dependencies and 
partnerships thus ‗blurring the boundaries‘ (Stoker, 1998) between the state, the market and 
civil society.  
In the light of these debates over the shift from government to governance, it is generally 
acknowledged that the role of the state is changing and cannot be taken for granted. The 
question therefore arises; what is the role of the state in this context? Some argue that it has 
been diminished or hallowed out; for example, Martin Jänicke, in his book ‗State Failure‘ 
(Jänicke, 1990), argues that states have become impotent and reactive in the face of increasing 
bureaucracy and industrialisation. Others see it as a result of a reduction in state sovereignty and 
power due to governments failing to exert their influence in an increasingly globalised context. 
On the other hand, this shift from government to governance can be seen as a strategic 
reorientation of the way states exercise their power and influence. As Bulkeley et al. (2007) 
summarise; ‗for some, the state has been all but replaced in the shift from ―government‖ to 
―governance‖(…) while for others, governing continues to take place ―in the shadow of 
hierarchy‖(…)‘ (p.2734).  
The latter explanation, that the state is exerting its influence in more subtle and efficient ways in 
response to an expanding and increasingly complex set of objectives (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003)
17
, is forwarded by Pierre and Peters (2000) who propose that ‗it is erroneous to conflate 
state structures with state power‘ (Davies, 2008: p.24). Anna Davies points to the work of John 
Pierre (2000) to argue that ‗current trends demonstrate a process of state transformation rather 
than a decline in state authority‘ and that rather than there being a ‗smooth linear trajectory (…) 
government-governance practices can ebb and flow over time and across space‘ (Davies, 2008: 
p.24/5). This distinction between state form and state power is highlighted by Pierre and Peters 
(2000): 
                                                     
17
 Hooghe and Marks only propose this as a potential explanation. 
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―The creation of a more participatory style of governing does not mean the government 
is in reality less powerful. It does mean that the state and society are bounded together 
in the process of creating government‖ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: p.49) 
Therefore, rather than the state being ‗hollowed-out‘ or diminished, we are witnessing a change 
in ‗the selection of instruments and organizational arrangements through which the state 
imposes its will on society and also the nature of the points of contact between state and society‘ 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000: p.93). The question is therefore not whether the state will exert its 
power but how it will do so and in what form.  
It is proposed that the relationship between the state and energy systems has proceeded in this 
fashion, and as the process of liberalisation and privatisation have unfolded, the role of the state 
in the governance of energy distribution networks has become more subtle and strategic. In 
order to uncover these changing dynamics, two relevant areas of this literature are drawn upon; 
state transformation (drawing from the work of Bob Jessop) and governmentality (drawing from 
the work of Michael Foucault). 
State Transformation 
In analysing the nature of the state and its transformation, the work of Bob Jessop has been 
particularly influential. Drawing from neo-Gramscian and Marxist theories, Jessop defines the 
state in relational terms as; ‗a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose socially 
accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions…‘ (Jessop, 2007b). 
These concepts of ‗common interest‘ and ‗the general will‘ are ‗illusory‘ and are strategically 
selected according to different values and opinions because ‗there is never a general interest that 
embraces all possible particular interests‘ (ibid: 2007: p.11). Therefore, rather than existing as a 
unified entity in ‗majestic isolation‘, the state is ‗embedded in a wider political system (or 
systems)‘ (Jessop, 2007: p.6) and, as a social relation, is constantly being redefined as it 
interacts with its environment. It is ‗the site, the generator and the product of strategies‘ (Jessop, 
1990: p.260. Quoted from Macleod and Goodwin (1999)). As the state pursues its interests (core 
roles of the state include maintaining domestic order and civil legitimacy, developing 
international relations, promoting economic growth and raising revenues (Scrase and Ockwell, 
2009)) it develops strategies and draws upon its resources, capacities to coerce, and the mutually 
interdependent networks of actors which ‗link the state to its broader social environment‘ 
(Jessop, 2007: p.6). Jessop argues that it is difficult to define the state as it is an ever changing 
and fluid concept, its ‗lines of difference‘ with its environment are constantly in flux and the 
state is therefore ‗a complex institutional system‘ that changes form in a strategic manner.  
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Interestingly, Jessop characterises this dialectic between the state and its environment according 
to the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), where the state changes form through processes of 
strategic selection (processes of variation, selection and retention) which  ‗privilege some 
actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, and some actions 
over others‘ (Jessop, 2009: p.378). Therefore, rather than governance being ‗autonomous‘ and 
removed from influence of the state ‗institutional arrangements and forms of interdependency 
which characterise governance are, in this account, created by the (central) state as a means of 
pursuing its own ends, and are only partially autonomous from the exercise of hierarchical 
power‘ (Bulkeley et al., 2007).  
The metagovernance approach described above, where states are engaged in the ‗governance of 
governance‘, proposes that it is not about the power which the state possesses as a unified all-
encompassing entity in itself, rather its capacity to transform and achieve its objectives. States 
draw on ‗resources produced elsewhere in its environment‘ (Jessop, 2007b) in a strategic 
manner in order to exert influence. This is characterised by the ability of states to exert control 
over the ‗web of structural interdependencies and strategic networks‘ (Jessop, 2007: p.6); the 
capacities and liabilities of the state determine the nature of its interventions. Strategies include; 
redefining priorities, expanding or reducing activities and rescaling activities (Jessop, 2007b). 
Jessop (1997) identifies three broader trends which are shaping and being shaped by state 
strategies: 
 De-nationalisation – involving a process of state transformation ‗with old and new state 
capacities being reorganized territorially and functionally on sub-national, national, 
supranational and trans-local levels‘ (Jessop, 1997: p.575, 576). Such processes of 
‗multi-level governance‘, particularly regionalisation, have been observed in the UK 
energy industry (Winskel, 2006, Smith, 2007). 
 De-statization – reflecting the shift from government to governance, states must engage 
in the ‗complex art of steering multiple agencies in order to achieve their objectives‘ 
(Jessop, 1997: p.575). A relevant example of this process is the privatisation and de-
regulation of network industries. 
 Internationalisation - partially due to the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state and the 
rise of neo-liberalism, ‗state action has extended to include a widening range of extra-
territorial or transnational factors and processes‘ (ibid: 1997: p.575). In their analysis of 
emerging relationships between cities and climate change, Hodson and Marvin (2011) 
argue that this processes has prompted new forms of urban entrepreneurialism where 
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cities must innovate in order to remain competitive and attract international flows of 
financial capital for investment in infrastructure networks.     
Within technological systems, particularly infrastructure sectors, these activities strategically 
select certain types of interactions, technologies, practices, organisational forms and sector 
structures. For example, due to concerns over the security of centralised energy systems, the 
state may pursue a polycentric approach to achieving its energy policy goals thus favouring 
more decentralised and fragmented responses e.g. local CHP-DH schemes. The following 
section explores in more detail the multiple ways in which the strategic selectivity of the state 
takes place.  
The State and Power 
Noting the dangers of conflating state structure with state powers (Davies, 2008), we turn to 
Michael Foucault‘s lectures and writings on governmentality to provide useful insights into the 
ways in which state power is diffused throughout society (Foucault, 1978) and how this in turn 
affects distribution networks. While the structurally orientated approach described above ‗seeks 
to explain the why of capital accumulation and state power‘ the governmentality approach 
developed by Foucault tries to ‗explain the  how of economic exploitation and political 
domination‘ (Jessop, 2006: own emphasis). The neo-Foucauldian approach moves away from 
preconceived notions of institutional structures and material objects and places the attention on 
the multiple sites where governing takes place and the heterogeneous set of techniques and 
tactics of government, or ‗arts of government‘. Referring to the governmentality approach, 
Foucault notes the following: 
―In short, the point of view adopted in all these studies involved the attempt to free 
relations of power from the institution, in order to analyze them from the point of view of 
technologies; to distinguish them also from the function, so as to take them up within a 
strategic analysis; and to detach them from the privilege of the object, so as to resituate 
them within the perspective of the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of 
knowledge‖ (Foucault, 2004: p.118) 
Rather than particular institutional arrangements or forms (Bulkeley et al., 2007) through which 
power is exercised, Foucault was concerned with the processes and practices of government
18
 
                                                     
18
 This is not equated with the state in a conventional sense: ‗…Foucault‘s work on governmentality takes 
us beyond the State, by emphasising…the diversity of forces, as well as groups, whose aim is to regulate‘ 
(Ezzamel and Reed: p.608). However, a neo-Foucauldian conceptualisation of Government (or the 
‗conduct of conduct‘) is quite close to Jessop‘s relational definition of the state: ―Government is the 
historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all these dreams, schemes, strategies and 
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which ‗render populations of individuals amenable to intervention, calculation, classification, 
homogenization and ordering‘ (Ezzamel and Reed, 2008: p.608). He argued that ‗power does 
not flow from centres to eventually impact on the minutiae of daily life but instead is produced 
through the play of forces in decidedly local settings‘ (Uitermark: p.145). In essence the 
approach analyses the micro-physics of power i.e. ‗the local settings in which power actually 
makes itself visible and sensible‘ (Uitermark, 2005: p.145). This ‗analytics of government‘ 
approach described by Foucault focuses on the everyday techniques, practices, rationalities, 
programmes and means of calculation which control populations. What Foucault proposes is ‗a 
relational understanding of power. Power is therefore not conceived as a stable and fixed entity 
that could be ‗stored‘ at particular institutional sites but signifies the result of a mobile and 
flexible interactional and associational network‘ (Lemke, 2007: p.13).  
Foucault‘s previous analyses had displayed ‗hostility to general theorizations about the state‘ 
and taking ‗the existence of the state for granted‘ (Jessop, 2006), rather the focus was on how 
power relations emerged from ‗dispersed local sites well away from the centres of state power‘. 
However, his later work considered how these dispersed power relations became codified, 
institutionalised and consolidated (Jessop, 2006) in structures and institutions associated with 
the nation-state. Therefore the governmentality approach concerns itself with the recursive 
relationship between dispersed and fragmented practices of government, and changing state 
forms
19
, while arguing that the pre-existence of the state cannot be taken for granted. Similar to 
the state transformation approach described above, the state is not understood in ‗juridical 
categories‘ but ‗within the logic of strategic relations that constitute a collective will‘, however 
there is less of an emphasis on the ‗materiality‘ of the state (Lemke, 2007).   
Rose and Miller summarise the governmentality perspective: 
―…the state can be seen as a speciﬁc way in which the problem of government is 
discursively codiﬁed, a way of dividing a ‗political sphere‘, with its particular 
characteristics of rule, from other ‗non-political spheres‘ to which it must be related, 
and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary 
institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another‖ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: p.176/177) 
                                                                                                                                                           
manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions…‖ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: p.175) 
19
 Foucault distinguishes between sovereignty (medieval states, controlling territory), disciplinarity 
(administrative states in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries) , and governmentality (controlling populations) 
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In an effort to understand the activities aimed at shaping, guiding and controlling the behaviour 
of actors and groups of actors, the approach analyses both the rationalities and technologies of 
government: 
 Governmental rationalities: These are ‗the changing discursive fields within which the 
exercise of power is conceptualised‘ (Rose and Miller, 1992: p.175). Such rationalities 
define the objects to be governed and the goals and means of government i.e. programs 
of government; where ‗reality can be governed and managed, evaluated and 
programmed‘ (Rose and Miller, 1992: p.182). These act as the ‗cognitive and normative 
maps‘ (Lemke, 2007) for state activities; knowledge and expertise have a key role to 
play in defining problematics of government and in shaping programmes.  In energy 
infrastructure sectors these programmes - such as market liberalisation - reflect 
underlying governmental rationalities and a sense of a collective will. 
 Technologies of government: These are ‗the complex of mundane programmes, 
calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures which authorities seek 
to employ and give effect to government ambitions‘ (Rose and Miller, 1992: p.175). 
These provide a means by which one can measure ‗the real against the ideal‘(Macleod 
and Goodwin, 1999: p.181). Broadly two types of governmental technology have been 
identified; those which focus on performance and those which seek to promote agency 
i.e. ‗which seek to invoke particular subjects and their participation in processes of 
governing‘ (Bulkeley et al., 2007). Studying these micro-level techniques and 
instruments highlights that ‗the difference between state and society, politics and the 
economy does not function as a foundation or a borderline, but as an element and effect 
of specific governmental technologies‘ (Lemke, 2007). In the case of distribution 
networks, technologies of government can refer to ways of calculating and controlling 
flows within a network e.g. network regulation and various licensing regimes, or more 
direct means such as ownership of a CHP-DH scheme by a local authority.  
Recognising the utility of both governance (structural) and the neo-Foucauldian 
governmentality approach, a number of authors (Bulkeley et al., 2007, MacKinnon, 2000, 
Macleod and Goodwin, 1999, Uitermark, 2005) have argued that although they derive from 
distinct ontological underpinnings (particularly regarding the nature of the state) there is 
significant scope to combine the approaches in order to explore how everyday practices of 
control across different scales are emblematic of and reinforce broader state structures i.e. ‗how 
the strategic selectivity of the state takes place‘ (Bulkeley et al., 2007: p.2738). The approach 
has been particularly useful in analysing the changing scales through which power is exercised; 
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this has been an increasingly prominent theme in the governance (Macleod and Goodwin, 1999) 
and environmental governance (Davies, 2008) literatures. 
This discussion is relevant to the analysis of energy systems in a number of ways. For the case 
of incumbent and established networks such as electricity distribution systems, the involvement 
of the state should be considered in the context of what Jessop terms ‗de-statization‘ i.e. the 
shift from government to governance and the associated efforts to engage with networks of 
actors and utilise less direct and more subtle techniques – such as economic regulation and 
licensing - in order to achieve objectives. Within these sectors, the privatization and 
liberalisation of energy systems and the associated problematization of natural monopoly can be 
viewed in the context of the move away from a Keynesian welfare state towards a more 
fragmented form based on the introduction of competition, unbundling and market liberalisation 
of network industries (Hodson and Marvin, 2011). Similarly, for the case of less established 
local infrastructures, such as CHP-DH in the UK, the traditional conceptualization of national 
integrated infrastructures and hierarchical institutions is being eroded by processes of ‗de-
nationalisation‘. At a sector level this is opening up new spaces for agency and transformation 
at different spatial scales which are creating new types of interdependencies and interactions 
between different tiers of government (Graham and Marvin, 2001). This is important because 
distribution networks in particular are spatially bound (typically at a local or regional level) and 
shaped in part by local contexts (for example the socio-political characteristics of cities or sites 
where renewable generators are most likely to connect). It is therefore crucial to consider their 
governance in a way which recognises these local contingencies and scalar dynamics.  
The literature on governance and state theory therefore provide useful theoretical insights 
regarding the diversity of ways in which the relationship between the state and infrastructure 
sectors can proceed. The next section synthesises these insights within an analytical framework 
which can operationalise the hypotheses and propositions outlined in this chapter and to act as a 
framework to structure the empirical chapters. From a reading of the governance and 
governmentality literatures, a key task is to frame the interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies as a complex governance process which can capture the relationships between 
changing state forms, different governmental rationalities and the instruments and technologies 
of government. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter had two main purposes. The first was to review the existing literatures which 
address the overarching research question regarding the interplay between actors, institutions 
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and technologies in distribution networks, and the second was to make a contribution to this 
body of literature by elucidating the role of the state in the governance of energy systems. The 
literature review discussed both economic/institutional and socio-technical approaches to the 
study of infrastructure networks. It was found that these literatures provide valuable insights 
into various aspects of the dynamics of energy distribution networks and a number of causal 
mechanisms were identified which will be used in chapter 7 to analyse the two case studies. 
However, it was recognised that they adopt different approaches to the analysis of institutions 
and institutional change in these sectors and place different degrees of emphasis on actors and 
structures in the process of change. The analytical framework which is developed in the next 
chapter will be cognisant of these differences and will propose a number of distinct analytical 
categories which will provide an ontologically coherent framework for the analysis of the 
interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in the two case studies. 
The second part of the chapter concentrated on one particular actor in this interplay – the state. 
It was argued in the introductory chapter that despite a number of notable exceptions, studies of 
energy sector transformations in a liberalised context have either downplayed or undertheorized 
the state and its role in shaping the governance of infrastructure sectors such as energy 
distribution. Literatures on governance, state theory and governmentality were engaged with in 
order to elucidate the ways in which state transformations and the rationalities and technologies 
of government influence meso level sector transformations. These insights will inform the 
analytical framework which is outlined in the following chapter.  
  
-68- 
 
 
 
  
-69- 
 
 
 
3 Analysing the interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies in infrastructure sectors 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a novel analytical framework which is utilised in the empirical chapters to 
highlight specific aspects of the social and technical reproduction and transformation of 
distribution networks. The analytical approach is based on two critiques of the economic and 
socio-technical literatures which were discussed in the previous chapter:   
1. That existing approaches offer an inconsistent and incomplete explanation of the role of 
institutions and the nature of institutional change in infrastructure sectors. 
2. That the role of the state in influencing the governance patterns of socio-technical 
systems requires a more systematic treatment, particularly in the case of network 
industries.  
The framework itself analyses the interplay between actors, institution and technologies in 
infrastructure sectors as a governance process exploring the outcomes of a series of 
interventions and interactions between a range of sector level stakeholders in the context of a 
wider governance regime. Following Davies (2008)
20
 a tripartite approach is taken; the 
governance regime (Paavola et al., 2009) outlines the national level policy and regulatory 
framework which embodies various political rationalities, programmes which are undertaken by 
the state and policy instruments. This is the structural context within which socio-technical 
processes - described here as interventions and interactions - take place between a wide range 
of actors to shape infrastructure sectors at the meso and micro levels. The outcomes of these 
interventions and interactions are analysed according to three analytical dimensions which 
characterise the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in infrastructures - the 
physical, the relational and the structural.  
The chapter proceeds by discussing the analytical framework in more detail with the final 
section outlining the research design and methodology.  
                                                     
20
 The framework draws from Davies‘ approach to the analysis of governance processes in the waste 
sector (Davies, 2009). In two national level case studies of the waste regimes in New-Zealand and Ireland 
she examines the relationships between policy interventions, interactions between actors across different 
scales and the associated outcomes.  
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3.2 Characterising the Governance Regime 
In the previous chapter, various approaches which relate to governance and the nature of the 
state were introduced. It was argued that the interdependencies between states and socio-
technical systems can be discussed in the context of changing state forms and strategies which 
are made visible though micro-level processes of calculation and control such as policy 
instruments, regulatory frameworks and licensing regimes; all of which have a key role in 
shaping interactions within infrastructure sectors. It is proposed that for the case of 
infrastructures such as distribution networks which have strong non-market characteristics, this 
wider governance regime constitutes the structural preconditions for agency and acts as the 
main selection environment for innovation in these sectors.  
This framing of a wider governance regime is developed by Paavola et al (2009) in their 
analysis of the governance of biodiversity in Europe. They argue that while it is important to 
study specific interventions (which they term governance frameworks) in a particular context 
‗there is a danger that an analysis of specific governance frameworks over-states the influence 
of the institutions in question whilst overlooking or under-emphasizing the influence of other 
important factors that lie beyond the boundaries of the study‘ (ibid: p.151). They propose the 
concept of a governance regime, or a ‗range of multi-level and multi-actor governance 
processes‘ which contextualises more specific and localised interventions and interactions. 
In order to elucidate the governance regime in each of the cases, the study draws from Bulkeley 
et al‘s. (2007) concept of ‗modes of governing‘. Bulkeley et al. argue that a governance 
landscape or regime should not be defined solely by the institutions and objects of governance 
in a structural sense, but also by the processes and practices through which governance takes 
place and outcomes occur. As Davies notes; ‗While it is important to establish the ‗what‘ and 
‗how‘ of governing in particular places it is also necessary to consider the outcomes of those 
governing moments and how governing entities react or resist the modes of governing that are 
being implemented‘ (Davies, 2008: p.36). By incorporating insights from the governance and 
governmentality literatures, they propose a stratified model of a governance regime where a 
mode of governing is; ‗a set of governmental technologies deployed through particular 
institutional relations through which agents seek to act on the world/other people in order to 
attain distinctive objectives in line with particular kinds of governmental rationality‘ (Bulkeley 
et al., 2007). Each mode of governing, they argue, is characterised by a specific governmental 
rationality, associated objectives and programmes/policies, sets of institutional relations 
between actors and agencies and technologies of governing e.g. regulatory frameworks and 
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licensing regimes. This provides a framework by which state strategies and the structural 
preconditions for agency can be made more visible in each of the cases (Davies, 2008). It is 
proposed that multiple modes of governing co-exist to constitute a governance regime for a 
sector i.e. ‗different constellations of actors, rationalities, technologies, institutional relations, 
and entities are brought together as problems are defined and solutions sought‘ (Bulkeley et al., 
2007: p.2740). 
There are a number of ways to define and characterise the governance regime for an 
infrastructure sector. For example, one may seek to do this by considering the broader 
institutional and regulatory apparatus in place to mitigate a range of environmental, health and 
security risks (Hood et al., 2001). However, in the interests of clarity it was decided to confine 
the analysis of governance regimes to the energy sphere. In this study a national level focus is 
taken in examining the governance regime for energy distribution sectors because in the UK this 
has been the tier or level of government at which the state has traditionally pursued its energy 
policies (Russell, 1993, Hannah, 1979, Hannah, 1982). This being said it is also important to be 
aware of the different scales (local, national and international) through which governance takes 
place. In the case of electricity distribution systems in the UK, the governance regime tends to 
be predominantly instituted at the national level and characterised by a strong regulatory 
framework.  Here the objectives and institutional relations are quite well defined and centre on 
the relationship between the regulatory authority (Ofgem) and the seven private network 
operators. This is because the distribution (and transmission) networks have been unbundled 
from the other segments of the value chain; therefore the governance regime can be isolated in 
this respect. A number of objectives or modes of governing can be identified in network 
regulation such as allocating the economic rents of natural monopoly (as this is not a 
competitive activity), providing incentives to private operators to reducing the costs of operating 
the networks, and enabling competition in other segments of the value chain such as retail and 
generation.  
In the case of heat distribution networks the governance regime is more dispersed and 
heterogeneous where modes of governing include efforts to promote energy efficiency in energy 
use and within the built environment, and more recently, the promotion of low carbon and 
renewable sources of heat generation. This is because the networks themselves operate within 
localised contexts and are more integrated with upstream and downstream value chain functions 
such as generation and retail. Also, they are not interconnected at the regional level and are 
more dispersed; they therefore tend not to be framed in terms of natural monopoly to the same 
extent as electricity distribution and are not as tightly regulated. 
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3.3 Interventions and Interactions 
Whilst the governance regime provides the macro level structural context, it is important to 
analyse the diverse sets of interventions and interactions between actors occurring in different 
contexts and scales at the meso-micro levels. For distribution networks these interventions and 
interactions refer to a broad range of actor strategies, motivations and framings, and the 
articulation and implementation of different modes of governing. Due the fact that electricity 
and heat distribution networks operate across different spatial scales and have a diverse set of 
governance arrangements, the main aim of this section is to provide an open framing whereby 
the unfolding storylines emerging as a result of the interplay between technologies, actors and 
institutions can be uncovered. For the case of electricity distribution systems, this may refer to 
the application of regulatory instruments and the ways in which network operators interact with 
the regulator. It may also incorporate how network operators interact with equipment 
manufacturers and engineering consultants to introduce new technologies to their networks, or 
the changing relationships between the sector regulator and government departments in the 
formation and implementation of energy policy in this area. For the case of heat distribution 
networks, a key set of interventions and interactions occur in the changing relationships 
between different tiers of government (national and local) in the UK and how this creates space 
for new forms of agency in the area of the provision of energy services within localities. 
In order to frame these sector or meso level processes the concept of an organisational field, as 
proposed in the sociological branch of new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Scott 
and Meyer, 1991, Scott, 2001, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)
21
, provides a useful framing for the 
sets of formal and informal interactions taking place between a wide range of actors in an 
infrastructure sector. An organizational field is defined as ‗a community of organizations that 
partakes in a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and 
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field‘ (Scott, 2001: p.84). The electricity 
                                                     
21
 The difference between economic and more constructivist/sociological approaches to institutions is 
summarised by Garud et al. as follows: ―Among institutional economists, for instance, the appearance and 
maintenance of institutional arrangements are explained in terms of economizing on transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). According to this perspective, institutional arrangements function to 
reduce uncertainty and to mitigate opportunistic behavior such that transaction costs associated with 
negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts between boundedly rational actors are reduced. 
Institutional arrangements, in turn, tend to reproduce – rather than change – existing social arrangements. 
Sociological perspectives on institutional theory emphasize how institutional arrangements confer 
legitimacy, which is ‗a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions‘ 
(Suchman, 1995: 574). As a result, some actions within a particular institutional field come to be seen as 
legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and may even be ‗prescribed‘, making it difficult for actors to 
deviate from them.‖ (Garud et al., 2007) 
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distribution sector in the UK can be defined along these lines with a number of private network 
operators operating under the terms of a licensing arrangement and regulated by a sector 
specific energy regulator. The heat distribution sector in the UK is more fragmented because the 
local systems are not integrated at a regional or national level and are operated by a more 
dispersed set of actors who are embedded at the local level. However, it is argued that in the 
context of the UK energy policy environment, they do ‗constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life‘ incorporating ‗key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products‘ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). 
Although the composition of an organisational field is different in each case, the following 
diagram illustrates some examples of actors within an energy distribution network 
organisational field. The organisational field constitutes a sector with core or focal actors – 
electricity network operators and local authorities – who tend to own and/or operate distribution 
networks in each of the cases, along with more peripheral actors who do not directly interact 
with the networks themselves but whose actions influence and shape the organisational field.  
Figure 3.1: Examples of actors within infrastructure sectors 
 
Of particular interest is how interventions associated with the dual agendas of liberalisation and 
the decarbonisation of energy systems are shaping field level interactions and the ways in which 
this process is shaped by the different modes of governing in the wider governance regime.  
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3.4  Outcomes 
As the main aim of this thesis is to explore the nature of the interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies in distribution networks, a key question is how to assess the 
outcomes of the field level interventions and interactions which take place. It has been argued in 
the literature review that existing approaches tend to be inconsistent on the relationship between 
institutions and infrastructures and that the role of agency in shaping institutional change needs 
to be better conceptualised. The figure below presents a novel way to conceptualise these 
relationships which can be used to assess the outcomes of governance processes in each of the 
cases.   
Figure 3.2: Dimensions of Institutions and Infrastructure Networks 
 
This draws from the MLP but is a novel framework which has been tailored to analyse the 
specific socio-technical dynamics of infrastructure networks whereby the institutional 
composition of sectors such as energy distribution and the role of actors in shaping change can 
be can be assessed in a systemic fashion. It distinguishes between three analytical categories or 
dimensions of institutions and infrastructure networks – the physical, the relational and the 
structural - and proposes that institutions are embedded in each of these three dimensions. This, 
it is argued, can provide a useful analytical tool whereby the outcomes of governance processes 
- particularly how institutional change happens - in different sectors and contexts can be 
analysed. This draws from a critical realist ontology
22
 where a ‗stratified model of reality‘ (Leca 
and Naccache, 2006) is presented (Sayer, 1999, Jessop, 2005, Clegg, 2010). Critical realism 
‗adopts an ontological realist position that distinguishes between the real, actual, and 
empirical‘(Leca and Naccache, 2006) or  ‗structures, events, and experiences‘ (Clegg, 2010) 
respectively.  In the domain of the empirical are experienced events, which are characterised as 
measurable physical flows within a network i.e. the material dynamics of the system – this is the 
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 A researcher‘s ontology ‗conceptualises social reality in certain terms, thus identifying what there is to 
be explained‘ (Archer, 1995: p.17) 
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physical dimension. In the domain of the actual events also occur, however these can be 
experienced and perceived in different ways by different actors – this is the relational 
dimension. This is characterised as the ongoing sets of interactions between actors within a 
particular infrastructure sector and across different scales where actors and groups of actors 
have different motivations, interpretations and framings of reality. Finally, the domain of the 
real is where all three of structures, events and experiences exist and reflects deeper ‗structures 
and causal powers that generate events‘ (Leca and Naccache, 2006) – this is the structural 
dimension. For the case of infrastructures this is defined in terms of different network logics 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001) which are drawn upon by actors to rationalise and legitimise certain 
types of activity within sectors. It is proposed that institutions act across these three interrelated 
dimensions and are embedded in the materials, practices and structures of the ongoing 
construction and reproduction of distribution networks.  
These three analytical dimensions which will be used to assess the outcomes of governance 
processes in each of the cases are discussed in more detail below.  
Physical Dimension 
In the physical dimension institutions coordinate physical flows within a network which can be 
measured, monitored and controlled. Institutions in this respect operate at the micro level and 
are the transactions which mediate between and direct these flows in order to develop what Rip 
and Kemp term a ‗configuration that works‘ i.e. ‗materials and components, combined into 
devices and linkages that, in their turn, are combined into an overall working system‘(Rip and 
Kemp, 1998). In the figure above these physical flows are characterised as flows of information, 
material (energy) and revenues which can be measured, monitored and controlled. By 
coordinating these flows, mainly formal institutional arrangements carry out two main 
functions: 
Achieve System Economies 
In large scale technical systems the management of networks has tended to be informed by a 
perception of the most economically rational way of controlling flows within a system (Hughes, 
1987, Hughes, 1983, Nightingale et al., 2003, Davies, 1996). In small scale urban distribution 
systems e.g. D.C. electricity systems such as the ones which emerged in cities in the 19
th
 century 
or modern CHP-DH schemes, system design and operation is informed by efforts to achieve 
economies of scope in service delivery. This entails sizing the system in order to provide a range 
of services to customers and therefore benefit from the associated economies ‗which are 
obtained by using the same plant and equipment within a single operating unit to provide (…) 
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services at a lower cost than that of providing each service separately‘ (Davies, 1996: p.1159). 
In countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark many of the formal institutions which control 
flows in the energy networks, e.g. pricing regimes and access regulations, have been designed in 
order to favour the development of energy schemes at a local level which provide a range of 
energy services (Verbong and Geels, 2007, Raven and Verbong, 2007, Toke and Fragaki, 2008).  
When energy infrastructures began to expand significantly in the mid twentieth century the 
conventional way of achieving system economies were through economies of scale where large 
capital investments in fixed cost components were spread over an increasing number of units in 
order to benefit from supply side efficiencies e.g. improving the load factor
23
 of electricity 
generating plant. Energy networks began to expand over wider geographical areas in order to 
encompass a greater diversity of loads (demands) thus facilitating cost recovery for large sunk 
investments. The economic regulation of integrated natural monopoly systems facilitated this 
process by reducing investment risk and by allocating economic rents. Increasingly however, 
due to institutional changes associated with liberalisation and unbundling, the allocation of 
network capacity and the nature of flows within energy networks have been influenced by 
market allocation mechanisms. This has placed a greater emphasis on improving the 
information flows within systems and has resulted in a more complex set of revenue flows as 
private operators must facilitate connection by third parties to their networks. Achieving these 
economies of system (Davies, 1996) through the development of more sophisticated control 
components has seen the diffusion of ICT based control systems on many networks which 
improve capacity utilisation - the monitoring and measuring of flows and the allocation of 
network capacity.     
Maintain the reliability and integrity of the system 
As noted in the literature on TCE, depending on the nature of the network itself, whether it is an 
electricity, heating, or gas infrastructure, a degree of complementarity must be maintained 
between the components of the system in order to ensure system security and reliability i.e. 
maintain the critical transactions of the system. Kaijser (2004) characterises these components 
as the nodes (points where decisions regarding flows are made), and the links (pipes, wires etc.) 
which mediate the various flows in a particular network. These physical elements are arranged 
within a ‗nested hierarchy‘ at the component (individual nodes and links), sub-systems (e.g. 
regional distribution networks) or system level (a nationally interconnected infrastructure). 
Therefore it is important not only to consider individual components but also the 
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 The ratio of average output to maximum potential output. 
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complementarities between these components within sub-systems and systems. Institutions 
which ensure this complementarity can include hierarchical centralised arrangements which 
control flows and access to nodes across an entire network or more decentralised arrangements 
where individual nodes are more independent. Institutions which control access to the 
components of networks (nodes and links) are also important in order to maintain system 
integrity and security (property rights) and in a liberalised context this function has become 
increasingly important for the revenue streams of private network operators.  
In terms of accessing a network, a distinction can be made between point-shaped networks 
which are accessible to users at some of the nodes (e.g. airports and train stations), line-shaped 
networks which can be accessed along their links where it is easier to create new nodes (e.g. 
telephone systems, electricity wires and heating pipes), and surface-shaped networks which can 
be accessed at all points within a particular area (e.g. satellite communications, radio 
frequencies) (Kaijser 1994). The nature of the system in question is also important in terms of 
the types of flows of material (energy), information and revenues taking place. Kaijser (2004) 
distinguishes between three types of arrangements. 
 Distributive – this includes energy and water systems where there is ‗a unidirectional 
flow from one or several central nodes to a large number of users‘ (Kaijser, 2004) e.g. 
electricity and heat distribution networks.  
 Accumulative – such as waste collection or sanitation where there is a ‗reverse 
unidirectional flow, from many users to one or several central nodes‘ (Kaijser, 2004) 
 Communicative – these are systems with a two-way flow e.g. telephones & transport. 
Although these distinctions are useful, in reality many energy systems involve a combination of 
the above e.g. in most energy systems raw material is accumulated (waste, biomass, coal) prior 
to a conversion process e.g. at an electricity or heat generating station after which energy is 
converted and distributed to the point of consumption via an energy carrier e.g. electricity or hot 
water. Also, it has been noted that there are often different forms of interplay which create 
synergies between various networks (Konrad et al., 2008, Jonsson, 2000, Frantzeskaki and 
Loorbach, 2010); for example communications systems are increasingly being used across a 
number of distributive and accumulative systems in order to enable real-time capacity 
utilization; these synergies help to create new system economies e.g. reducing the need to build 
large amounts of redundancy into the system.  However, it should be noted that these 
interactions between different systems can cross previously strong sector based institutional 
boundaries at the relational dimension.  
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Relational Dimension  
Institutional change from the physical perspective may appear to occur in a functional or 
rational manner as flows within a network can be empirically measured and calculated. 
However, it is proposed that this cannot be considered in isolation and that it is heavily 
influenced by the structure of the sector, the types of interactions taking place, and the differing 
motivations, interpretations, strategies and capabilities of different actors and groups of actors 
within an organisational field. At this level, although interactions take place, these are less prone 
to measurement or verification as they can happen ‗independently of the experience and 
perception that actors may have of them‘ (Leca and Naccache, 2006). In terms of 
infrastructures, this is what Jane Summerton refers to as the ‗invisible grid‘ or ‗the seamless 
web of interdependencies that enables and sustains the operation of these systems‘ (Summerton, 
1992: p.81). Summerton proposes that this includes regulators, legislative and political bodies, 
public agencies, financial institutions, professional interest groups etc. Institutions in these 
terms address the issue of ‗…independent but autonomous organisations, each controlling 
important resources‘ and the role of institutions is ‗to coordinate their actions to produce a joint 
outcome which is deemed mutually beneficial‘ (Jessop, 1995). This moves away from a rule 
based view of institutions towards an actor based one where ‗institutional change involves not 
simply remaking the formal rules, but fundamentally it requires realignment of interests, norms 
and power‘ (Nee, 2003: p.24). Institutions therefore shouldn‘t be seen as a solution to an 
abstract notion of efficiency or promoting system economies, but as a mechanism of 
coordinating actors, aligning interests and which characterise the structure of a sector.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, one way of thinking about infrastructure sectors is in 
terms of their value chain from production, distribution and through to consumption. This can 
be organised hierarchically i.e. vertically integrated or based on market transactions where 
coordination is achieved through the price mechanism. It is argued however that a reliance on 
these binary distinctions can often obscure many of the different types of collective action 
which take place in infrastructure sectors. For example, Campbell et al. (1991) point to 
numerous forms of governance within industry sectors with different forms interactions taking 
place such as obligational networks, joint ventures, R&D alliances, trade associations and 
producer cooperatives.  This is based on the premise that each industry and sector ‗is a matrix of 
interdependent social exchange relationships‘ (Campbell et al., 1991: p.5,6). Infrastructure 
networks are no different, consisting of a series of vertical and horizontal relationships in which 
actions are institutionally embedded (Granovetter and McGuire, 1998). There are therefore a 
multitude of types of interactions taking place within organisational fields which can be 
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assessed with vertical interactions along a value chain and horizontal interactions between focal 
actors and the regulator, component manufacturers and consultants. 
Over time, repetitive interactions with an organisational field can lead to the institutionalisation 
of certain types of behaviour often to the exclusion of others. This notion of a dialectic between 
structures and agents draws from the work of Anthony Giddens whose structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984) has been adopted by transitions theorists in their framing of the socio-technical 
regime (Geels, 2004). The structuration of organizational fields leads to isomorphism or 
similarity between organisations within fields as actors seek to conform to their institutional 
environment (or selection environment). This leads to the creation of a sense of collectively 
defined rationality within sectors which can be characterised as ‗…widespread social 
understandings (rationalized myths) that define what it is to be rational‘ (Clegg, 2010). 
Therefore, it is possible that across different infrastructure sectors actors will pursue the 
‗efficient‘ operation of energy networks and define system economies in entirely different ways. 
This process of isomorphism occurs through coercive, normative, and mimetic processes
24
; thus 
‗institutionalized fields limit the direction and content of change, causing an inexorable push 
towards homogenization‘ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: p.148). As a result of these processes 
‗organizational success depends on factors other than efficient coordination and control of 
productive activities‘; organizations which ‗succeed in becoming isomorphic with these 
environments gain the legitimacy and resources needed to survive‘ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 
p.53).  
However, this is not a recipe for terminal inertia or obduracy. Although actors, organisations 
and interactions can become highly structured over time, they ‗are also capable of responding to 
these influence attempts creatively and strategically‘ (Scott, 2001: p.179) both in a collective 
and individual capacity. Also, from the literature on STS, organisational fields should be seen as 
‗contested terrains‘ which are ‗contoured‘ by competing strategies, variations and struggles 
(Greenwood et al., 2008: p.20). In their study of the changing relationships between 
infrastructures and cities, Hodson and Marvin (2010) draw from the work of Pierre Bordieu 
(1993) to provide a more differentiated view of ‗fields‘ which are characterised by closed spaces 
of reproduction or alternatively by open spaces of radical reconfiguration. 
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 Clegg (2010) describes these: ‗coercive (when external agencies impose changes on organizations—
most obviously through practices of state regulation), normative (when professionalization projects shape 
entire occupational fields), and mimetic mechanisms (essentially the copying of what is constituted as 
culturally valuable ways of doing or arranging things—cultural capital). 
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Structural Dimension 
The third analytical category in the analysis of governance outcomes in distribution sectors is 
the structural dimension. Here institutions represent the underlying rationality behind the 
system which shape field level interactions and act as a source of legitimacy for action. This is 
the structural element of infrastructures i.e. the ‗generative structures or causal mechanisms‘ 
(Jessop, 2005) and is defined by institutional logics. Returning to the literature on sociological 
institutionalism, an institutional logic can be defined as ‗a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions - which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to 
organizations and individuals to elaborate‘ (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Institutional logics 
constitute the ‗content and meaning of institutions‘ and shape ‗the interests, identities, values, 
and assumptions of individuals and organizations‘ which are embedded within them (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008). By following a ‗logic of appropriateness‘ actors who are embedded within 
these broader contexts conform to norms and rules ‗because they are seen as natural, rightful, 
expected, and legitimate‘ (March and Olsen, 2004). A sense of collective identity emerges when 
actors in organizational fields fulfil roles and obligations and draw legitimacy from institutional 
logics where ‗what is legitimate changes depending on the context in which it is negotiated and 
evaluated‘ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Within an organizational field therefore, institutional 
logics shape action, provide ‗socially constructed systems of classifications that constitute 
categories of social actors‘ and they convey a set of rules and norms ‗for deciding which 
problems get attended to, which solutions get considered, and which solutions get linked to 
which situations‘ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). However, it must also be noted that institutional 
logics can also motivate strategic behaviour which can act as a source of institutional change. 
The role of the institutional entrepreneur has been highlighted in this regard; they use causal 
powers of logics by exploiting  differentiation and inconsistencies in their environments to bring 
about change (Tracey et al., 2011) i.e. ‗organized actors who skilfully use institutional logics to 
create or change institutions, in order to realize an interest that they value highly‘…‗they must 
mobilize institutional logics that are likely to match potential allies‘ interests and/or values‘ 
(Leca and Naccache, 2006).  
Drawing on the concept of institutional logics, a number of ideal type network logics (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001) can be identified in the case of energy distribution sectors which represent 
the different rationalities which characterise the nature of service provision and are underpinned 
by distinct political and economic rationalities (Offner, 2000). The first is termed the ‗public 
services model‘ which is rooted in the view that the services that infrastructures provide should 
be ‗delivered by social institutions based on private or public monopoly control‘ (Graham and 
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Marvin, 2001 p.73). The political rationality behind this is that energy systems are public goods, 
therefore the costs of providing these services and the financial risks should essentially be 
socialised. This was influenced by notions of ‗Keynesian models of state policy and demand 
management, to balance Fordist production and consumption practices‘ (Graham and Marvin, 
2001). This logic prevailed during much of the 20
th
 century when many of the large scale 
infrastructure systems such as electricity, telecommunications and sanitation were constructed 
in industrialized countries.  The second ideal type network logic is termed the ‗competitive 
model‘, where certain functions of infrastructure service provision are privatized and opened up 
to competition (liberalization) e.g. energy retail, electricity generation. Under this model the 
networks themselves, the pipes and wires, tend to be treated as natural monopolies which are 
privately operated under some form of regulatory supervision
25
 in order to ensure third party 
access to the network. This network logic is based on the neo-liberal premise that regulation 
and/or public ownership is costly and that the price mechanism, as a mode of coordination in 
these sectors, promotes efficiency in investment decisions and system operation.  
These network logics do not exist in isolation and are not temporally bound. Throughout the 
evolution of infrastructures actors have drawn from these ideal type logics in different ways to 
legitimise certain practices and influence interactions and perceptions of technical and economic 
rationality
26
 e.g. the development of state owned public monopolies and their subsequent 
privatization have drawn in different ways from these logics (Graham and Marvin, 2001, Guy et 
al., 1999). A key question that this research seeks to address is how, in the contemporary 
context, actors draw upon these broader logics to shape organizational fields and influence 
technical change.  
Summary of the Dimensions Approach 
By presenting the relationships between infrastructures, institutions and actors in this multi-
dimensional way it is hoped to move away from linear, cause-and-effect explanations for 
change in infrastructure sectors towards a more open framing whereby different contextual 
factors can be taken into account and the ontological depth of these large scale socio-technical 
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 Although there have been cases where network operation has been opened up to competition in certain 
forms e.g. franchise bidding for natural monopoly (Williamson, 1976) or facilities based competition in 
the telecoms sector (Pollitt, 2010) 
26
 Ezzamel and Reed (2008) characterise this as an ongoing tension between ‗the simultaneous drive for 
technical efficiency and the need for symbolic legitimacy‘ i.e. ‗the symbolic and cultural prerequisites for 
legitimacy and the material and technical prerequisites for survivability‘ (2008: p.609).  
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systems can be represented. For each of the analytical dimensions the following analytical 
variables apply across both of the case studies: 
 Physical Dimension: How are the relationships between nodes, links and flows (of 
material (energy), information and revenues) being altered? How is capacity utilisation 
being achieved? What is the changing interplay between functions of a network 
(vertical) and across different networks (horizontal)?  
 Relational Dimension: What is the changing structure of the organisational-field? What 
is the outcome of differential strategies, motivations and capacities amongst a diverse 
array of actors? How are actors forming new alliances and partnerships? What are the 
changing roles of incumbents and new entrants in the organisational-field? How are 
new spaces of interaction emerging across different scales of the system? 
 Structural Dimension: In what ways do actors draw upon network logics in order to 
legitimise their actions? How are network logics being reproduced or transformed in 
different contexts? 
A key concern is whether these outcomes represent a reproduction, transformation or more 
fundamental transition in sector structures for each of the cases. 
3.5 Summary of the Analytical Framework 
The purpose of the analytical framework described above is to provide a structure whereby two 
quite distinct sector level cases in the UK can be analysed in terms of the changing relationships 
between institutions, technologies, and actors. Central to the approach is the characterisation of 
the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in distribution networks as the 
outcome of a series of interventions and interactions and contextualised by a broader 
governance regime; questioning whether this results in processes of transformation, 
reproduction or transition of sector structures. This is summarised in the following diagram: 
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Figure 3.3: Summary of analytical framework 
 
It is proposed that by developing the framework described above, valuable insights from a range 
of relevant literatures can be incorporated whilst maintaining a sense of overall coherence. Of 
course, the outcomes that will be observed are context specific but it is hoped that by providing 
an overarching analytical framework, useful generalisations across the two case studies can be 
uncovered in chapter 7. Due to the fact the unit of analysis, distribution network sectors in the 
UK, is quite broad, chapter 4 will provide a contextual background to each of the two cases by 
introducing the energy policy context in the UK and the more specific technical and institutional 
characteristics of the electricity and heat networks. This chapter will outline how the analytical 
framework can be operationalised for each of the cases by identifying more detailed analytical 
variables for each of the energy distribution sectors.  
3.6 Research Design 
The first part of this chapter discussed the conceptual and theoretical issues relating to the study 
of distribution networks, focusing in particular the complex interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies. A model was proposed which outlined the key analytical variables 
which will be considered when analysing the socio-technical dynamics of energy infrastructures 
in the case studies; this drew from a number of literatures ranging from new institutionalism to 
science and technology studies. This second part outlines some of the more practical issues 
involved in applying the analytical framework to a real world context and it serves to act as a 
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bridge between the theoretical and empirical sections of the thesis as a whole. Firstly, the 
rationale for choosing a qualitative case study approach as a basic methodology is outlined, 
following this the justification for the case study choices is outlined along with the 
national/sector level unit of analysis, and finally the specific research methods which were used 
to gather information on the cases is laid out. 
3.6.1 A Qualitative Case Study Approach 
The purpose of the empirical part of this thesis is to refine and further develop the conceptual 
and theoretical understands of energy infrastructures and their socio-technical dynamics which 
have been developed earlier in this chapter. The overarching rationale behind this is to 
contribute to ongoing debates in a number of literatures which have been discussed in chapter 
two, and doing so with a view to developing policy orientated insights into the specific 
dynamics of infrastructure networks in socio-technical transition processes. Following much of 
the institutionalist and STS literatures which were discussed in the literature review, it is argued 
that the outcomes of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies cannot be 
predicted ex-ante and should not be evaluated in terms of objective criteria such as efficiency or 
optimality. Rather, the purpose of developing an analytical framework and applying it in an 
empirical/real world context is to refine and further develop the conceptual and theoretical 
understands energy infrastructures and their socio-technical dynamics. This approach draws 
from a critical realist philosophy of science (Blaikie, 2007, Sayer, 1999, Bhaskar, 1978), where 
it is argued that knowledge is best advanced through ‗the historical interaction of theory and 
experience‘ (Proctor, 1998: p.361) in an approach to social inquiry that has been termed 
retroduction. This is a middle-range perspective which rejects the extremes of both objectivism 
and subjectivism; rather proposing that ‗the truth- content of different ideas can be compared on 
a relative basis: some (social) explanations are more adequate representations of reality than 
others‘ (Proctor, 1998: p.361).  
With this in mind, it is argued that a comparative case study approach is the most appropriate 
research strategy for this particular study. A comparative case study approach is adopted for two 
main reasons; firstly it will allow the analytical framework to be applied in a number of 
different contexts and because this type of analysis is not confined to a small number of 
variables which are measured and analysed in a linear fashion, a broader and more holistic 
account of a complex social process (Yin, 1994) such as the interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies in energy systems can be developed. This has been motivated in 
particular by the evolutionary/institutional and STS literatures discussed in chapter two which 
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have highlighted the particular importance of context in shaping the process of technical change 
for example with concepts such as the ‗selection environment‘ in evolutionary economies and 
the ‗system and its environment‘ in Hughes‘ LTS approach. A second rationale for choosing 
this approach is that case studies tend to be deployed in order to analyse processes rather than 
expected or optimal/efficient outcomes. An analysis of processes has been identified as a 
suitable strategy to identify causal mechanisms in complex social processes because they allow 
the researcher to extensively explore historical background and context (George and Bennett, 
2005). Causal mechanisms are ‗recurrent processes generating a specific kind of outcome‘ 
(Mayntz, 2004: p.237) which identify ‗frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal 
patterns‘ (Elster, 1998: p.45) and facilitate broader generalisation from a case or cases. Table 
2.2 has identified a number of causal mechanisms from the literature which will be used to 
analyse the two case studies in chapter 7 in order to explore different aspects of the interplay 
between actors, institutions and technology in energy distribution sectors. This type of causal 
analysis attempts ‗to explain a given social phenomenon - a given event, structure, or 
development - by identifying the processes through which it is generated‘ (Mayntz, 2004) and is 
in contrast to a multivariate approach which seeks to identify ‗statistical relationships among 
variables‘ (Mayntz, 2004).  
As case studies are useful for the analysis of ‗a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident‘ (Yin 1994: 13); it is argued that this is particularly suitable for the study of large scale 
and complex socio-technical systems such as energy networks. However, the case study 
approach has been criticised on a number of grounds
27
 (Flyvbjerg, 2006), e.g. that context-
dependent knowledge holds little validity and that it is difficult to make generalisations from 
one or a small number of cases, In order to avoid these pitfalls which have been associated with 
case study research, a multiple case study design has been selected where the interplay between 
                                                     
27
 Flyvbjerg (2006) refutes five of the common misunderstandings regarding case studies: 
Misunderstanding 1: ‗General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than 
concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge‘, Misunderstanding 2: ‗One cannot generalize on the 
basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development‘, 
Misunderstanding 3: ‗The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of 
a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory 
building‘: Misunderstanding 4: ‗The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to 
confirm the researcher‘s preconceived notions‘, Misunderstanding 5: ‗It is often difficult to summarize 
and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies‘. Also, George and 
Bennett (2005) argue that case studies can be used alongside and complement statistical and formal 
modelling methods. 
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actors, institutions and technologies will be analysed in two different cases, thus facilitating 
generalisability. This type of approach has been termed as instrumental case study research 
where a number of cases are developed with the purpose of analytical generalisation; this is 
contrasted with an intrinsic case where the purpose is to develop an in-depth knowledge of one 
particular case (Stake, 2005).  
3.6.2 Case Study Selection and the Unit of Analysis 
The cases which have been selected to form the basis of the study are the electricity and heat 
distribution networks in the UK. Electricity distribution networks are incumbent systems which 
have been in place in some form or another since the early/mid twentieth century in most 
industrialised countries. These are highly interconnected systems across both urban and regional 
areas and treated as natural monopolies which are organised in a regional basis in the UK. 
Electricity distribution networks transmit high voltage bulk power from the national 
transmission grid (the National Grid) and deliver it to the customer‘s meter. In doing so the 
network operator must comply with strict quality and safety codes and standards and 
periodically make investments to maintain the asset base. Traditionally this has been carried out 
in a relatively conservative manner whether by the state or a private company. However, in the 
context of the transition to low carbon energy systems, there is increasing focus on the role that 
electricity distribution networks can play in facilitating the deployment of renewable and low 
carbon generation (which is often connected to distribution networks whereas in traditional 
electricity systems generators are large scale and connected to the high voltage transmission 
network) and enabling more efficient and responsive demand side behaviours (as the electrical 
output from renewable generators tends to be less predictable than conventional generation). 
There is therefore an ongoing debate within the electricity industry as to how regional networks 
can be made more intelligent or smarter and the potential implications for the technical and 
organisational structure of distribution systems.  
In contrast, heat distribution networks are non-incumbent networks which have never been part 
of the mainstream of energy provision in the UK. In conventional energy systems, heat 
provision is typically based on each customer having an individual boiler which is connected to 
the gas grid. The alternative approach is to distribute heat, rather than gas, using a network of 
pipes which run into businesses and dwellings – this is termed district heating (DH). Due to the 
heat losses which result from distributing hot water or steam over distance, heat networks are 
typically organised on a local basis for example within a city centre or a university campus, 
however in cities such as Malmö and Copenhagen these have expanded over larger areas. As 
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chapter four will outline, in certain circumstances, depending on the density and mix of 
dwellings within an area, this can be a more energy efficient form of heat provision and 
generation because heat is typically generated using a gas-fired combined heat and power 
(CHP) plant which also generates electricity (CHP-DH). In UK cities, CHP-DH has 
traditionally not been a common technology for a variety of reasons; primarily the due to the 
national level structure of the electricity industry which has treated CHP-DH as a competitor 
and the lack of supporting sector level institutions for local energy systems (Russell, 1993). 
However, recently it has been proposed that CHP-DH should be encouraged as a low carbon 
alternative to centralised energy and can contribute to significant emissions reductions in certain 
circumstances, however a number of barriers exist to its deployment in the UK  (DECC, 2009d, 
DECC and DCLG, 2010); this will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. 
The purpose of choosing these contrasting case studies is twofold: Firstly, it is a well 
established practice when conducting case studies that extreme or polar cases be chosen in order 
to facilitate subsequent generalisation. Flyvbjerg notes: ‗This is because the typical or average 
case is often not the richest in information. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more 
information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation 
studied‘ (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Secondly, insights form transitions theory suggest that an 
understanding of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in both of these 
types of cases – structured (regime) and unstructured (niche) – is necessary to fully comprehend 
the governance challenges involved in the transition to a low carbon energy system. As one of 
the central aims of the study is to develop policy relevant insights regarding the longer term 
transition to a low carbon energy system in the UK, it is argued that selecting such extreme or 
polar cases can lead to more relevant insights for policy makers and regulators than would be 
the case if ‗a representative case or a random sample‘ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) strategy was chosen.    
There is however an issue as to the comparability of these two cases; Davies articulates this as 
establishing ‗functional equivalence between actors and agencies to capture the complexity of 
the cases‘ (Davies, 2008: p.85) – the table below summarises some of the main institutional 
differences between the two cases. 
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Table 3.1: Differences in the institutional make-up of the two cases 
In an effort to overcome these difficulties a particular focus on the UK context has been 
maintained which provides a consistent backdrop for each of the studies and facilitates both 
analytical generalisation and the extraction of relevant policy insights.  Although comparison 
between networks in different countries was considered, it was felt that a study of incumbent 
and non-incumbent sectors in the UK would contribute to a broader understanding of 
infrastructure networks in the context of the long term transition to a low carbon energy system. 
Also, because the UK has been a first mover in terms of the privatisation and liberalisation of 
energy sectors it was felt that it could be an interesting case study of the changing nature of 
energy network governance in a liberalised environment; thus addressing research questions 2 
& 3. Such a country specific analysis could then subsequently be used as a basis for 
comparisons with other countries. 
As the central aim of the study is to explore various aspects of the interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies in energy networks, the unit of analysis in each of the cases is the 
sector or meso level. Although project (e.g. a particular or part of a network where an 
innovative technology is being deployed) and firm level (a particular network operator or local 
authority) approaches were also considered as units of analysis, it was felt that such a micro-
level approach would neglect some of the important structural and political aspects of energy 
network governance which in the case of the UK is best studied at the national level (Winskel, 
1998, Russell, 1993, Russell, 1994). As a key aim of the research is to explore the changing role 
of the state in the governance of these sectors, these micro level firm and project level 
approaches were rejected in order to capture the influence of these structural dynamics. A 
similar argument regarding the appropriate level of analysis for studies of the relationship 
between technology and the environment was made by Arthur Mol in his study of Ecological 
Modernisation in the Dutch Chemicals Industry: 
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―A micro-level analysis may miss inter-firm changes and sectoral changes 
and may consider (collective) actors and factors which are in fact relevant to 
be independent variables of the social environment. A macro-level focus 
would abstract from relevant environment-induced inter-firm transformations 
by putting too much emphasis on the net national effect‖ (Mol, 1995: p.62) 
However, by deploying the analytical framework outlined earlier in the chapter, it is proposed to 
capture the key interactions taking place between the micro, meso and macro levels.  
3.6.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
Exploring the dynamics between actors, institutions and technologies in each of the cases 
necessitates that a number of practical issues had to be addressed, namely methods of data 
collection and analysis. In order to achieve some level of triangulation; i.e. ‗using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation‘ 
(Stake, 2005: p.454) the empirical chapters draw from four sources: 
 Established histories of energy systems in the UK covering the pre-nationalised, 
nationalised and early privatised periods 
 Relevant literature covering various technical, economic and institutional issues within 
contemporary energy systems 
 Policy documents including departmental consultations and white papers along with 
regulatory documents 
 A series of semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders 
Studies of UK energy policy typically delineate between three main periods; nationalisation 
(late 1940s – 1980s), privatisation (1980s-2000s) and the contemporary period since 
approximately 2000 when issues surrounding climate change and resource scarcity have begun 
to reshape the policy landscape. It is this contemporary period that is of primary concern in the 
two main empirical chapters, however the established histories proved to be a useful source in 
understanding the background and context to each of the cases (see chapter 4). In order to 
understand the contemporary issues facing energy systems and to develop an adequate 
understanding of the technical and institutional composition of these sectors, a range of 
literatures on these topics were consulted.  
Selected policy documents were reviewed firstly to provide an overview of the governance 
regime in each of the cases and also to give an outline of the most significant developments 
which have taken place within the sectors in the past ten years or so. Government departments 
and the energy regulator, Ofgem, retain significant repositories of their documents including 
white papers, consultations and regulatory documents. Accessing these documents allowed me 
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to map out the policy landscape for each of the cases and also to follow some of the key debates 
within each of the sectors; consultation documents and price control reviews for electricity 
distribution networks proved to be very useful in this regard. As it was not possible to review 
each and every policy document in this field, a selective approach was taken with documents 
relating to key moments and debates in the cases being prioritised; Appendix A contains a 
summary table of the key documents which were reviewed as part of the study. 
These policy documents provided an overview of the key events and debates across the two 
cases and were used to gain initial insights and to structure early chapter drafts. However it was 
felt that they could only provide a stylised account of developments in each of the sectors which 
in reality are shaped by the different motivations and strategies of a range of actors. In order to 
explore this, over forty semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders 
throughout the study period. The purpose of conducting these interviews was to complement the 
documentary analysis by highlighting and elucidating the key areas of contestation and 
interpretive flexibility which are shaping change in the two cases.  
In the early stages of the interview process potential interviewees were identified using a 
targeted approach. This started with existing contacts from the Transition Pathways to a Low 
Carbon Economy project and by identifying key individuals who were members of industry 
coordinating bodies such as the Electricity Networks Strategy Group. Following a number of 
initial contacts, a snowballing sampling method was also used where the interviewees would 
help in identifying relevant and influential actors. This process continued until data saturation 
was reached and the participants‘ suggestions for further interviewees began to be repeated. In 
total 41 interviews were conducted (Appendix B contains a list of all interviewees who 
participated in the study); 22 of these covered the electricity distribution case, 17 covered the 
CHP-DH case and the first two interviews covered both cases. In order to avoid any form of 
selection bias, for each of the cases every effort was made to speak to a wide range of 
stakeholders from focal organisations (DNOs and local authorities) but also actors who are less 
central such as consultants and equipment manufacturers. The table below illustrates the range 
of stakeholders interviewed as part of both cases and the number of interviews conducted in 
each category. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Stakeholder Groups Interviewed 
The interviews on average lasted for one hour and were recorded as the interviewees were 
assured anonymity.  A guide was used as an outline structure during the interviews but they 
were conducted in such as way as to allow the interviewee as much scope as possible to express 
their opinions. Key issues discussed in the interviews included: 
 The interviewees background and current role within the relevant sector 
 Opinions on the most significant technical/institutional issues facing the relevant sector 
 The interviewees personal involvement in developing technologies/projects/new 
organisations 
 Their views on how policy/regulation is affecting change 
 Opinions on how is the sector evolving and what will this mean for the types of 
interactions taking place between actors 
 Their views on the medium/long term evolution of the sector and potential implications 
for their particular organisation 
Subsequent to an interview the recording was transcribed and analysed. Analysis was a three 
step process, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998). Beginning with open coding the 
transcripts were analysed in order to extract a large number of themes and concepts which were 
broadly related to the research questions. This was done by highlighting relevant 
sentences/paragraphs in the transcripts and labelling them according to a particular theme or 
issue. Following a more theoretically informed analysis which was guided by the research 
questions, these ideas and codes were then aggregated into a smaller number of themes which 
emerged and were given separate headings. Appendix C contains an example of a coded extract 
from one of the interviews which illustrates this. Following a further process of refinement and 
analysis the most predominant and relevant themes or issues were then identified, these formed 
Stakeholder Electricity Distribution Case CHP-DH Case
Distribution Network Operator 7 -
Local Authority - 10
Academia 3 2*
Big Six' Energy Supplier 3 -
Specialist DE company/division - 2
Engineering Consultancy 6 1
Electrical Engineering Manufacturer 1 -
Energy Regulator 1 -
Government Department 1 1
Government Agency - 1
Industry Body - 2
Transmission Network Operator 2 -
*Interviews 1&2 covered both cases
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the main sub headings of the ‗interventions and interactions‘ sections in the empirical chapters. 
These are seen as the key issues, debates, and areas of interpretive flexibility which have 
punctuated and shaped the process of change in each of the organisational fields. Upon 
completing the initial drafts of the empirical chapters the interview transcripts were once again 
reviewed in order to ensure that all relevant issues were accounted for and there were no 
inconsistencies between the chapter and the data. 
When conducting research of this kind a number of confidentiality issues needed to be 
addressed. In order to reassure interviewees that data would be treated with sensitivity, I 
undertook to store any interview transcripts in a secure place, not distribute them to any other 
individuals, and to protect the anonymity of the research participants. This was in accordance 
with guidelines set out by the University of Leeds who oblige researchers to undertake an 
ethical review of their project
28
.  
The next chapter will lay out the contextual background to the two case studies and outline how 
the analytical framework has been operationalised. 
  
                                                     
28
 Ethical approval for this project was granted under Faculty Reference Number: AREA 09-018.  
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4 Overview of UK Energy Policy and Networks 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the technological and institutional 
context of the case studies and to outline on how the proposed analytical framework can be 
operationalised. This is necessary because the distribution pipes and wires which are the focus 
of this study are one part of a wider energy system which begins with the sourcing and 
extraction of raw energy (fossil fuels fuel or ambient energy e.g. wind and solar) and ends with 
the provision of an energy service such as heating, cooling or lighting to end customers. In the 
intermediary stages a number of processes take place which convert the raw material into 
various forms of energy carrier (e.g. electricity, hot water) and they are transported to sites of 
demand via infrastructure networks e.g. gas and electricity transmission, distribution networks 
etc. Of particular importance are the interactions which take place between different elements of 
energy systems e.g. the networks, generating plants and end use. The nature of these systemic 
relationships has changed quite dramatically throughout the history of modern energy systems 
and therefore it is important to situate the analysis of distribution networks in the context of the 
wider energy policy and technological environment.  
4.2 Energy in the UK 
The provision of energy in the UK has had a dramatic influence on the social and economic 
development of the country throughout the centuries from the steam powered industrial 
revolution in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries to the electrification of the country during the 20
th
 
century. These long run changes in the nature of energy provision in the UK are reflected in the 
figure below where primary energy inputs are shown from 1700 to 2008. It can be observed that 
since the middle part of the 20
th
 century the relative importance of natural gas and electricity 
have increased dramatically.  The increasing prominence of electricity and natural gas in the 
overall energy mix has of course been enabled by the development of large scale infrastructures 
such as transmission and distribution networks during this period. 
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Figure 4.1: UK primary energy demand (1700-2008) 
 
Source: (Skea et al., 2010) 
The levels of demand for energy during this period have been affected in particular by the two 
world wars and the oil crises of the 1970s. Since the oil shocks, the nature of demand has 
changed in the UK; the figure below shows the sectoral breakdown for energy demand since the 
1970s. It can be observed that there has been a decrease in demand from the industrial sector, 
which is as a result of a general trend towards a services based economy, but increases in the 
domestic and transport sectors. Currently in the UK, overall energy demand is 220.0 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent29 (DECC, 2010g) of which approximately 37% is transport, 22% 
electricity and 41% is heat (DECC, 2009d). 
                                                     
29
 This figure is for 2009 and is 6.3% lower than in 2008 – DUKES (DECC, 2010a) 
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Figure 4.2: Final Demand by Sector 1970-2008 
 
Source: (Skea et al., 2010) 
Achieving the UK‘s greenhouse emissions reductions targets of 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels 
and a renewables target of 15 % of gross final energy consumption from renewables by 2020 
presents a significant challenge. In the electricity and heating components, which this study is 
particularly interested in, although there has been a steady rise in the levels of renewables over 
the past number of years (see graph below), largely due to incentives such as the renewables 
obligation, even for the case of electricity this only comprises 6-7%.  
Figure 4.3: Growth Share of Renewables in Heating and Electricity 2004-2009 
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The figure below from the Committee on Climate Change shows the scale of the challenge 
facing key sectors in the UK economy. As part of the UK‘s decarbonisation strategy it is 
expected that the electricity and residential sectors will radically decarbonise meaning that the 
diffusion of renewable and low carbon heating and electricity technologies will need to increase 
rapidly.  
Figure 4.4: UK sectoral CO2 emissions to 2050 on an 80% emissions reduction path 
Source: (Climate Change Committee, 2008) 
The next sections will explore in more detail each of these sectors and the potential implications 
for the distribution network component of each.  
4.3 The Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) 
This sub-section gives a general introduction to the electricity supply industry (ESI) outlining 
the basic structure of the industry, it historical evolution and the most significant contemporary 
challenges facing the ESI as a whole and distribution networks in particular. Electricity systems 
in industrialised countries typically have a similar structure with the majority of electricity being 
generated in large plants which are connected to a high voltage transmission network. Currently 
there are 32 ‗Major Power Producers‘30 who generate the majority of electricity in the UK. The 
                                                     
30
 Companies whose main function is to generate electricity, includes major wind farm companies: AES 
Electric Ltd., Baglan Generation Ltd., Barking Power Ltd., British Energy plc., Centrica Energy, 
Coolkeeragh ESB Ltd., Corby Power Ltd., Coryton Energy Company Ltd., Derwent Cogeneration Ltd., 
Drax Power Ltd., EDF Energy plc., E.On UK plc., Energy Power Resources, Gaz De France, GDP Suez 
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figure below shows figures for the generation mix as of 2009.  The gas segment refers to either 
conventional gas turbines or combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants which incorporate both 
gas and steam turbines. Coal and nuclear fission are used in conventional steam turbines. Of the 
renewables segment 35.7% is wind, 20.1% is hydro and 44.1% (DECC, 2010c)
31
 is other 
renewables which includes solar PV, municipal solid waste (MSW) and sewage sludge, 
biomass, wave and tidal and landfill gas.  
Figure 4.5: Share of net electricity supplied in 2009, by fuel input 
 
Source: (DECC, 2010c) 
Generation (if greater than approximately 50MW) is connected to the high voltage transmission 
network which is either 400KV or 275KV. The purpose of the transmission network is to 
transport power from generation to sub-stations which are closer to locations of demand; this 
typically results in an overall north-south flow in GB. The transmission network in England and 
Wales is owned by National Grid and the two transmission networks in Scotland are owned by 
Scottish and Southern, and Scottish Power. National Grid is the overall system operator (TSO) 
whose job it is to ensure that the demand for electricity can be met at all times. If this is not 
ensured the frequency of the system will become imbalanced and there is a possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                           
Teesside Power Ltd., Immingham CHP, International Power Mitsui, Magnox North Ltd., Premier Power 
Ltd., RGS Energy Ltd, Rocksavage Power Company Ltd., RWE Npower plc., Scottish Power plc., 
Scottish and Southern Energy plc., Seabank Power Ltd., SELCHP Ltd., Spalding Energy Company Ltd., 
Western Power Generation Ltd. (DECC, 2010a) 
31
 Percentages for renewables were calculated from Table 5.1 on page 133 of DUKES 2010 (DECC, 
2010a) 
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failures occurring on the system. Appendix D contains a map showing the layout of the GB 
electricity transmission network and the locations of major generating stations.  
As the figure below shows, the next step in the electricity chain is to distribute power to the end 
customers.   
Figure 4.6: A Generic Electricity Distribution System 
 
Source: (Schienbein and Dagle, 2001) 
Traditionally, the central role of a distribution network has been to reliably deliver power to the 
customer within a certain voltage limits for safety. Along distribution lines transformers are 
used to progressively reduce the voltage
32
 closer to customers (or loads). There are also 
protection devices e.g. relays which ensure that voltage, current and frequency are kept within 
certain limits and if limits are exceeded these devices can isolate certain equipment if there is a 
fault somewhere on the system. The flow of electricity in a distribution system has typically 
been one way and unlike transmission networks they are passive systems as they were not 
designed to accommodate significant amounts of generation which would lead to dynamic two 
way flows; much of the case study chapter is concerned with how this is changing and 
distribution networks are needing to become more active.  
                                                     
32
 The power flowing through a line is a function of its current and voltage 
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4.3.1 The Evolution of Electricity Markets in the UK33 
In 1948 the UK ESI was nationalised by the post-war Labour government. Prior to this the 
sector was dominated by approximately 600 small scale local electricity supply undertakings 
which were owned both by private actors and municipal authorities – municipal authorities were 
the dominant players in the industry (Hannah, 1979, Hughes, 1983). The first national 
transmission grid (the ‗Gridiron‘) was constructed in the 1920s and 1930s and the Central 
Electricity Board (CEB) was created which sought to bring about standardization and 
interconnection of the many local electricity systems. There were efforts to rationalise the 
industry through voluntary coordination based on regional Joint Electricity Authorities (JEAs) 
(similar to the German model), but this failed and eventually the ESI was taken into public 
ownership by the Labour Government in 1947/48 following World war II. The nationalisation 
of the ESI also occurred alongside the taking into public ownership of the gas and coal 
industries, and it reflected a political rationality where ‗the industry regarded electricity as a 
public service to be universally available, and the monopoly structure enabled full pass-through 
of costs‘ (Parker, 1996: p.295).  
Following nationalisation, the British Electricity Authority (BEA)
34
 was formed whose job it 
was to control the generation and transmission assets and 14 Area Boards
35
 who received bulk 
power from the BEA and distributed it to customers. These were coordinated centrally by an 
Electricity Council who were also responsible for ‗central management of finance, taxation, 
industrial relations, R&D, national advertising and marketing campaigns‘(Chesshire, 1996: 
p.18).  During the early years of nationalisation in the 1950s, the need to meet an ever growing 
demand
36
 meant that the emphasis became focused on using central planning and top-down 
demand projections to coordinate network investments, thus securing a low cost of capital than 
would have been the case through market based financing. The system was operated in a non-
market hierarchical fashion which meant that generators were dispatched according to a 
predefined code.   
Following the economic recession of the 1970s, the rationality which underpinned the structure 
of the industry (expansion, growing demand) was undermined
37
 and following the election to 
                                                     
33
 This section is largely based on Hannah (1979, 1982) and Helm (2004) 
34
 This later became the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in 1957 
35
 These later became Regional Energy Companies (RECs) 
36
 Demand for electricity in the UK grew by 7% per annum between 1955-1970 (Chesshire, 1996) 
37
 Many of the predictions regarding demand growth proved to be overly optimistic as economic growth 
slowed during the 1970s resulting in ‗substantial surplus capacity‘ where the plant margin or the excess of 
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power of Margaret Thatcher‘s conservative government, the Keynesian welfare state started to 
be dismantled. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s a series of privatisations occurred across the 
energy sectors
38
 (see table below) and arrangements for the privatisation of the ESI were set out 
in the 1989 Electricity Act. 
Table 4.1: Summary of ownership changes in UK energy industries 
 
Source: (Helm, 2004: p.18) 
A program of rolling privatizations followed; in Nov 1990 the RECs were floated, in March 
1991 two generating companies National Power and PowerGen were sold, and finally, in 1995 
the transmission company, National Grid Company, was floated. The nuclear companies were 
partly privatized in 1996 with an umbrella organization, British Energy, being established.  
                                                                                                                                                           
generation capacity over demand ‗rose from 21% in 1970-71 to 42 per cent in the period 1973-1976‘ 
(Chesshire, 1996: p.27) 
38
 The 1980 competition act - the monopoly companies were opened up to scrutiny by the Monopoly and 
Mergers Commission (MMC) - the oil and gas enterprise act in 1982, the 1983 Energy Act- obliged the 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) to open up their networks to alternative sources e.g. CHP - the 
1986 Gas Act, and the 1989 Electricity Act 
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In order to bring about competition in electricity generation a wholesale market called the 
Electricity Pool was established
39
 and a licensing and regulatory regime for networks was 
established. Liberalisation of the retail markets took place towards the end of the 1990s
40
 and in 
2001 the electricity pool was replaced by NETA
41
 in England and Wales, this was subsequently 
replaced by BETTA
42
 in 2005, this covers Scotland, England and Wales. As the schematic 
below shows, unlike the Electricity Pool BETTA is a voluntary market which allows generators 
and suppliers to enter into a variety of contracts including bilateral arrangements and there is no 
central pool price. The TSO‘s role is to ensure that there is a balance between supply and 
demand and operate the balancing mechanism where after ‗gate closure‘ they review contracts 
and then accept or rejects any further offers or bids from generators and suppliers.   
Figure 4.7: Overview of BETTA Market Structure 
 
Source: (National Grid, 2011) 
                                                     
39
 This was a compulsory market where generators placed day-ahead bids to generate a certain amount of 
power. The pool price, or system marginal price (SMP), was set each half hour according to the 
‗computed unit cost of electricity from the most expensive unconstrained generation unit called on to 
operate‘ (Newbery, 1998). Unconstrained generators which were dispatched received the pool purchase 
price (PPP: a capacity constrained payment plus the SMP), unconstrained generators which were not 
dispatched received a capacity payment. RECs then supplied electricity to customers at a price based on 
the PPP plus network charges and ancillary services. The system was criticised as there was an effective 
duopoly at the time between National Power and PowerGen which led to concerns that the system could 
be gamed for example by generators being taken offline to raise the pool price (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). 
40
 Retail competition was introduced in a staged process as follows: ‗From 1 April 1990, customers with 
peak loads of more than 1 MW (about 45 per cent of the nondomestic market) were able to choose their 
supplier…From 1 April 1994, customers with peak loads of more than 100 kW were able to choose their 
supplier…Between September 1998 and May 1999, the remaining part of the electricity market (i.e. 
below 100 kW peak load) was opened up to competition‘ (DECC 2010a) 
41
 New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
42
 The British Electricity Trading Arrangements 
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Following the introduction of BETTA the ESI has become dominated by six large vertically 
integrated companies (they own retail & generation licences, and sometimes distribution and 
transmission licences also) who use long term contracts and the bilateral trading facility to 
conduct internal deals within their companies in order to reduce the risks of imbalance. As a 
result less that 5% is traded through the balancing mechanism (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). The 
schematic below shows the overall market arrangements in the ESI today: 
Figure 4.8: The Electricity Market in the UK 
 
Source: (Green, 2011) 
4.3.2 Challenges Facing the ESI and Distribution Networks 
There are a number of significant challenges facing the ESI as a whole in the coming decades. 
In their fourth carbon budget, the UK‘s Committee on Climate Change used the following graph 
to summarise the scale of the challenge in decarbonising electricity supply in order to meet the 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets which were set out in the 2008 Climate Change 
Act
43
: 
                                                     
43
 A reduction in ‗Kyoto greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (77% 
below 2005 levels)‘ (CCC, 2008). There is also a renewables target of 15% of all energy by 2020, which 
has been translated into 30% of all electricity from renewables by 2020 
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Figure 4.9: Trajectory for decarbonising the power sector (2010-2050) 
 
Source: (Climate Change Committee, 2010: p.243) 
The red line shows an increase in the overall demand for electricity because the ‗costs of 
reducing carbon-intensity in the power sector are generally lower than doing so in other sectors‘ 
(Climate Change Committee, 2010: p.243) it is therefore likely that there will be a large scale 
electrification of much of the heating and transport sectors (through heat pumps and electric 
vehicles respectively). It is expected however that there will be some demand side efficiencies 
which will offset the need for greater levels of investment. This increase in demand combined 
with expected plant closures
44
  will necessitate a cumulative new build of over 45GW by 2022 
(Climate Change Committee, 2008) with approximately 30% of electricity being generated from 
renewable sources (DECC, 2009f). During the 2020s it is expected that 30-40GW worth of 
investments in low carbon generation will be required to meet the growing demand due to the 
increase in electrification of transport and heat (CCC, 2010).  
This poses significant challenges to the electricity distribution sector in the UK.  In conventional 
electricity system, as described above, large scale generators are typically connected to a 
                                                     
44
 The EU‘s Large Combustion Plant Directive means that a number of coal generating stations will close. 
Also, a number of nuclear plants are nearing the end of their lives and will need to be decommissioned.  
―The introduction of the Large Combustion Plants Directive (LCPD) has required large electricity 
generators to meet more stringent air quality standards since 1 January 2008. Plant that has ―opted out‖ of 
this obligation will have to close by the end of 2015 or after 20,000 hours of operation from 1 January 
2008, whichever is the sooner.  This affects some 12 GW of coal and oil-fired generating plant which will 
therefore now close by 1
st
 January 2016. However, the exact timing of these closures is a commercial 
matter for plant owners, taking into account factors such as other environmental restrictions and the state 
of repair of the plants. Consequently, it is not possible to predict with certainty the precise timing of the 
impact of the LCPD on generation capacity, particularly if a replacement station is planned to be 
constructed on the same site.‖ (National Grid, 2011)  
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transmission system. Because there needs to be a real-time balance between electricity supply 
and demand in order to ensure system security, the flexibility required to achieve this has been 
built into the transmission system which is actively managed and can respond to real time flows 
of energy and information. Distribution networks (and the demand side) have essentially been 
passive elements within the overall system with little in-built flexibility and real time 
management of the system (Strbac, 2008, McDonald, 2008, Farhangi, 2009). There are three 
main reasons why this is likely to change in the future: 
1. It is likely that an increasing proportion of low carbon generation, particularly small 
scale renewables
45
 and CHP, will be connected directly to the distribution networks or 
on the customer‘s side of the meter. If this connected generation exceeds local demand 
this will change the direction of flows on the networks. This will necessitate a more 
active approach to managing distribution networks
46
, similar to transmission networks, 
in order to facilitate these connections whilst ensuring that the networks fulfil their 
basic functions. 
2. As demand increases due to the electrification of heat and transport the flow of 
electricity through the distribution lines will increase, particularly on the low voltage 
11KV lines in built up areas. Improving the capacity management through the 
utilisation of information processing technologies will help to off-set the expensive 
reinforcement of these lines (Strbac et al., 2010, Baker et al., 2010). 
3. In the future the demand side will become a more active component in the electricity 
system. This is because as increasing levels of intermittent renewable generators are 
connected to the system balancing supply and demand will become increasingly 
complex and will benefit from a more flexible demand side. This will also reduce the 
need for large capacity margins and network reinforcements (Strbac et al., 2010) and 
help with efforts to reduce the per capita electricity demand and promote the more 
efficient use of electricity. Because customers are connected to the distribution 
networks, these systems will become an increasingly important part of developing a 
more interactive relationship between customers and the electricity system.   
                                                     
45
 For example, a feed-in tariff subsidy has been introduced for small scale renewable generators (under 
5MW); this provides a fixed subsidy for every kilowatt hour of electricity produced. 
46
 More generation connected to the grids will increase the fault current and runs the risk of increasing the 
fault levels. There are ways of overcoming through the use of power electronic interfaces (Green T.C. and 
Hernández Arámburo C.A., 2006). The second major issue is voltage control. Using more flexible 
transformers e.g. with on-load-tap changers can help to improve the voltage profile of distribution lines 
with more dynamic flows. 
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As a result of these issues facing distribution networks, concepts such as ‗The Smart Grid‘47 and 
active and intelligent distribution systems have become increasingly prominent – the figure 
below illustrates how a more complex and dynamic relationship between energy and 
information flows are a key aspect of this: 
Figure 4.10: Illustration of a smart grid concept 
 
Source: (EPRI, 2011) 
 Essentially these concepts refer to ways in which distribution systems can facilitate a low 
carbon future by improving capacity management and becoming more similar to actively 
managed transmission systems; thus avoiding the need for conventional solutions i.e.  
expanding the networks – this is illustrated in the figure below: 
                                                     
47
 Defined as ‗An electricity network which makes use of information and communications technologies, 
enabling more dynamics ‗real-time‘ flows of information on the network and more interaction between 
suppliers and consumers‘ (CCC,2010: p.273) 
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Figure 4.11: Relative levels of system capacity under centralized and distributed control 
strategies 
 
Source: (Djapic et al., 2007) 
In the UK context, a recent scenarios report published by Ofgem (Ault et al., 2008) outlined five 
different potential futures for the transmission and distribution networks in 2050 (summarised in 
the table below). These scenarios show that there is a wide range of potential technical futures 
for the distribution networks ranging from a scenario which is characterised by dispersed micro-
grids which are managed on a local basis, to one which sees an expansion of the current 
networks to meet a growing demand.  
Table 4.2: Summary of the LENS Scenarios 
Big Transmission and Distribution (T&D) — in which transmission system operators (TSOs) are at 
the centre of networks activity. Network infrastructure development and management continues as 
expected from today‘s patterns, while expanding to meet growing demand and the deployment of 
renewable generation. 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) — in which energy services companies are at the centre of 
developments in networks, doing all the work at the customer side. Networks contract with such 
companies to supply network services. 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) — in which distribution system operators take on a central 
role in managing the electricity system. Compared to today, distribution companies take much more 
responsibility for system management including generation and demand management, quality and 
security of supply, and system reliability, with much more distributed generation. 
Micro-grids — in which consumers are at the centre of activity in networks. The self-sufficiency 
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concept has developed very strongly in power and energy supplies. Electricity consumers take much 
more responsibility for managing their own energy   supplies and demands. As a consequence, 
microgrid system operators (MSOs) emerge to provide the system management capability to enable 
customers to achieve this with the new technologies. 
Multi-purpose Networks — in which network companies at all levels respond to emerging policy and 
market requirements. TSOs still retain the central role in developing and managing networks but 
distribution companies also have a more significant role to play. The network is characterised by 
diversity in network development and management approaches. 
Source: (Ault et al., 2008): Table taken from Pollitt (2009)   
With this uncertainty in mind regarding the range of potential transition pathways for electricity 
distribution networks in the future, the following table outlines how the analytical framework 
can be operationalised: 
Table 4.3: Operationalising the Analytical Framework for the Electricity Distribution 
Case 
The Governance Regime for Electricity Distribution 
 How are distribution network regulated in the UK? 
 How does energy policy influence network regulation? What is the regulatory style in the UK? 
 What are the political rationalities, institutional relations and key instruments/tools which 
underpin the modes of governing distribution networks? 
 Who are the network operators and how are their businesses structured and operated? 
Interventions and Interactions 
 How have technical changes influenced the dynamics of the sector? 
 How have DNOs dealt with the issue of DGs connecting to their networks? 
 What is the changing role of the customer and what does this mean for DNOs? 
 How has the regulatory framework changed during the period of study? 
 How are DNOs deploying innovative technologies on their networks as a long term strategy for 
the transition to a low carbon energy system? 
Outcomes 
Physical Dimension 
 How have flows of energy, information and revenues changed? 
 How is capacity management being achieved? Are system economies being achieved? 
Relational Dimension 
 How have DNOs interacted vertically with other actors in the value chain 
 How have DNOs interacted horizontally with actors such as equipment manufacturers 
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 How has the relationship between the regulator and the network companies changed? 
 How has the relationship between network regulation and energy policy changed? 
Structural Dimension 
 How do actors in the organisational field draw on different network logics to frame and 
legitimise their actions? 
4.4 Combined Heat and Power with District Heating (CHP-DH) 
The basic principle behind combined heat and power (CHP) technology is that heat (hot water 
or steam) and electrical power are produced simultaneously at the same site. Today in the UK, 
as in most other developed nations, the vast majority of electricity is generated at large 
centralised generating stations and transported long distances via a high voltage transmission 
grid and regional distribution systems – as described above. Heat, particularly at the domestic 
level, is predominantly supplied by natural gas with individual boilers in each dwelling. This 
emerged due to the UK‘s abundance of North Sea natural gas reserves and the legacy of town 
gas infrastructures in many of the major cities across the country. District heating (DH) on the 
other hand is organised on the basis of networking hot water or steam, rather than gas. This 
involves an energy centre, which is  typically a gas-fired CHP plant connected to the regional 
distribution gas and electricity networks, supplying a locality with heat via a piped distribution 
network and the pipes and radiators within buildings (Roberts, 2008). The electricity is typically 
fed back into the public distribution grid but due to the proximity, the power will tend to be 
consumed by local loads.  
A number of fuels can be used in the process such as natural gas, landfill and sewage gas, fuel 
and gas oils, coal, lignite and coke, biomass and biogas, solid waste (e.g. refuse, tyres), waste 
gases (e.g. refinery off gas) and waste process heat (IET, 2007). The figure below shows that in 
the UK the vast majority of fuel used in CHP plants is natural gas:  
-109- 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Types of Fuel used in CHP in 2004 & 2005 
 
Source: (DEFRA, 2007) 
CHP-DH schemes benefit from proximity economies as there are less electrical losses
48
 and the 
heat produced can be distributed locally more efficiently. Also, economies of scope are 
achieved by supplying electricity and heat simultaneously (co-generation), thus increasing the 
efficiency of fuel utilisation. Currently the aggregate efficiency of such CHP plants in the UK is 
approaching 70%; as oppose to 40% for power generating plants (Pollitt and Kelly, 2010) where 
the waste heat is ‗dumped‘. In cases where the most modern gas turbines are utilised this can 
exceed 80% for CHP, also the economies of scope can be improved by deploying absorption 
chillers to provide chilled water as well as heat and power, a process known as ‗tri-generation‘.  
Economies of scale in the provision of heat are achieved by balancing and sequencing a diverse 
set of loads, therefore more efficient fuel utilisation can be brought about than with individual 
boilers which often operate at part load and the performance of the boiler is less efficient 
(Roberts, 2008). Also, schemes with a distribution network have the potential to connect to a 
range of heat sources aside from CHP plants such as distilleries and electrical transformer 
stations (Roberts, 2008) – these benefits vary from location to location where successful 
schemes tend to rely on a dense and diverse set of loads and often a large anchor load such as a 
public building (university, library etc.) which can act as a stable and long-term customer.   
                                                     
48
 In centralised systems electricity distribution and transmission thermal losses account for 7-9% of 
power consumption. These benefits are poorly recognised in transmission and distribution charging 
regimes. 
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There is a large upfront capital cost involved with a heat distribution network; ‗the capital and 
installation costs of the energy-distribution network then tend to become the pre-dominant cost, 
i.e. exceeding the cost of the CHP plant, and the scheme is likely to become more of a public 
service than a private-sector profitable business‘ (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996). However, ‗if 
the differences between heat production cost and heat selling price is high enough the DHN 
capital cost can be recovered over time‘(PÖYRY, 2009). Key variables include the cost of fuels 
supplied, the spark spread (‗the relationship between the cost of fuel inputs and the price for 
which electricity production can be sold‘ (Toke and Fragaki, 2008)), and the nature of the loads 
(customers) within the reach of the network. 
Despite the potential efficiency benefits, CHP-DH has not developed to the same scale as other 
European countries. In the UK, electrical power from CHP accounts for approximately 6% of 
total capacity, with 98% of this being stand-alone industrial plants
49
 and only 2% district 
heating (Pollitt and Kelly, 2010); accounting for only 2% of overall heat demand (PÖYRY, 
2009) and 1% of households (Roberts, 2008). This is in contrast to Scandinavian countries; for 
example in Finland and Denmark district heating accounts for 49% and 60% of total supply 
respectively, and in Vienna 36% is supplied via heat pipes (PÖYRY, 2009). There are a number 
of reasons for this; for example in a country such as Denmark, due to the colder climate there is 
a greater demand for heat - in Copenhagen there are 2,900 ‗heat degree days‘50 per year while 
the figure in London is 1,700 - therefore the economic viability of CHP-DH is greater. This was 
helped by the fact that many of the Scandinavian countries have set electricity tariffs at 
beneficial rates for CHP generation (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). 
A unique feature of CHP-DH is its reliance on strong local energy institutions to successfully 
develop schemes. Due to the public good characteristics, high upfront capital cost, the need for 
large anchor loads and the planning and legal complexities involved, in most cases local 
authorities tend to be at the centre of schemes, or the focal actor. Strong local government 
involvement in coordinating a range of actors has been a significant feature of the diffusion of 
district heating in Scandinavian countries (Summerton, 1992). In these countries municipal 
authorities tend to have had a much greater role than in the UK in the provision of energy 
services and shaping energy institutions (Lehtonen and Nye, 2009). 
                                                     
49
 ‗Much industrial CHP is concentrated in a few industries which have both a high overall energy usage 
and a ratio of heat to power needs which suits CHP well: chemicals, refineries, paper and board, food and 
drink, iron and steel‘ (Brown, 1994) 
50
 ―…the difference between 15.5o C (60o F) and the daily mean (average) temperature when the latter is 
less than 15.5
o C.‖ (Roberts, 2008) 
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4.4.1 Historical Overview of CHP-DH in the UK 
When the electricity sector was nationalised in 1947/1948 there was already underway a strong 
technological trajectory towards the interconnection of the fragmented municipal electricity 
systems and the aggregation of loads in order to achieve economies of scale in electricity 
generation. Although there were a number of significant CHP-DH schemes operating in the pre-
war period, such as the Bloom Street power station in central Manchester and Battersea power 
station in London, many of the smaller municipal undertakings (private and local authority 
owned) which had dominated the ESI were essentially bypassed by the construction of the 
‗Gridiron‘ – a high voltage transmission system which connected the largest power stations – 
throughout the 1920s and1930s. Throughout the nationalised period from 1948 until the 1980s 
there were short periods when interest in CHP-DH was heightened, but this tended to result in 
the formulation of grand plans and strategies which resulted in little material outcome (Russell, 
1986). One such ‗hype-cycle‘ (Verbong et al., 2008) was during the reconstruction period 
immediately following World War II where a number of local authorities received funding to 
develop schemes e.g. Birmingham, Manchester, Coventry, Pimlico and a number of the new 
towns (Russell, 1993: p.35). Russell notes that thirty five schemes ‗reached the stage of 
preliminary plans and costings‘ but eventually most were scaled back for a number of reasons 
e.g. cost and inability to secure a heat source from the ESI. Also, because the role of local 
authorities in the energy industry had been diminished following nationalisation, and central 
government‘s attitude to CHP-DH ‗was characterised by ambivalence‘ reflecting ‗conflicting 
interests and opinions within government and among advisers‘ (Russell, 1993: p. 38), district 
heating lacked both the national/sector level supporting institutions and local level leadership 
and coordination.  
The public electricity companies tended to have free reign over technology related decisions 
often with little political interference and, due to coal supply shortages and blackouts in the 
1940s, attention was focused on increasing centralised electricity generating capacity rather than 
local CHP-DH schemes. Overall therefore ‗CHP was seen as marginal to the main thrust of 
growth and operation of the supply industry in large centralised condensing stations, 
increasingly remote from major heat loads‘ (Russell, 1993: p.40). Although a number of 
strategy documents and visions were produced during this periods; ‗the eventual outcomes of 
visionary plans for heat networks in major cities and the many smaller projects around the 
country was a pathetic handful of DH schemes, many were much reduced from their planned 
size‘ (Russell, 1993: p.40).  
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The oil shocks of the 1970s led to a renewed interest in the potential of CHP to deliver greater 
levels of fuel efficiency than centralised generating plant; most notably in Nordic countries and 
the Netherlands who were heavily dependent on imported fuels. Due to the discovery of North 
Sea oil and gas reserves this was less the case in the UK; however there were a number of 
reports commissioned to assess the potential for CHP-DH in major UK cities. The 1979 
Marshall Group report recommended a greater degree of national coordination in the form of a 
national heat board and the ‗resulting Combined Heat-and-Power Group of the government 
concluded that CHP-DH would be important for the UK when oil and natural gas became scarce 
fuels (…) it recommended setting up of CHP-DH demonstration schemes and a national Heat 
Board. However, these two recommendations were subsequently rejected by the now defunct 
Department of Energy (DoE)‘ (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996).  
The subsequent Atkins report of 1982 was commissioned in order to identify suitable locations 
for CHP-DH in UK cities. Recommended were Belfast, Glasgow, Liverpool, London, Sheffield 
and Tyneside. Eventually Belfast, Edinburgh and Leicester were granted funding (£750,000 in 
1985) under the ‗lead city scheme‘ (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996) and later on Sheffield, 
London and Newcastle were selected.  Writing in 1996, Babus'Haq and Probert (1996) argue 
that ‗To date, the progress in the implementation of CHP-DH in the three lead cities, as well as 
the other three privately supported cities has been disappointing‘ (Babus'Haq and Probert, 
1996). The scheme in Belfast did not go ahead due to a lack of local government involvement 
and in Edinburgh and Newcastle ‗the predicted rates of return on the proposed investments for 
the Belfast and Edinburgh schemes were too low to attract finance solely from the private 
sector‘ (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996). Successful schemes were however developed in 
Sheffield and Leicester. In the case of Leicester ‗development started in 1987 with a planned 
DH network across large parts of the city and a combined-cycle cogeneration system‘ 
(Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996), currently the scheme is one of the largest in the UK. In 
Sheffield a large scheme based around a waste incinerator was initiated in 1988. 
In his history of district heating in the UK Russell (1993) points to a number of factors that 
account for the lack of development of CHP-DH during the nationalised period: the lack of an 
institutional framework to support ‗the distribution of two products‘, CHP‘s ‗possible value for 
energy saving‘, this was not in line with the expansionary model of the ESI which relied on 
demand growth, and the fact that energy policy at the national level tended to prioritise the 
interests of the publically owned electricity companies thus negating the benefits of local energy 
provision. 
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Since the 1980s the overarching institutional dynamic within the energy sector as a whole has 
been the progressive introduction of market liberalisation and the eventual privatisation of state 
owned assets in 1990. The 1983 Energy Act provided ‗the first legislative support for CHP‘, as 
it allowed a generator to ‗buy electricity from Local Electricity Boards (LEBs) for its own use 
or the use of its customers‘, to ‗sell its privately generated electricity to the LEBs‘, and to ‗use 
the national transmission and distribution network for its own use or the use of its customers‘ 
(Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996). There was ‗a duty on the regional distribution boards to ―adopt 
and support‖ combined heat and power‘ (Brown, 1994) under the 1983 Act as they had to 
guarantee that ‗any company with power to export had a market for that power‘. However ‗the 
price varied from year to year and was subject to the changes that the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) made in its bulk supply tariff‘ (Brown, 1994 p.174). Babus'Haq and 
Probert (1996) note that, although the intention was to get the CEGB to ‗promote the sale of 
heat in the same way that they had developed the nationwide electricity grids‘, in its 
implementation ‗the Act mainly helped those investors in industrial and small scale CHP 
applications‘ rather than investment in local infrastructure (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996 p.51).  
Although the tentative steps towards the opening up of the electricity market in the 1983 Act 
had little material effect on CHP diffusion (see graph below), the eventual de-regulation of the 
electricity trading market following the 1989 Electricity Act saw a more rapid increase in the 
diffusion rate of CHP: 
Figure 4.13: Growth of CHP in the UK (1977-2006) 
 
Source: (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) 
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Following liberalisation of the wholesale electricity generating market the newly privatised 
companies National Power and PowerGen began to take an interest in CHP. They setup 
specialist co-generation companies (National Power Cogen and PowerGen CHP respectively) 
which were particularly focused on marketing CHP to industrial customers and along with this a 
number of the RECs began to sell small scale CHP systems to commercial customers
51
 (Brown, 
1994). Also, the Combined Heat and Power Association (CHPA) was set-up in this period in 
order to represent the interests of the emerging sector. Incentives for CHP were put in place 
during this period such as a Climate Change Levy (CCL) exemption for units which meet 
environmental standards under ‗CHP Quality Assurance (CHPQA) programme‘  and an 
‗enhanced capital allowance‘ which allowed ‗companies installing CHP [to] write off their taxes 
on profits against the value of the CHP capital investment in the year in which the investment 
was made‘ (Toke and Fragaki, 2008).  
The growth in CHP was part of a overarching trend towards investment in more efficient and 
flexible gas turbines which became economically viable following liberalisation (Winskel, 
2002, Watson, 2004). However, although there was a significant increase in CHP, the majority 
of new investments which were made in medium sized CCGT electricity plants did not capture 
the heat. The demand in a competitive environment for plants to be built cheaply with short 
construction periods meant that new gas plants tended to be located far away from built up areas 
closer to main gas lines as land was cheaper and there were less planning delays (Kelly and 
Pollitt, 2010). The lack of a regulated tariff for the output from CHP, the time and upfront 
capital cost associated with laying distribution pipes and the time and difficulty involved in 
developing a market for the heat meant that there was no significant uptake of CHP-DH during 
this period unlike Nordic countries.  
4.4.2 Challenges facing the Heat Sector and Networks 
Heat demand constitutes approximately 41% of final energy consumption in the UK (Speirs et 
al., 2010) and in households the vast majority of heat is provided through gas
52
 with 18-20 
million gas boilers installed in dwellings (DECC, 2011b). As of the mid-2000s, the UK has 
become a net importer of gas (POSTNOTE, 2004, Watson, 2010) and this has become 
problematic as it supplies approximately 40% of total UK energy, and because the gas and oil 
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 ‗Midlands Electricity established Cogen systems in 1991 to market packaged systems. Also in 1992, 
three RECs – London, Northern and NORWEB – each formed a joint venture company with the 
established manufacturer and installer, Combined Power Systems, to market units across the country‘ 
(Brown, 1996: p.175) 
52
 Approximately 81% gas, and around 8% electricity and oil (BERR, 2008) 
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price remain to be completely decoupled (Stevens, 2010), the recent rise in oil prices have 
raised concerns over the long term energy security implications of this heavy reliance on gas.  
In order to reduce carbon emissions and reduce the reliance on imported gas, the government 
has put in place a target of 12% of heat to be supplied from renewable sources by 2020. As the 
graph below shows, the UK is starting from a low base with only 1% approx of final heat 
consumption from renewables (Friends of the Earth, 2010).  
Figure 4.14: Percentage of total final consumption of heat from renewable sources, 2007 
and 2008 
 
Source: (DECC, 2010e: p.82) 
As the figure shows, counteries with a high penetration of CHP and district heating such as 
Denmark and Finland, tend to have a greater percentage of their heat supplied from renewable 
sources, particularly biomass. Although the government has set targets for CHP in the past, 
these have not been met
53
; however, a number of recent government white papers have cited 
district heating networks as an important enabler for the more efficient utilisation of gas and the 
diffusion of renewable heating technologies (DECC, 2009d, DECC and DCLG, 2010). 
It has been well documented that heat networks in particular have faced a number of barriers to 
their development in the UK. Stewart Russell, in his history of CHP-DH during the nationalised 
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 A target was set in 1993 as part of the climate change programme to reach 5 GW CHP capacity by 
2000 which was not achieved and in 2000 a 10 GW of good quality CHP capacity target was set by 2010 
which again was not met (Pollitt and Kelly, 2010) 
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period, noted that district heating did not take off in the UK due to a lack of local level 
leadership and an absence of a national level framework to support the development of 
decentralised energy (Russell, 1986). A recent report by the PÖYRY engineering consultancy 
for DECC largely reiterated this and pointed to a range of economic and financial barriers to 
CHP-DH (PÖYRY, 2009).    
Recognising CHP-DH therefore as a niche technology which has not been part of the 
mainstream energy regime in the UK, the following table outlines how the analytical framework 
can be operationalised for the case study: 
Table 4.4: Operationalising the Analytical Framework for the CHP-DH Case 
The Governance Regime for CHP-DH 
 Which local authorities are involved in CHP-DH and to what extent? 
 What policy areas and government departments influence the CHP-DH sector? 
 What are the political rationalities, institutional relations and key instruments/tools which 
constitute the modes of governing CHP-DH? 
Interventions and Interactions 
 How do local authorities engage in energy issues and how has this been evolving? 
 What is motivating a small number of local authorities to develop CHP-DH schemes? 
 What are the different approaches being taken to CHP-DH and how are the different schemes 
structured and organised? 
 What are the financial arrangements surrounding CHP-DH? 
 How does CHP-DH interact with the incumbent energy regime? 
Outcomes 
Physical Dimension 
 How have flows of energy, information and revenues influenced change? 
 How are system economies being achieved? 
Relational Dimension 
 How have local authorities engaged with public and private sector actors to develop schemes? 
 Is there a CHP-DH sector in the UK? How is this being coordinated? 
 What is the nature of the national and local level interacts? 
Structural Dimension 
 How do actors in the organisational field draw on different network logics to frame and 
legitimise their actions? 
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4.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter provided a brief overview of energy policy in the UK which described the broader 
context within which energy distribution sectors operate. It was outlined that the transition to a 
low carbon economy in the UK is placing a significant emphasis on achieving emissions 
reductions via the decarbonisation of energy supply along with demand reductions and energy 
efficiency measures. The chapter outlined the challenges that this poses for electricity and heat 
distribution networks which, for different reasons, traditionally have not been an active or 
prominent part of the energy system as a whole. By referring to the analytical framework which 
was developed in the previous chapter, each of the case studies were considered in more detail 
by outlining key analytical variables which relate to the governance and socio-technical 
characteristics of the sectors; this will guide the discussion in the following two chapters.  
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5 The Electricity Distribution Sector in the UK 
This chapter charts the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in the electricity 
distribution sector. The chapter begins by focusing on two particular issues - the connection of 
distributed generation and promoting flexible demand side behaviour - and their effect on the 
governance regime for electricity distribution. These issues have both been shaped in recent 
years by the liberalisation agenda and concerns over climate change and in a number of ways 
have begun to challenge existing institutions and modes of governing the sector. The 
interventions and interactions section charts the emergence of these issues and how the 
governance regime is changing and adapting. Following this, the outcomes section summarises 
how these co-evolutionary processes are influencing the physical, relational and structural 
dynamics of electricity distribution in the UK. The chapter begins by introducing the 
governance regime and the key actors within the sector. 
5.1 Electricity Distribution in the UK 
The current structure of the electricity distribution sector emerged following the 1989 Electricity 
act which established licences for 14 private regional electricity companies (RECs). RECs 
carried out a similar function to the nationalized Area Boards; however, rather than accepting 
bulk power from a monopoly generator (the CEGB), they received power from the electricity 
pool, and along with owning proportionate shares in the transmission network, their role was to 
distribute and supply electricity in their respective areas. Following the Utilities Act in 2000 and 
the introduction of retail competition, a specialised distribution licence was created for the 14 
areas. Over the years there have been a number of mergers and acquisitions, and today there are 
seven companies who operate the 14 distribution licences - these are termed Distribution 
Network Operators (DNOs). There are also a small number of independent DNOs (IDNOs) who 
do not operate in a specific area but compete with incumbent DNOs for new connections
54
. The 
map of the UK below shows the companies and their respective areas
55
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 For example EDF Energy (IDNO) Ltd, a subsidiary of EDF energy, is developing the electricity 
distribution system for the 2012 Olympic Games 
55
 This study focuses on England, Wales and Scotland. Northern Ireland Electricity is a transmission and 
distribution company which is regulated separately by the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility 
Regulation (NIAUR). There is a high level of cooperation and interconnection between NI and the 
Republic of Ireland this makes the institutional context more unique and outside the bounds of this study 
(see http://www.allislandproject.org/en/homepage.aspx) 
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Figure 5.1: Map of DNOs in the UK 
 
Source: (Nationwide Utilities, 2011)
56
 
A number of the DNOs are separate business units of larger energy companies (the ‗big six‘) 
who also operate in the electricity and gas retail markets and the wholesale generation market, 
whilst others are specialised asset management companies e.g. CE Electric.  
Under the 1989 and 2000 Acts, the main duties of DNOs are as follows (ILEX, 2002): 
 To ‗develop and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of 
electricity supply‘ (Section 50) 
 To ‗facilitate competition in the supply and generation of electricity‘ (Section 50) 
 To make a connection on request (Sections 16) and to recover expenditure for ‗any 
expenses reasonably incurred‘ (Section 46) 
 To ‗secure all monies owed for both delivery of energy (distribution use of system 
charges) and for connection‘ (ILEX, 2002) 
Due to the fact that distribution networks are organised as regional monopolies, the distribution 
of electricity is treated largely as a non-competitive activity which is governed by a sector 
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 This is as of 2010. In 2011 Central Networks was purchased by the PPL Corporation who also own 
Western Power Distribution.  
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specific regulator - Ofgem
57
. Ofgem is non-departmental agency but it shares with the Secretary 
of State the responsibilities of regulating the gas and electricity networks and overseeing the 
operation of the wholesale and retail markets for energy (MacKerron and Boira-Segarra, 1996). 
Ofgem‘s main duty with regards to electricity distribution is to ensure that the DNOs fulfil their 
licence obligations whilst remaining financially viable. In order to do this, the regulator must 
strike a balance between the interests of present and future customers (e.g. the levels of 
investment that should be made and whether they should be funded through price increases 
today or through future borrowing) and divide economic rents between the shareholders of 
private companies and customers (the levels of profit of the DNOs) in an equitable manner 
(Surrey, 1996). Any changes made to the terms of the distribution licence must be jointly agreed 
by Ofgem and the companies prior to parliamentary approval. If agreement cannot be found, a 
case can be referred to the Competition Commission for adjudication. 
5.2 Characterising the governance regime 
Broadly there are two approaches to the governance of natural monopoly networks which have 
been employed by regulators. The first is where the regulator focuses on the input costs or the 
revenue requirements of operating the networks and the company is compensated for the costs 
that it incurs by charging prices based on an agreed rate-of-return on investment. This ‗cost of 
service‘ approach means that there is no risk for the company, as their costs are covered, or for 
the regulator as there are no excess profits left to the company (Joskow, 2008). However, it has 
been argued that this is an inappropriate mechanism as linking company profits to the size of 
their asset base increases the likelihood that companies may over-invest in order to expand their 
capital base (Averch and Leland, 1962). At the opposite end of the spectrum is a form of 
regulation where constraints are placed on the prices that companies can charge ex-ante. Here 
the regulator specifies how much tariffs can increase plus or minus a specified amount; in 
theory this places an incentive on companies to run their businesses in a more efficient manner 
as they benefit from any savings they achieve i.e. ‗networks are set targets upfront and are 
encouraged to outperform these‘ (Utilityweek, 2009). However placing the obligation on private 
companies runs the risk of under-investment and poor service quality. Also, companies may 
game the system by providing inadequate information to the regulator regarding their 
underlying costs, thus making excess profits.  
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 Following the 1989 Act, the RECs were regulated by the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER). 
Following the 2000 Utilities Act, OFFER was merged with the gas regulator to form the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 
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This latter approach has been favoured in many countries, including the UK which since the 
1980s has been at the forefront of the liberalisation and privatisation of network industries, 
along with Chile and New Zealand (Voß, 2007). The particular form of price regulation which 
has been applied to the UK was designed by the academic economist Stephen Littlechild 
(Littlechild, 1983) and is based on setting price-caps for groups of customers which are linked 
to the rate of inflation over a specified period of time (5 years
58
); in theory giving autonomy to 
the companies in reducing costs and finding efficiencies. Beesley and Littlechild (1989) 
summarise this approach which has been termed RPI-x in the UK: 
―…for a predescribed period of four to five years, the company can make any 
changes it wishes to process, provided that the average price of a specified 
basket of its goods and services does not increase faster than RPI-x, where 
RPI is the retail Price Index (i.e. the rate of inflation) and X is a number 
specified by the government…‖ (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989) 
This mechanism was designed to ‗mimic the market‘ and was indicative of boarder trends in 
society such as the move away from a Keynesian interventionist state and a reorientation of 
energy policies towards the use of prices to allocate resources ‗efficiently‘ (Mitchell, 2008). 
Over time, the RPI-x model has become more complex with separate incentive schemes for 
operating expenditures (OPEX)
59
, capital expenditures (CAPEX)
60
, the quality of service, and 
network losses (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011). 
As part of what has been a five-yearly price control review process
61
, Ofgem set an initial price 
(Po) and which is then linked to the RPI which sets a basis for how prices will change from year 
to year. Then, through a process which is described below, they determine an x factor which is a 
target productivity change factor for the companies to achieve (Joskow, 2008) and hence the 
price for the price control period (P1) . Joskow (2008) summarises this in the following 
equation: 
 
 
The aim of the process is to estimate the likely OPEX for an efficient DNO and to set Po i.e. a 
return on the regulated asset base
62
 which is adjusted for investment requirements and 
                                                     
58
 The risks to the regulated company are reduced the longer the period between price controls 
59
 The amount of money needed to run the network operator business 
60
 ‗The amount of money needed to invest in the distribution network in order to maintain required 
service levels‘ (ILEX, 2002) 
61
 The first distribution price control review was in 1990 (DCPR1) and the most recent was DCPR5 in 
2010 
62
 The worth of existing network assets 
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depreciation
63
 (ILEX, 2002) - this has been set each five year period. This is termed the allowed 
revenue of the DNO, as summarised in the schematic below: 
Figure 5.2: DNOs’ allowed revenues 
 
Source: (ILEX, 2002) 
The price control review process begins with the publication of a consultation document 18 
months prior to the commencement of the price control period; this generally centres on topics 
such as the timetable for the price control process and particular issues that need to be dealt with 
during the process. Six months prior to the deadline, a ‗Final Proposals‘ document is published 
which includes the first estimates for the calculation of the x factor. Companies then submit 
business plans ‗for operating and capital expenditure requirements‘ and the x-factors for each 
DNO are determined in a two step process: Initially an efficiency analysis which focuses on 
CAPEX requirements is carried out by management consultants, and a subsequent 
benchmarking exercise using a regression analysis is conducted to determine the efficient level 
of controllable OPEX for each DNO (Giannakis et al., 2005). The companies are compared 
using an efficiency frontier of the ‗best practice DNOs in the sector‘ (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007) 
and a target is set for the allowed OPEX ‗such that it requires them to close a specific 
proportion of their performance gap relative to the frontier during the price control period. In 
addition, the DNOs are given a general technical efficiency improvement target that is common 
to all DNOs‘ (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011). The total allowed revenues of the DNO is therefore 
                                                     
63
 The regulator decides on a specific rate of return for existing and new investments and this reflects the 
cost of capital for DNOs to either fund their activities either through equity or borrowing based on a 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (ILEX, 2002). Theoretically DNOs should be allowed to 
recover their costs i.e. capital costs (WACC x RAB), operating costs, and depreciation costs. 
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a combination of its OPEX and CAPEX, and is used as a basis to calculate the x factors for each 
DNO along with the maximum charges which can be charged to customers in the different 
‗tariff baskets‘.  
Although the RPI-x approach was intentioned to be an apolitical and mathematical method of 
adjusting prices (Moran, 2003), in practice the periodic price control review process means that 
the regulator does have to make some decisions regarding the cost base of the companies. In 
order to set Po, Ofgem needs to make decisions regarding the costs of operating the networks 
and therefore setting appropriate rates of return for the existing asset base, which in turn 
influence prices (Alexander and Irwin, 1996). As a result there is a risk that an operator will 
front load its cost saving measures early in a price control period and ‗towards the end, when 
resetting is being considered, companies may have an incentive to conceal or postpone price 
cutting initiatives so as to encourage the regulator to impose an lenient x term in the next 
round‘(MacKerron and Boira-Segarra, 1996: p.101). The regulator must make decisions and 
judge the relative risks of over or under-investment in a situation where they know less about 
the underlying cost structure of the companies than the companies themselves (Joskow, 2008), 
thus creating information asymmetries which increase the transaction costs of the regulatory 
review process. The system of regulating distribution (and transmission) networks is therefore 
closer to a hybrid of rate-of-return and price regulation (Surrey, 1996). The regulator must 
pursue economic objectives (which are largely achieved through setting pricing regimes) whilst 
gaining legitimacy for its actions by ‗distributing the economic rent in a way which retains the 
broad acceptability of the various stakeholders, especially consumers and shareholders‘ (Surrey, 
1996: p.254).  
Modes of Governing Electricity Distribution Networks 
Having outlined that RPI-x regulation is more complex and multi-faceted that simply setting 
prices in order to achieve predefined and efficient outcomes, the various modes of governing 
(Bulkeley et al., 2007) distribution networks are explored in more detail i.e. the rationalities, 
programmes and instruments which are developed and implemented in order to pursue state 
strategies with regards to the distribution networks. These rationalities, programs and 
instruments which constitute the governance regime, have largely evolved from the underlying 
market based logic of the competitive model with privatisation, liberalisation and unbundling of 
the ESI. As can be seen in the figure below, these are characterised by three modes of governing 
which are described in more detail below: 
-125- 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Modes of governing the electricity distribution sector 
 
 ‘Sweat the assets’ 
A key rationality and outcome of the RPI-x governance regime has been to shift the emphasis of 
regulation away from capital investments towards achieving short-run operational efficiencies 
(interviews – 1, 3, 6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20). This was largely due to the fact that under 
nationalisation the expansionary model which  relied upon an ever increasing demand
64
 and 
utilised top-down and long term demand forecasting models in order to plan and coordinate 
investments (Chesshire, 1996), became largely obsolete following the economic slowdown of 
the 1970s which meant that many of these long term predictions proved to be inaccurate, 
leading to significant over-investment
65
. One of the central aims therefore of RPI-x was to 
adjust to a new environment where demand growth was no longer the driver behind the 
momentum of the system. The new system goal was to exploit the existing asset base which had 
been developed during nationalisation (interview – 10) – this has been termed ‗sweating the 
assets‘ (Helm, 2004). Shifting the emphasis away from asset investments towards exploiting the 
installed asset base has meant that the regulation of OPEX has received more attention from the 
regulator involving a more thorough process during price controls with techniques such as ex-
ante incentives to reduce costs and benchmarking of company performance. However, as the 
next section will outline, the natural asset replacement cycle and the need for investment in 
order to facilitate low carbon technologies, means that the focus of the regulator is beginning to 
shift towards CAPEX regulation. 
                                                     
64
 2.7 million new houses were built in the first 10 years of nationalization and the number of domestic 
customers rose from 9.7 million to 14.3 million (Hannah, 1982). Demand for electricity in the UK grew 
by an average of  7% per annum between 1955-1970 (Chesshire 1996) 
65
 For example the plant margin, or the excess of generation capacity over demand, ‗rose from 21% in 
1970-71 to 42 per cent in the period 1973-1976‘ (Chesshire, 1996) 
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 ‘Open Access’ 
A second mode of governing electricity distribution networks in the UK is based on the 
competitive network logic where the networks are governed in order to facilitate competition in 
the retail and generation markets. The rationality behind ‗open access‘ is that ‗with respective 
regulation for network services in place, competition can unfold in other market segments (such 
as supply, trading, and retail provision)‘ (Voß, 2007); it therefore forms a key pillar of the 
governance regime of infrastructure networks in a liberalised and privatised context
66
. The 
function of maintaining access to the networks for third-parties has a significant influence in 
determining the structure of pricing regimes for operators because ‗the introduction of 
competition in electricity and gas necessitated non-discriminatory charging schemes to allow 
competitors access to the transmission and distribution systems. This involved estimating the 
value of the relevant capital assets and deciding appropriate rates of return for existing assets 
and for new investment‘ (Surrey, 1996: p.245). Under the 1989 and the 2000 Acts, ‗DNOs have 
a statutory duty
67
 to make a connection when requested to do so by the owner or occupier or 
premises (or by an authorised supplier acting on behalf of the owner or occupier) for the 
purposes of enabling electricity to be conveyed to or from the premises. There is a 
complementary statutory right
68
 to recover the expenditure reasonably incurred in making a 
connection‘ (Ofgem, 2001a). Regulating connection is important because ‗those seeking 
demand and generation connections do not have the advantages of information and knowledge 
of network conditions enjoyed by DNOs: they cannot deal with them on an equal footing‘ 
(Ofgem, 2001a). Ensuring third party access became particularly important after the separation 
of distribution and retail to ensure the connection of new customers and generators to the 
networks and to allow customers to switch supplier in a de-regulated environment whilst 
                                                     
66
 Prior to privatisation third party access to the networks tended not to be a major issue as Area Boards 
were monopolies in the distribution of electrical power all the way to the end customer. The 1989 
Electricity Act amended this situation by outlining a number of specific duties that privatised RECs 
would have in relation to allowing parties to access network services: (a) ‗To make a connection between 
a distribution system of his and any premises, when required to do so by – (i) the owner or occupier of the 
premises; or (ii) an authorised supplier acting with the consent of the owner or occupier of the premises, 
for the purpose of enabling electricity to be conveyed to or from the premises‘; (b) ‗to make a connection 
between a distribution system of his and any distribution system of another authorised distributor, when 
required to do so by that authorised distributor for the purpose of enabling electricity to be conveyed to or 
from that other system‘ (1989 electricity Act). Following the 2000 utilities act these obligations were 
extended to accommodate the de-regulation of retail whilst ensuring a sustainable revenue stream for the 
newly constituted DNOs where ‗statutory duties will be placed on DNOs similar to those placed on the 
holder of a transmission licence requiring them to facilitate competition in generation and supply, not to 
discriminate between classes of persons when setting connection charges, and to develop and maintain an 
efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of distribution‘ (EGWG 2001: p. 9).  
67
 Electricity Act 1989, section 16, as substituted by section 44 of the Utilities Act 2000 
68
 Electricity Act 1989, section 19, as amended by section 46 of the Utilities Act 2000 
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developing revenue streams from those connections and the use of the system. The figure below 
outlines how non-discriminatory, open access forms the basis of how DNOs collect their 
allowed revenues: 
Figure 5.4: Flows of revenue and contractual relationships in the distribution sector 
 
Source: (Adapted from ILEX (2002)) 
The following contractual arrangements are directly relevant to DNOs: 
Use of system agreement: This is a contract between licensed retailers and network operators; ‗it 
sets out the conditions of, and provision for, use of the distribution system by licensed suppliers. 
End customers are not party to the use of system agreement – although the commercial terms 
under which a customer‘s energy supplier has access to the local distribution network‘ (ILEX, 
2002: p.7) 
Connection agreement: The purpose of this contract is to ‗formalise the terms and conditions of 
connection‘ to the network. The agreement contains details of metering equipment, financial 
liability, maximum capacity (KVa/MVa) and other technical issues‘ (ILEX, 2002). 
DNO revenues are collected through: (a) ‗charges for use of the distribution system‘ (DUoS) 
where DUoS are levied on the suppliers according to their use of system agreement, and (b) 
charges for connection to the distribution system‘ (ILEX, 2002). There is a competitive 
environment for new connections where a number of licensed independent DNOs (IDNOs) 
compete with incumbent operators in this market. Until recently ‗the DNOs have been 
reasonably free to determine how charges are levied for use of system and connection‘ (ILEX, 
2002), however, we will see later how this situation has been made more complex by increasing 
levels of generation being connected to the distribution networks. 
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‘Protect the Customer’ 
A key underlying rationale behind unbundling and price regulation has been the 
problematization of natural monopoly in network industries (Voß, 2007). The logic behind this 
is that although competition is possible in certain areas of the value chain - retail and generation 
- the networks (pipes and wires) are natural monopolies. A network industry such as the ESI is 
seen as ‗a chain of vertically related stages of production of which transmission/transport via 
networks is one stage that can be isolated from the others and be treated as a self-contained 
activity‘ (Voß, 2007: p.121). Customers therefore need to be protected from monopoly pricing 
and poor quality of service. In the UK electricity context, this notion of protecting the customer 
has been interpreted in a very specific way; to promote competition and enabling customers to 
switch between suppliers i.e. through prices (Mitchell, 2008, SDC, 2007). This is illustrated in 
the following extract from an Ofgem document: 
―Ofgem‘s principal statutory objective is to protect the interests of 
consumers, wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition. Where 
there is scope to do so, it has been Ofgem‘s policy to seek appropriate 
market-based solutions, ensuring equitable treatment of parties, and cost-
reflective pricing. In other circumstances the appropriate regulatory policy is 
one of controlling the exercise of monopoly power‖ (Ofgem, 2001a) 
Again, this mode of governing is closely linked to the other two modes of governing; ‗sweat the 
assets‘, and ‗open access‘. For example, the relationship between the supplier and the DNO 
described in the ‗open access‘ section is based on the premise that customers can switch 
between suppliers thus necessitating a fluid contractual relationship between parties which 
reduces asset specificity
69
. Pure price regulation which promotes the optimal operation of a 
network only exists in theory however and throughout the period of privatisation a number of 
specific measures have been in place to ensure safety standards
70
  and quality of service 
standards (QOS)
71
 . Prior to  2000, QOS was regulated through ‗guaranteed standards of 
                                                     
69
 Under Standard License Condition 46 suppliers must allow customers to switch between companies 
without being unduly penalized.  Before 2007 this had to be done within 28 days; however, following 
modification of the license conditions, suppliers can offer contracts to customers with longer notice 
periods. 
70
 ‗The UK Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations specify steady-state voltages within 
±6% of nominal for systems up to 132 kV and within +10/-6% at 400 V‘ (Harrison and Wallace) 
71
 ‗Revenues [which are] are linked directly to what customers actually value (e.g. few interruptions, 
stable voltages, speedy response to queries or requests for work or connection, low accident rates etc) 
rather than the size of a DNOs asset base‘ (EGWG, 2001), have become an increasingly important aspect 
of the regulatory landscape, particularly since 2000. Rather than receiving return on a regulatory asset 
base; ‗the DNOs [would] have an incentive to score well on the performance measures…to spend as little 
money in doing so. In essence, they would seek to deliver the system at lowest possible cost by whatever 
means possible‘ (EGWG, 2001). A move towards an incentive based model was introduced for 2000-
2005 where ‗the third price control review set company-specific quality standards for 2004/2005 on the 
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performance, which entitle consumers to compensation if the firms breach them‘ (Giannakis et 
al., 2005) but in the subsequent PCRs these aggregate standards were replaced by a company 
specific incentive regime – the growing prominence of QOS regulation is discussed in a later 
section. 
Summary 
The section above outlined the prevailing governance regime which has emerged from 
privatisation and market liberalisation, largely as a response to the perceived inefficiencies of 
state run companies. Using the modes of governing framework (Bulkeley et al., 2005), the 
underlying rationalities, programs, institutional relations, and regulatory instruments were 
outlined. These represent the changing nature of state strategies with regards to the ESI which 
can be summarised as a move away from an investment led/expansionary strategy towards 
efforts to utilise an existing asset base more efficiently, using pricing strategies as a key tool to 
achieve this.  The table below summarises the governance regime for electricity distribution in 
the UK: 
Table 5.1: Summary of the electricity distribution governance regime 
Mode of governing Rationality Institutional Relations Policy/Regulatory 
Instruments 
‗Sweat the assets‘ Public ownership is 
inefficient due to over-
investment and a lack 
of incentive for 
efficiency 
Periodic price control 
reviews (5 years) with 
interdependencies between 
the regulator and private 
companies 
RPI-x incentive 
regulation, 
benchmarking of 
company performance 
‗Open access‘ Promote competition in 
generation and retail. 
Contractual relationships 
between DNO, retailer and 
customer.   
Access regulation: 
Licence obligations, 
network access codes 
and standards. 
                                                                                                                                                           
basis of their standards of performance (OFGEM, 1999a)‘.  Following the 2000 price control review, 
Ofgem began to link some revenues to performance measures; this was initially at 2% but has increased. 
The main reason that these outputs based incentives were introduced was concerns that with strong 
incentives for cost reduction, a trade-off would result between OPEX and QOS which would not be of 
benefit to customers 
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‗Protect the customer‘ Natural monopoly is an 
economic externality 
which can be priced 
and regulated 
Price control reviews 
carried out by the regulator 
on behalf of the customer 
Prices designed to 
‗mimic the market‘, 
efforts to promote 
customer switching. 
The introduction of 
QOS incentives  
The next section outlines how various interventions and interactions, broadly associated with 
the transition to a low carbon electricity system, are shaping and being shaped by the 
governance regime described above. Following this, the outcomes section will discuss the 
emerging interplay between actors, institutions and technologies and the implication for the 
evolution of the sector. 
5.3 Interventions and Interactions 
The previous section outlined the structures and modes of governing which are associated with 
the structural legacy of privatisation and market liberalisation. In order to explore how these 
structures are affecting the uptake of different technologies and practices, this section describes 
the various interventions and interactions that have taken place in the electricity distribution 
sector which are characterising the emerging smart grid concept in the UK context. This section 
provides a process orientated analysis of the ongoing sets of interventions and interactions 
which are shaping the organisational field. Explored are the ‗mechanisms of governance‘, and 
the ‗practice and processes (or rationalities and technologies) of governing‘ that give a 
‗comprehension of how the identified institutions, structures and agencies of governance 
become articulated and interact‘ (Davies, 2005 p.36). The analysis is divided into four parts and 
where possible follows a chronological order.  
5.3.1 Distributed Generation 
This section explores how the issue of distributed generation (DG) - which is connected to the 
distribution networks - has begun to challenge aspects of the governance regime described 
above. As discussed in the previous section, prior to the introduction of retail competition in the 
late 1990s and the creation of the DNO licence following the Utilities Act in 2000, the RECs 
carried out the functions of both distribution and retail of electricity to end customers under a 
Public Electricity Supply (PES) licence. Under this regime the REC could recover the costs of 
new connections and in the relatively rare cases where a medium/small scale
72
 generator would 
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 Typically under 50MW 
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request a connection to the distribution networks, these costs could be recovered through ‗deep‘ 
connection charges
73
 where the upfront costs of any reinforcement needs would have to be 
borne by the DG developer (Harrison et al., 2007, Cossent et al., 2009). This typically acted as a 
disincentive to DG development (Interview - 10), however it was not a major issue within the 
sector at the time because of the overarching emphasis was on the restructuring of the industry 
and the introduction of competitive markets (interview – 4). Although ‗It was recognised, at the 
time that the Utilities Act 2000 received Royal Assent, that distributed generation would 
necessitate modification of the Electricity (Connection Charges) Regulations 1990. At that time, 
however, the priority was to ensure that the 1990 Regulations were amended to accord with the 
provisions of the new primary legislation – particularly in respect of the separation of electricity 
supply and distribution and the abolition of Public Electricity Suppliers (PESs)‘ (Ofgem, 2002).  
Also, because RECs had been incentivised to follow a relatively conservative business strategy 
with regards to the operation of the networks, their attention was focused on ‗sweating the 
assets‘ (interview – 11). One interviewee from a distribution company who worked within the 
sector at the time describes how this affected their approach to dealing with DG connections 
during this early period of privatisation: 
"Anything that‘s sizeable in the way of DG we can deal with on an ad-hoc 
basis, if somebody wants to put 5MW or 30MW of DG on the network, it‘s a 
bespoke design study and we do what we need to do to accommodate that, and 
usually that involves some conventional network reinforcement or at least an 
extension to the networks" (Interview - 20) 
However, following the 2000 act and the new ‗statutory duty on DNOs to facilitate competition‘ 
(Ofgem, 2002), the connection of DG became a more substantial issue within the sector and led 
to calls for the sector to change what had been piecemeal approach to the connection of DG.  
Although small and medium scale generation has been part of energy systems for many years 
(accounting for approximately 10% of new capacity amongst countries associated with the 
International Energy Agency countries in 2000 (IEA, 2002)), these have mainly been mature 
technologies typically used for industrial applications e.g. ‗diesel and gas reciprocating engines 
and gas turbines‘ along with ‗Industrial-sized engines and turbines‘ (IEA, 2002). In a small 
                                                     
73
 The difference between deep and shallow connection charges are summarised as follows: ‗Deep 
connection charges involve a one off, upfront payment. The charges include the costs of replacing 
equipment associated with protecting the network or with voltage control, up to the boundary of the 
distribution network. Where fault levels are increased above the rating of installed equipment, the cost of 
replacing that equipment would be included in the charge. By contrast, shallow connection charges 
involve paying for the assets specifically required for the connection, usually up to the first transforming 
point. The remaining re-inforcement costs, if any, are regarded as general load growth. They are 
recovered through use of system charges‘ (Ofgem, 2001) 
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number of EU countries DG has become a central plank of their energy policies as it is seen as a 
way of promoting energy efficiency, particularly in Nordic countries where CHP is common. 
However, as the figure below shows, this has not traditionally been a feature of the UK system 
where DG penetration has been relatively low:  
Figure 5.5: DG across the EU 
 
Source: (Cossent et al., 2009) 
During the early part of the last decade there has been an increased focus on DG as a significant 
source of low carbon energy because renewable technologies can operate at all scales of the 
network and in some cases are optimally deployed closer to loads (or demands). This has called 
into question the traditional role of distribution networks (Strbac et al., 2006, Strbac et al., 2002, 
Djapic et al., 2007, Strbac et al., 2009, McDonald, 2008, Bayod-Rújula, 2009) which were  
designed in the context of large scale centralised plants with a predictable output. The 
momentum behind DG as a potential low carbon technology was reinforced by a number of 
influential reports during the 2000s, for example the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP) stated in an influential report on climate change that ‗generating electricity at 
or near the point of use reduces energy losses within the network; electricity is transmitted over 
shorter distances and undergoes fewer changes in voltage‘(RCEP, 2000). During this period, 
DG also became part of a wider public discourse where it was seen as a more cost effective 
solution which could achieve social as well as environmental benefits. The following quote 
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from the then major of London, Ken Livingstone, illustrates the growing political support 
behind unconventional energy solutions such as DG: 
―Decentralised energy allows the financial costs and energy losses associated 
with the long-distance national transmission system to be reduced and 
savings passed on to consumers. Bringing energy production closer to 
people‘s lives helps in our efforts to promote energy efficiency. Security of 
supply can be improved, with power blackouts reduced. The UK could take 
the opportunity to develop expertise and technologies, leading the developed 
world, and facilitating the developing world‘s path to a sustainable energy 
future.‖ (Greenpeace, 2005) 
Reflecting this growing momentum behind DG, in a 2001 speech Prime Minister Tony Blair 
optimistically announced that ‗Electricity suppliers will be obliged to generate 10% of their 
energy from renewable sources by 2010. And we have set a target of at least doubling combined 
heat and power, also by 2010‘ (Blair, 2001). 
For the distribution sector, this of course posed a number of difficulties because the underlying 
asset base was ‗designed and really optimised over the last 50-60 years for one way flow of 
power and are not really designed to have significant generation input to them‘ (Interview - 19). 
The RCEP report highlighted a number of technical issues associated with integrating DG into 
the system effectively in order to capitalise on the potential system benefits: 
―…embedded generation adds to the technical difficulties of ensuring security 
of supply and maintaining the stability of the network, including maintaining 
an appropriate element of reactive power among end users… The relatively 
small size of renewable energy plants generating electricity and local CHP 
plants does not fit easily with an electricity distribution and transmission 
network based on massive generators and highly centralised control. The 
national grid and the regional distribution systems need to become more  
favourable to small and very small environmentally friendly  generators  
which sometimes need to import  electricity‖ (RCEP, 2000) 
A number of non-technical barriers relating to commercial and regulatory issues were also 
highlighted in the report: 
Regulatory policies will need to promote, and must not inhibit, this 
development (…) [Where] (…) Transmission and distribution companies 
remain as monopolies and have their prices controlled by the regulator. In the 
absence of any special provision by the regulator to cover the additional costs 
of such activity, they have no incentive to operate in a way that would be 
beneficial or encouraging to small embedded and/or intermittent generating  
plants nor to decentralise the control of their networks (RCEP, 2000) 
Within the context of a liberalised regime however, the DNOs were obliged to maintain ‗open 
access‘ to their networks following the deregulation of electricity generation and retail. In 
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particular the charging regime for DG, where developers pay upfront the costs of reinforcement, 
became problematized as there was a perception that it acted as a barrier to DG investment by 
placing an undue burden on DG developers (Harrison et al., 2007). There was also a concern 
that ‗subsequent generation connection might ‗free-ride‘ in the use of expensive network assets 
paid for by an earlier generation connection (the ‗initial contributor‘) to the same part of the 
network‘ (Ofgem, 2002).  
Issues also arose due to the short time horizons engendered by the five year price control period 
(Interview – 14, 17, 19, 22) meaning that if capital investments had to be made in order to 
accommodate DG the companies would tend to invest in short term conventional solutions such 
as investing in new lines or ‗invest in more copper‘ (Interview - 20). This piecemeal approach 
would allow a company to quickly expand its asset base and costs in advance of the following 
price control period, rather than improving the capacity management of the existing asset base 
by managing more complex flows in an innovative way. This became problematic because a 
fundamental motivation behind the design of the RPI-x regulatory regime was to act as a 
disincentive for companies to expand their asset base (‗sweat the assets‘); but if companies were 
forced to reinforce large parts of their networks to connect large numbers of DG this would 
undermine this (interview - 3).  
In response to these developments, the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI)
74
 set up the 
Embedded Generation Working Group (EGWG
75
) which in 2001 produced a report exploring 
the barriers to the efficient integration of DG into UK distribution systems (EGWG, 2001). The 
report argued that in the context of government targets for CHP and renewables and the 
licensing terms of the Utilities Act, 2000, there is an obligation on DNOs to better facilitate the 
connection of DG to their networks, however ‗...current arrangements are not conducive to the 
development of embedded generation‘ (EGWG, 2001: p.1). The report outlined three ‗technical 
and practical limitations to expanding levels of embedded generation‘; 1) capacity constraints in 
rural areas, 2) ‗fault restrictions in urban areas‘, and 3) ‗Design standards which prevent the 
variable nature of loads, generation and network capability being fully recognised‘. It also 
highlighted issues relating to charging and transparency, i.e. that embedded generators were 
charged the ‗full reinforcement costs which result from their connection‘, and that DNOs have 
weak incentives to connect DG as they have no clear revenue stream from it. Also pointed out 
                                                     
74
 In the absence of a dedicated dept. for energy, the DTI were in charge of energy production and the 
Department for Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) controlled demand side policies until the formation of 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in 2008 
75
 Which subsequently became part of the Energy Networks strategy Group - ENSG 
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was a lack of transparency and information on locations i.e. ‗potential generators have difficulty 
in determining charges and the best (or worst) places to connect…‘ (ibid: p.5). 
The report issued a number of recommendations, key amongst these being a review of 
regulatory incentives where ‗Ofgem should review the structure of the regulatory incentives on 
DNOs in the light of the new statutory duty on DNOs to facilitate competition‘ (ibid: p.6). A 
number of specific proposals for regulatory reform were made; to ‗allow the contribution of 
embedded generation to network performance to be fully taken into account‘76 (ibid: p.45) and 
to ‗establish more transparent and consistent arrangements for the provision of information by 
DNOs to developers‘ (ibid: p.45) e.g. in which parts of the networks is it most economic to 
develop new connection nodes. In terms of creating a sustainable revenue stream, the report 
argued that the ‗deep‘ connection charges imposed on DG developers was a barrier, particularly 
to early investors because ‗there is no mechanism for sharing the costs of the reinforcement with 
subsequent connecters‘ (ibid: p.5). 
Therefore, DG became a problem as it did not fit or align readily with the prevailing modes of 
governing – this is summarised in the table below: 
Table 5.2: DG connection and modes of governing 
Mode of Governing Impact of DG 
‗Sweat the assets‘ 
Conventional approaches to DG connection increases reinforcement costs thus 
adding to the capital expenditure of companies and their RAB 
‗Open access‘ 
There is a lack of information regarding the best connection nodes and no 
revenue generating model. A free rider problem where the first DG developer 
pays costs of reinforcement 
‗Protect the 
customer‘ 
DG potentially reduces quality of service standards and clashes with existing 
codes e.g. UK Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 
specifications on voltage levels. There is no way of valuing the potential input 
DG can provide a flexible way of managing the networks
77
.  
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 The potential flexibility of DG can be used by network operators to manage voltage and fault levels on 
their networks.  
77
  As part of their requirements to reliably deliver power to customers, the DNOs are obliged to ‗to 
design networks in accordance with Engineering Recommendation P2/5. Reliance on embedded 
generation rather than on network reinforcement could breach P2/5. The possible value of embedded 
generation (e.g. in terms of reduced losses) is not reflected‘ (Ofgem, 2001). 
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A number of the interviews pointed to a second dimension of the DG issue; the organisational 
routines of the network companies themselves (Interview – 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 18, 24). 
Conventional network solutions such as investing in copper not only came about due to 
prevailing incentive structures, but also because of the cognitive behavioural routines within 
network companies. One interviewee who started his career during the nationalised period 
argues that this can be traced back to the days of the CEGB:  
" ….the systems and people are still in place, not a lot of the people to be fair 
now but I used to work for a company that was part of CEGB (…) so I 
understand what was going on in there, I spent a lot of years in that kind of 
environment. The CEGB had this fantastic control of what happened to the 
network and it was very conservative and everything had plenty of margin 
built in and it was all about mak[ing] sure suppliers weren‘t lost, price was 
(…) not really a priority (…) Thatcher really went for the CEGB to break it 
up, it was just costing too much, it was a huge massive civil service basically 
(…) It has a lot of really good things about it, we‘ve lived off all of those good 
things in the last 20 years and we‘ve basically worked our way through all 
those margins (…) it‘s like chewing through different bits of insulation in a 
wire and we‘re gradually getting through to the core, we can‘t go any further, 
it needs investment now.  All of that good investment was built up over 40 
years is being eroded now (…) There‘s a lot of corporate memory there about 
conservatism, a lot of that is still there so things are very conservative in how 
it [is] approached especially around the regulatory side‖ (Interview - 10) 
This conservative approach to planning and operating the networks has been reinforced by RPI-
x regulation where the companies operating the networks had been incentivised to develop a 
low risk approach in the area of CAPEX efficiency (Interview - 13). 
The Regulatory response: 4
th
 Distribution Price Control Review 
As the EGWG report suggested, this ‗passive role for distribution networks has been formalised 
in design codes, charging structures, price controls and other regulatory incentives‘ (EGWG, 
2001). DUoS became a particular focus; although these were already capped under the RPI-x 
price controls as part of the companies‘ ‗allowed revenue‘ under the terms of the licence, this 
applied only to demand customers and not DG. Although it is possible for Ofgem to propose 
licence modifications, this cannot however be imposed as it is subject to agreement by the 
companies and can be referred to the Competition Commissioner if necessary (Ofgem, 2001a).  
As a response to the various issues raised, the regulator initiated a consultation document 
(Ofgem, 2001a) in advance of the 2005 price control review. In the consultation it was 
recommended that ‗DNOs should be encouraged to move to a shallower basis of connection 
charges for embedded generators, recovering costs up-front only in relation to dedicated 
connection assets‘;  and where a conflict arises, a right of appeal to Ofgem for DG developers 
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would be put in place. DNOs would be required to publish their connection and use of system 
charges which would eventually evolve into a simplified and standardised connection regime, 
thus reducing transaction costs. Following an industry-wide consultation process, the final 
proposals in price control review itself (DPCR 4) contained a number of relevant changes to the 
regulatory regime: 
DG Incentive 
As discussed above, ‗there have been concerns that deep-connection charging models which 
oblige developers to fund, upfront, the full capital costs of connection, [were] acting as a 
disincentive to DG‘ (Harrison et al., 2007). In response to government targets for CHP and 
renewables (Ofgem, 2004), the 2005 price control review proposed shallower charges which 
sought to ‗reﬂect the costs and benefits associated with DG‘ (Harrison et al., 2007). Following 
this, a DG developer ‗had to pay a much smaller [amount] for the same investment upfront cost 
related to a well defined smaller bit of any reinforcement (…) But then they had to pay a use of 
system charge which is an ongoing thing, you pay every year, which is meant to cover some of 
the costs of reinforcement‘ (Interviewee - 19). This reduced the upfront capital costs, spreading 
it out over a number of years through use of system charges. The costs to the DNO of 
connection are ‗are given a partial pass-through treatment‘ and ‗the DNOs are given a further 
supplementary £/kW revenue driver (or incentive rate) to incentivise the connection of 
distributed generation to the network‘ (Ofgem, 2004). The details of the proposals were as 
follows (Harrison et al., 2007): 
  80% pass through rate - ‗A 15-year annuity charge based on 80% of the cost of 
reinforcement works required to connect the DG, if any.‘ 
 ‗An annual capacity charge of £1.50/kW of DG capacity installed in lieu of remaining 
reinforcement cost.‘ 
 ‗An annual operations and maintenance (O&M) charge of £1/kW of DG capacity to 
recover appropriate costs.‘ 
Thus, the DG Incentive (DGI) was designed to alter the flows of revenue within the sector and 
remove barriers to the connection of small scale generators to the distribution networks. One 
interviewee from a DNO notes that the rationale behind the scheme was ‗…to try and get the 
DNOs themselves play in that game. It gives them an opportunity to gain additional 
revenues…That‘s what the incentive is trying to do, and to a certain extent, reasonably risk free‘ 
(Interview - 13). This was to be achieved whilst also seeking to align developments within the 
sector with broader energy policy goals; the interviewee suggests that ‗it‘s being driven by the 
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government agenda to try and make sure there is (…) more generation dispersed across our 
networks‘ (Interview - 13).  
Innovation Incentives 
As was discussed the previous section, the success of the RPI-x regulatory regime was based on 
achieving efficiencies through OPEX savings and disincentivising capital investments. 
However, as part of DPCR4, Ofgem allowed the companies to on average increase their 
CAPEX by 48% on the previous price control period (Ofgem, 2004), this reflected both a 
general trend in the asset replacement cycle i.e. the ageing asset base, and an expectation that 
DG penetration levels would increase (Interview – 9). The EGWG noted that ‗If extended from 
its initial very low level, a change to performance-based regulation could increase the extent to 
which DNOs use embedded generation as a means of catering for increased demand as an 
alternative to the replacement of time expired assets or network reinforcement…‘ (EGWG, 
2001). The inherent ‗bias toward achieving OPEX over CAPEX efficiencies‘ (EGWG, 2001) 
within the RPI-x regime and the ‗ad-hoc‘ approach to DG that this engendered therefore 
provided a rationale to explicitly incentivise R&D and innovation – CAPEX efficiency - for the 
first time. The EGWG report argued; ‗once it has been established that reinforcement of 
supplies is needed, investments in network assets have been favoured by DNOs since they are 
rewarded by an increased revenue through the price control mechanism...‘ (EGWG, 2001).  
The innovation incentives that Ofgem introduced in 2005 was an R&D funding mechanism: the 
Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) – DNOs were permitted to spend up to 0.5% of its revenue 
on R&D – and a measure to promote trials of network innovations; Registered Power Zones 
(RPZ) – a DNO could spend up to £500,000/year and earn enhanced revenues for the 
connection of DGs. The following points summarize the main rationale behind the scheme 
(Ofgem, 2003a): 
 ‗To encourage DNOs to integrate appropriate technical development plans as part of 
their wider business innovation‘. 
 ‗To deploy new technologies, and encourage their wider application, where this enables 
distributed generation to be integrated more effectively and efficiently, to help meet the 
government‘s targets for renewables and CHP‘.  
 ‗To signal to potential generators and other interested parties a DNO‘s development 
intentions or network capabilities at a particular location‘ 
-139- 
 
 
 
So, innovation became a strategy to deal with increasing levels of DG connection for the 
regulator, however, this was not achieved without some degree of contestation. Within the 
industry it was generally accepted that innovation levels in liberalised energy systems had 
dropped since nationalisation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008, Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). The 
distribution sector was no exception; as one interviewee who has been working in a DNO 
throughout these periods notes; ‗Ofgem provided no incentive for R&D and in fact any money 
you spent on R&D was just a cost you were carrying that you weren‘t being rewarded for‘ 
(Interview – 20).  
The introduction of the scheme came in the wake of the 2004 Energy Act which gave Ofgem a 
secondary duty to consider sustainable development in its decision making (Owen, 2006). 
However, moving away from the application of pure RPI-x and introducing specific incentives 
for low carbon innovation was not uncontested within Ofgem. Referring to a leading proponent 
of the innovation incentives within Ofgem itself, one interviewee describes the difficulties 
involved in changing the culture within the organisation: 
―(…) he had a real battle trying to get Ofgem to agree to that because they 
thought it was fundamentally wrong that you give DNOs an artificial 
incentive like that.‖ (Interview – 20) 
A later section will explore in more detail the outcomes of this regulatory initiative and how the 
issue of innovation in distribution networks has become an increasingly important part of the 
regulatory agenda in the UK.  
Summary 
This sub-section has shown how during the early part of the last decade changes in the energy 
policy landscape and associated politically driven efforts to promote the diffusion of DG has 
resulted in changing energy flows within the networks which have necessitated changes to the 
revenue flows within the electricity distribution sector. As a result, a process of regime 
adaptation (Smith et al., 2005) followed where efforts were made to integrate DG both 
technically and institutionally, and to break the lock-in to the passive operation of networks and 
piecemeal approaches to generator connections. A number of barriers were encountered such as 
incentive structures in the regulatory regime and firm level organisational routines. In 2005, 
DPCR4 sought to address these by incorporating DG into the revenue flows within the sector 
and to incentivise network operators to innovate and reorientate their organisational routines and 
approaches to CAPEX efficiency.  
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5.3.2 The Demand side 
Since the introduction of retail competition following the Electricity Act in 1989 and the 
Utilities Act in 2000, a greater emphasis has been placed on understanding energy use patterns 
(Guy and Marvin, 1996b, Guy et al., 1999, Guy and Marvin, 1996c). Under public ownership 
electricity systems were based on a ‗predict and provide‘ paradigm (Guy and Marvin, 1996b) 
which ‗doesn‘t really recognise customers as anything other really than demand takers and 
taking [whatever] they want whenever they [want it]‘ (Interview – 6). This supply side 
dominated approach was supported by a sector structure which was configured in order to 
achieve economies of scale (high load factors) and eventually led to the interconnection of 
dispersed local systems in order to aggregate consumption (Fox-Penner, 2010). This led to ‗a 
near-total disconnect between the industry‘s instantaneous balancing function and the utility‘s 
pricing and billing activities‘ (Fox-Penner, 2010: p.30). This frame within which ‗customer‘ and 
particularly domestic customers have been viewed has been a cornerstone of the growth of 
electricity systems and their governance structures throughout the 20
th
 century. Network 
planning and operation has proceeded on this basis resulting in little real time management of 
distribution systems (particularly at the low voltage level), and large margins being built in at 
the network planning stage (Interview - 10). However, since market liberalisation, this framing 
of the customer as passive has changed and there have been efforts to engage with customers, 
understand their practices, and segment and understand the retail market in new ways with the 
role of the regulator under the Utilities Act, 2000; to ‗…protect the interests of consumers… 
wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition‘.  
Opening up the black-box of the demand side 
Since the introduction of privatization in the 1989 Electricity Act and the eventual introduction 
of retail competition in the UK domestic market following the 2000 Utilities act, efforts have 
been made to engage with customers and understand how they use electricity at different times 
(interviewee – 4). This alternative to the ‗predict and provide‘ paradigm has been termed 
‗demand-side management‘ which moves away from the supply side/economies of scale 
approach towards a more differentiated treatment of different types of customers using 
techniques such as market segmentation and micro-profiling. The difference between these 
paradigms of managing an electricity system is illustrated in the following diagram: 
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Figure 5.6: Approaches to Infrastructure Management 
 
Source: (Guy and Marvin, 1996c)
78
 
A report by the consultants Earnst and Young outlines that; ‗segmentation draws on leading 
practice in consumer management, where we would expect the UK energy consumers to fall 
into segments with different energy services needs. These segments can then be targeted with 
specific education and propositions‘ (E&Y, 2009). They outline four ‗types‘ of energy 
customer: 
 Passive: Customers who are ‗happy with their energy consumption, cost and service‘ 
and have ‗no explicit need for reduced energy consumption, cost or better service‘. 
 Price conscious: These customers make decisions on the basis of price rather than any 
environmental concerns i.e. they are ‗unhappy with the price they pay‘. 
 Consumption conscious: A particular segment which ‗has started to take ownership of 
their own consumption as a factor in their energy bill, either on cost or environmental 
grounds‘. 
 Energy aware: Customers who are ‗prepared to invest time and energy in energy 
services and related products such as automated analysis of consumption‘. 
In recent years this trend towards a more synergistic relationship between end-use patterns and 
system planning and operation has been reinforced due to the expectation that intermittent 
renewables such as wind power will become much more prominent in the system. Using the 
potential flexibility of the demand side is increasingly being seen as a way of promoting the 
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 FIS refers to ‗Facilitating Infrastructure Supply‘ i.e. ‗Predict and Provide‘ 
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transition to a low carbon electricity system with much greater levels of DG and renewables e.g. 
demand side management and load shifting to balance supply and demand (Interview – 10, 12, 
11, 16, 21). To illustrate this, the figure below shows a scenario where changes in demand 
patterns become out of synch with generation, thus posing a risk to system security. 
Figure 5.7: An illustrative scenario where there is a mismatch between generation and 
demand 
 
Source: (DECC, 2009e) 
Concerns over the operation of a system with a high penetration of intermittent generation have 
led to calls for customer activity to become part of the day-to-day operation of the system by 
utilising information regarding customer behaviour, price elasticities and incentivising 
customers to change their demand, particularly at peak periods. There is an expectation within 
the sector that this will ‗create a system that works efficiently‘ (Interview – 22) with large 
amounts of intermittent generation connected to the system. A number of studies have argued 
that by incentivising customers to become more flexible in their usage patterns through more 
dynamic pricing there can be a reduction in the overall network reinforcement costs (Strbac et 
al., 2010) and peaking plant requirements (Faruqui et al., 2009). Demand response (DR), which 
is a broad concept ‗that refers to all policies and programs that get customers to shift their use 
around‘ (Fox-Penner, 2010: p.40), as a technique to achieve system economies, has had limited 
application in the UK, typically being confined to large industrial users. One of the reasons for 
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this has been a lack of metering technology which can facilitate two-way communication 
between the customer and their supplier – commonly referred to as smart meters79. 
As expectations surrounding the large scale diffusion of renewables grow, smart metering is 
being seen as a way of utilising the potential flexibility of the increasingly price conscious and 
energy aware customers in order to achieve system economies (interviews – 2, 4). The figure 
below shows the different methods of achieving DR through dynamic pricing which have been 
utilised. These techniques range from short term real-time pricing i.e  ‗setting the prices that 
retail customers pay equal to these hourly wholesale process…‘ (Fox-Penner, 2010: p.40), to 
longer term contractual arrangements such as time of use rates where average prices are taken 
over a longer period.   
Figure 5.8: Dynamic pricing techniques 
 
Source: (Fox-Penner, 2010) 
These changing conceptualisations of the customer and the perception that system economies 
can be achieved through DR measures have influenced ongoing debates in the UK ESI 
surrounding the implementation of smart metering and the respective roles of DNOs, retail 
companies and customers.  
                                                     
79
 A smart meter is defined as electricity and gas meters that ‗collect meter values on a half hourly basis 
and transmit the data without the need for the customer to read the meter manually‘ (Ofgem, 2010a) 
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Smart Meters and Distribution Networks 
In the light of debates surrounding the transition to a low carbon electricity system, the issue of 
smart metering has taken on added significance. The move towards an all-electric future, which 
involves the electrification of heat and transport (described in the previous chapter), has also 
added weight to the momentum behind smart metering and a UK roll out strategy.  Plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) in particular are seen as a potential source of energy storage 
allowing customers to become more flexible and responsive to more dynamic pricing tariffs 
(Interviews – 2, 6, 20). However, as one interviewee describes, there are concerns that this could 
lead to constraints by increasing the demand for capacity on low voltage (LV) distribution 
cables: 
"…if you look at the cable that runs down your street and that supplies your 
house or whatever, then you‘ll find no measurement and no control (…) the 
DNO that owns it doesn‘t know how much current is passing through it at any 
one time and doesn‘t know what voltage is on it" (Interview - 14) 
Similarly, renewable subsidies such as the feed-in tariff provide incentives for investment in 
small scale low carbon generation technologies. However this may have significant implications 
for distribution networks as these inputs to the grid could create two-way power flows and 
potentially create ‗bottlenecks‘ within the networks; particularly due to the fact that control 
systems on low voltage distribution networks remain basic (Interview - 14). As another 
interviewee from a DNO notes: 
"Deployment of generation at domestic level we can cope with, [but] suddenly 
if everybody starts to do it, it gives you problems. Having more real time 
information of what is happening on our system in terms of power flows [and] 
in terms of voltages (…) Tak[ing] action rather than guessing what the impact 
might be‖ (Interview - 15) 
As a result of these issues, advanced metering technology is increasingly being viewed as a way 
of achieving DR and economies of system; thus reducing the need for expensive reinforcement 
of LV cables and reducing the need for expensive peaking plant (Strbac, 2008, Strbac et al., 
2010).  
Ofgem‘s approach to the issue of smart metering has been that it could fulfil a dual role of 
facilitating pro-environmental behaviours such as micro-generation and reducing consumption, 
whilst also furthering competition in the retail market by facilitating customer switching 
(Ofgem, 2003b). Prior to the unbundling of distribution and retail, the RECs held a monopoly 
on metering services within their respective areas however, following unbundling of retail and 
distribution, the metering function began to be opened up to competition where Ofgem sought 
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to ‗separate metering from monopoly transportation and distribution businesses‘ and 
discontinue metering as ‗a regulated activity‘ (Ofgem, 2001b).  In its 2001 metering strategy, 
Ofgem sought to promote competition in the delivery of metering technology, arguing that ‗the 
current degree of competition is limited.  Energy consumers would be better served by more 
effective competition, which would reduce costs and promote innovation‘ (Ofgem, 2001b) and 
‗protect and advance the interests of customers‘ (Ofgem, 2003b) by promoting competition and 
facilitating switching between suppliers. However, following the announcement of a national 
roll out to be coordinated by DECC, there has been a move away from the competitive de-
regulated approach that Ofgem had originally envisaged. 
The Smart Metering Roll Out 
In 2008 the UK government announced a roll-out of domestic smart meters across UK domestic 
households to be carried out before 2020. The announcement to roll out smart meters came after 
it was added as an amendment to the 2008 Energy Act in the house of Lords (by Lord Hunt). 
During the debate (Hansard, 2008) Lord Hunt argued that; ‗Consumers would be given better 
information on how to manage their energy use, they would be provided with accurate bills and 
gain potentially easier access to a wider range of tariffs. It is a bit of a no-brainer when one 
thinks about it. For suppliers, too, the benefits include reduced costs through remote meter 
reading, better customer service through more accurate billing, and the potential to switch 
consumers between tariffs‘. This was given a two year period for consideration of roll out 
strategies and given a ten year implementation program which was subsequently shortened. A 
2009 consultation on the implementation strategy for the roll out (DECC, 2009b) by DECC 
made proposals regarding electricity and gas meters ‗in domestic households‘ and ‗at small and 
medium non-domestic (business and public sector) sites‘. In this context the role of smart 
meters is to ‗provide accurate real time information on energy consumption‘ but also to ‗both 
change our energy habits and provide an essential stepping stone to smart grids in the future‘.  
A follow-up document outlined a wide range of objectives and motivations for the roll out; 
proposing that ‗the new consumption data smart meters will make available will help network 
operators to make better informed investment decisions‘ … ‗help the system deal with the 
intermittent character of significant new renewable energy generation‘ …  ‗Smart meters , will 
allow exported energy to be measured, and therefore support the development of 
microgeneration in the home‘, and ‗Smart meters combined with time of use tariffs will also 
enable the grid to support increasing numbers of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles‘ (DECC, 
2009a: p.13/14). The added significance that has been attributed to smart meters – that they will 
enable smart grids – and the DECC led approach signalled a change in approach from the 
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market-led, competitive model which Ofgem had been advocating since the early 2000s. This 
has led to some uncertainty and interpretive flexibility surrounding the issue.  Since the 
announcement of a national roll-out, there has been considerable debate within the industry as to 
the manner in which it should be coordinated and how the demand side information flows can 
be utilised in order to improve system economies (interview – 4, 15, 23). This is largely due to 
the unbundled structure of the UK ESI which means that the retail and distribution functions are 
carried out in separate business units, therefore creating uncertainty as to how the new flows of 
information can be utilised and optimised by different parties along the value chain. 
In their subsequent 2009 consultation (DECC, 2009b), DECC made proposals regarding the 
delivery model for the national roll out for electricity and gas smart metering and the degree of 
meter functionality which would be required. The consultation favoured a central 
communications delivery model where ‗gas and electricity supply companies will have 
responsibility for the provision of smart meters‘ but ‗a single provider will be appointed 
centrally to provide communications services to and from meters‘. This was favoured ahead of 
the competitive model previously proposed by Ofgem; where ‗suppliers are free to determine 
their own deployment strategy, choose the metering services they require, and have the ability to 
contract the management of such services‘ (DECC, 2009a). However, the proposals did not go 
so far as to favour a fully regulated roll-out with ‗regional franchises to manage meter asset 
selection, ownership, deployment and maintenance, via a time-based competitive franchise or 
licence awarded under competition‘. It was argued that a centralised communications strategy 
‗should provide a platform to support innovation and competition between the supply 
companies, leading to more choice for customers in metering and other products and services‘ 
and ‗It also retains many of the advantages of the Competitive model such as supplier flexibility 
over the customer proposition, deployment strategy and differentiated service offerings. 
Competitive pressures for metering services are retained in this model‘.  
Amongst distribution companies however there was some concern regarding the non-regulated 
supplier led model, with one interviewee noting: 
 ―Nobody else has even thought about suppliers doing it (…) in other 
countries it‘s the network operator. In most cases they are not really that 
separated anyway at the residential level, so there‘s no real issue which is 
why it has been a bit of an uphill battle for us as DNOs to get what we want 
from the smart meter because the supplier had their views on what they 
wanted from a smart meter. As I say I think it‘s beginning to dawn on them 
that they need the same things that we are pressing for aswell. (…) There will 
be still some people out there who still want an automatic meter reading 
function and really aren‘t thinking about anything cleverer than that, whereas 
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we are. But that‘s absolutely why it is so difficult in this country‖ (Interview - 
20) 
This raised issues regarding how smart meters could enable smart distribution networks i.e. how 
information flows could be coordinated and optimised across the value chain. This is because 
‗there is a regulatory boundary at the metering point and there are business separation issues (...) 
[distribution operators] are forbidden through (…) statutory business separation to talk to 
suppliers or generators‘ (interview - 16). Therefore, due to the legal unbundling of distribution, 
retail and generation businesses; ‗there is no opportunity for the networks business to favour the 
affiliate generator or the affiliate supplier‘ (interview - 16) thus increasing transaction costs and 
creating a barrier to the coordination of information flows in order to achieve system 
economies. In an article for an industry magazine, the managing director of Central Networks, 
Bob Crackett, stated the following:  
"It means the communications and data will be engineered to suit the 
supplier's requirement (...) Engineering communications to deliver automated 
meter readings is not sufficient to run a smart grid. If you need to monitor 
loads in a particular street, you need all the data from the meters in that 
street immediately. I worry that we may end up with something that is not 
integrated with smart grids (...) There are 32 suppliers in the Central 
Networks area, so 32 firms might pull up in any one street over the next ten 
years to fit a smart meter‖ (Utilityweek, 2010) 
Carckett argued for a regulated DNO led roll out with a set rate-of-return; however in their 
proposals DECC argued that ‗re-regulation of metering would be particularly disruptive of the 
existing market resulting in delay to initial deployment‘ (DECC, 2009a) 
A second area of contestation and interpretive flexibility surrounding the proposals centred on 
the degree of functionality of the smart meters i.e. ‗common minimum technical specifications‘ 
and how they would interact with the upstream asset base. The consultation document (DECC, 
2009a) made the following proposals: 
 That ‗smart meters must be sufficiently standardised to be interoperable, so that any 
energy supply company can work with any smart meter‘ 
 That there would be capability to carry out remote reading and provision of information 
to customers 
 The meters would ‗support for a range of time of use tariffs‘ and measure electricity 
exports from microgeneration 
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Once again, although the proposals noted that interoperability and standardisation must ensure 
that ‗the requirements of the network operators are efficiently met‘ and that functionality would 
enable ‗Load management capability to deliver demand side management‘; there was a 
considerable degree of uncertainty as to how this might work in practice. As one interviewee 
noted, there is uncertainty whether the functionality of the meter would be used to improve the 
capacity management of the local distribution networks or as a measure to ensure the stability of 
the overall system at a national level.  
"What do we change the demand for? Is it for the national power balance 
which affects the grid frequency, or is it because of an undesirable local 
imbalance between power generated and consumed which affects the local 
power flow and the local voltage profile in an adverse manner‖ (interview - 
11) 
As an illustrative example, the following scenario laid out by an interviewee from an energy 
company illustrates potential inconsistencies and conflicts between the retailer and the DNO in 
this respect: 
"… [a] retail company perhaps wants to avoid people using power between 
7pm and 9pm because it‘s expensive for when they buy it, but from a grid 
point of view it might be six am [that‘s] a real problem because that‘s when 
generators start up (…) and it might want to pull back loads. So their idea of 
controlling your loads might be very different from the retail company who‘s 
the one who‘s talking to the end customer ―(interview - 4) 
The interviewee went on to note that because DNOs currently have no direct interaction with 
customers, there is little clarity as to how price signals and DR could improve capacity 
management on distribution networks;  
―As an end consumer I really only talk to my suppliers, bills come and that‘s 
all I really need to know about electricity is my supply company. Whereas 
what we‘re talking about now is that the local distribution company will be 
needing to control loads in my house perhaps; whether I can switch my car on 
to recharge. So I don‘t know how that relationship will work whether it‘ll be 
via the supply company or whether [you‘ve] got another relationship with a 
distribution company aswell‖ (interview – 4). 
Following DECCs December 2009 response to its initial consultation, a subsequent consultation 
outlined further details of the implementation program  (DECC, 2010f) and issues surrounding 
meter functionality are under consideration of a government ‗Smart Meter Design Group‘80 
involving technical experts and industry stakeholders. These ongoing debates within the 
industry illustrate how processes of contestation and interpretive flexibility are part of the 
innovation process and highlight the difficulty of coordination within an unbundled context.  
                                                     
80
 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/e-serve/sm/Stakeholder/SMDG/Pages/SMDG.aspx 
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Summary 
Emerging from the liberalisation agenda, a more nuanced and complex view of the customer has 
emerged and following low carbon and sustainability debates, a reframing of the customer has 
taken place where they are seen as a more active component of the system and a resource which 
can be utilised in order to achieve system economies - the table below summarises this. This 
evolving role and conceptualisation of the demand side has however begun to challenge 
previously well defined sector boundaries and interactions within the organisational field as 
there is uncertainty regarding how resultant flows of information (data), revenues (tariff 
structures), and energy (PHEVs, microgeneration) can be optimised. 
Figure 5.9: Different framings of the customer 
 
It is clear that by intervening in order to coordinate the smart meter roll-out, DECC are seeking 
to use smart metering as a strategy to achieve longer-term sustainability and low carbon goals 
within the overall context of a liberalised/unbundled energy policy paradigm. Within the 
distribution sector this has however resulted in a degree of uncertainty regarding the coherence 
between the liberalisation and the smart grid agenda.  
5.3.3 Changing the Regulatory Regime 
The previous sections described how two issues which have been shaped by liberalisation and 
climate change agendas - DG and demand side developments - in different ways have 
challenged the governance regime. As a result, since the fourth price control review in 2005, a 
number of changes have been made to the regulatory framework for electricity distribution 
networks.  
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4
th
 Distribution Price control Review 
Following the 2003 Sustainable Energy Act and the Energy Bill in 2004, the role of the 
regulator has been amended to incorporate a sustainable development duty. The primary role of 
Ofgem was set out in the Utilities Act, 2000; ‗to protect the interests of consumers… wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition‘ (Owen, 2006). This was amended such that 
Ofgem was obliged to ‗contribute to the achievement of sustainable development‘ (Owen, 
2006). In this context and the DG issues discussed above, DPCR4 (Ofgem, 2004) signalled a 
number of changes to the traditional RPI-x regulatory regime. 
Regulating Investments 
As discussed, RPI-x had been designed to place the emphasis of efficiency savings on OPEX 
rather than CAPEX i.e. to ‗sweat the assets‘ and squeeze the margins which were built in during 
nationalisation. However, as the figure below shows, much of this asset base was installed 
during the 1960s and is thus approaching the end of its life; necessitating higher levels of 
allowed CAPEX each price control review: 
Figure 5.10: Capital investment in the UK electricity distribution network 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2006) 
As a result of this, and expectations surrounding the likely costs of DG connections (Shaw et al., 
2010), DCPR4 began to consider how to regulate CAPEX to a degree that previous price 
control reviews had not. As part of DCPR4, Ofgem allowed for an average 48% increase in 
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investment over the previous five years, totalling 5.7 billion (Ofgem, 2004), and for the first 
time since DPCR1, there was not a real price decrease
81
 i.e. ‗OPEX cuts were now outweighed 
by increasing CAPEX programmes‘ (Littlechild, 2009). The following quote illustrates the 
regulatory dilemma facing Ofgem: 
―Current regulatory arrangements may provide DNOs with a skewed 
incentive to solve network performance or constraint problems through 
further investment in transformers and cables, rather than maintaining 
existing assets to prolong their life or seeking to reduce or manage load, even 
when the latter solution is cheaper.  This is because, relative to the 
arrangements for network investment, the DNO can currently keep a much 
higher proportion of underspend against the regulatory operating cost 
allowance, and is not able to pass onto customers any of the overspend‖ 
(Ofgem, 2009b) 
Ofgem introduced a new incentive scheme where ‗DNOs are rewarded by higher rate of returns 
if their actual investments are lower than the predicted levels‘ (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011)  in 
their business plan submissions. This was achieved via a ‗sliding scale mechanism‘ (Ofgem, 
2004)  where ‗the higher the ratio selected by the company to PB power‘s [consultant] 
assessment, the weaker the incentive if the company actually delivered its investment below 
budget‘ (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). The rationale behind this was to incentivise companies to 
reveal accurate information regarding their costs and avoid gaming (Crouch, 2006). Although 
this provides an efficient way of regulating large scale investments and improving the rate of 
return, such piecemeal or modular approaches to network investment do not benefit from the of 
economies of scale that can be achieved through an integrated and systemic approach to 
investment programmes in the networks (Helm, 2004).    
Quality of Service (QOS) Incentives 
As a result of the strong drive for efficiency savings for DNOs under RPI-x, there have been 
concerns that this could result in a trade-off against the quality of service provision to 
customers
82
 e.g. the number of interruptions
83
, quality of communication with customers, storm 
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 In DCPR4 the annual price change was set according to the RPI (x=0), whereas in the previous two it 
was RPI minus 3% (x=3) (Littlechild, 2009) 
82
 ―In an idealised competitive electricity market, customers could choose a network provider offering a 
level of service quality that reflected their willingness to pay for it. Assuming that the maximum amount 
that consumers would pay for quality equals the total quality-induced costs they incur, the socio-
economic optimum occurs at a quality level where the sum of the total cost of quality provision by 
network operators and the total quality induced costs faced by consumers is minimised. However, in the 
absence of (incentive) regulation, natural monopolies may operate at sub-optimal quality and social cost 
levels. In order to prevent inefficient resource allocation, service quality standards and incentives need to 
be incorporated in the regulation of the utilities‖ (Giannakis et al., 2005) 
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compensation arrangements and other the standards of performance  i.e. the network services 
which customers value. It is generally recognised that because CAPEX, OPEX and quality 
outputs are treated separately, this ‗may provide ﬁrms with distorted incentives that lead them to 
adopt an inefficient output mix. Under the current regulatory regime, a ﬁrm receives greater 
beneﬁts from saving OPEX than by an equal amount of CAPEX reduction… ﬁrms may seek to 
capitalise OPEX to obtain higher efﬁciency score and allowed revenue‘ (Giannakis et al., 2005). 
Until 2000, QOS was achieved through guaranteed standards of performance where customers 
received compensation if the standards were not met (Giannakis et al., 2005). DCPR4 explicitly 
included ‗targets for significant improvements in performance‘ and ‗stronger incentives to 
exceed those targets‘ e.g. ‗incentives for DNOs to restore customers promptly and efficiently 
following severe weather  events and streamline the arrangements for compensation for 
prolonged outages‘ (Ofgem, 2004). Following a customer survey which sought to uncover the 
willingness to pay for different network services, a proportion of DNO revenue (2%) was 
‗exposed‘ to QOS incentives. This could penalise DNOs for not meeting targets, reward those 
who do and ‗reward frontier performance by guaranteeing less strict standards for the next 
control period‘ (Giannakis et al., 2005).  
5
th
 Distribution Price control Review 
The key changes in DCPR5 related to the manner in which DNOs collect revenues and how 
these changes have been linked to efforts to promote DG and DSM. The following diagram 
illustrates some of the measures introduced and their impact on DG and demand side issues. 
Broadly, these measures relate to how DNOs can be incentivised to avoid conventional 
reinforcements: 
                                                                                                                                                           
83
 This consists of ‗the number of customers interrupted per 100 customers (CI)‘ and ‗number of customer 
minutes lost per customer (CML)‘ (OFGEM, 2004) 
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Figure 5.11: Measures in DCPR5 to encourage DG and DSM 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2009b) 
Key measures within this diagram include obligations to remove the information asymmetries 
between DG developers and DNOs and equalising incentives for OPEX and CAPEX. 
Equalising incentives means ‗a common incentive rate for all network costs‘ (Ofgem, 2010c); 
‗This means that a fixed  proportion of costs across all these activities will be funded through a 
return on the company's Regulatory Asset Value (RAV) and depreciation, and the same sharing  
factor will apply between customers and the DNO for any over or underspend against 
allowances‘ (Ofgem, 2009b) i.e. the regulator will allocate rents associated with network 
operating costs and investments in the same way in an effort to take a more holistic approach to 
the costs of OPEX and CAPEX.  
Additional to these measures, DCPR5 continued the broader trends in the regulatory regime 
described above - the regulation of CAPEX
84 
and outputs incentives - but also signalled further 
changes to the ways in which DNOs revenue is regulated. Traditionally there had been a direct 
correlation between the revenues of distribution companies and the volume of electricity 
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 For example there was a 32% increase on allowed revenue for reinforcements across the networks 
compared to DCPR4 levels (OFGEM, 2009) 
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flowing through their networks where ‗the overall income of the DNO scales with the amount of 
energy distributed from the network‘(Shaw et al., 2010) . However, due to expectations that 
developments such as DG and DR would reduce the average flows of energy through the 
networks, this income driver has started to be removed because the companies costs are based 
on peak flows rather than average volume, thus creating a potential mismatch between the 
capital cost requirements to run the networks and revenues (Shaw et al., 2010). As Shaw et al. 
note (2010); ‗DNOs would lose income because of efficient electricity use by their customers. 
DNOs‘ costs would not reduce in the same way, because peak power flows are the main driver 
of their costs, rather than energy distributed‘ therefore ‗DNOs would be financially penalised 
for reductions in net demand for energy from their networks, such as when on-site generation 
offsets gross energy demand‘.  
During this period Ofgem (Ofgem, 2009b) announced a move towards cost reflexive charging 
for new connections. This replaces the ‗Distribution Reinforcement model‘ which had been the 
industry standard from the days of the Electricity Council when in 1984 the Electricity Board 
originally established charges for ‗use of the distribution system‘ (ILEX, 2002). This calculated 
the long run marginal costs of connection (inputs including design, transportation, equipment), 
and allocated ‗costs between customer groups on a fair, equitable and transparent basis in 
accordance with well established, and proven, long run marginal cost principles‘ (ILEX, 2002). 
However, a 2002 study found that the ‗underlying assumptions, design philosophy and asset 
types‘ were not questioned and it ‗...does not consider embedded generation‘ (ILEX, 2002); i.e. 
‗it does nothing to encourage people to go to locations where the costs they impose on the 
network are less‘ (interview – 19). Under new arrangements DNOs set charges for connections 
based on the actual costs of connection; for example, a generator which is located close to an 
area of high demand will be less costly and this will be reflected in the charging regime. As of 
2010, this will include a common set of charges at the low voltage level across all DNOs (a 
Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM)) and company specific charges which 
will be published. This is designed to promote ‗consistency and transparency in connection 
charging, caused largely by variations in the interpretation of connection charging 
methodologies across DNOs‘ (Ofgem, 2009d: p.8/9): Ofgem note: 
 ―In our view cost reflective charging arrangements are necessary to 
encourage efficient siting and use of network decisions, particularly for larger 
users, and for rewarding users who provide a benefit to the distribution 
network, for example distributed generation  (DG) located close to load or for 
customers implementing demand side management‖ (Ofgem, 2009d) 
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This is significant due to the increasing numbers of DGs seeking connection (see graph below) 
and the introduction of feed-in tariff subsidies for small scale renewable technologies connected 
at the customer side of the meter: 
Figure 5.12: Numbers of DG Connections 2007-2010 
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Source: (Ofgem, 2009d)
85
 
Future Price Controls: RIIO  
In 2010, an Ofgem document noted the following: 
―The existing ‗RPI-X‘ regulatory framework has served consumers well, 
delivering lower prices, better quality of service and more than £35bn in 
network investment since privatisation twenty years ago. But RPI-X was 
designed for a very different environment to the one we will face in the future. 
The regulatory framework needs to change to encourage network companies 
to deliver a sustainable energy sector and provide value for money‖ (Ofgem, 
2010e) 
This statement was contained in a report which introduced changes to the regulatory framework 
which will be implemented following DCPR6 in 2015 for the electricity networks. The 
publication of the document (‗RIIO: A new way to regulate energy networks, final decision‘) 
followed a period of consultation and engagement with a range of stakeholders, including 
academics. The following excerpts from an article in the Utilityweek magazine by the director 
of the regulatory review, Hannah Nixon, gives an insight into the rationale for undertaking the 
review and points to the reasons behind the cautious nature of the final proposals where, from 
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 Data was taken from table 2.2 on page 14 
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the outset, a ‗full review of the structure of the gas and electricity industries [was] beyond the 
scope of RPI-X@20‘ (Ofgem, 2010c): 
―The decision to undertake RPI-X@20 did not arise because there were signs 
of cracking in the regime that has, since privatisation, driven efficiency in the 
energy network businesses. There are no such signs. Indeed, our current 
approach has served, and continues to serve, customers well. The review was 
born out of awareness that it is better not to wait until it comes to the crunch, 
before testing the vehicle – especially before a journey across new terrain‖ 
(Utilityweek, 2009) 
As part of the RPI-x@20 review
86
 Ofgem commissioned a number of reports and studies; for 
example, investigating the role of benchmarking in price controls (Frontier, 2010c), the 
regulation of outputs (Frontier, 2010b), and on the extension of the regulatory period (which is 
currently five years) (Reckon, 2009). Contributions by a number of prominent academics in the 
field were also made (Helm, 2009, Littlechild, 2009, Pollitt, 2010). During the process Ofgem 
produced a set of interim proposals titled ‗Emerging Thinking‘ (Ofgem, 2010c) in which the 
following proposals were made: 
 An outputs led approach: The ex-ante approach is to be retained however there will be 
an even greater focus on an outputs led approach, therefore less discretion for the 
companies on how they achieve their efficiencies i.e. ‗focusing on what is delivered 
rather than how it is delivered‘ with network companies retaining ‗a fixed proportion of 
the benefit of any saving made‘ (Ofgem, 2010c). 
 Measures to promote more effective ‗engagement and accountability‘: Including rights 
for third parties, e.g. customers, generators, environmental groups etc, to challenge 
decisions, ‗encouraging network companies to engage with consumers on an ongoing 
basis‘  and to ‗encourage network companies to focus on the needs of their consumers 
rather than on the regulator‘ (Ofgem, 2010c).  
 Promoting long term efficiency: Extending the regulatory period in order to incentivise 
longer term decision horizons (the final proposals have changed this from 5 to 8  years), 
requiring companies to submit longer term business plan proposals and more 
differential treatment for network companies e.g. some ‗Network companies could earn 
a below average return if they fail to deliver outputs or if they deliver them 
inefficiently‘ (Ofgem, 2010c) 
 Promoting Innovation: The proposals regarding incentives for innovation will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section 
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 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/RPIx20/Pages/RPIX20.aspx 
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Following these proposals, Ofgem published its decision document later in 2010 in which it 
outlined its future approach to price controls; Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs 
(RIIO) – the figure below summarises the main components of the framework: 
Figure 5.13: Key components of RIIO 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2010e) 
Although concerns have been expressed over the financeability of investments (interview – 20) 
and the regulatory risks of proportionate assessment (Utilityweek, 2010), many of the measures 
have been welcomed, in particular a continuing commitment to offering incentives for 
innovation (Interviews – 18, 23).  However, the proposals are very much aligned with the 
broader regulatory trends towards regulating CAPEX and focusing on outputs, thus building on 
measures which had already been incorporated into DCPR5 (Utilityweek, 2010). In this sense 
RIIO does not signal a major paradigmatic shift in the regulatory regime; Ofgem ‗are building 
on the principles and practices of the RPI-X framework‘ and have ‗taken the elements that 
deliver benefits effectively, adapted and developed other elements, and added new elements to 
enhance the framework‘ (Ofgem, 2010e).  
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Summary 
This sub section has shown how the regulatory regime has evolved, mainly since 2005 when 
issues relating to DG and engaging with the demand side began to be addressed. Measures such 
as innovation incentives (which will be discussed in more detail below), cost reflexive pricing 
and incentives to promote more transparency and the disclosure of information have been 
introduced during the period. These developments have taken place in the context of two 
overarching trends in regulation; efforts to promote more efficient CAPEX with an ageing asset 
base and a trend towards outputs based form of regulation which offers less autonomy to the 
private operators in how they achieve their efficiencies and begins to judge the performance of 
the individual companies rather than the aggregate performance of the sector – this general trend 
is illustrated in the figure below: 
Figure 5.14: The evolution of network regulation 
 
Source: (Viljainen, 2005) 
RIIO is broadly in line with these regulatory trends and has ‗tweaked‘ the existing modes of 
governing associated with RPI-x in the following ways:  
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Table 5.3: Changes to the regulatory governance regime 
Mode of governing Adapting the UK regulatory regime 
‗Sweat the assets‘ Regulation of CAPEX through closer scrutiny of business plans, extending the 
regulatory period, incentives for innovation, differential treatment of companies 
‗Open Access‘ New charging methodologies, incentives to connect DG, move towards cost 
reflexive charging regime 
‗Protect the customer‘ Increasing emphasis on outputs, maintain industry structure to enable customer 
switching, measures to promote ‗engagement and accountability‘ 
 
5.3.4 Promoting Innovation 
One aspect of the regulatory change process which is worthy of particular note has been efforts 
to incentivise and promote innovation within the electricity distribution sector. The RPI-x 
regulatory approach had initially been designed to be a technology blind tool which, in terms of 
promoting innovation, was underpinned by the neo-liberal rationale that market forces would 
place a competitive discipline on firms thus promoting innovation  (Kern, 2009, Mitchell, 2008, 
Watson, 2008). For the case of regulated monopoly sectors such as electricity distribution this 
derived from the Schumpeterian view of the temporary nature of monopoly – monopoly power 
and above normal profits would act as an incentive to innovation and entry to the market, and 
through periodic interventions and price controls, the regulator could simulate a competitive 
market, thus placing downward pressure on prices and a quasi-competitive disciplining the 
companies (Helm, 2004). Littlechild‘s view was that over time the need for sector specific 
regulation would diminish as competitive forces would lead to the self-regulation of the 
networks with competition and contract law providing an appropriate institutional framework. 
Innovation would therefore take care of itself and the job of the regulator was relatively simple; 
to ‗act as a surrogate for competition‘ whilst ensuring that network operators had the ability to 
finance their activities (Owen, 2006).  
This view, that innovation was a natural consequence of pure market competition, illustrated a 
poor understanding of the innovation processes set out in chapter 2. What transpired was that 
RPI-x created a selection environment which favoured non-infrastructure solutions, i.e. cutting 
the costs of organising network companies, and short-term/piecemeal approaches to network 
planning which were often inefficient from a system perspective (Helm, 2004, Helm, 2009). 
This was illustrated in the case of DG where, due to a lack of progress, the network operator 
-160- 
 
 
 
was eventually forced to create an artificial incentive for innovation through the IFI and RPZ 
schemes. The problematization of demand side issues has added another dimension to the 
innovation debate and the view that pure ex-ante price regulation cannot deliver innovation is 
now well recognised (interview – 1, 3, 13, 17). For example, Tooraj Jamasb and Michael Pollitt, 
academic economists who have argued that RPI-x has been a successful regulatory instrument, 
have stated the following: 
―...we note the impact of future innovation on network regulation. 
Technological progress has in the past and will continue in the future to 
transform the nature and economics of networks. It is therefore very important 
that any regulatory framework will provide the right incentives for innovation 
and adoption of new technologies in the networks. It is also important that the 
regulatory system is flexible. The UK system of regulation has performed well 
from 1990 to 2006. However, it will need to evolve in the face of new 
technology and the challenge of demands from electricity consumers and 
producers for cleaner and more decentralised production(…) Thus, an 
important question is whether the UK regulation model provides the necessary 
incentives for innovation and accommodates the ―active networks‖ of the future 
with renewables, distributed generation, micro-generation, and active demand. 
Micro-generation units installed by households, industrial CHP, and 
decentralised renewable generation sources will impose new challenges for 
network regulation. This implies that European electricity regulators should 
take into account the power and long-term effects of incentive schemes in 
influencing the features and behaviour of regulated firms. In responding to the 
choice of benchmarking, models and target variables firms are led to follow a 
certain path. This can mean a narrow focus on a limited number of strategic 
variables. Regulatory models will therefore need to be reviewed and evolve 
constantly to meet the needs of future networks‖ (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007).  
This section discusses how the regulator has attempted to incorporate innovation incentives into 
the regulatory framework and the success to date.  
RPZ and IFI: Promoting Active Network Management 
The application of ICT technologies to the operation of distribution systems is not a wholly new 
development; distribution automation technologies have been deployed within the industry for 
over 20 years in order to promote operational efficiencies e.g. in improving response times to 
fault events  (Northcote-Green and Wilson, 2006, Kendrew and Marks, 1989) but have typically 
only been deployed at the higher voltage levels (interview - 9). These technologies can include; 
inline voltage regulators, SVCs and STATCOMs, active voltage controllers and dynamic line 
rating systems (BERR, 2008a). In recent years however, due to DG connection and projections 
of future demand growth, concerns have been raised that increased fault levels along with 
increased and more complex power flows could result in distribution lines exceeding their 
thermal ratings or voltage fluctuations which may exceed safety requirements (interview - 7). 
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Active Network Management (ANM) can be seen as an evolution of distribution automation 
which involves both generation and the demand side i.e. ‗controlling the inputs onto the 
network from generators or storage owners (supply-side options) or the offtakes from the 
network by customers (demand-side options)‘ (Frontier, 2010a). BERR (BERR, 2008a) outline 
the basics of ANM: 
―ANM means devices, systems and practices that operate pre-emptively to 
maintain networks within accepted operating parameters.  ANM may be 
compatible with automation of the network to speed supply restoration 
following an abnormal event, and increased visibility and control of the 
network to facilitate management practices‖ (BERR, 2008a: p.1) 
As has been discussed previously, the conventional response of the DNOs operating under the 
RPI-x incentive regime to these issues has been to expand the capacity of the network by 
investing in reinforcements, thus expanding their asset base. However, the increasing emphasis 
being placed on CAPEX regulation means that the regulator is looking towards less capital 
intensive solutions. The IFI and RPZ schemes were designed to assist ANM based technologies 
along the innovation chain, this is because; 
―Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) typically operate passive networks 
today, with relatively straightforward flows of electricity. They do not have a 
history of making trade-offs between network investment and active 
management options‖(Frontier, 2010a) 
The innovation incentives that Ofgem introduced in 2005
87
 was an R&D funding mechanism: 
the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) where DNOs were permitted to spend up to 0.5% of its 
regulated revenue on R&D which ‗allows a DNO to pass through to customers 80% (tapered 
from 90% to 70% from 2005 to 2010) of the cost of eligible IFI projects‘ (Ofgem, 2010d).  
Along with the IFI, a measure to promote trials of network innovations was also introduced; 
Registered Power Zones (RPZ), where a DNO could spend up to £500,000/year and earn 
enhanced revenues for the connection of DGs. RPZ offered ‗an additional incentive of an extra 
£3/kW/year (over and above the main DG incentive) for a five year period commencing on the 
date of commissioning of the project‘ (Ofgem, 2004), this was ‗capped at £0.5 million per DNO 
per year‘ (Ofgem, 2005).  
The RPZ scheme was introduced as part of DCPR4 where ‗DNOs will be allowed to seek 
registration for up to two RPZs per year for the first two years of the scheme‘ (Ofgem, 2005) 
and ‗Ofgem will register, though not approve, RPZ projects and, where appropriate, will seek 
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advice from an independent panel, established by Ofgem, in relation to the innovation content 
and potential benefits of an RPZ Proposal‘ (Ofgem, 2005). As part of an RPZ, a DNO had to 
‗demonstrate that an innovative solution could offer material advantages to DG customers 
compared to a conventional solution‘ (ENA, 2007). An RPZ was loosely defined as; ‗a 
collection of contiguously connected distribution system assets (i.e. which provide an electrical 
path for the distribution of electrical energy) having one or more terminal points which together 
describe in full the RPZ‘s boundary with the total system.  These terminal points will be 
selected such that any system components or connected customers (existing demand and 
generation) that may be affected by the RPZ project are included within them‘ (ENA, 2007). 
As Figure 4 below shows, the IFI did have a significant positive impact on R&D spending in the 
sector as R&D had declined significantly since liberalization (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008, Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2011). It was a clear incentive where the risks to the DNOs were low and companies 
did not have to rely on Ofgem for approval. They therefore had a degree of autonomy in how 
they spent the money as the scope of the IFI covered ‗all aspects of distribution system asset 
management from design through to construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and 
decommissioning‘ (Ofgem, 2004). 
Figure 5.15: UK electricity distribution R&D spending 
Source: (Ofgem, 2009c: p.5) 
The figure below shows that EDF and ENW were particularly active in the uptake of the IFI: 
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Figure 5.16: R&D Intensity (%) 
 
Source: (Ofgem, 2010d) 
In a review of the scheme Ofgem noted that ‗In total some £10.9 million has been invested by 
the Distribution Network Operators (DNO) in IFI projects in 2008/9. This represents an overall 
research and development (R&D) intensity (spend as a proportion of allowed revenue) of 
0.30%. This is 60% of the maximum allowed under the scheme.  It is less than the outturn for 
2007/8 when total spend was £12.1m, an R&D intensity of 0.33%‘ (Ofgem, 2010d). This 
essentially was a task of fixing a market failure of a lack of R&D spending since privatization; a 
number of interviews have noted that this was waiting to happen (Interview – 6, 7) and the 
scheme has been continued into DPCR5. 
The RPZ scheme on the other hand was not so successful; only four projects were undertaken 
by the companies throughout the five years of the price control period: 
1. The Orkney Island RPZ involves a collaboration between the University of Strathclyde, 
SSE and Smarter Grid Solutions (start-up company) deploying active network 
management technologies. Problems were encountered in connecting DG to the island 
network due to capacity constraints and limited connectivity to the mainland networks 
via sub-sea cables (Interviews – 3, 18). This caused voltage rise and thermal limit issues 
on the network. The ‗voltage problems were resolved by installing a dynamic VAr 
compensator (DVAr)‘ and thermal issues were addressed by sequencing generator input 
into the network based on theoretical scenarios and ‗on the basis of last on, first off to 
keep the system within the theoretical limits determined by the studies‘ (BERR, 2008a). 
A key factor in the economic success of the scheme was the avoided cost of investing in 
additional sub-sea cable capacity.   
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2. Central Networks‘ Boston/Skegness project uses dynamic line rating techniques in 
order to accommodate a greater number of DG connections on a particular section of 
their network. Transmission power through a line increases its temperature. In order to 
deal with this the typical approach has been to use conservative ambient air predictions, 
based on the summer months, according to Engineering Recommendation P17 (BERR, 
2008a). In response to this Central Network utilised an ENMAC™ SCADA system to 
measure real-time weather data and increase the capacity of the line for DG.  
3. At the Martham primary substation EDF Networks used Econnect‘s (a specialist power 
engineering firm) GenAVC™ to actively control voltage levels such that when DG is 
connected the statutory voltage limits are not breached.  
4. A similar project was undertaken on the EDF network at Steyning primary in order to 
accommodate a landfill gas generator. This avoided the installation of 4.5km of 
underground cable (EDF, 2008) 
Although these individual schemes are innovative in their own right, there was a poor uptake of 
the RPZ incentive. Although the projects were relatively successful in trialing new technologies, 
as one academic interviewee suggests, they were modular innovations which were not of the 
radical or architectural type: 
"…it didn‘t really come into that space. It was still very traditional but 
innovative way of operating a distribution network, I would argue, it doesn‘t 
really address the market opportunities" (interview – 20) 
While another describes the scheme as; 
―…a failure, there are only 3 schemes after 4 or 5 years. There‘s no incentive 
for the network to try something [which] may undermine its business model‖ 
(interview – 2) 
This relative failure can largely be explained using the systems failure arguments in the IS 
literature. The RPZ scheme treated a lack of innovation as a market externality which can be 
priced, rather than recognizing the systemic barriers produced by multiple externalities. For 
example, the following table which draws from Meeus et al. (2010) illustrates some of these 
systemic barriers to the development of an innovation system in the electricity distribution 
sector: 
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Table 5.4: Systemic barriers to innovation 
Cost increase Connecting DG, integrating demand and storage all increase the cost of 
operating the grids (OPEX) and the cost of maintaining quality – this goes 
against the prevailing incentives to reduce OPEX and improve QOS.  
Short term costs for 
long term benefits 
Also with more DG and demand, companies should substitute CAPEX for 
OPEX, but they are incentivised to do the opposite due to the short 
regulatory period i.e. cut OPEX, particularly due to the length of the 
regulatory periods which skews the regulatory trade-off towards cutting 
OPEX 
Distributed benefits For the case of many smart technologies ‗system wide costs and benefits do 
not always coincide‘ i.e. a smart grid investment e.g. ANM may benefit 
many parties along the value chain whilst the investment risk is confined to 
one party.  
Systemic vs. company 
specific 
According to the IS literature Innovation requires systemic interventions and 
the development of a sector innovation system. However, the RPZ 
innovation incentive was aimed at individual companies and did little to 
promote collaboration across the value chain.  
Source: Table draws from (Meeus et al., 2010) 
The Low Carbon Networks Fund 
Whilst continuing the IFI in DCPR5, the regulator has replaced the RPZ scheme with the Low 
Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF). Following the relative failure of the RPZ scheme, in DCPR5 
Ofgem announced the LCNF to promote the deployment of innovative technologies. Similar to 
the RPZ scheme, there is an almost total partial pass-through (90%) of costs to customers and 
the aim of the LCNF is to ‗try to replicate the incentives on unregulated companies to innovate‘ 
(Ofgem, 2010a). A significant difference is that the LNCF is not confined to the connection of 
DG alone because ‗DNOs may need to radically change the way they charge for access to their 
networks if customers (including domestic customers) change their patterns of use in response 
to smart metering and become customers and producers of electricity at different times of the 
day. DNOs' charges will need to reflect the costs (or cost savings) associated with very different 
patterns of use and encourage customers who have control over their demand to use more at 
times of the day when there is spare network capacity to avoid the need for expensive network 
investment in new capacity‘ (Ofgem, 2010e). 
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There are two tiers to the LCNF. The first tier of funding is £80million and is for smaller 
projects with funding per DNO being limited annually, these projects are registered with Ofgem 
and in 2010 nine projects have been registered as tier one projects
88
. The second tier provides 
£320million for ‗flagship projects‘; ‗Ofgem will hold an annual competition for project funding 
and the DNOs will compete against each other for an allocation of the funds‘ (Ofgem, 2010e). 
Submissions are assessed by a panel of experts and each year a number of projects are awarded 
funding. There is also an ex-post ‗discretionary funding mechanism‘ of £100million which 
‗enables Ofgem to reward successful delivery and projects that bring particular value in helping 
the DNOs understand what investment, commercial arrangements and operating strategies they 
should be putting in place to provide security of supply at value for money for future network 
users, while doing all they can to tackle climate change‘ (Ofgem, 2010e).  
In 2010 four projects were selected on a competitive basis: 
 Customer-led Network Revolution: This was submitted by CE Electric UK and is a 
partnership with British Gas‘ smart metering program, the Durham Energy Institute, 
Sustainability First, National Energy Action and EA Technology. The aim of the project 
is to align demand response with ANM techniques (voltage control, real time thermal 
rating and storage) to learn about customer load characteristics, the potential for more 
flexible customer behaviour, to manage network constraint issues and the ‗most 
effective means to deliver optimal solutions between customer, supplier and distributor‘ 
(CE Electric UK, 2010). £26.8million was awarded (Ofgem, 2010b) . 
 Low Carbon London was submitted by EDF Energy Networks for the London area 
(now UK Power Networks) and was awarded £24.3 million. The project utilises data 
from 5,000 smart meters to allow the DNO to connect microgenerators and improve the 
capacity utilisation of the urban network. They also seek to develop novel contractual 
arrangements involving customers, companies who aggregate a number of 
microgenerators and the DNO. Project partners include Siemens, Imperial College, 
Smarter Grid Solutions, the GLA, National Grid amongst others (EDF, 2010). 
 Central Networks‘ Low Carbon Hub involves the utilisation of ANM techniques to 
connect DG to a 33KV segment of their network. This applies dynamic line rating, 
flexible AC transmission system devices which are typically deployed on transmission 
networks, dynamic voltage control and new commercial arrangements between the DG 
and DNO (Central Networks, 2010). This received £2.8million from the LCNF 
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-167- 
 
 
 
 LV Network Templates for a low carbon future was submitted by Western Power 
Distribution (WPD) and awarded £7.8million. Along with the University of Bath WPD 
will monitors LV feeder lines in South Wales with the expectation that the data will 
help National Grid to manage the grid with greater levels of microgeneration. This uses 
information from the Welsh Assembly‘s low carbon initiative which involves over 
1,000 PV installations  (Western Power Distribution, 2010).  
It is clear that Ofgem have learned some of the lessons of the failure to incentivise deployment 
of innovative technologies and practices under the RPZ scheme (interview – 14). By awarding 
the companies the vast majority of their upfront costs and giving them more autonomy to design 
projects according to the particular needs of their networks, the LNCF is an improvement on the 
RPZ demand pull model.  Although it is early to assess whether the scheme is a success, it has 
largely been welcomed (interviews – 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24) and in the RIIO 
proposals a similar program is planned for DPCR6 which is called the ‗Innovation Stimulus‘ 
(Ofgem, 2010e).  
These inventive schemes are important not only in trialling new technologies and developing 
innovative responses to network related issues, but also in developing the capabilities and 
organisational routines necessary to promote innovation as a strategy within the network 
companies (interviews – 3, 6, 18, 20). Emerging from the period of nationalisation when 
network investments were made on the basis of demand growth and network expansion (Surrey, 
1996), under the RPI-x incentive scheme disincentives were put in place for long term thinking 
about the networks (Scott and Evans, 2007). As a result, the organisational routines of the 
network companies have not developed in ways that promote innovation - the following quote 
from an interviewee from a big six company illustrates this: 
"I‘m not sure and speaking honestly that we‘re that big on innovation 
ourselves (…) we‘re a utility that runs a business and a set of assets and those 
assets we buy from manufacturers, equipment manufacturers of one 
description or another. So a lot of the innovation will be done there and we‘re 
buying it in and putting it together‖ (interview - 4) 
Programs such as the LNCF can begin to change this culture within the sector (interview – 6); 
however, it is envisioned that over time specific innovation incentive schemes will be ‗wound 
down‘ and innovation will need to become part of the day to  day planning and operation of the 
networks (Ofgem, 2010e). The following quote from an innovation manager within one of the 
DNOs illustrates that ultimately, separate innovation programs such as the LCNF will be 
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sideline issues to the main business of operating the networks under the price based incentive 
regime.  
―Say we have some load growth on part of the network, the conventional way 
is to say we will buy a transformer (…) that is going to cost say a million to 
accommodate for load growth. If you use technology, say the LCNF, [and] we 
utilise storage to manage the load growth, whatever we spend we are going to 
get 90% back (…) So there is a conflict there straight away, so I can use the 
conventional route to manage that load growth and I‘ll get 100% return 
because I‘ll go to Ofgem and say ‗well I need a transformer‘ (…) Or I can go 
the technological route and it‘s going to cost me 10% of my investment. 
There‘s a conflict there straight away" (interview – 17) 
If the costs associated with innovation are continually passed through to the customers through 
innovation incentives the shareholders of these companies bear little risk and it is unlikely that 
innovation can become embedded within the companies‘ organisational routines. ‗Flagship 
projects‘ run the risk of becoming gold-plated, stand alone initiatives and thus not affecting the 
‗day-to-day‘ investment decisions and operation of the companies. It is as yet unclear as to how 
innovation can be institutionally embedded within the mainstream regulatory process as the 
RIIO proposals do not illustrate how the risks and benefits of innovation can be equitably shared 
between customers and shareholders and between different actors across the value chain 
(interviews – 18, 20, 23, 18). Also, the outputs led approach which RIIO seeks to reinforce runs 
the risk of reverting to a demand pull approach. The reasons why RPZ didn‘t work was because 
they were outputs based, or demand pull exclusively. IS theory suggests that the whole 
innovation chain needs to be considered and this is why the LCNF needed to be developed. 
However, it is uncertain how this will be incorporated into the mainstream regulatory regime 
which, as the following quote from the Ofgem illustrates, is evolving towards the regulation of 
outputs: 
―In time we expect that an outcomes-led framework, with appropriately 
designed longer-term incentives and a greater role for competition in 
delivery, would encourage network companies to seek out innovative delivery 
solutions… The stimulus could be removed if, for example, it became clear the 
regulatory framework was itself encouraging sufficient innovation or there 
was evidence that the scale and nature of innovation required was reducing‖ 
(Ofgem, 2010c) 
With early stage technologies in particular outputs are inherently uncertain and difficult to 
measure; an over reliance on an outputs based approach to promote innovation will favour near 
commercial technologies and incremental changes which reduce the investment risks for 
companies (Meeus et al., 2010). 
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5.3.5 Conclusion to Interventions and Interactions Section 
This section outlined some of the key regulatory and policy interventions that are taking place 
as a result of efforts to promote the transition to a low carbon economy. These interventions are 
resulting in new forms of interaction at the sector or organisational field level e.g. between the 
customer, retailer, and DNO, between the network operator and the regulator and across the 
sector as a whole as it attempts to govern in an increasingly complex and uncertain 
environment. The next section of the chapter will discuss the outcomes of these interventions 
and interactions in terms of the physical, relational and structural institutional dimensions.    
5.4 Outcomes 
This section utilises the dimensions of infrastructures approach which was introduced in chapter 
3 where the physical, relational and structural analytical categories characterise the interplay 
between actors, institutions and technologies in energy distribution sectors as a the outcome of a 
governance process. It was argued that institutions can be considered as embedded in each of 
the infrastructure dimensions and analysed in a systematic fashion where actors within the 
organisational field simultaneously seek to strive for notions of technical efficiency and 
legitimacy for their actions.  
5.4.1 Physical Dimension 
In the physical dimension institutions coordinate physical flows within a network which can be 
measured, monitored and controlled. Key analytical variables which were outlined in chapter 3 
include the changing relationships between nodes, links and flows, how system economies are 
being achieved, and how system reliability and integrity is maintained. In the electricity 
distribution case the focus was on the manner in which DG and demand side issues are affecting 
physical flows within the networks - the following table summarises the main outcomes. 
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Table 5.5: Characterising the changing flows within electricity distribution systems 
Flows Electricity Distribution 
Energy 
 DG connecting to the distribution networks and the potential for two-way flows 
 Increasing demand for electricity due to electrification of heat and transport 
 Increasing volume of flow on the low voltage feeder lines 
Information 
 Increasing amounts of information available due to liberalisation of the retail 
market 
 Smart metering to make customer data more available  
 Incentive schemes designed to reduce information asymmetries between 
companies and regulator 
 Efforts to deploy ICT to manage more complex flows of energy and revenues 
Revenues 
 New charging regime for DGs  
 Revenues of network companies to be increasingly determined through specified 
outputs 
 New measures to regulate CAPEX 
 Incentives for real-time transacting and active management of networks through 
innovation funding 
One key outcome has been increasing efforts to use new flows of information to achieve system 
economies rather than expand the network in order to accommodate an increasingly complex 
and diverse set of energy flows (interview – 2, 23). The traditional approach of expanding the 
network using conventional technologies and practices is seen as a costly solution, therefore 
new measures to regulate CAPEX and early attempts to incentivise innovation are seeking to act 
as a disincentive to this. As one interviewee noted it is; 
 ‗about understanding the capacity of our networks, because particularly at 
the low voltage levels we don‘t have the ability to  monitor the capacity of 
those networks, the only way we know is when the customer complains about 
the  quality of their supply, so that will allow us to fill that capacity up‘ 
(interview - 23).  
However, efforts to improve capacity management and achieve economies of system through 
the utilisation of new information flows are encountering barriers as a result of the organisation 
of the ESI which artificially separates key components of the system, thus increasing transaction 
costs and making it difficult to bring about system complementarities. The example of the smart 
metering roll out, which is designed to make available information regarding demand side 
energy use patterns, highlights an ongoing tension between the use of prices to reduce the asset 
specificity of transactions taking place within the industry, and the technical requirements of the 
system which demands a real-time balance between supply and demand. It is questionable 
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whether the latter can be achieved through prices and incentives alone as the physical flows 
within the system become more complex.  
The example of distributed generation illustrates how increasingly complex flows have 
undermined the traditional revenue streams of DNOs. Distribution networks, which had 
traditionally been passive systems with one-way flows of power, are increasingly being seen as 
more dynamic systems which can accommodate and manage a diverse set of inputs and loads. 
This increased demand for third party access to nodes of the network has prompted changes to 
the revenue model of DNOs in order to maintain the integrity of the system; for example in how 
they collect charges from DG operators. Also, the localisation of flows which is resulting from 
increased DG connection is making the regional networks less uniform entities with more 
differentiated approaches emerging to how rural and urban systems are planned and operated
89
. 
This is resulting in a trend towards cost reflexive charging regimes which can reflect these 
geographical differences. As a result, the concept of a Distribution System Operator (DSO), 
where DNOs manage their systems in a real-time dynamic way using ANM techniques – similar 
to a Transmission System Operator (TSO) – is seen as a potential evolution of the DNO 
business model in the future (interview – 13, 15, 17, 18, 20).  
5.4.2 Relational Dimension 
The relational dimension address the issue of ‗independent but autonomous organisations, each 
controlling important resources‘ and the role of institutions is ‗to coordinate their actions to 
produce a joint outcome which is deemed mutually beneficial‘ (Jessop, 1995). The 
problematization of passive distribution networks due to issues relating to DG connection and 
the uncertainty surrounding the integration with retail and the end customer has begun to change 
the relational dynamics within the organisational field in a number of ways. 
Changing Vertical Dynamics 
The structure of the ESI in the UK has been based on a set of vertical relationships between 
electricity generators, the transmission operator (who is responsible for ensuring that the system 
is balanced at a national level) and regional distribution network companies (who deliver power 
to end customers according to the Safety, Quality and Continuity standards) and retailers. 
Although market based mechanisms (the development of retail and wholesale markets for 
electricity) have been increasingly introduced with the aim of promoting the efficient dispatch 
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of generation and the reduction of capacity margins, the system relies on a set of hierarchical 
institutions in order to achieve the necessary system balance and coordination. The TSO has 
ultimate responsibility to maintain system security and the distribution networks as a result have 
had a passive role i.e. manage one-way flows of power to the end customer. However, 
increasing levels of DG and the ongoing trend towards integration with the demand side are 
creating expectations and visions surrounding more active distribution systems and smart grids. 
This is creating uncertainty surrounding how these relationships might be configured in the 
future e.g. between the TSO, DNO, retailers and DG operators (interview – 4, 22, 23).  
In order to illustrate, one interviewee from a DNO which is owned by one of the ‗big six‘ 
energy companies outlines potential conflicts which may arise due to increased DG diffusion: 
―…if NGC90 want to re-secure the network by changing generation patterns 
they can dispatch-off generation or they can dispatch generation on to secure 
the network (…) [however] (…) the distribution network [generators] don‘t 
have access rights and they can be turned off for system control purposes. If 
you‘ve got multiple embedded generators how do you decide who goes off 
first because there‘s no formal connection arrangements; is it last on first off? 
Is it a pro rata reduction? There‘s no regulatory framework for managing 
that‖ (interview - 16).  
Similar conflicts of interests emerge in customer interactions where ‗you‘ve got all these 
different bodies (…); national grid at a national level, the network operator at a local level and 
the supply company perhaps wanting to do different things with your devices at home and 
actually want to send/use different control mechanisms or price signals‘ (interview - 4).  
This may potentially necessitate new formal institutions to coordinate activity within the sector 
(interview – 23) in a different way as; ‗there is no question that the current structure of the 
market here in the UK, in a deregulated environment where you‘ve got the TSOs, DNOs, and 
electricity suppliers, does not lend itself to a very effective integration (…) because you‘ve got 
conflicting interests obviously among the different players in that market‘ (Interview - 12). As 
has been noted, this uncertainty regarding vertical relationships within the sector have most 
recently been played out in disputes over the smart meter roll out where the transmission 
operator may be concerned with the national level power balance and grid frequency while the 
DNO would be concerned with local power imbalances and voltage profiles (interview – 11). 
Whether this institutional coordination is achieved through market based approaches e.g. ‗real 
time‘ pricing, or a return of more conventional forms of hierarchical strategic planning, is as yet 
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uncertain (Foxon et al., 2010). However, this interpretive flexibility surrounding how the set of 
vertical relationships in organisational field might develop in the future is resulting in 
stakeholders beginning to question the current unbundled structure of the sector; i.e. ‗the 
boundaries between suppliers, network operators, and virtual power plant operators will become 
very very blurred and you could even argue that it becomes so blurred that it becomes more of 
an entity‘ and ‗... it starts to challenge the highly unbundled organisation we have in this 
country; we have separate suppliers, DNOs, new players coming in…aggregators, VPP91 
operators and so on‘ (interview - 20). Thus questions over prevailing institutional arrangements 
have arisen as there is a great degree of uncertainty regarding ‗the nuts and bolts: who‘s 
controlling the smart grid or how much is it controlling itself? How smart is it? And what does 
it mean?‘ (interview – 4) -  the same interviewee from one of the ‗big six‘ energy companies 
notes;  
‗One of the things that‘s exercising us is if you put in a smart grid in a local 
distribution network then that‘s got to be controlled from somewhere; it 
makes sense for the distribution companies (DNO) to control that, not NG. So 
the DNO probably needs a much better control infrastructure than there is at 
the moment (...) and there are a number of solutions proposed like somehow a 
distribution network operator will take control of the time you charge your 
car up so you make sure it charges overnight‘ (interview - 4).  
A related issue is how the traditional model for revenue generation in distribution networks is 
changing. In the past, revenue was secured through vertical relationships via connection and use 
of system charges imposed on retailers; however, the development of more complex flows 
within distribution systems is beginning to challenge this linear model of revenue generation. 
For example, DG connection until recently has been relatively rare and traditional forms of 
reinforcement were used to accommodate it (the ‗fit and forget‘ approach). This prevailed 
because it benefited the DNO as it increased the overall regulatory asset base and because 
CAPEX efficiency was a secondary consideration for the regulator. However, developments 
such as new DG connections, the need for new investments due to the natural asset replacement 
cycle, and the increased emphasis on CAPEX efficiency are beginning to undermine these 
traditional revenue streams. Under the existing institutional framework it is increasingly 
difficult to account for the risks and benefits of investments and to achieve system economies 
with more complex physical flows of energy and information – as one interviewee notes, this is 
beginning to call into question the traditional ‗value chain‘ model: 
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―[In a] market structure like today where there are conflicting interests and 
the interests are not aligned then obviously the ones that are closer to the 
customer might get the most value potentially (…) but when you take a look at 
the whole system you may not get the most value (…) because you would still 
have that value really focused more towards the customer end versus all the 
way upstream (…) The market is in a state of flux right now, certainly not 
optimised in order to have a smart grid infrastructure … [if] everybody says 
ok fine, I‘m going to plug a meter which is going to cost me x, what‘s really 
the benefit? But the benefit is not only to the consumer; it‘s to the consumer, 
it‘s to the operator, it‘s the distribution network operator, it‘s the national 
grid potentially, and back to whoever is going to be generating that power as 
well" (interview - 12) 
An example of these emerging conflicts is how many technologies that have been associated 
with the smart grid tend to be of benefit to the system as a whole, and not just the party who 
invests and takes on the risk. A number of examples are highlighted by interviewees: 
Battery storage: 
"If you take battery storage for example; if we had a big battery that we could 
plug into the system it might remove the need for asset investment, but the fact 
is the cost of a battery with significant power capability is absolutely 
astronomical, you‘re talking about (…) a 2mw battery for 4million pounds. If 
you really did want to put in a battery, the business case for its installation 
would have to take into account the energy trading revenue from that facility 
to make it worthwhile. So the business case has got to accommodate network 
benefit and the ability for a supplier to trade that energy and never the twain 
shall meet in terms of regulatory Chinese walls" (interview - 16) 
Active management of distribution networks – the interviewee is responding to a question on 
the commercial incentives required for smart grid investments: 
"I think clarity on what are the most valuable smart grid functions as I said 
earlier and gave some examples of different things a smart grid could do 
which have a real value; enhancing customer security or increasing efficiency 
or connecting more renewables (…) there‘s not yet good clarity on what‘s the 
most valuable things to do and certainly no priority on which to do first" 
(interview - 3) 
Demand side management:  
"Demand Side Management, as well as Energy Storage are two smart 
concepts where it remains to be seen which of the sectors in the electricity 
industry in the UK could benefit, and for what reason. These technologies are 
able to provide ancillary services, but what organisation will pay them and 
who administers this?" (interview - 11) 
And overall: 
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"I think there‘s some value there but I‘m worried just how much change there 
needs to be to extract that value in terms of all these control systems that need 
to be put in place" (interview - 4) 
These issues are as yet unresolved but are creating uncertainty and interpretive flexibility 
regarding the future function of distribution networks and the nature of interactions between the 
TSO, DNOs, retailers and DG operators etc. 
Changing Horizontal Dynamics: DNO Procurement Practices 
Along with vertical dynamics within the organisational field there are new forms of horizontal 
dynamics emerging, particularly in how DNOs interact with equipment manufacturers and 
procure network components. The innovation chain for distribution networks has traditionally 
begun at the R&D stage in large multi-national engineering companies such as General Electric 
and ABB, with DNOs deploying their components on the networks (interview - 1). The RPI-x 
incentive structure, where the emphasis has been on achieving short term operational 
efficiencies, has shaped the nature of this relationship: 
"Network companies have this strong incentive to push down capital costs so 
they have put a lot of emphasis on negotiating at the procurement stage which 
basically means they just keep pushing down prices for buying basic 
standardised, well specified pieces of equipment whereas [the] ABBs [and] 
General Electric‘s probably wanted to do a bit more than that and sell assets 
with lots of extra services added on (…) I‘m not sure if the network companies 
have gone for that" (interview - 3) 
DNOs were incentivised to operate at the margin and to deploy standard off the shelf 
components rather than specialised pieces of control technology designed to deal with a 
particular issue on their network and as a result the large engineering companies themselves 
have tended to operate a low risk business model (interview – 3, 6, 18).  
However, following the RPZ and IFI programs there are some signs that this is beginning to 
change within the sector. In an effort to develop a business case for RPZ projects and trials 
which were often location specific, relationships outside of the standard DNO-manufacturer 
have begun to develop (interview – 3, 18). A number of smaller engineering companies who 
develop specialised/site specific components and solutions have emerged and formed 
collaborations with DNOs: Their expertise tends to be in the areas of addressing constraint 
issues such as voltage control when integrating DG – see table below: 
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Table 5.6: Specialist R&D companies in the UK 
Company Product/expertise Projects 
Smarter-grid Solutions
92
 ANM constraint management 
solutions 
Orkney Is. RPZ with SSE 
Synergy Econnect
93
 GenAvc voltage control device Martham primary RPZ with 
EDF 
EA Technology
94
 A range of asset management 
solutions 
IFI funded study with SSE on 
the Ashton Hayes Microgrid 
pilot 
During interviews, employees of one of these companies (interviews – 9, 10, 18) argue that their 
competitive advantage lies in finding the value for DNOs i.e. developing revenue streams, 
particularly in relation to DG connection.  
"What we‘re doing is coming at it from a sort of functional perspective; what 
are the problems? What kind of control systems do you need to solve those 
problems? What are the commercial arrangements that will sit around them 
to enable that to happen? (…) These problems are emerging as you said on a 
localised basis so that‘s small fry for someone like GE, as much as some of 
the people in the company would want to go and solve that problem they‘re 
probably not, there‘s no scale in that for them, they‘re not sure about how the 
market is going to go, so they‘re probably happy that a company like us 
would go and do that" (interview - 18) 
―We are giving them some benefit in that it works with their existing 
requirements, it [will] act automatically so they don‘t have to think about 
getting involved with it, so it allows them to connect more generation to the 
networks, they normally wouldn‘t be able to connect it because there isn‘t 
another option other than building more lines" (interview – 18) 
Also in creating a business case for the deployment of innovative technologies on the networks: 
―We know where the value is, we can show them and give them (…) what that 
value means in terms of pounds and pence, in terms of megawatts‖ (interview 
- 10) 
"I think the key thing of any sort of development like that is in messaging and 
in getting the message across to the big dominant players in the right way so 
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that they can understand where the business case fits, where the real benefits 
for them comes" (interview - 9) 
In contrast, an interviewee from one of the larger multi-national manufacturers described their 
role as thinking about the whole value chain rather than addressing specific network issues that 
may arise in the UK context:  
"the point is that we are driving innovation (…) Innovation is not only linking 
up all of the different features of the T&D network but we are also 
showcasing how that can be linked to appliances in the home for example. 
[We are] a big appliance manufacturer, [we are] looking and showcasing at 
how we can link that infrastructure to the smart fringe at home or the smart 
stove or the smart whatever at home" (interview - 12) 
These small niche/specialist companies could potentially form an important part of the 
emerging smart grid innovation system in the UK, this is discussed further in the analysis 
chapter.  
Changing Regulator-Government Interactions 
In chapter three of this thesis it was proposed that approaches to infrastructure governance tend 
to view the state as a passive actor with little influence over an all powerful ‗independent‘ 
regulator. The case of electricity distribution networks in the UK has shown that state strategies, 
broadly relating to the transition to a low carbon electricity system, have been key in shaping 
the nature of sector regulation and how it has changed over the period. Beginning with the 
political momentum behind DG in the early 2000s, the institutionalisation of carbon targets in 
2008 and the national roll out of smart meters to be controlled by DECC, energy policy has 
become an increasingly prominent part of the political landscape during this period. As a result, 
the governance model of the electricity networks has become more politicised and role of the 
regulator is becoming more complex as it seeks to balance the interests of the different 
stakeholders in a time of increasing investment in the networks. This blurring of the boundaries 
between the regulator and government departments is reflected in the evolution of regulatory 
instruments over the period where the initial concept of an apolitical/mathematical formula for 
achieving cost reductions has been made more complex as various social and environmental 
goals have come under the remit of the regulator. The RIIO proposals signal a more ‗hands-on‘ 
regulatory style where companies are increasingly judged on the basis of their actual 
performance against defined targets, rather than given autonomy to reduce costs on the basis of 
ex-ante incentives.  
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Within this context one should view Ofgem as a quasi-independent implementation body which 
is part of an increasingly politicised national energy policy environment. Broadly three 
scenarios for how this role might evolve in the future can be identified – elements of all three 
are contained in the RIIO proposals:   
 Continue on a liberalised path with a strengthening of innovation incentives; ‗where you 
make sure the incentives for low carbon generation are correct and you remove as many 
barriers to entry as possible. You rely on innovation to come along and you concentrate 
subsidy on achieving learning benefits and removing barriers‘ (interview - 2).  
 A more top-down hierarchical approach involving ‗strategic investment that is centrally 
coordinated‘ with ‗some kind of transition plan, maybe networks produce transition 
plans of how they are going to do this and that is a requirement‘ (interview – 22). This 
might involve a move away from periodic price controls with a greater degree of 
emphasis being placed on long term business plans submitted by DNOs.  
 A further strengthening of the target or performance based approach ‗where you say this 
is what we think is going to happen, this is what we expect to happen or for [the DNOs] 
to do‘ (interview - 22).  
The nature of state involvement in the future of the sector and whether DECC begins to exert its 
influence over Ofgem is largely an open question as in the wake of the Climate Change Act in 
2008, the institutional boundaries between state bodies is still in flux – as one interviewee notes: 
―[Ofgem] do have disagreements with their sponsoring department DECC 
(…) Sometimes I suspect quite strongly that Ofgem has a lot more resources 
than DECC does in those debates. So I think even if you had a secretary of 
state who came in [and said] we must sort Ofgem out (…) I think for DECC, it 
may be quite difficult to do that. But also I think there are people within 
DECC, the civil service, who also have been around since the 90s and so also 
take this market based view and are (…) very cautious about leaving behind 
the way things have been done. So I‘m sure there‘s a lot of debate" (interview 
- 1) 
This is also dependent on where state capacities (knowledge and resources) lie in these matters, 
currently this continues to reside in Ofgem with one interviewee noting that ‗the specialist 
knowledge in government you‘re probably aware is incredibly depleted these days, close to nil‘, 
and therefore ‗it would be very hard to recreate a new central planning organisation. Who would 
populate a new department of energy that will centrally plan these smart grids?‘ (interview - 6). 
The interviewee also recognises the political risks of doing so; ‗how can you expect someone in 
Whitehall to really have a view and confidently recommend to their minister that this is 
something worth spending money on, and you‘re not going to get shot down in public for that‘ 
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(interview - 6). Overall, as the following quote from a civil servant working the in the energy 
policy area suggests, a move towards a top-down hierarchical model is seen as a last resort: 
―There are some calls for governments to take action and to show leadership, 
but they're quite vague calls in that when they are dug into a bit what does 
that mean for government to take leadership? (…) but that is not to say it is 
not something that might happen in the future, the door is open on that one 
and it is something that we are open to the idea of but I think we need to be 
very sure of what we are asking people to do‖ (interview - 22) 
Within this uncertain environment, industry platforms such as the Electricity Networks Strategy 
Group (ENSG
95
) and the Smart Grids Forum
96
 are important bodies in bringing parties together 
to develop shared visions and creating a dialogue between industry stakeholders (interview – 1).  
5.4.3 Structural Dimension 
Network logics represent the underlying rationality behind the system which shape field level 
interactions and act as a source of legitimacy for action. Two ‗ideal type‘ network logics were 
identified; the competitive model – where competition and prices promote efficient system 
planning and operation and the regulator‘s primary goal is to deal with the market externalities - 
and the public services model - where utility services are seen as a social good and risks are 
socialised. In important ways the evolution of the electricity distribution sector during this 
period draws from each of these two overarching logics. For example, emerging concepts such 
as the smart grid which emphasises flexibility, real-time transactions, demand-side management 
and customer choice, reside comfortably within the selection environment and technological 
trajectory which has been brought about by privatisation and liberalisation. However, in many 
ways making distribution networks a more active part of the system as a whole threatens to 
undermine the set of vertical relationships within the sector upon which the current competitive 
arrangements rely. These tensions are part of the ongoing discourse within the sector and form 
the basis for the multitude of smart grid visions which have emerged which seek to reconcile 
these inconstancies into a coherent whole. 
From charting the various interventions and interactions in the sector it can be observed that 
efforts to adapt the governance regime to the challenges posed by DG connection etc. tend to 
draw their legitimacy from a market based logic where decisions are justified on the basis of 
how they reduce the costs of operating the networks or improve competition in other segments 
of the value chain e.g. the ability of customers to switch between suppliers. Issues such as DG 
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 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100919181607/http:/www.ensg.gov.uk/ 
96
 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/SGF/Pages/SGF.aspx 
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connection tend to be problematized in terms of how they affect market arrangements, as a 
consequence the solutions tend to be market and price based (e.g. locational pricing, smart 
metering and DR, new charging regimes etc) rather than formed on the basis of whether they 
address the underlying environmental or social concerns (Mitchell, 2008, SDC, 2007). Similarly 
incentives to promote innovation within the sector tend to be justified on the basis of whether 
they promote CAPEX efficiency i.e. innovation is about ‗sweating the assets more‘ (interview – 
11). This reinforces Mitchell‘s arguments surrounding the nature of energy policy and 
regulation in the UK which were introduced in the introductory chapter: Energy Governance in 
the UK tends to be structured according to a Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP) (Moran, 2003) 
which defines the principles and processes of regulation; this is based around market solutions 
and short term incentives where ‗actions are designed to fit with these principles‘ (Mitchell, 
2008: p.6).  
5.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This case study discussed the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in the 
recent evolution of the electricity distribution sector in the UK. It was observed that in the early 
part of the 2000s, efforts to promote the connection of distributed generation which were often 
politically motivated encountered numerous barriers within the sector. This was because the 
governance regime which emerged from liberalisation was largely based on the rationale that 
natural monopoly is an economic externality which can be dealt with using a mathematical and 
apolitical approach to regulation. This did not favour particular technologies but sought to give 
autonomy to private network operators to run their businesses in an efficient manner. The RPI-x 
approach which regulated the prices companies could charge for network services on an ex-ante 
basis, incentivised short term time horizons and a focus on achieving OPEX rather than CAPEX 
efficiencies. This has become problematic because there has been little incentive for DNOs to 
approach the connection of DG in an integrated or innovative way, rather a piecemeal approach 
has been taken using conventional technologies, thus increasing the transaction costs for DG 
developers. Similar issues regarding the inflexibility of the current governance structures have 
emerged regarding DSM and the roll out of smart meters, in particular following the 2008 
Energy Act. There has been considerable uncertainty as to how energy use information can be 
utilised to achieve system economies and how DSM can be achieved due to the fragmented and 
unbundled structure of the industry which separates the competitive from the non-competitive 
segments of the value chain. 
The regulatory response to these issues has been to adapt the existing governance regime rather 
than fundamentally reconsider the current structure of the industry and the rationality behind 
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network regulation. This evolutionary approach has seen the introduction of more cost reflexive 
charging regime for new connections, incentives to reduce losses and a gradual trend towards 
the regulation of outputs which are specified by the regulator. The issue of how to promote 
more innovative approach to DG connection and integration with the demand side has been 
problematic for the regulator. Although a number of incentives for innovation have been 
introduced there is as yet little indication as to how a more innovative approach to operating the 
networks can be embedded within the mainstream regulatory regime. However, it is likely that 
the provision of an innovation fund which reduces risk by covering upfront capital costs and 
which promotes collaboration between DNOs, third parties and other actors from across the 
value chain will likely increase the capacity for innovation across the sector which has been 
lacking to date. However, throughout the period changes to the governance regime have been 
extremely slow and not commensurate with the urgency required to enable a low carbon energy 
system. This is due to the embedded organisational routines of the regulator and the companies 
which have been slow to change and nature of the price control review and the licence 
modification processes which require consensus. 
These issues point to an ongoing tension or misalignment (Künneke, 2008) between the 
governance regime which emerged following liberalisation and the demands that are being 
placed on the sector, particularly in the context of the long term transition to a low carbon 
electricity system. Following privatisation, and in order to facilitate liberalisation, the networks 
were siloed from the more competitive parts of the value chain and the primary focus of 
regulation has been to deal with the economic externality of natural monopoly through price 
regulation and the provision of incentives to reduce costs. Although this has lead to an overall 
reduction in the marginal costs of operating the networks (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007), a techno-
institutional mismatch is being exacerbated as the need for capital investment increases and the 
requirement to deliver a more synergistic relationship between different segments of the value 
chain in order to satisfy long term energy policy goals becomes more apparent.  
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6 The CHP-DH Sector in the UK 
This chapter charts the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in the CHP-DH 
sector in the UK. This sector is more fragmented than that of electricity distribution because 
CHP-DH schemes are not interconnected at a regional or national level and there has not been a 
history of district heating in the UK as compared to Scandinavian countries for example. The 
interventions and interactions section charts recent developments in CHP-DH in the UK; 
particular attention is paid to the relationships between national policy structures and initiatives 
in the areas of energy policy and local governance, along with the responses of different local 
authorities in terms what technologies they deploy and how they organise and structure their 
local energy schemes. The outcomes section summarises how these socio-technical interactions 
are changing both the physical and relational dynamics of the sector and how these responses 
draw from different network logics. The chapter begins by introducing the governance regime 
and the key actors within the sector. 
6.1 Local Authorities and CHP-DH 
As has been discussed in chapter 4, due to the local nature of CHP-DH, local authorities (LAs) 
generally tend to be the focal actors in the development of schemes. Broadly there have been 
two types of scheme which have been developed by local authorities. The first type of scheme 
are those which have been developed on large council housing estates, over the years these have 
developed a poor reputation as they have often fallen into disrepair due to poor maintenance 
(UKGBC, 2010, interview - 32, 36 ). The second type of scheme are those which have been 
developed as part of a city-wide energy strategy which involves a mix of both public and private 
buildings and are typically located in or close to city centres. It is this second type of scheme 
that this chapter pays particular attention to; the map of the UK below shows the significant 
city-wide schemes which formed the basis for this study
97
. 
                                                     
97
 These were chosen as they are the largest mixed use and highly interconnected schemes which are 
currently operating and based in and around city centres which serve both commercial and residential 
loads (demand). There are a number of other schemes in UK cities which although they are expanding or 
there are plans to do so (e.g. Glasgow, London Development Agency), do not yet constitute city-wide 
CHP-DH schemes, rather community schemes which typically are smaller and heat only. Examples 
include the Byker scheme in Newcastle which services a large number of council housing units, the 
Manchester Alexandra Park and Longsight Estates Heating Schemes, and Barnsley and Bristol where a 
number of council tower blocks are served by communal heating. A number of CHP-DH schemes were 
also looked at but did not form part of the basis of the chapter: developments such the MediaCityUK 
scheme near Manchester – a new development which does not serve the city centre -  and a district 
heating scheme in Lerwick on the remote Shetland Islands. 
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Figure 6.1: Significant City-Wide District Heating Schemes in the UK 
 
Southampton: Initially developed in 1986 following a Council, EU and government funded 
project to investigate a geothermal heat source. The scheme supplies heating and cooling to 
a range of city centre commercial properties e.g. ASDA and BBC. Over the years it has 
expanded to the quays area of the city and has 14km of pipe work. It uses gas CHP 
(5.7MWe and 1.0MWe CHP engines) and a geothermal heat source (8MW CHP) (IEA); 
supplies 40,000 MWh of heat, 7,000 MWh of chilled water and 26,000 MWh of electricity 
per annum.  
Woking: Electricity, heating and cooling scheme (1.3 MW electrical, 1.6 MW heating; 1.2 
MW absorption cooling) which services civic and private buildings since 2001. The scheme 
within the town centre links the civic offices and car park, the Holiday Inn, a niteclub and 
events centre, and has been expanded to service 240 dwellings (Thorp and Curran, 2009, 
Woking Borough Council, 2001) 
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London: There are a number of schemes across London. The Pimlico DH system (three 
8MWe boilers and two 2MWe CHP units) which services 3016 residential, 46 commercial 
properties; the Whitehall scheme (4x6MW boilers and a 4.9MWe CHP) which services 23 
Government offices – the LGA plans in place to link the Pimlico and Whitehall systems 
(interview – 40) - The Citigen scheme located around the Smithfield Markets which mainly 
serves commercial customers, the Barkentine scheme in Tower Hamlets which supplies 
8,000MWh of heat and exports 5,500MWh of power per year and services over 700 
residential units on an East London estate, a nearby leisure centre and a local primary 
school (URS, 2010).  
 Milton Keynes: A scheme developed by Thamesway Energy (a company owned by 
Woking council) in 2007 which supplies electricity and heat to some 800 residential and 30 
commercial units from a 3.2MWe CHP plant utilising a 12.6MWh thermal store. It supplies 
heat and power to a new commercial and residential area in the west end of the city along 
with a number of buildings in the CBD.  
Birmingham: The system began operating in 2007 and supplies heating, power and cooling 
to commercial customers and civic offices in central Birmingham. The Broad Street leg of 
the scheme has a 1.6 MWe CHP unit which services a number of large city centre civic and 
commercial premises, the Eastside leg services a regeneration area along with Aston 
University, the children‘s hospital and council buildings (BDE, 2007). It has an additional 
1.6MWe CHP. Overall the scheme delivers 6,700MWh and 41,000MWh of electricity and 
heat output annually. 
 
Leicester: An initial investment was made as part of the Lead Cities scheme in 1987 to 
service 4 large social housing developments with 2142  housing units and 13 public  
buildings (Taki et al., 1993). The scheme is in four parts with council buildings and a 
number of schools connected with approx 20km of networks. It is currently undergoing an 
expansion to the university and the prison with 15 civic buildings through 7km of insulated 
pipe work which is partly funded by the Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP)
98
. 
The scheme has 5MW of CHP. 
 
Nottingham: The Nottingham scheme is one of the largest in the UK and has been running 
since 1973 with significant refurbishments made in the mid 1990s. It services approximately 
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 CESP is discussed in more detail in table 6.1 
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5,000 homes and 100 businesses using 65km of pipes. Energy input is from the 15 MW 
CHP Eastcroft Energy from Waste (EfW) plant (LG Improvement and Development, 2011). 
 
Sheffield: The Sheffield scheme is also one of the largest in the UK with 44 km networks. 
The scheme was initiated in 1988 with the construction of a waste to energy plant for the 
city. The 19MWe CHP plant supplies many of the city‘s large civic and public buildings 
such as the Winter Gardens and the Victorian Theatre along with a number of council 
housing tower blocks  (Veolia, 2009, Vital Energi, 2011) 
 
Aberdeen: The scheme began in 2001 and consists of three CHP plants (1 MWe each 
approx) covering 14 multi storey blocks and 8 public buildings including a sports facility 
and leisure complex. The scheme has recently been awarded a £1million grant to expand 
further. 
6.2 Characterising the governance regime 
This section describes the wider governance regime (Paavola et al., 2009) within which CH-DH 
is embedded, focusing in particular on the national level policy frameworks. Unlike incumbent 
networks such as gas and electricity, heat networks are not regulated by Ofgem as natural 
monopolies as there is currently little or no market for heating services in the UK. As a result 
heat distribution and local energy schemes operate within a wider national policy regime 
involving a number of government bodies in the energy and local government areas. In the 
figure below this governance regime is characterised according to three modes of governing; the 
sections below elucidate the rationalities, programs and instruments which are associated with 
these. 
Figure 6.2: Modes of governing the heat distribution sector 
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‘Local Governance’ 
Because local authorities tend to be the focal actors in CHP-DH schemes, a key aspect of the 
governance regime for decentralised energy scheme development is the changing relationship 
between national and local government in the UK. Traditionally, local government was 
structured according to a tiered system which emerged from the Victorian era; this included 
‗county, district/borough and parish councils‘ in London and rural areas along with a smaller 
number of single local authorities in the larger towns (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003: p.60). The 
1970s saw the amalgamation and rationalisation of a number of the smaller boroughs and 
following the 1982 Local Government Act, a number of unitary authorities which are 
responsible for all services were instituted in the larger urban centres (Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2003: p.60) with the two tier system remaining in smaller towns, typically involving a 
borough/district council and a larger county council.  
The core functions of local government cover areas such as education, health and well-being, 
environment and planning, transport, community safety, employment and skills, and housing 
and regeneration (Stoker, 2004  p.16). Until the 1970s, there was a greater degree of autonomy 
for LAs in the delivery of these services where ‗it was possible to describe local authorities as 
the primary agents of  local governance, as direct providers of services‘ (Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2003: p.61). However, following the reforms of the Thatcher and Major governments, processes 
of deregulation and a rebalancing of power between the national and local levels have eroded 
this direct service provision role. Wilson and Game (1998) characterise the altered status of 
local government as having ‗partial autonomy‘- ‗National governments can, through 
parliamentary legislation, create, abolish, restructure and amend the powers of local authorities 
as and when they determine‘. They argue that the relationship has evolved from one of 
‗consultation, through corporatism, to confrontation and finally control‘. Stoker (2004) proposes 
that following the election of New Labour in 1997, the nature of this relationship has changed 
once again where ‗the debate about public service reform at least at the local level has moved 
beyond the concerns of new public management to an emerging concept of networked 
community governance‘ (p.10). Therefore, rather than a hierarchical relationship between the 
centre and localities; ‗local governance has become more complex, with a wider range of public, 
private and voluntary organizations involved‘ (ibid: p.63).  
One particular area relevant to CHP-DH where LAs have been granted a degree of autonomy is 
that of sustainability. Following the introduction of the Local Government Act and the 
Sustainable Communities Act in 2000 and 2007 respectively, local authorities have gained new 
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forms of functional and financial autonomy in this area – in particular the ‗power to do anything 
which they consider is likely to achieve‘ economic, social and environmental well-being in their 
area including incurring expenditure (DCLG, 2000). The Department for Communities and 
Local Government have stated that the Sustainable Communities Act ‗begins from the principle 
that local people know best what needs to be done to promote the sustainability of their area, but 
that sometimes they need central government to act to enable them to do so (…) It is also a new 
way for local authorities to ask central government to take action which they believe would 
better enable them to improve the economic, social or environmental well-being of their area‘ 
(DCLG, 2008c). 
Along with governance dynamics within the UK, the international climate change agenda is also 
delivering a more substantial role for local authorities in promoting sustainability (Bulkeley and 
Kern, 2006, Collier and Löfstedt, 1997). Local Agenda 21 (LA21), which was an outcome of 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, invites local authorities ‗to draw up their own  Local Agenda 21 
in consultation with citizens, local organizations and private enterprises‘ (Collier and Löfstedt, 
1997) to promote sustainability. The quote below from chapter 28 of LA21(UN, 1992) 
highlights this emerging local dimension to environmental issues: 
―Because so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 
21 have their roots in local activities, the participation and cooperation of 
local authorities will be a determining factor in fulfilling its objectives. Local 
authorities construct, operate and maintain economic, social and 
environmental infrastructure, oversee planning processes, establish local 
environmental policies and regulations, and assist in implementing national 
and subnational environmental policies. As the level of governance closest to 
the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and responding to 
the public to promote sustainable development‖ (Quote is taken from 
Tuxworth (1996)) 
Tuxworth (1996) notes that there has been strong response to LA21 amongst local councils in 
the UK and argues that ‗the stripping away of powers from UK local authorities by national 
government, has perhaps made Local Agenda 21 (which Agenda 21 makes explicit only local 
authorities can deliver) an attractive area of activity for local authorities‘. Similarly Collier and 
Löfstedt (1997) argue that ‗…local authorities consider the  involvement in Local  Agenda 21 
and climate change policies as a means to regain some of the powers that have  been taken away 
by central government (…) Local environmental policies can thus be viewed as self-defence and 
counter-attack mechanism, providing a new political space for local authorities‘. An example of 
such a response is the ‗Nottingham Declaration‘, launched in 2000 and signed by some 3000 
LAs which commits signatories to; ‗Work with central government to contribute, at a local 
level, to the delivery of the UK Climate Change Program‘ (Nottingham Declaration, 2000).  
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These trends have continued following the 2010 general election with emerging discourses 
surrounding ‗the big society‘ and the appointment of a minister for decentralisation. The May 
2010 coalition agreement stated that; ‗We will promote the radical devolution of power and 
greater financial autonomy to local government and community groups‘ (HM Government, 
2010a). The 2010/2011 Localism Bill, which is at the committee stage at the time of writing, 
proposes to grant a ‗general power of competence‘ similar to that of the Fire and Rescue 
Authorities which gives local authorities ‗the legal capacity to do anything that an individual 
can do that is not specifically prohibited‘ as well as new rights to community groups to take 
‗over the running of a local authority service‘ (DCLG, 2011a). However, in the light of public 
service expenditure cuts and limits on the borrowing capabilities of LAs there is uncertainty as 
to how effective these new powers will be (interview – 32). 
 ‘Decarbonise Heat’ 
The uptake of CHP-DH is also contextualised by efforts to promote the decarbonisation of 
heating supply and promote demand side energy efficiency.  As has been outlined in chapter 4, 
heat supply in the UK currently tends to be organised on an individual basis with domestic gas 
boilers which are connected to regulated distribution networks. Arising from concerns over the 
increasing reliance on imported gas and the need to meet climate change targets (heat accounts 
for over 41 percent of total energy consumption in 2006,  47% of total CO2 emissions and 60% 
of average domestic energy bills (DECC, 2009d)) the governance regime for heat is increasingly 
becoming part of the energy policy landscape and is affecting both the supply and demand side - 
these are discussed in turn. 
As part of the overall efforts to deliver a low carbon energy supply in the UK, the electrification 
of heating (and transport) is being proposed as the most efficient long term trajectory – ‗the all-
electric future‘99.  The work of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), who provide 
independent advice to the government in relation to achieving the emissions reductions targets, 
has been particularly influential in this regard.  Using the MARKAL macro-economic model, 
the CCC has been instrumental in proposing the electrification of heating using technologies 
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 Speirs et al. (2010) critically review the ‗all-electric future‘ as it relies heavily on ‗electricity-only 
thermal power stations, particularly fossil fired generation with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), with 
large amounts of primary energy lost as ‗waste‘ heat‘. They argue that ‗major system changes, may be 
under-represented in existing scenario analyses‘ (p.15) and propose that a wider range of options, 
including a greater emphasis on CHP-DH, in order to benefit from generating electricity and heat close to 
demand and the potential benefits to the network associated with this e.g. reducing reinforcement costs. 
They also express concerns over the efficiency of heat pumps. 
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such as air and ground source heat pumps as a longer term strategy to meet targets
100
: The 
following quotation from their 2008 report highlights the rationale behind this: 
―As electricity is decarbonised, it is likely that low-carbon electricity can be used to 
replace fossil fuels in space and water heating. Once the carbon intensity of electricity 
falls below about 200g/kWh it will be more carbon efficient to provide hot water and 
space heating with electricity than with gas burned in a condensing boiler, even using 
established technology such as electric bar or storage heaters (Figure 2.21). But far 
greater efficiency is possible with the use of heat pump technology. Ground-source heat 
pumps can deliver three to four times as much usable heat energy as they require in 
electricity input. The potential efficiency of air-source heat pumps is slightly lower (two 
to three times) but they can be deployed in many buildings (e.g. in dense urban areas) 
where ground source heat pumps are impractical. Either variant of heat pump can 
therefore already, even at the existing average UK carbon-intensity of electricity, 
deliver heat energy more carbon efficiently than gas.‖ (Climate Change Committee, 
2008: p.66) 
As a result, within the CCC analyses: ‗There is a limited assumed role for district heating, 
reflecting uncertainties around technical and economic aspects of this option, with the 
possibility of deeper penetration as uncertainties are resolved‘ (Climate Change Committee, 
2010: p.24). Along with overarching strategies for the decarbonisation of the energy system as a 
whole, specific policy instruments are being designed and implemented in order to promote the 
wider diffusion of different renewable fuels and heat generating technologies. Until recently UK 
renewable heat policies were based around the provision of capital grants, predominantly for 
biomass or small scale solar projects
101
 (Connor and Xie, 2009). However, following the 
Renewable Energy Strategy consultation (BERR, 2008b) the case was forwarded for a financial 
incentive mechanism specifically for renewable heat generation.  
A Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) mechanism was proposed in the 2008 Energy Act which 
subsidises certain technologies ‗on the basis of the quantity of heat generated – and so is similar 
in nature to the use of feed-in tariffs‘ (BERR, 2008b). As of 2011, the RHI is to be introduced 
on a phased basis beginning with the non-domestic sector and near commercial technologies 
and in 2012 phase II will support domestic technologies (DECC, 2011b) where the Treasury 
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 ‗Scenarios run by DECC suggest that around 30% of electricity, 12% of heat and 10% of transport 
demand will need to come from renewable sources if this target is to be met‘ (Spiers et. al, 2010) 
101
 ‗Community Energy Programme (grant, biomass, 2001-2007), Bio-energy Capital Grants Scheme 
(grants, biomass, 2002-), Community Renewables Initiative (small-scale, limited funds, 2002-2007), 
Clear Skies Initiative (grants, biomass & solar, 2003-2006) , Biomass Heat Acceleration Project (biomass 
heat, 2005-), Bioenergy Infrastructure Scheme (wood and straw supply chain, 2005-8), Low Carbon 
Buildings Programme (replaced Clear Skies), (grants, small scale RE inc. RES-H., oversubscribed, 2006-
), Climate Change Programme Review (biomass, grants)‘ (Connor and Xie, 2009) 
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will subsidise a number of heating and cooling technologies
102
. The measures also include 
‗premium payments‘ to cover the upfront capital cost of installing equipment which qualifies, 
however this does not explicitly include DH as ‗there will be no specific ‗uplift‘ for district 
heating installations‘ (DECC, 2011b). 
Efforts to reduce the carbon intensity of heating also include demand side measures, in 
particular efforts to promote energy efficiency. The issue of energy efficiency came to the fore 
following the oil crises of the 1970s and the subsequent liberalisation of energy markets 
throughout the 80s and 90s (Eyre and Staniaszek, 2005) and has since fed into the pursuit of 
‗environmental policy objectives, both directly, through the reductions in energy consumption 
that might follow an increase in energy efficiency, and indirectly, by reducing the cost of 
adjustments to higher energy prices‘ (Brechling and Smith, 1994). Traditionally energy 
efficiency has been framed as a market failure therefore ‗justifying government intervention in 
the market for domestic energy efficiency‘ (Brechling and Smith, 1994). Brechling and Smith 
(1994) outline a number of such market failures associated with efficiency investments and a 
failure to adjust ‗efficiently to higher energy prices‘: 
 Information: Customers are poorly informed about different technologies and 
opportunities. 
 Benefits cannot be appropriated: For example in rental properties where the owner may 
not be able to recoup the full benefits of an investment in energy efficiency. 
 Credit Market Failure: There are issues relating to securing finance in order to make 
efficiency investments e.g. lack of collateral, poorer households with limited access to 
credit.    
 Uncertainty: Uncertainty about how effective an efficiency measure will be because of 
future energy price fluctuations and changes in income.  
In order to address these issues a number of policies relating to energy efficiency have been 
formulated in order to incentivise more efficient space and water heating in domestic premises 
and larger public and private sector buildings. 
                                                     
102
 Tier 1 technologies that are to receive support include biomass boilers, solar thermal, energy from 
waste combustion (biomass portion of waste), heating from biogas combustion – gas from waste, ground 
and water source heat pumps, biomethane injection into the gas grid, deep geothermal, renewable district 
or community heating (biomass), renewable combined heat and power (CHP), for biomass, biogas and 
geothermal. Different levels of support are to be given based on the technology type and size. 
 
-192- 
 
 
 
In the UK the predominant approach taken to address the above ‗market failures‘ in the 
domestic sector have been regulated programs where obligations are placed on licensed energy 
suppliers to improve the efficient use of energy amongst their customers. The table below charts 
the evolution of these obligations which have been funded though a customer levy (Eyre, 2010):  
Table 6.1: Energy Company Efficiency Obligations 
Obligation Year 
Energy Efficiency Standards of 
Performance  
Began in 1994 this placed an obligation on each energy supplier to 
achieve certain efficiency performance standards. Suppliers had 
scope to choose the best way of achieving this through insulation, 
lighting, appliance or heating measures. 
Energy Efficiency Commitment This was introduced following the utilities act in 2000 and saw a 
more direct role for government in setting the targets (Eyre and 
Staniaszek, 2005). The first phase began in 2002 and second in 
2005. Addresses information and appropriateness problems. This 
saw a large increase in the level of expenditure with £400m 
collected in 2005 (Eyre and Staniaszek, 2005) 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target CERT began in 2008 and is more directly related to carbon savings 
rather than an energy saving target. This has been extended until 
Dec 2012 (DECC, 2009c). Running parallel with CERT is the 
Community Energy Savings Program (CESP) which specifically 
targets funding for 4,500 low income areas
103
 to address fuel 
poverty and delivered through community based partnerships 
between LAs, community groups and energy companies.  
The Green Deal After 2012 ‗The green Deal‘ will be introduced. This signals a 
move away from the company obligation/regulated model where a 
levy is placed on customers, towards an incentive scheme for 
individuals to invest in energy efficiency. Households which do not 
qualify for the Green Deal scheme will fall under the Energy 
Company Obligation which will amalgamate CERT and CESP but 
focus on low income and ‗hard to treat‘ households 
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 Areas within the ‗lowest 10% income decile in England and the 15% most income deprived areas 
within Scotland & Wales‘ (Npower, 2011) 
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Eyre (2010) argues that these regulated programs have been successful ‗in helping to transform 
product markets (insulation, heating, lights and appliances), but less successful in engaging and 
restructuring the work of the key trades in the energy efficiency business, in particular those 
involved in day-today building maintenance and improvement‘. Following CERT the proposed 
‗Green Deal‘ will de-regulate the energy efficiency market by shifting the emphasis from 
obligations on licensed suppliers to incentives for individuals and opening the market up to new 
operators. A key feature of the proposal is to deal with the credit market failure issue by 
introducing a ‗pay as you save‘ model. This broadly continues the ‗market failure‘ approach to 
addressing energy efficiency issues in the domestic sector.  
For non-domestic customers, along with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), a 
Climate Change Levy (CCL) is chargeable ‗on the industrial and commercial supply of taxable 
commodities for lighting, heating and power‘ (HM Revenue and Customs, 2011) e.g. electricity 
and gas; this applies to the industrial, commercial and public administrations sectors - local 
authorities are included in this. In large commercial and public sector buildings, along with non-
energy intensive industries, the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) has been introduced in 
2010. This is a mandatory carbon trading scheme designed to promote energy efficiency. Under 
the scheme qualifying participants (those who consumed over 6000MWh of electricity in 2008) 
must report on their annual carbon emissions, and in 2012 will need to buy allowances to cover 
their emissions. It was originally designed so that savings would be recycled to the most 
efficient participants however as of budget 2010 this will be retained by the treasury.  
‘The Built Environment’ 
A third area of national level policy making that is particularly relevant to CHP-DH are policies 
relating to building codes and standards. This is closely related to the energy efficiency policies 
described above but specifically focuses on the built environment and the energy performance 
of buildings, both commercial and residential, and are outlined in a number of building and 
planning regulations. Building regulations in the UK cover a number of issues, they ‗set 
baseline mandatory national standards for the health, welfare, safety and convenience of people 
in and around buildings, for the accessibility of those buildings, and for the reasonable 
conservation of fuel and power used by those buildings‘ (DCLG, 2006) and have been put in 
place by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Standards relating 
to the energy performance of buildings have been in place since the 1960s and increasingly 
-194- 
 
 
 
these standards are affecting the carbon performance of buildings
104
 where they outline 
minimum specifications in a number of areas such as ‗improving the fabric of the building, e.g. 
through better insulation and sealing of the fabric, draught-proofing of windows and doors; 
improving the efficiency of heating and lighting; and through the use of lower carbon fuels and 
heating appliances‘ (DCLG, 2006). 
In order to improve the efficiency of a range of building types and reduce the carbon intensity of 
the buildings, the government has introduced a number of standards and codes for existing 
residential and public buildings – they include the following (DCLG, 2008b): 
 Energy Performance Certiﬁcates (EPCs) for homes and buildings. These became 
mandatory for private dwellings in 2008 when they are constructed or sold 
 Display Certiﬁcates for public buildings 
 Inspections for air conditioning systems 
 Advice and guidance for boiler users 
Aside from the mandatory standards for new homes which specify the ‗conservation of fuel and 
power, health and safety, accessibility in buildings‘, the Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH) 
covers more generally ‗sustainability in homes‘ (DCLG, 2006), covering a wider range of issues 
in the areas of energy/CO2, water, materials, waste, pollution, health and well-being, and 
ecology. This emerged following a consultation by the DCLG in 2006 (DCLG, 2006) which set 
out a target for achieving ‗zero-carbon‘ development by 2016: 
―New homes make up less than 1% of the stock every year. But, in 2050, around a third 
of the housing stock will have been built between now and then (…) That is why the 
Government has set out the ambition that we move towards zero carbon development 
over time. This means a transition first to low carbon development, through measures 
that drive down carbon dioxide emissions from homes, buildings and other 
infrastructure; and ultimately to zero carbon, i.e. zero net carbon emissions from new 
developments.‖ (DCLG, 2006) 
The consultation document pays specific attention to three areas; the planning system, the 
building regulations, and the new code for sustainable homes; where ‗the aim of the code is to 
increase environmental sustainability of homes and give homeowners better information about 
the running costs of their homes‘ (ibid: p.12). There are six levels to the code and it covers a 
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 Part L of the Building Regulations introduced in 2002 deals with the conservation of fuel and power. 
Part L specifies ‗minimum energy efficiency standards for the building fabric (such as walls, floors, 
ceilings and windows), as well as for space heating, hot water and lighting systems. Revisions to Part L 
came into force in 2006 following the introduction of the 2002 E.U. Performance Buildings Directive‘ 
(Greenwood, 2010) 
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range of areas such as waste, energy and building materials. The code is voluntary but the 
government has set out a number of targets for implementation: 
Table 6.2: Targets for the CSH 
 
Source: (DCLG, 2006) 
The definition of a ‗Zero Carbon Home‘ has caused some confusion and uncertainty within the 
building industry (Greenwood, 2010) as it was ‗requiring all CO2 emissions to be mitigated on-
site‘ (Zero Carbon Hub, 2009). In a subsequent study by the UK Green Building Council it was 
argued that ‗10% to 80% of new homes may not be able to meet the current definition of ‗zero 
carbon‘ (UKGBC, 2008) and following this a new definition has been forwarded which includes 
a number of off-site ‗allowable solutions‘ – which is likely to include CHP-DH -  if the standard 
cannot be attained through built in efficiencies in the fabric and design of the dwelling and on-
site, directly connected technologies such as microgeneration and renewable heating.  
These measures have direct relevance for LAs as they have a key role in implementing national 
level policy guidelines and regulations. In the past LAs have played a leading role in the 
development of planning policy in relation to the sustainable built environment e.g. the ‗Merton 
rule‘ which ‗requires any new residential development of more than 10 units or any commercial 
building over 1000 square meters to reduce its carbon emissions by a certain percentage through 
the use of on-site renewables‘ (Solar Century, 2011). Also, Planning Policy Statements (PPS) 
which ‗explain statutory provisions and provide guidance to local authorities and others on 
planning policy and the operation of the planning system‘ (DCLG, 2011b) can be used by LAs 
to tailor solutions suitable to a particular context in line with national regulations. In particular 
PPS1 for sustainable development and PPS22 for renewable energy outline a framework 
whereby individual local authorities can develop planning guidance within their areas (Local 
Development Frameworks) in line with national level priorities and local circumstances. PPS1 
‗mandates an evidence-based understanding of the local feasibility and potential for renewable 
and low and zero carbon technologies, including microgeneration, to supply new developments 
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in their area‘ (UKGBC, 2010: p.16). This has been cited as an important mechanism to advance 
CHP-DH schemes in a number of examples (interview - 31).  
Summary 
The section above outlined the governance regime for CHP-DH in the UK. It is proposed that 
because CHP-DH is not regulated in a similar manner as other energy networks it is situated 
within a broader national level governance regime which is shaped by a diverse range of policy 
priorities and government bodies (UKGBC, 2010). This includes areas such as local governance 
and decentralisation, national energy policy priorities and regulations and planning codes 
relating to the built environment. Using the modes of governing framework (Bulkeley et al., 
2005), the underlying rationalities, programs, institutional relations, and regulatory instruments 
were outlined. The table below summarises the governance regime for CHP-DH in the UK: 
Table 6.3: Summary of the electricity distribution governance regime  
Mode of 
governing 
Rationality Institutional Relations 
Policy/Regulatory 
Instruments 
‗Local 
Governance‘ 
Local authorities will 
become central actors in 
dealing with climate 
change and sustainability 
issues 
Changing relationship 
between the national and 
local tiers of government 
More autonomy being 
given to LAs and 
communities to deliver 
sustainability goals but 
with a reduction in 
central government 
expenditure 
‗Decarbonise 
heat‘ 
Achieve national level 
carbon targets using 
supply and demand side 
measures 
Much of policy is 
designed and 
implemented through 
DECC, CCC, Ofgem and 
the ‗big six‘ energy 
companies   
High level macro-
economic modelling 
techniques and scenario 
analysis.  
A move towards 
incentives for 
individuals and 
companies to invest in 
efficiency and 
renewable heating 
technologies 
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‗Sustainable Built 
Environment‘ 
Reduce the carbon 
footprint of existing 
buildings and new 
developments 
National level standards 
and regulations drawn up 
by the DCLG and 
implemented by LAs 
Change building codes 
and standards to 
mandate carbon 
reductions, LAs have 
some autonomy in 
implementation 
The next section outlines how various interventions and interactions involving LA involvement 
in CHP-DH schemes are shaping and being shaped by the governance regime described above. 
Following this, the outcomes section will discuss the emerging interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies and the implications for the evolution of the sector 
6.3 Interventions and Interactions 
The previous section outlined the structures and modes of governing within which the CHP-DH 
schemes described above have been developing. Drawing from a series of semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders within the CHP-DH sector, this section explores in more detail 
how these schemes have been shaped though various interventions and interactions within the 
organisational field. This begins with a discussion of the different motivations behind local 
authority involvement in energy service provision such as dealing with fuel poverty issues 
within their own localities. Also, the different organisational models and financing 
arrangements that the schemes have adopted are discussed. It is found that local authorities 
structure their schemes according to their resources and level of risk they are willing to take on. 
The final sub-section explores how CHP-DH at the local level interacts in different ways with 
national energy regime structures such as electricity markets and regulatory licensing regimes. 
In line with transitions theory it is found that local energy niches face significant barriers as they 
interact with regime structures which tend to be institutionalised at the national level. The 
outcomes section explores the implications and the nature of the relationship between 
institutions, actors and technologies in this particular case. 
6.3.1 The Evolving Role of Local Authorities in the Energy Sector 
Chapter 4 outlined how prior to WWII local authorities were the dominant actors in the direct 
provision of energy in the UK. However, nationalisation and a technological trend towards 
interconnection and scale saw the amalgamation of many of these municipal schemes into 
regional monopolies and eventually led to national level coordination of a centralised electricity 
system (Hannah, 1979). The years of municipal dominance of the energy industry was seen as 
out of step with the techno-economic paradigm (Freeman and Perez, 1988, Perez, 2002) of 
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centralised generation and the aggregation of loads to achieve economies of scale. This situation 
pervaded throughout the period of state ownership and, leading up the privatisation of the 
energy industries, the 1973 Local Government Act precluded  LAs from selling electricity to the 
grid unless it was part of a CHP installation (DECC, 2010a)
 105
. As a result local authority 
involvement in direct energy provision has diminished greatly from its pre-nationalisation 
status, and aside from a small number of CHP-DH schemes (Russell, 1993), their role with 
respect to energy had largely been relegated to the energy management of their own estates; 
energy supply became the preserve of the national energy bodies.  
However, the liberalisation of the energy sectors throughout the 1980s prompted efforts by local 
authorities re-engage with the energy sector and to align themselves with the emerging logic of 
a market-led energy system. In approaching energy management they began to regard 
themselves as commercial entities and ‗strive for efficiency‘ (interview - 25). Rather than 
investing in significant capital assets, efforts concentrated on saving money by promoting the 
use of energy more efficiently within their own estates. One interviewee who was in charge of a 
council building services unit in the 1980s notes that this prompted LAs to develop more 
comprehensive energy strategies: 
"Back in the early to mid 80s the only thing that people really thought about 
was saving energy for saving money. Energy prices were beginning to go and 
so anything that you could save immediately got you to the bottom line, it was 
a net saving in revenue and that had appeal. Not only did it have appeal but 
was being encouraged anyway (…) So an energy policy was introduced in 
1986‖ (interview – 32) 
However, Guy and Marvin (1996a) note that this trend towards ‗local energy management‘ 
which emerged following liberalisation became ‗disconnected from the commercial and 
regulatory forces shaping local energy economies‘ (p.145) and therefore tended to take place on 
an ad-hoc basis as there was ‗no statutory basis for any form of subnational energy-related 
planning‘ (p.146).  
Although ad-hoc and uncoordinated, a number of interviewees noted that these energy 
management programs laid the foundation for more sophisticated carbon management plans 
which have emerged in more recent years (interview – 26, 31, 32). In some of the schemes 
surveyed, an early focus on reducing energy related costs following liberalisation have evolved 
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This has been changed recently to allow councils avail of the feed-in tariff subsidy: ―These Regulations 
provide that local authorities can also sell electricity which is produced from the following renewable 
sources: wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, 
landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas, and biogases.‖ (HM Government, 2010b) 
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into more sophisticated carbon management plans and a longer-term strategic perspective 
(interview - 26, 31, 30, 32, 34). Along with the CCL which was introduced in 2001, this has 
been supported by voluntary schemes such as the Carbon Trust‘s ‗Carbon Management Plan‘ 
and ‗The Local Authority Carbon Management Programme‘. As a result ‗many local authorities 
have built upon their role as major energy users to develop programmes of energy-efficiency 
and conversion measures, with innovative local authorities developing sophisticated energy-
management strategies for their building stock‘ (Guy and Marvin, 1996a). Following from this 
there has been a growing sense that LAs need to ‗drive action for the sake of their population in 
their district rather than just their organization‘ (interview - 28). Reflecting this evolution the 
same interviewee who had been involved in building services management since the 1980s 
reflects on how carbon management plans have evolved from earlier concerns over energy costs 
and efficiency:  
―Yes there is a carbon management plan, it was adopted in March of 2008 
and it replaced what was the energy efficiency policy that had been in place 
since 1986. So one replaced the other and not surprisingly you can see how 
the two are very very closely linked (…) the two are intrinsically linked 
anyway because energy is tied to carbon" (interview - 32) 
Another interviewee who has been involved in developing a large CHP-DH scheme describes 
how this evolution has resulted in the adoption of carbon reduction targets at the local level: 
―Part of that was reducing carbon emissions by [a] carbon management 
program where we set ourselves targets for reducing carbon across a whole 
range of different facilities. Back in 2002 (…) we met and had a conference 
and as a result of that we developed an action plan for tackling climate 
change and mitigation. It just followed on from that really, looking at a whole 
range of different things to see how we can deal with carbon emissions and 
greenhouse gas emissions." (interview - 34) 
In many of the cases this re-engagement is being manifest in the development of detailed 
city/local level energy strategies which identify local opportunities and begin to engage with 
wider governance regimes at the national level (interview – 28). A number of these initiatives 
such as the Mayor of London‘s energy strategy have received a great deal of attention and have 
grown in prominence, in particular the Mayor of London‘s energy strategy which states that: 
―How we use energy is fundamental to long-term sustainability. If London is 
to make a significant contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions we need to restrain our use of fossil fuels, encourage greater 
energy efficiency, and promote renewable energy. Implementation of the 
Mayor‘s Energy Strategy will help to mitigate climate change by reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions. This Strategy has wide implications, promoting 
new kinds of fuel for transport and encouraging high performance buildings 
with less demand for energy‖ (GLA, 2004: p.iv)  
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And  
―London should maximise its contribution to meeting the national target for 
combined heat and power by at least doubling its 2000 combined heat and 
power capacity by 2010 (…) The expansion of heat distribution networks will 
be critical to the success of CHP in London, which in turn will have a huge 
influence on London‘s ability to achieve its CO2 emissions reduction targets‖ 
(ibid: p.76 & 80) 
In the CHP-DH cases, councils are drawing legitimacy from their historical role as energy 
suppliers before nationalisation (interview – 30) when ‗local authorities in the UK would have 
been running gas and electric companies‘ (interview - 38) and are leveraging their role as 
significant energy users to expand their influence and begin to consider energy provision within 
their wider localities (interview – 27, 36, 37). Also, due to the fact that the distribution of heat 
tends to favour local actors who have better knowledge of the nature of loads in a particular area 
and the potential to develop a local market, CHP-DH has emerged as a key link in the emerging 
relationship between local authority energy strategies and the wider governance regime at the 
national level. There are a number of motivating factors which are shaping these local 
responses: 
Reducing Fuel Bills 
A key rationale behind LA involvement in CHP-DH is efforts to reduce the fuel bill of both the 
council itself and tenants in social housing. As has been noted in the previous section, since the 
liberalization of the energy sectors in the UK, councils have increasingly sought to promote 
energy efficiency on their own estates and more recently this has evolved into sustainable 
energy and carbon action plans. Increasingly efforts to address fuel poverty have become part of 
this agenda: The table below shows the increase in the levels of fuel poverty
106
 that has occurred 
in the UK since 2003-2004:  
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 ‗Households are considered by the Government to be in 'fuel poverty' if they would have to spend 
more than 10% of their household income on fuel to keep their home in a 'satisfactory' condition‘ (The 
Poverty Site, 2011) 
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Figure 6.3: Fuel Poverty Statistics for UK 
 
Source: (The Poverty Site, 2011) 
As has been noted above, the role of local authorities is to deliver public services within their 
localities, and arising from the Local Government Act and the Sustainable Communities Acts 
(2000 and 2007), they have been granted increasing autonomy ‗to do anything which they 
consider is likely‘ (DCLG, 2000) to improve well-being. In the light of increasing levels of fuel 
poverty this has prompted local authorities to address the issue in a more direct fashion. This is 
particularly the case within large city councils, often in former industrialized cities in the north 
of England e.g. Sheffield and Nottingham and in inner city areas with a large social housing 
stock in densely populated inner cities e.g. London, Aberdeen.  An interviewee from one of 
these cities describes this as a key motivation for developing CHP-DH infrastructure: 
―For us fuel poverty. We recognize that we have got many deprived 
communities; it is a good old socialist intent in many respects. The majority of 
people will be in fuel poverty if we don't do something to try and alleviate 
that, so I think that is a political driver, it's fuel poverty, deprivation and the 
rising cost of energy‖ (interview - 33) 
Although there has been a longer term trend towards a decrease in fuel poverty since the 
liberalization of the electricity sector in the UK in 1989/1990 (Pollitt, 2008), there are concerns 
that liberalised energy markets are having a detrimental effect on fuel poverty rates by making 
customers more venerable to volatile fossil fuel markets and prices (interview – 33, 37). The 
following quote from an official in a large council in the north of England illustrates how the 
council is using this to legitimize more direct involvement in energy provision: 
―It is worrying because liberalising the market has not achieved a reduction 
of fuel poverty (...) we know that in terms of energy consumption, the 
wealthier areas consumed significantly more energy than the poorer areas 
even though they have all the opportunities to invest and reduce their energy 
consumption but they choose not to, so that is one of the big challenges‖ 
(interview - 37) 
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A notable illustration of this is Aberdeen City Council which developed an Affordable Warmth 
Scheme in 1999 and following a study into the energy efficiency of the council owned multi-
storey blocks, they began to invest in CHP-DH. This has since expanded to service other civic 
buildings within the city (EST, 2003). 
Promoting Low carbon Development 
A second significant motivating factor behind local authority involvement in the development 
CHP-DH has been to promote low carbon development within their localities. A similar theme 
has been explored in Hodson and Marvin‘s study of climate change strategies in large ‗World 
Cities‘; they argue that energy strategies are in part driven by efforts to improve the economic 
competitiveness of a city in a low carbon context (Hodson and Marvin, 2011). They note that 
‗…territorial priorities at the scale of the city – economic growth targets, carbon emissions 
reductions aspirations and so on – are becoming strategically intertwined with the 
reconfiguration of socio-technical infrastructure systems…‘ (p.138). Similar processes are at 
play in developing CHP-DH schemes in large, medium and small sized cities in the UK. 
Interviewees saw low carbon infrastructure as a key strategy in attracting developers to an area 
(interview – 31), promoting local job growth (interview – 33), regeneration (interview – 27) and 
competing with other cities for investments (interview – 38).  
This response is closely aligned with the ongoing institutionalization of sustainability and low 
carbon energy in planning guidance. As one interviewee notes; ‗all local authorities need what 
is called a local [development] framework in order to guide planning, and we had our local 
development framework well underway for development until the government about two years 
ago came up with PPS1, planning policy statement one supplement, which then changed the 
basis on which you would write to your LDF
107‘ (interview - 31). Some of the councils are keen 
to use CHP-DH to attract new developments; for example, within Woking Borough areas of the 
town have been zoned ‗and depending on which zone you are developing in, you might be 
expected [to] either connect your development to an existing network (…) or provide a financial 
contribution towards a network‘ (interview - 38). 
As the following quote suggests, some of the more proactive councils have begun to 
institutionalize sustainable energy within their planning strategies and guidance with CHP-DH 
being a key part of this: 
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"So you have got certain statutory solutions like the Merton 10% rule (…) If 
we ask for 40% we have got to be able to prove that that 30% is feasible and 
possible (…) An allowable solution would be (…) when a developer says that 
I can't do it on the building, do you have a low CO2 option that I can connect 
into? And that is where our sustainable energy (…) system comes in. We say 
yes, if you pay to connect to us we can provide you with the low CO2 energy" 
(interview - 31) 
Ensuring Energy security and long term resilience  
A third motivation for local authorities to develop carbon management and energy strategies 
and invest in low carbon infrastructure has been issues of energy security and long term 
resilience. This is prompted by a view that the incumbent energy companies and the regime of 
energy provision in the UK will be unable to achieve national targets and reinvest in the energy 
system, thus leaving cities vulnerable to severe price rises or supply shortages. These concerns 
are highlighted in the following quotes from local authority officers:   
"The more fundamental issue for the government will be overall energy 
supply, because I think the UK hasn‘t come to terms with the fact that it has 
failed to address its ageing energy infrastructure both in generation and 
distribution‖ (interview - 26) 
"I think we can see the vulnerabilities of the UK energy system, and we have 
not had a really honest and coherent energy strategy for far too long. I think 
we see that there is increasingly a requirement and a responsibility for local 
government to get a grip on some of these things that national government 
perhaps is not doing. I think we realized that the challenges are big, we are 
big-city with a half 1 million people, 200,000 homes, and yet we are entirely 
reliant on deals that are struck for the supply of gas and coal and oil at a 
national level, and yet we also recognize that we have got significant natural 
resources in the city, and man-made resources that we can exploit far more 
effectively. So we want to insure that the city is sustainable in the long term 
and we do not have the confidence that they are is a clear plan at the moment. 
Essentially what we are saying is that local authorities need to take a stronger 
role in local energy generation‖ (interview – 37) 
These perceived inconsistencies at the energy regime and landscape levels are prompting some 
LAs to ‗take a much more prominent role in developing it because the utility companies are not 
coming forward‘ (interview - 37). Arising from these concerns, a number of interviewees 
expressed a view that through the development of local infrastructures cities can ‗build long-
term resilience‘ and ‗develop some sense of self-sufficiency around energy‘ (interview – 37). 
Summary 
Throughout the period of liberalisation the relationship between LAs and the energy sector has 
evolved from a passive customer-producer relationship to one where a small number of leading 
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LAs are beginning to actively shape energy institutions within their own localities and make 
large scale infrastructure investments. This has been occurring in the context of national level 
policy drivers such as more autonomy for LAs in the delivery of certain services and more 
comprehensive building efficiency standards. In the cases surveyed CHP-DH has emerged as a 
key strategy to negotiate between these drivers in a strategic manner and deliver a sense of long 
term energy security and resilience.  
6.3.2 Types of Local CHP-DH Schemes 
Each of the CHP-DH schemes surveyed is organised and structured according to the particular 
context within a locality and the resources and motivations of the relevant LA. In order to 
synthesise this, the 2x2 matrix below identifies three types of CHP-DH scheme according to the 
main motivation behind the scheme – whether this is based on efforts to address rising energy 
prices and fuel poverty or it is part of a city-wide strategic development initiative - and whether 
the scheme has been initiated in the past 10-15 years when climate change has become part of 
the energy policy landscape or whether the scheme had been in place previous to this.   
Figure 6.4: Types of CHP-DH scheme 
 
Type A schemes tend to be within unitary authority cities where CHP-DH investments had 
occurred in the past often as part of the Marshall and Atkins Reports e.g. the lead cities program 
and subsequent publically funded investments which took place in the 70s and 80s (see chapter 
4). Examples include Nottingham, Leicester, and Sheffield - these are amongst the largest city-
wide schemes in the UK. LAs in these cities tend to have as their primary motivation the 
provision of local services and improving the well-being of residents; in particular addressing 
the issues of fuel poverty as these cities have large social housing tenants (interview – 33, 37).  
The schemes were initially built by council owned and operated bodies, such as Sheffield Heat 
and Power, but in the case of Sheffield the contract for waste collection and energy services 
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have been tendered to private operators (Veolia Environmental Services), while in the case of 
Nottingham these functions have remained in-house within a council owned body 
(Enviroenergy). In these cases, after the networks were constructed in the 70s and 80s they 
sometimes fell into disrepair due to poor maintenance and reputational issues (they were 
associated with dirty fuels and inefficiency) (interviewees – 33, 37, 38). However, in more 
recent years due concerns over rising energy prices and climate change, LAs are beginning to 
view these schemes as a valuable resource and are expressing a desire to redevelop and expand 
the schemes which had tended to be run in an arm‘s length fashion and removed from the 
councils‘ core agenda (interview – 33, 37).  
An interviewee from one of these cities describes how the CHP-DH scheme which is fueled 
from waste collected within the city has only recently become economical in part due to the 
Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROCs) scheme. This shift in perception can be viewed in 
terms of the ‗opening up of closure‘ as described in the SCOT literature (Murphy, 2006b, Pinch 
and Bijker, 1987): 
"I think we have had the incinerator from the 1970s (…) we are quite lucky in 
many respects, so a lot of our current renewable energy is delivered by and 
large by the district heating scheme. And we have gone through phases really 
with that; now we recognize it as an asset but for years it has been a liability, 
the council has had to prop it up by several million pounds each year until 
this year (…) Bear in mind that this has [been a] cost up until this year so, 
why would we wish to increase our level of subsidy. We were thinking about 
reducing cost, paring back the management structure, making sure that we 
are a lean mean organization that minimizes the liability. Our thinking has 
fundamentally shifted in the last year; we now recognize that as a fantastic 
asset that is key to our energy aspirations, we need to have a plan for 
expansion and growth of that scheme which is why we are expanding the 
infrastructure at the moment‖ (interview - 33) 
Type a schemes have taken a slightly ad-hoc approach where many of the earlier schemes, 
which were initially focused on energy management in the council buildings, expanded in an 
uncoordinated and piecemeal fashion, tending to take advantage of opportunities such as grant 
schemes as they arose.   
Type B schemes such as those in Birmingham and Aberdeen are newer systems which have a 
mixture of motivations; both seeking to address fuel poverty issues but also to use CHP-DH to 
enhance the economic development of the city (interview – 30, 34). Unlike type ‗A‘ schemes, 
these cases did not have significant upfront capital investment; therefore they are evolving from 
smaller projects which over the years have started to become amalgamated. This  is a 
polycentric approach where a city picks off the low hanging fruit in terms of the large loads in 
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city centres and over time seeks to join these up to create a city-wide scheme (Interview – 30, 
34), this is a more pragmatic approach. In this case the developer of the scheme identifies the 
low risk anchor loads first, usually large public buildings, and then moves down the hierarchy in 
terms of loads. For example, in the Aberdeen case they ‗started off with islands‘ and began 
‗linking them all together over a period of time‘ (interview – 34). This began with identifying 
the areas of high heating demand, which were within the high density multi-storey blocks, and 
have since begun to expand into the city centre areas. In the Birmingham case, the scheme 
began with the Broad Street scheme which services a number of the large commercial and civic 
units in the city centre, and a newer set of pipes which services the Eastside area of the city 
including Aston University and the Children‘s hospital. Over time there is an intention to link 
these and also to expand the LAs low carbon heating strategy to the suburban areas of the city 
(interview – 30). In these cases the local authority has been instrumental in seeking out new 
markets and customers for an expanding DH scheme and there tends to be a mix of goals 
associated with this including energy efficiency, attracting new developments and fuel poverty 
(interview – 30, 34, 38). The role that the council takes on in these cases is predominantly as a 
long term anchor customer who coordinates the activities of a range of stakeholders across a 
city and provides a strategic backbone to a scheme.  
Type C schemes are also recent developments but which have more of a strategic element to 
them and the CHP-DH scheme is closely aligned with the city‘s long term strategic aims and 
with the overarching governance regime of heat and energy;  
 by using a scheme to attract new developments and engage with planners (interview –
31) i.e. using CHP-DH as a catalyst (interview – 30)  
 by engaging directly with customers and helping them to be more efficient  
 by integrating across different infrastructures to diversify across fuel sources and to take 
advantages of economies of scope at a local level e.g. waste, cooling, electricity and 
heat, gas/biomethane 
These schemes such as Southampton and Woking tend to be the frontrunners and risk takers and 
they have been involved in trialing new technologies whilst importing best practice techniques 
from European countries. For example, the Southampton scheme emerged from an experimental 
trial of using geothermal energy as a heat resource; the system has since expanded to become 
one of the largest commercial schemes in the UK. The Woking case is often cited within the 
emerging sector as a frontrunner within the UK (interview – 26, 27, 31, 36, 38) as it has been 
successful in developing an organizational model around the scheme which integrates CHP-DH 
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with the planning section of the council and uses its infrastructure to leverage in new 
developments and make the area more attractive for commuters to London (interview – 31). The 
CHP-DH scheme acts as a key strategic tool in the long term future of the city and has raised the 
profile of the council e.g. Woking council has recently been awarded Beacon council status for 
supporting sustainable communities. Often these types of schemes are more sophisticated and 
there is a desire amongst A and B type councils to move towards this more integrated and 
strategic approach (interview – 30, 33, 34, 37, 38) - as one interviewee from a type B council 
outlines: 
―Our planning system isn't as robust as it needs to be in prescribing district 
heating. So we have a planning policy that is very similar to most other 
planning authorities (…) It's doesn't recognize the unique opportunity that 
[we have] with the district heating scheme, and it needs to. So as part of the 
local development framework review process, that has been fed into our 
planning colleagues and will strengthen planning policy to make that a little 
bit more of a prescribed process in favor of district heating‖ (interview - 33) 
Woking Borough Council in particular stands out as having a longer term strategic perspective 
and a number of authorities are seeking to move in this direction e.g. the London Development 
Agency (LDA) have proposed the Thames Gateway Heat Network
108
 which is planned will link 
the existing fragmented schemes together across London.  
The table below summarizes the three main types of CHP-DH schemes in the UK: 
Table 6.4: Summary of types of CHP-DH scheme in the UK 
Type Characteristics Examples Rationale 
A Existing infrastructures 
which had a poor reputation 
are being redeveloped  
Sheffield, Nottingham, 
Leicester 
Main rationale is to 
promote the well-being of 
residents and address fuel 
poverty 
B Recently developed 
fragmented infrastructure 
which is being linked and 
expanding across the city 
Birmingham, Aberdeen Mixture of fuel poverty 
and low carbon 
development drivers  
C Risk takers who are more 
strategic and integrated, are 
Woking, Southampton Uses CHP-DH to 
Integrate planning and 
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frontrunners in terms of 
technologies deployed 
energy policies to 
promote the long term  
development of the 
locality 
Amongst the types of schemes described above councils can often play a number of roles:  
An Enabler:  
As an enabler the council actively generates a market for heat and funds the expansion of a 
particular scheme; this is typically the case with type c schemes such as Woking. ‗Local 
authorities have relevant planning powers and the ability to coordinate between developers and 
potential customers given their network of relationships with controllers of large heat loads (e.g. 
social housing groups, NHS trusts and public buildings)‘ (PÖYRY, 2009). One interviewee who 
has been involved in coordinating a government funding program for district heating notes that  
‗There are various roles, in some cases they will commission and contract 
with those providing or delivering the networks so they are procuring aswell. 
The fact that they have got all of those things in one place gives it a catalytic 
role to sort of do this thing, particularly in the digging up of the streets which 
is a bit of an issue for some of these networks alongside other statutory 
undertakings" (interview – 27). 
A Promoter:   
In some cases councils also promote the schemes by using their reputation and trustworthiness 
to attract customers (Interview – 25, 29, 30, 37). One council official outlines this approach;  
‗We also have a strategic role in trying to encourage other people in trying to 
connect to the scheme, we champion it and you will have picked up that we 
sort of promote it. We promote it as a single issue (…) scheme and we 
promote connection to it as well to develop the new schemes and new 
developments‘ (interview – 25).  
A Customer:  
In order to make schemes more viable, councils often act as an ‗anchor tenant‘, typically in a 
dense built up area e.g. a city centre, in order to provide long term stability and reduce risks for 
the investment required to lay pipes. For example, as one interviewee notes, they are often the 
first customer to connect to a scheme because ‗you really need that local authority leadership 
and perspective and one of the ways they are looking at rolling this out is by having the public 
buildings, the kind of first physical infrastructure willing to take on the heat‘ (interview – 36). 
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This first mover role often acts as the ‗bedrock contract and that then gives other customers the 
confidence to join‘ (interview – 39). 
An Investor:  
In the absence of private sector funding, Local Authorities have the ability to access cheap 
finance by borrowing against their own assets, using the UK government‘s prudential borrowing 
facility or accessing a range of UK and EU grants for investment in local level infrastructure 
(interview – 27). They can also use their status attract various sources of public funding for the 
expansion of a scheme (the sub section 6.3.4 will explore the financing of CHP-DH in more 
detail). 
Although local authorities tend to be the focal actors in local energy systems as schemes tend to 
be either under their control or based around their energy demands, they are not always involved 
in the day-to-day operation of a CHP-DH system.The role(s) that a local authority takes up is 
largely dependent on the organizational model they chose to adopt which is a function of their 
resources, capabilities and willingness to take on operational and investment risk. 
6.3.3 The Organisation of CHP-DH Schemes 
This sub-section explores in more detail the various ways in which CHP-DH schemes are being 
organised and in particular how this shapes local authority involvement. As is noted in much of 
the evolutionary based innovation literature, technological change cannot be considered in 
isolation from organisational change (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008, Chandler, 1990, Schumpeter, 
1939). For example, in the case of large scale energy infrastructures, the development of 
centralised electricity grids in the mid twentieth century relied upon an industry structure which 
allowed investors to get a regulated return on large scale investments and enabled the massing 
of consumption, thus achieving the system goal of economies of scale and  to ‗sell as much 
power as possible as cheaply as possible‘ (Fox-Penner, 2010: p.6). Studies of CHP-DH schemes 
also emphasise the importance of developing an appropriate organisational model within the 
focal organisation themselves (in this case the local authority) and also how a wider network of 
actors are coordinated with the purpose of reshaping local energy technologies and institutions. 
In her study of CHP-DH in a Swedish town Summerton (1992) noted that ‗shaping a district 
heating system places considerable demands on organisational capacity‘ (ibid: p.13).  Here two 
dimensions of this organisational capacity are explored in detail; the first is how local 
authorities, as focal actors, have brought about change within their own organisations and 
secondly how they interact with a range of stakeholders to develop local energy infrastructures.  
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Shaping Organisational Change within Local Authorities 
Thomas Hughes‘ insights regarding the role of individuals in shaping early stage energy 
infrastructures (Hughes, 1983) are relevant to the case of city-wide district heating schemes in 
the UK. Hughes stressed the importance of motivated and entrepreneurial system builders in 
overcoming both the technical and non-technical barriers to system building. Similarly, in her 
analysis of low energy housing in the UK, Lovell (2009) explores the role of entrepreneurs who 
have been instrumental in developing sustainable housing experiments and influencing the 
wider policy environment. Following interviews with a number of local authority officers who 
had been involved in CHP-DH, it emerged that the role of such entrepreneurial individuals 
within councils has been a key element in shaping the both the material and organisational 
approach to low carbon infrastructure – a number of the interviewees referred to these as 
‗champions‘ (interview – 39, 30, 36).   
As the following quote from a policy officer who has been involved in advocacy on behalf of a 
number of LAs suggests, this reliance on individuals is largely due to the lack of an overarching 
regulatory and policy framework for non-incumbent energy infrastructure in the UK:  
"…to get a champion or having the expert does make a big difference, and 
having that skill set does make a difference about whether you were able to 
get that project off the ground, it is really really important ( ...) You either 
have this very central government ‗you will do this you will do that‘; then you 
have no autonomy for the local circumstances, or you to rely on these gifted 
people" (interview - 36) 
Within this vacuum there tends therefore to be a reliance on individuals within the councils to 
drive the technological and political agenda and in a number of cases these individuals have 
gained a high profile. One prominent example is Allan Jones, originally the building services 
manager with Woking Borough Council, who has since moved on to head up climate change 
strategies at the London Climate Change agency and the City of Sydney. These individuals are 
important because organisations such as local authorities are known for their reluctance to take 
risks. For example one interviewee who has been involved in working with local government on 
energy projects argues that ‗local authorities are basically set up not to make decisions because 
decisions cost money‘ and that the bureaucratic nature of the organizations themselves make 
change of any type difficult because ‗there is a whole serious of checks and balances within the 
local authority that means that (…) decisions go through a sorting process and they can be 
stopped at any level. So even a decision that has gone through all of the minor levels is stopped 
higher up‘ (interview – 39).  
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The political nature of councils means that there are a number of tiers of decision making within 
a centralized and hierarchical structure which makes individuals or technical and political 
champions particularly important agents of change within this highly structured environment. 
An energy consultant who had previously worked in a council engaged in developing energy 
schemes notes that: 
"…if you don't have the people with the desire and the drive or the knowledge 
to solve it then it just goes nowhere and it just fizzles out. There are lots of 
examples of people in local authorities going ‗yeah why don't we do this‘ (…) 
But they will inevitably come up with their own problems and constraints that 
stop [you from] doing it, and if they don't have the resources to get over them 
it fizzles out. It is even worse because when it fizzles out people say that we 
tried that last year so we're not doing it next year" (interview - 28) 
In order to bring about the organizational changes necessary to develop long term infrastructure 
projects, policies and strategies across a number of departments need to be aligned e.g. 
planning, building services, finance, legal, procurement etc. This requires the co-coordination of 
a diverse set of actors across the organization ‗so that you can bring in your procurement teams 
and your legal teams and you bring in anyone else across the council‘, a CHP-DH champion 
within a council is ‗someone who's going to project manage the whole thing, and who is able to 
get partners in and is able to work with the private sector, because you need to be able to get at 
that funding‘ (interview – 36). 
The roles of a champion in this sense are to possess and harness the knowledge necessary to 
develop a scheme (interview – 26, 36), to coordinate actors within and outside the council, to 
engage with politicians on the council in order to convince them of the long term benefits of 
CHP-DH investment, and to de-risk the long term investment. A champion is required to get the 
infrastructure issue ‗elevated up through the organization and get it right at the top, that high 
level buy-in‘ (interview - 30). The central role of a political champion, often a prominent 
councilor, is outlined by the following interviewee who works on the technical side of a city-
wide CHP-DH scheme. The quote emphasizes the importance of creating long term stability in 
an environment where the make-up of the council can change due to the political cycle: 
―He bought in to the scheme very early on, he came on the visits with us 
[and] we went to look at other local authorities (…) and he bought in, so we 
have (…) buy in at that high level. One of the things that helps drive that 
through was when, and you do get barriers to certain things like this, people 
say; ‗is it right having 25 year contracts‘. You will always get the skeptics‖ 
(interview - 30) 
Another interviewee from a company who works with a number of councils in developing 
schemes argues that both a technical and a political champion are necessary to drive a scheme 
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through the layers of decision making within a council and achieve the necessary coordination 
between different departments: 
―We believe that every successful scheme is spawned from a public sector 
champion on the grassroots level and also a public sector champion on a 
senior-level within any Council. All of our schemes share that and it is 
essential that all parties buy into the scheme and its benefits, and again that 
political will is, if you like, for driving through the scheme‖ (interview - 29) 
The following table outlines the roles that both technical and political champions have played in 
bringing about the organizational environment necessary for the development of CHP-DH: 
Table 6.5: The role of technical and political champions 
Technical Champion Political Champion 
 Develop knowledge and capabilities of the 
building services/energy management 
department 
 Learn from other successful schemes both 
nationally and internationally 
 Coordinate actors from a number of 
council departments 
 Scope out the potential demand for 
heating within the locality and develop an 
overall strategic vision for the expansion 
of the scheme 
 Manage the contractual arrangements for 
the building and operation of the scheme 
 Place CHP-DH on the political agenda 
 Enroll other councilors from across the 
political spectrum and create an advocacy 
coalition   
 Help to de-risk large scale investments by 
displaying a commitment to long term 
infrastructure development regardless of 
the political cycle 
 Use CHP-DH to advance the 
sustainability/low carbon agenda and raise 
the profile of the council 
In the case of Woking Council, a leader in this area, the council Chief Executive
109
 who was 
involved in developing the energy strategy of the council since its inception, argues that ‗it‘s a 
combination of political and technical, managerial‘ requiring ‗strong political leadership and 
direction, managerial support and technical support. And if you can‘t get those three aligned it 
doesn‘t work‘ (interview – 26). An illustrative example of the importance of this 
interdependency between the technical and the political came when the council owned energy 
company, Thamesway Energy, made a large investment in a CHP-DH scheme in central Milton 
Keynes. Due to the economic slowdown in 2008 a number of the buildings that the scheme was 
due to service had not been built resulting in stranded assets. The CEO noted; ‗it brought 
criticism that we were undertaking this work outside of our borough‘ and as a result the 
ambitious program of expanding to other areas outside the borough has been stalled due to a 
lack of political support. The CEO notes that the ‗set back we‘ve had means there‘s a less 
ambition to go and set it up outside the Borough, so members don‘t want us to take that business 
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line and do any more‘ (interview – 26). This example highlights the political nature of making 
large scale infrastructure investments and the need for a virtuous circle between both the 
technical and political elements of a CHP-DH scheme. 
Creating Multi-Organisations 
In order to develop successful CHP-DH schemes, local authorities must also interact with a 
range of stakeholders such as customers, consultants, contractors, regulators, financial 
institutions and so on. In her study of the development of a district heating scheme in Sweden, 
Jane Summerton highlights the importance of what she terms a ‗multi-organisation‘ or an 
‗invisible –grid‘ where actors ‗functionally interact to achieve a shared purpose, performing 
different roles in support of the system (…) this may be centered around a central body or ―focal 
organisation‖ that has specific planning, coordinative and decision-making functions‘ 
(Summerton, 1992: p.79). As described above, LAs are the focal actors within CHP-DH 
schemes and can play a number of roles from being an anchor tenant who improves the 
financeability of local infrastructure, to being an investor. These ‗multi-organisations‘, which 
bring coherence to a sometimes fragmented set of energy institutions and technologies at the 
local level, are unique to each of the schemes involving different relationships between public 
and private actors and different approaches to the planning and operation of the energy systems 
themselves.  
Key variables in the organisational structure of CHP-DH schemes include the willingness of the 
council to take on investment risk, the council‘s priorities and the resources available to LAs 
and their organisational and technical capabilities (interview - 36). It has already been pointed 
out that in the past some of the schemes (such as the lead cities) would have been owned and 
operated by the council themselves, but in modern schemes councils can take up a multitude of 
roles and in some cases are not directly involved in the day-to-day running of the system. In 
each of the cases surveyed, councils have either set-up arms length organisations –termed 
Energy Services Companies (ESCOs
110
) – or have entered into contracts with private sector 
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 Following the 2003 Local Government Act, councils have been given scope to trade services in order 
to fulfil their well-being function. Prior to this, local authorities were prohibited from owning more that 
20% of a company and had capital controls imposed on their activities: ‗The position on trading and 
charging under the Local Government Act 2003 has a wide application and the power to trade is 
particularly useful in terms of energy services. Under the Act, a local authority can trade on a commercial 
basis in relation to any of its ordinary functions (section 95). This is in addition to the power to trade with 
other public bodies under the Local Government (Goods and Services) Act 1970. Only those authorities 
with a Comprehensive Performance Assessment rating of fair or above, or with a star rating can use the 
power to trade. The trading power, used with the Well Being Power, does enable these authorities to enter 
into trading agreements or arrangements for the provision of goods, materials, staff, accommodation and 
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specialist asset management companies to run the scheme, such as Cofely District Energy 
(Southampton, Leicester, Birmingham) or Veolia Environmental Services (Sheffield), with long 
term contracts being tendered to the market (typically in the region of 25 years). The figure 
below shows a range of these types of relationships and the role that a council tends to play in 
each111:  
Figure 6.5: Organisational form of a selection of schemes 
 
Given the complexity of these multi-organisational structures, there are a number of dimensions 
behind the design of ESCOs. The model which is closest to full council ownership is the asset 
management ESCO which is controlled by the council, e.g. Woking. In this case the council 
forms an organisation which is answerable directly to the councillors and the local authority 
themselves often finance the schemes and take on the associated risk. One key advantage of this 
model is that it is possible to secure cheaper sources of finance through council loans (see next 
section), however councils are often reluctant to take on investment and fuel price risk directly 
(interview – 30, 39, 40). It also enables the council to use CHP-DH to advance the strategic 
aims of the council, particularly in relation to planning (interview – 31, 36).  
In the case of Woking, Thamesway Energy Ltd. is a subsidiary of a group holding company 
called Thamesway Ltd. which was set up in 1999 in order to advance the general climate change 
and sustainability agenda within the borough (interview – 31). Rather than being profit driven, 
the overarching aim of Thamesway Ltd is to advance the council‘s priorities in the areas of 
decent and affordable housing, the environment, health and well-being and economic 
development (Thamesway, 2011). As the schematic below shows, Thamesway Energy, a 
                                                                                                                                                           
services for the purpose of promoting well-being.  Local authorities also have the power to charge for 
discretionary services on a cost recovery basis‘ (Braybrook, 2008) 
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 Based on interviews and own observations 
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subsidiary of Thamesway Ltd, is part owned by the council and a Danish company called Xergi 
Ltd., whose expertise in the areas of decentralised energy and district heating have been drawn 
upon by the council; they are part owners (interview – 26). Also, as the investments were taking 
place prior to the introduction of the ‗well-being‘ function which was introduced in 2003, the 
council could not be the sole owner of a company which traded services and would have been 
subject to capital controls (Braybrook, 2008). 
Thamesway Energy also owns and operates the CHP-DH scheme in Milton Keynes. 
Thamesway Ltd. is also involved in housing development through Woking Borough Homes 
Ltd. and the provision of consultancy and project management services through Energy Centre 
for Sustainable Communities Ltd – the figure below outlines the complex organisational 
structure involved: 
Figure 6.6: Thamesway Corporate Structure 
 
Source: (interview – 26) 
All profits from the company are re-invested into environmental sustainability projects within 
Woking, as one of the directors points out; ‗Thamesway is a CO2 reduction entity‘ and ‗not a 
profit-making entity for the purpose of council tax reduction‘ (interview – 31). Any profits from 
Thamesway Ltd. are not retained by the council but are re-invested in sustainability/energy 
saving measures within the Borough. The council is the sole shareholder in Thamesway Ltd and 
each of the subsidiaries are setup as a ‗special purpose vehicle company which encapsulates the 
business risk within this pyramid and keeps all of the business risk away from Woking‘ (…) 
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‗Thamesway Limited is a holding company and all of the others are joint ventures or special 
purpose vehicles‘ (interview – 31). This is a flexible and adaptive organisational structure which 
allows the council to pursue a number of strategies, CHP-DH being amongst them, in order to 
advance the overall aim of the council in the areas of climate change mitigation, sustainability 
and well-being. 
In the case of a non-profit limited company, the council is a part owner of the ESCO and the 
council procures energy services from an arm‘s length body which is only part-owned by the 
council. This is similar to the Woking arrangement where the ESCO operates on a non-for-
profit basis as profits are reinvested; however, it acts independently of the council chamber, 
although some councillors may sit on its board (interview – 36). A key rationale behind 
adopting this organisational framework is that there is less risk for the council, particularly in 
relation to rises in the wholesale price of gas and investments made. However, as the ESCO has 
greater autonomy it is less integrated with other strategic aims of the council (interview – 31). 
These schemes tend to be less commercially orientated, with the LA acting as the main, if not 
sole, customer for the scheme. 
An interviewee from a council where this arrangement is in place describes the main points of 
the council‘s ESCO agreement: 
"It is a separate entity, it is an independent not for profit company which is 
limited by guarantee. Essentially the council is [its main] customer, the 
council has board members, but it is set up as a separate organization. That 
does mean that its accounts have to be audited independently and all of those 
things, it is registered for VAT independently. It is a separate organization. 
The main framework agreement between the council and [the ESCO] sets out 
things like that the surplus generated, (…) the next capital cost, that the 
ownership of the assets will revert to council, (...) that the buildings will go on 
to council land; and the council give them a license to operate using that 
land. So all of those things come into the main framework agreement, then for 
each scheme that is developed there is an installation agreement which covers 
the capital cost‖ (interview – 34) 
The respondent goes on to describe the arrangement regarding funding: 
―For each scheme that is developed there is an installation agreement which 
covers the capital cost; [The ESCO] provide XY and Z in return for the 
council providing this set amount of funding‖ (interview – 34) 
Also, with regard to fuel risk: 
There is also a supply agreement that says [the ESCO] will provide heat to 
these properties at such and such a rate and that rates can be changed in 
future (...) It is directly linked to the cost to [the ESCO] of the gas that they 
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buy to run the CHP system. So [the ESCO‘s] gas cost goes up, then the heat 
charge goes up proportionately‖ (interview – 34) 
In the case of Aberdeen there was an additional rationale for setting up an arm‘s length 
company due to the 1976 Local Government Act which precluded Scottish councils from selling 
electricity in any circumstances – in England and Wales an exception was made when 
‗produced in association with heat‘ (DECC, 2010a).  
The third model is where the council offers a tender to the market for the operation of a CHP-
DH scheme for a set period of time, typically up to 25 years. This is the risk averse approach in 
terms of financing the scheme and exposure fuel price fluctuations. In this case, a council 
enterers into a contract with a private  company ‗which says you will supply energy at this, 
electricity at that, heat at this rate over 25 years through low carbon technologies‘ (interview - 
30). The council plays a more hands off role and the private operator has autonomy over the 
day-to-day operation and expansion of the scheme to commercial customers. In exchange for 
the operator taking a greater share of the risk, the council signs a long term energy supply 
contract and acts to promote the scheme to other potential customers. In some cases, because of 
public sector procurement rules, other public bodies that wish connect to the scheme do so 
through the local authority rather than the private operator, this is because of public sector 
procurement policies. These ‗back-to-back‘ arrangements, where public sector customers 
procure energy from the council indirectly through the operator, allow the customer to purchase 
energy from a third party whilst avoiding strict procurement rules. In such instances there is a 
profit sharing arrangement between the council and the operator to incentivise the local 
authority to promote the scheme (interview - 30).  
In other cases the relationship is more hands-off; the ESCO sells an energy service to the 
council, a defined amount of energy for a set period, and takes on all of the risks of price rises 
and asset management (investment and maintenance – depending on the contract). An interview 
from a prominent decentralised energy company who bids for these contracts outlines their role 
in such arrangements: 
"(…) we also then agree to finance the plant (...) So we agree to the capital of 
the scheme and then we sell the energy to our clients, similar to a tracker 
mortgage (…) We will identify savings and regardless of fluctuations in the 
gas market we will always deliver that saving throughout the terms of the 
agreement, so it has maintained savings throughout the agreement (…) while 
the risk is borne to the private sector (…) Essentially we are a lean 
organization which has expertise and experience (…). Typically councils are 
asset rich - so they have got plenty of buildings and heat loads - but they are 
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cash poor - they do not have the finance to bring the schemes on board 
themselves‖ (interview - 29) 
In these arrangements the role of the council is act as a sustainable, long term customer base by 
connecting their large buildings which act as an anchor load around which the scheme can be 
built and potentially expand (interview - 29). These local authorities also promote the scheme 
within the city thus reducing the transaction costs for the private operator; they are treated as a 
‗statutory utility within the boundaries of the city so it can lay its mains without the need for a-
way needs and planning‘ (interview - 29). Although this activity has tended to be carried out by 
smaller specialised decentralised energy companies such as Vital Energy, Cofely DE (formally 
Utilicom), and Veolia Environmental Services, there are also niche businesses within the major 
energy companies such as E-On
112
 and EdF
113
. There are concerns however that a private sector 
led model could lead to cherry picking of the most profitable investments rather than ‗a coherent 
city-wide approach‘ (interview - 33) 
6.3.4 Obtaining Finance for CHP-DH Schemes 
The characteristics of CHP-DH are such that contracts are ‗generally 15-20 years because the 
infrastructure costs are so high‘ (interview - 25). A key variable in the organization and nature 
of a particular scheme is the attitude and approach taken to issues of financing and risk taking. 
The figure below shows the cost per technology of heating technologies which shows that 
district heating (DHN) and renewables are more costly compared to the baseline i.e. individual 
gas or electric heating
114
. The main component of the costs of district heating is the upfront cost 
of laying distribution pipes and procurement of components (there is currently no supplier in the 
UK (PÖYRY, 2009) and therefore little benefit from economies of scale in manufacturing 
components for CHP-DH systems (interview – 39)) 
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 EON Community Energy operate the Citigen scheme in London: http://www.eonenergy.com/In-
Business/Sustainable-Energy/Community+Energy/?WT.svl=4 
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 As part of London ESCO, EDF have been a partner in the Barkentine scheme: 
http://www.edfenergy.com/sustainability/our-sustainability-challenge/climate-change/london-
ESCO.shtml 
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Figure 6.7: Cost of Heat Provision by technology in current market conditions (£/MWH) 
 
Source: (PÖYRY, 2009) 
However, as has been discussed previously, networks tend to benefit from strong increasing 
returns; therefore as more customers connect to the scheme, overall costs will reduce and as a 
consequence the heat tariff for customers should decline. The following graph from the PÖYRY 
study models this for an average sized CHP-DH scheme; it shows that as the connection rate 
increases the heat tariff for customers also decreases.     
Figure 6.8: Quantifying the take-up risk. Heat tariff in £/MWh 
 
Source: (PÖYRY, 2009) 
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However, because ‗the required tariff to recover the initial outlay must be relatively high‘ 
(PÖYRY, 2009) the upfront capital costs are substantial for CHP-DH
115
. This, combined with 
the long payback period on investment, the lack of expertise in CHP-DH in the UK (PÖYRY, 
2009), the long lead times involved in planning and delivering major infrastructure projects, and 
the fact that lending institutions in the UK tend to take a short-term approach and be 
conservative in their attitudes to risk (Mitchell, 1994), means that securing project financing at a 
reasonable cost-of-capital can be difficult for low carbon infrastructure projects (interview – 27, 
31, 36). In supplementary evidence given to a Scottish Parliament hearing, Aberdeen City 
Council noted that ‗CHP district heating schemes have high capital costs, but significantly 
lower running cost and carbon emissions. We need CAPEX grants. OPEX incentives (such as 
exemption from CCL, ROCS, feed-in tariffs or Heat Incentives) alone won‘t kick-start 
replication in other areas, or allow us to grow the heat network in Aberdeen‘ (Aberdeen City 
Council, 2009). 
As a result, CHP-DH schemes rely on upfront capital funding. Broadly there are three sources 
of funding for low carbon infrastructure schemes at the local level; they are publicly funded 
grant schemes, council borrowing (against their own assets) and private finance – these are 
discussed in more detail below: 
Capital Grants 
This source of funding comes from a number of capital grant schemes, in particular from 
national government, but also from the EU level. These various sources of funding are outlined 
in the table below: 
Table 6.6: Sources of public funding for CHP-DH 
Sources of funding Description 
Community Energy Fund 
(CEF) 
A program of £50mil for updating/installing community heating schemes 
from 2002 to 2005 managed by the Carbon Trust (CT) and Energy Savings 
Trust (EST), but has been discontinued. Schemes in Aberdeen and 
Birmingham benefited from this. 
Low Carbon 
Infrastructure Fund 
Introduced in 2009 and administered by the Homes and Communities 
Agency (HCA) on behalf of DECC and DCLG. This included £21million for 
community heating schemes. 13 projects were funded with 3 in the pipeline 
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 Laying pipes costs in the region of £1,000/metre 
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(LCIF) (interview - 27) which were typically extensions to existing networks. This 
ran until 2010. 
European Funding The European Regional Development Fund and the European Investment 
Bank who fund infrastructure projects. 
Biomass Capital grants UK Government/DEFRA funded schemes for up to £500,000 per installation. 
Community 
Infrastructure Levy 
 This is a charge which LAs are enabled to impose on new developments. 
The charges are based on the size of the development (DCLG, 2008a). 
Similarly a proposed CHP-DH scheme in a new development can benefit 
from developer contributions as part of ‗allowable solutions‘. 
CESP As part of CESP, licensed energy suppliers can part fund DH projects with 
LAs in a number of low income zones e.g. Leicester. 
District Heating Loan 
Fund (Scotland) 
 
In 2011 the Scottish Government announced a £2.5million loan fund for DH 
These grant programmes, in particular the CEF and the LCIF, have played a significant role in 
developing CHP-DH schemes; the majority of interviewees involved in schemes cited their 
importance in providing an initial capital injection to lay the piping (interview – 25, 30, 34, 33). 
As noted previously, local authorities are well placed to attract such funding and the ability to 
do so successfully has become a core competency in CHP-DH development (interview – 36). 
An interviewee who had been involved in administering one particular funding scheme pointed 
out that local authorities in particular were favoured for such funding as oppose to private sector 
bodies as it was felt that it was more likely that LAs would contribute to a wider range of policy 
goals and more effectively coordinate actors at the local level (interview – 27).  
However, the rapidly evolving energy policy environment in recent years has meant that these 
funding schemes are temporary, thus undermining the requirements for long term certainty in 
infrastructure investments (interview – 29, 36). A number of interviewees from local authorities 
expressed frustration at the temporary nature of the schemes (Interviewee – 25, 31, 34). 
Referring to government support for CHP over the years, the following interviewee from a 
private CHP-DH operator argues that this has undermined confidence in the long term viability 
of local infrastructure investments; they argue that:  
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"…it has typically been over the last 20 odd years that CHP is very important 
and that has been one of our primary technologies and it has received various 
levels of support. What we have seen is that support mechanisms often 
disappear without a trace very quickly and with little warning and that has 
led to schemes being pulled at the last minute where funding disappears and 
can be quite an unsustainable practice‖ (interview - 29) 
Similarly, a local authority officer who was involved with a project which received a number of 
capital grants from the CEF argues that the reasons for closing the scheme were vague and 
unjustified: 
―It closed because it did not appear to meet the objective. We more than met 
the objective - three projects within time, on budget and achieving carbon 
savings. I would say that the reason that it didn't achieve its objective was 
because of the way that the money was allocated, so huge schemes that were 
never going to, within the timescales, be deliverable‘ (interview - 34).  
The interviewee argues that the CEF had allocated funding to a small set of large schemes rather 
than a greater number of smaller initiatives where the viability and potential for carbon savings 
were greater.  
Council Funding 
In a number of the cases these capital grants were used alongside own council funding to initiate 
projects. For example, for one of the schemes in Aberdeen the split was council funding - 60% 
and a CEF grant - 40% (interview - 34). Council funding can come either from council 
borrowing or through a self-funded revolving investment fund – these are discussed in turn: 
Under the 2003 Local Government Act new forms of autonomy were introduced to grant greater 
autonomy to LAs to go into debt to fund activities (LGA, 2005b). The Prudential Capital 
System introduced following the 2003 Act allows councils ‗to borrow to invest in capital works 
and assets so long as the cost of that borrowing was affordable and in line with principles set out 
in a professional Prudential Code, endorsed by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy‘ (LGA, 2005a). In place of the borrowing cap which was set by central 
government the ‗prudential code‘ assesses the  ability of the council to service the debt, where 
‗projects identified by local authorities are self financing, in that the cost of borrowing and 
repayment can then be met by revenues gained through the investment‘ (LGA, 2005b) – 
investment in local energy infrastructures fits into this category. The rate is set by central 
government and this allows councils to borrow at a low cost of capital, thus making investment 
in such things as low carbon infrastructure networks more feasible. As a result ‗local authorities 
are able to borrow at lower rates than pretty much any other organization‘ (interview - 36) and 
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‗their interest rates are approaching zero‘ (interview - 39). This facility is typically availed of in 
conjunction with a capital grant e.g. this has been used in Nottingham along with a capital grant 
to fund a recent expansion of its scheme. In general councils do not tend to invest using cash 
reserves (interview - 39) as councils tend to be asset rich rather than cash rich (interview – 29), 
therefore prudential borrowing has emerged as an important facility for infrastructure 
investments. However, in the light of significant cuts to LA funding from central government, 
debt funding of capital investments is becoming less likely (interview – 32, 33, 38). 
The second self-financing approach is a revolving investment fund or mechanism where over a 
number of years, a council reinvests the savings it makes from energy efficiency to create a 
capital fund which can be used to invest in capital assets such as DH pipes. Examples of 
councils using this approach include Aberdeen and Woking. In the Woking case, the council 
began monitoring its energy efficiency in 1992 and after a number of years of savings a capital 
fund was available for investment in the CHP-DH scheme in 2001 (interview – 26). In 
Aberdeen, the council invested the money set aside for the replacement of old and inefficient 
heating systems in its social housing stock and invested it in its ESCO, Aberdeen Heat and 
Power co. As investments take place in more efficient heating systems to service the buildings 
the savings that accrue are reinvested by the ESCO, thus allowing the scheme to expand to other 
areas of the city (interview – 34). This model is most common where the council has a greater 
stake in the ESCO, i.e. the non-profit/ council ownership model. The expectation with this 
approach is that it will become ‗more and more self funding with the council just putting it what 
[they] would put in to replace the heating systems‘ (interview - 34) as is the case in Aberdeen. 
As the following quote suggests, this approach can allow a scheme to benefit from increasing 
returns: 
"[The ESCO] was set up so that it can profit its surplus, it can be ploughed 
back into the next development. For the first scheme to make it stack up we 
needed a 40% grant, we are now onto fourth scheme and we need a 25% 
grant, which is what we have got‖ (interview - 34) 
As the quote suggests, this approach can allow a scheme to benefit from increasing returns as 
the system expands, thus reducing the reliance on public grant funding which decreases over 
time.   
Private Financing 
Due to ongoing cuts to budgets across the public sector there is an expectation that upfront 
capital funding and the ability of councils to fund infrastructure investment by going into debt 
will be severely curtailed (interview – 25, 27, 32, 33). As a result, it is likely that private sector 
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financing will increasingly by relied upon. It is rarely the case that large lending institutions will 
fund local infrastructure projects because due to their short time horizons, which are typically 5-
7 years, they will be reluctant to provide ‗long-term low interest rate‘ loans (interview – 31). 
There are however a number of examples of private sector involvement in larger CH-DH 
schemes, this is secured through the public sector procurement processes where a local authority 
places a tender on the market for the provision of energy services to the council and operation of 
a scheme for a defined period of time, typically for 15-25 years (Carbon Trust, 2004). In this 
way a number of schemes have been contracted out to specialist district energy companies or 
ESCOs such as Cofely DE (formally Utilicom) who operate the Southampton, Leicester and 
Birmingham schemes, and Veolia Environmental Services who operate the Sheffield scheme. 
These companies have autonomy to achieve OPEX efficiencies and choose the most suitable 
generating solutions whilst allowing them to enter into separate third party heat supply 
agreements with commercial customers.  
This private sector model is attractive because it transfers a great deal of the investment and 
operational risk to the private sector as the prices paid for energy services by the council will be 
indexed linked over the period.  However, the required rate of return on new investment will 
likely be higher than would be the case under a council funded project (interview – 31, 39). One 
interviewee from a council which uses own funding stated that due to the lower cost-of-capital 
available to councils, their internal rate-of-return is 8% while a private sector operator may 
demand 15-25% return on shareholder investment (interview – 31). Also, because the private 
operator will have control over the operation and future evolution of the system, there will be 
less scope for the local authority to integrate a CHP-DH scheme into their wider energy and 
climate change strategies (interview – 31, 36, 39). 
These tensions between risk and the cost of financing schemes are closely related to the 
individual council‘s perspective on risk taking which in turn is influenced by the political make-
up of a council. In a number of the councils surveyed, the balance of power within the council 
chamber was cited as a key factor in providing both a political framework to make strategic and 
long terms decisions regarding infrastructure investments, and also in terms of allowing the 
council to raise finance and take risks. One interviewee indentifies this relationship between 
politics and risk as crucial to whether the schemes go ahead and the form they take: 
―Within the political bubble debt is bad! So councils need to go into debt to 
be entrepreneurial and they can do [so] at low interest rates for 50 years 
fixed; but electorally debt is bad. So they are between a rock and a hard 
place, they know that they have got to spend money, they have access to cheap 
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funds, but electorally it is dangerous to borrow money and go into debt‖ 
(interview - 31) 
It is often the case that councils which have had long term coalition arrangements can be more 
amenable to large scale infrastructure investments such as CHP-DH (interview – 26, 36). For 
example, in the case of Woking, one of the interviewees describes the crucial role that a 
supporting political environment played in allowing an ambitious infrastructure project to go 
ahead: 
―At least two thirds of the council has stayed on this agenda all of that time. 
And I think if you‘ve got a political environment that says we want something 
done, we accept that not everything would work, but we are willing to try 
them and accept that sometimes it doesn‘t work and we‘d learn from that and 
add to what we do next time. That‘s created a positive environment for the 
managerial and technical side to work within, and we still have a cross party 
climate change working group that steers the work that we do. I think the 
right political cross party framework is critical to success and when it‘s a 
party political issue of one wanting it and the other not or sniping, it won‘t 
work (…) Where there has been an alignment of will of the parties it tends to 
happen or when they‘re not aggressively party political it tends to happen‖ 
(interview - 26) 
As has been discussed, the role of a political champion is crucial in advocating a project at the 
political level because ‗if you have got a Councilor who is particularly understanding of these 
issues and particularly motivating, they will push the Council to overcome certain risks‘ 
(interview - 36). At the national level, the issue of long term certainty is also an important factor 
in the relationship between politics, risk and investment. As one interviewee from a 
decentralized energy company notes; ‗until there is that surety in place no one is going to invest, 
no one is going to put money up when they are not sure what the return is going to be. So 
without that surety, money does not get invested‘ (interview - 29). 
6.3.5 Interacting with the energy regime 
Unlike national energy infrastructures such as electricity or gas, heat networks operate in a 
largely unregulated environment as they are generally not regarded as natural monopolies (SDC, 
2007). As a result, throughout the history of CHP-DH in the UK, ‗electricity and heat 
production are almost entirely separate activities, physically and institutionally‘ (Russell, 1993: 
p.32). Also, as the institutions and technologies of energy provision have become increasingly 
embedded at the national level, CHP-DH has ‗found only a limited role‘ and ‗fallen in between 
the gaps separating the existing institutions‘ (Russell, 1993: p.34). However, as the CHP-DH 
systems reviewed as part of this study develop, they are beginning to encounter and engage with 
national level energy institutions which in many cases can act as a barrier to their expansion. 
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The following sub-section explores aspects of this interaction with the incumbent energy regime 
in more detail. Two issues are explored, the first is how CHP-DH schemes transact in the 
wholesale and retail electricity markets and the second is how small scale, local energy schemes 
are treated within the current licensing and regulatory regime. 
Electricity Markets 
The structure of the electricity supply industry has been introduced in chapter 4. BETTA, the 
current electricity trading arrangement, allows generators and suppliers to enter into a variety of 
contractual arrangement and prior to ‗gate closure‘ any further activity following this in advance 
of generation dispatch is mediated by the TSO, National Grid. Following the Balancing 
Mechanism period, up to half an hour before generators are dispatched during the imbalance 
settlement, generators face significant penalties if they fail to generate the same amount of 
power they had agreed to before this period - they must pay either the system buy price or the 
system sell price on the amount of power the fail to generate. There has been much comment on 
the fact that these risks of transacting in the national electricity markets will tend to be greater 
for small scale generators because they face higher transaction costs relative to large scale 
generators (Mitchell, 2008, Toke and Fragaki, 2008). This is because it is more costly to deal 
with the administrative and credit conditions involved in registering with the Balance and 
Settlement Code (BSC), and secondly they run the risk of being penalised under the BSC 
because the output of small scale generators is less predictable (due to intermittency e.g. wind 
generators, and the fact that output is also subject to on-site electricity demand and potential 
mismatches between electricity and local heat demand
116
). As a result, following the 
introduction of NETA, a review indicated that there was a 44% overall drop in the output of 
small scale generators and for the specific case of CHP, the review indicated a there was a 61% 
drop (Mitchell, 2008).  
This was particularly detrimental to district heating schemes as revenues from electrical output 
forms a key component of the economic rationale for CHP-DH because ‗the electricity output 
from CHP is more valuable than the heat output‘ (IET, 2007). As a result of NETA and 
BETTA, ‗exported electricity from a CHP plant has a lower value than the electricity generated 
and used on site‘ and this is ‗due to a number of factors including the buy/sell spread, the 
network costs to deliver the electricity to a customer, and market participation costs‘ (IET, 
2007) . Toke and Fragaki (2008) have noted that ‗a major factor in inhibiting the development 
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 This problem has been largely overcome in Denmark through the use of thermal stores (Toke and 
Fragaki, 2008) 
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of a Danish style CHP-DH system is the poor rates of electricity that CHP-DH schemes can 
earn for selling power to the grid‘. The IET report quoted above also argues that CHP suffers 
under these arrangements because its environmental benefits are not taken into account; there is 
a ‗mismatch between economic and environmental efficiency flows from a number of energy 
pricing issues‘ such as the fact that ‗the environmental costs of electricity and heat production - 
known as the cost externalities - are not yet fully incorporated in electricity prices‘ and ‗the 
added value of electricity generation close to consumers - known as embedded generation 
benefits - may only be partly recoverable by the CHP owner‘ (IET, 2007). Unlike approaches 
which have been taken in countries such as the Netherlands (Raven and Verbong, 2007) and 
Denmark (Toke and Fragaki, 2008), the market arrangements in the UK do not explicitly reward 
CHP for its environmental and system benefits
117
 as there has been a technology and fuel blind 
approach to energy policy in the UK which tends to favour incumbent technologies and actors 
(Mitchell, 2008). 
Due to the difficulties that CHP-DH schemes face in transacting in the conventional national 
electricity markets, there are currently a number of approaches being taken by the schemes 
surveyed: 
1. Sell the power locally to designated customers using the public distribution wires e.g. 
Leicester. Under this approach the operator bears the costs of using the distribution 
system (DUoS) and must engage with a licensed supplier who deals directly with the 
customers. In the case of Leicester: ‗The district heating mains take up all the available 
heat from the CHP units whilst the excess electricity is transmitted through the local 
distribution network to 17 nominated sites owned by the Council‘ (Ofgem, 2007). The 
council tenders to the market for supplier services called ‗netting-off‘ which means that 
all excess electricity from the CHP units is taken and this is then credited back to the 
council minus the DUoS charges. In the event that there is not enough electrical output 
to service the customers the supplier will top this up (Ofgem, 2007). 
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 In Denmark for example, the flexibility of CHP and its proximity to loads is seen as a benefit to the 
system as it can displace less environmentally efficient forms of generation and help the system operator 
to balance the grid due to the high penetration of wind, which is a variable output. CHP receives 
preferential prices, called a ‗triple tariff‘ where CHP operators receive higher prices during peak periods, 
this can amount to three times the off-peak prices. These market arrangements, the fact that many of the 
CHP operators utilise thermal stores which allows them to generate extra electricity during peak periods, 
and the presence of effective aggregators operating in the market have meant that CHP can compete with 
conventional generators and has contributed to the fact that up to half of all the electricity in Denmark is 
produced from CHP, much of which is connected to district heating schemes (Toke and Fragaki, 2008)  
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2. Employing a consolidator to act on behalf of the ESCO. For example Aberdeen. 
Aberdeen Heat and Power Co. do not directly supply their customer base with 
electricity but employ a consolidating service to carry out the administrative duties 
(Ofgem, 2007). This company will pool the output of a number of such generators 
which are treated as a negative demand and can be traded as an ancillary service, thus 
reducing the risks of transacting in the BSC (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). The ECSO 
receives a discounted price for its electrical output and is supplied electricity by the 
consolidator. 
3. Selling surplus electricity directly to an energy company who transact in BETTA e.g.  
Pimlico. In this case licensed suppliers bid for the exported electricity each year. Due to 
the costs of transacting in BETTA it is typically sold to one of the large energy 
companies. Because the electrical output is not used on-site the scheme must be 
synchronised with the grid and the operator of the scheme therefore needs permission 
from the DNO to switch on the units each morning (Ofgem, 2007). This is a 
disadvantageous arrangement for the scheme operator as they will pay a lot more for 
electricity at the retail price than what it is sold for. 
4. Sell the electricity directly to onsite customers using private wires which are owned by 
the scheme operator e.g. Woking. This is currently the only way that schemes can 
benefit fully from the retail price of their electricity whilst avoiding DUoS. In the case 
of Woking the ESCO utilises both its own private wires and the public distribution 
system to sell electricity to a number of its customers and to supply its own buildings. 
Each of the private wires has its own connection to the grid if back-up supply is 
required. However, investing in private wire imposes a significant additional upfront 
capital cost and there are also a number of legal issues surrounding private networks 
(these are discussed in more detail in the section below). 
The manner in which CHP-DH interacts with the electricity markets highlight the persistent 
barriers to the development of local energy schemes in the UK since nationalisation (Russell, 
1993) and which has continued under BETTA and liberalisation. The example of Denmark 
which was briefly discussed here shows how CHP-DH can be successfully integrated into a 
national energy system by rewarding its potential environmental and system benefits.    
Licensing Regimes 
As has been discussed, heat distribution systems, unlike gas and electricity networks, are 
currently unregulated by Ofgem and this is also the case for small scale supply companies who 
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generate and sell electricity to customers under a certain threshold. Under the current regulatory 
arrangements governed by Ofgem, medium and large scale generators and suppliers along with 
the network operators must hold a licence which sets out the legal obligations a company has to 
its customers. For example, in the case of network operators, companies must ensure that they 
supply electricity within certain statutory limits, and electricity supply companies must allow a 
customer to switch within a certain time period, depending on the contractual arrangement in 
place. 
Due to the fact that many decentralised energy schemes are too small to operate as licensed 
suppliers there are a number of exemptions to the licences which are set out in the 1989 
Electricity Act and the 2000 Utilities Act
118
. The 2001 class exemption order (HM Government, 
2001) sets out the qualifying criteria: The class exemption order grants ‗both individual and 
class exemptions from the requirement to hold a licence‘, in order ‗to save small-scale 
generators costs arising from compliance with the electricity licensing regime‘ (DTI, 2004). 
Generation, distribution and supply licences are included in this exemption: 
 The exemption applies to a generator which does not provide more than 10 MW of 
output at any one time and to generators which do not provide any more than 50MW 
where the net declared capacity is less than 100 MW.  
 An exemption applies to generators who supply a single customer or ‗customers up to a 
maximum of 5 MW of power - of which up to 2.5 MW may be to domestic customers‘ 
(DTI, 2004) – this translates to 1-2,000 domestic customers depending on their end-use 
efficiency (interview - 31). This has the effect of CHP-DH schemes having to build a 
number of energy centres which can be inefficient (LEP, 2007).  
 The exemption from holding a distribution licence applies to those who ‗do not 
distribute more than 2.5 MW of power to domestic customers‘ or for the case of local 
networks, those who ‗distribute electricity from generating plant… located on their 
network provided they distribute no more than 1 MW of power from any such station to 
domestic customers located on the same network‘ (DTI, 2004).  
There is also discretion for the Secretary of State to grant licence exemptions by application. 
These exemptions have direct relevance to CHP-DH schemes as the following quotes from a 
DTI explanatory note outlines, arguing that it will reduce the costs of transacting in the market 
for small generators: 
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The requirement to hold a generation licence restricts the level of flexibility in 
terms of how to operate under the new electricity trading arrangements. 
Licensees have to sign and be directly subject to the Balancing and Settlement 
Code (BSC).  Without the proposed measure, the ways in which such 
generators and suppliers could aggregate their output and so benefit from 
such aggregation would be limited.  In particular, it would prevent small 
generators from simply selling their output to local suppliers.  Exemption 
would minimise the commercial and trading arrangements into which they 
would have to enter directly.(DTI, 2004) 
And reduce the costs of linking small scale distribution systems with the national grid and 
allowing them to create private wire distribution systems: 
―The requirement to hold a distribution licence means, for example, that 
operators of networks based on industrial estates would have to establish a 
range of administrative services that are appropriate for the national 
networks, such as a meter point administration service; provide an 
infrastructure capable of supporting competition in electricity supply; and 
adhere to a range of accounting requirements from the regulatory regime.  
Alternatively the person would have to arrange for the network to be taken 
over by another licensee – if that were possible.‖ (DTI, 2004) 
However, a 2007 Ofgem consultation on these issues raised the fact that due to the expectation 
that decentralised energy (DE) schemes are likely to proliferate in the future; ‗the development 
of larger-scale district and city-wide DE projects that fall outside of the 2001 Class Exemption 
Order and will need to be licensed‘ (Ofgem, 2007). The consultation raised concerns regarding 
how customers can be protected under such schemes, i.e. the ability to switch between 
suppliers, and particularly those who are connected to private wire electricity systems. The aim 
of the consultation was to address the issue of protecting customers without putting further 
barriers in place for decentralised energy schemes. A key concern has been that under these 
exemptions a growing number of schemes have been either installing private wire systems or 
considering it and this has raised legal issues regarding access to private networks and customer 
protection.  
This issue was brought to the fore in the wake of a European court ruling known as the 
Citiworks case
119
 which involved a large German utility company who successfully sued a 
private wire operator in Leipzig Airport; it was argued that the supply monopoly breached EU 
competition law. Following this, as part of the EU‘s third energy package, Article 3(5) of the 
Internal Market in Electricity Directive stated that ‗Member States shall ensure that the eligible 
customer is in fact able to switch to a new supplier‘ (Ofgem, 2007). 
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This ambiguity has raised concerns amongst a number of the CHP-DH schemes regarding the 
legality of private wire networks (interviews – 25, 28, 30, 33, 34, 37, 38). For example, one 
interviewee makes the point that the uncertainty regarding private networks will result in 
schemes tending to feed-in to the grid directly and accept the inferior price for their electricity: 
―If we put the standalone unit [in] then there would have to be some serious 
thought given to how the connection would operate, it would probably just go 
straight to grid‖ (interview - 25) 
Another interviewee involved in a scheme which has already invested in a private wire system 
discusses the potential for assets to become stranded: 
―It‘s a disadvantage when you have to put millions of pounds in to do 
something and you‘re not totally clear whether that‘s ok or not‖ (interview - 
26) 
Whilst another commented on how this uncertainty is affecting the financial viability of future 
investments, in particular for large infrastructure investments as it is crucial to secure customers 
and bind them to long term contracts (interview - 34). An interviewee from a decentralized 
energy company argues that this can inhibit funding: 
―At the moment you have to open it up to competition and there is an issue 
that you can't 100% guarantee 100% of the revenue, regardless if it is the 
most complicated or not, and therefore the banks cannot fund against that 
revenue‖ (interview - 29) 
As a result, there is an emerging conflict between the regulatory imperative of enabling 
customer switching, which Ofgem sees as central to its primary duty to protect the interests of 
customers (Mitchell, 2008, SDC, 2007), and the requirement for long term contracts which are 
put in place to reduce the risk of large scale infrastructure investments . One interviewee from a 
council which is currently considering developing low carbon infrastructure projects notes that 
this conflict may mitigate against such investments: 
―Because you can't afford to plough out millions of pounds into pipes and 
boilers and whatever if (…) the potential customer is going to turn around 
and say; ‗actually we have changed our mind and we are going to buy it from 
someone else‘. So there are huge challenges there‖ (interview - 38) 
This issue has been most prominent in Woking, where private wire is most extensive amongst 
the schemes. In Woking the approach which has been taken is to adopt the licence terms which 
apply to regulated energy companies where possible e.g. customers connected to a private wire 
can switch on demand but the new suppler must pay Thamesway (the ESCO) ‗third party 
distribution and use of system‘ charges (interview - 31). For domestic customers they also 
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guarantee prices ‗5% below the duel fuel basket‘ and this is made possible by the fact that they 
are a vertically integrated entity, they therefore have a ‗retail margin that [they] can flex‘ (ibid). 
For commercial customers they ‗do market comparable pricing so if they have got a written 
offer of a price [Thamesway] will match it‘ (interview - 31).  
Liberalising access to private wire systems is also a potential concern for private network 
operators themselves as there is a possibility that the larger utilities will engage in predatory 
pricing in order to reduce the market share of the CHP-DH scheme – as one interviewee notes: 
―The big problem with the Citiworks case and what the government is 
currently wrestling with is that a massive utility provider could come in and 
say to my customers ‗I will give you free electricity if you sign up to me‘, and 
if they do, they can give them free electricity for two years and put me out of 
business and buy my assets for pound‖ (interview - 31) 
The interviewee goes on to refer to the outcome of the Ofgem regulatory consultation: 
―If Ofgem do not constrain the ability of the utilities to flex their prices below 
what I can meet then I have got problems because I can only take my retail 
margin down to a point and below that I lose money‖ (interview - 31) 
The 2007 Ofgem consultation did propose a number of options such as enabling DE schemes to 
trade in the wholesale markets, selling to third parties, ‗Operating as an Exempt Supplier on the 
Licensed Distribution Network‘, and ‗Becoming a Licensed Supplier‘. Following a further 
consultation in 2008 (Ofgem, 2008), a final proposal document was issued by Ofgem in 2009 
(Ofgem, 2009a).  Under the proposals Ofgem ‗will allow small suppliers to become licensed 
suppliers in a way that is proportionate to their size and impact, while protecting consumers‘ 
rights to switch energy supplier‘ (Ofgem, 2009a: p.1). They proposed one licence modification 
which would allow small scale suppliers who exceed the exemption limits to operate as licensed 
suppliers while providing  ‗an option for a derogation from the requirement to be a direct party 
to the industry codes in the electricity supply licence
120… as long as alternative arrangements 
are in place with a third party licensed supplier that is a signatory to the industry codes for the 
scheme to operate in the competitive market and allow consumers to switch energy supplier‘ 
(Ofgem, 2009a: p.1).  
This removes the obligation for potential licensees to engage in ‗wholesale market trading, real 
time system balancing, retail competition and consumer protections‘ (Ofgem, 2009a), these 
services are intended to be made available by the third party licensed supplier which in theory 
                                                     
120
 Standard electricity supply licence condition 11.2 – costs relating to the BSC and the Master 
Registration Agreement 
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would allow the small scale licensee holder to operate more effectively on the public network. 
While this solution does not alter the basic issues surrounding the functioning of BETTA, it 
does clear up some of the legal ambiguities which might develop if CHP-DH schemes grow and 
would allow them to at least get the retail price for their electricity whilst not having to invest in 
private wires. It also clears up much of the uncertainty surrounding private wire. However, as 
there is no obligation on the third party licensed supplier to provide the necessary services, it is 
unclear whether incumbent energy companies will be receptive to these arrangements.  
On the specific issue of access to private wires; under the DECC proposals legislation will be 
amended to oblige operators to allow access to private networks where an operator will be 
‗obliged, when asked, to provide third party energy suppliers with network access in order to 
supply energy customers, and Ofgem having powers to take enforcement action against those in 
breach of this obligation‘ (DECC, 2010b). Also, the operator must publish a set of tariffs for 
system use which must be approved by Ofgem (DECC, 2010b). Once put before parliament in 
2012 as part of the implementation program for the EU Third Energy Package, this will see a 
retention of the distribution licence exemption (DECC, 2010d). This solution is broadly in line 
with the Woking approach outlined above where the scheme has use of system charges in place, 
and as long as it does not exceed 1MW, can distribute power to customers if they are not 
prohibited from switching between suppliers.  
6.3.6 Conclusion to Interventions and Interactions Section 
This section outlined how CHP-DH schemes hare being shaped at the local level due to various 
interventions and interactions which are taking place between a wide array of actors within the 
organisational field. It has been observed that local energy schemes are shaped by a number of 
issues such as local authority responses to issues and priorities within their own localities, e.g. 
addressing fuel poverty, but also by responses to external drivers such as the long term security 
and resilience of the UK energy system. Due to the fragmented nature of the sector and the lack 
of a coherent policy landscape for heat networks in the UK, the schemes are taking quite 
different approaches to how they structure their systems and finance investments. As the 
systems develop and expectations surrounding the proliferation of small scale energy systems 
grow, the sector, which had previously operated in a largely unregulated space, has begun to 
confront and in some cases alter the regime structure, particularly in relation to the licensing 
regime for electricity suppliers. The following section will synthesise the outcomes of the 
interventions and interactions described above. 
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6.4 Outcomes 
The following section explores the outcomes of the interventions and interactions which have 
taken place regarding local authority involvement in CHP-DH across the UK. This utilises the 
dimensions of infrastructures approach which was introduced in chapter 3 where the physical, 
relational and structural analytical categories characterise the interplay between actors, 
institutions and technologies in energy distribution sectors as a the outcome of a governance 
process. It was argued that institutions can be considered as embedded in each of the 
infrastructure dimensions and analysed in a systematic fashion where actors within the 
organisational field simultaneously seek to strive for notions of technical efficiency and 
legitimacy for their actions. 
6.4.1 Physical Dimension 
In the physical dimension, institutions coordinate physical flows within a network which can be 
measured, monitored and controlled. Key analytical variables which were outlined in chapter 3 
include the changing relationships between nodes, links and flows, how system economies are 
being achieved, and how system reliability and integrity is maintained. For the case of CHP-DH 
the following table synthesises the main outcomes in this respect:  
Table 6.7: Characterising the changing flows within CHP-DH systems 
Flows Heat Distribution 
Material (Energy) 
 Heat is distributed within a locality from a central node which is typically 
connected to the gas distribution network 
 Different types of interplay between electricity and heating systems 
depending on the organisation of the scheme and the approach to electricity 
sales 
 Some schemes are developing an interplay with other material flows within 
the locality such as different sources of renewable energy e.g. waste and 
biomass 
 The reduction of carbon emissions was a key motivating factor behind the 
design of the schemes 
Information 
 Lack of information on the density, diversity of heat loads within localities  
 Heat demand mapping techniques increasingly being deployed by leading 
councils to improve information e.g. identify anchor loads 
 Little information on heating usage patterns on a real-time basis 
Revenues 
 Longer term ESCO contracts needed to reduce investment risks. 
 Revenues not regulated as in traditional/incumbent sectors 
 Capital costs are front loaded but securing upfront financing is a major 
barrier to developing schemes 
 Different approaches to the retention of profits. Some schemes have 
revolving investment funds while others have private sector involvement 
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As a consequence of the development of local energy systems, a more complex set of flows and 
interplay between a number of different types of infrastructures are taking place. In a 
conventional heating regime, gas is transported from the national transmission grid via a local 
distribution network to individual domestic boilers. However, a different picture emerges with 
CHP-DH schemes where an energy centre, i.e. a CHP plant, operates as a central node within a 
locality which mediates between internal and external flows. In some cases flows of energy 
within localities are becoming more bounded and less reliant on external national and regional 
energy networks; investment in private wire networks and the use of locally sourced biomass 
and EfW as energy sources are examples of this. There is also a more transactive relationship 
emerging between localities and external flows, in particular following the introduction of feed-
in tariffs for micro-generation and the potential for CHP-DH operators to develop virtual trading 
arrangements for biomethane which is fed into the gas networks.  
In terms of achieving system economies, the key advantage that CHP-DH systems have is the 
ability to achieve economies of scope by bundling together a number of energy services 
including heating, cooling and electricity provision. Also, local systems can benefit by 
developing an interplay between a number of different infrastructures which can be integrated at 
particular nodes e.g. using waste or biomass from a local supply chain as fuel in a CHP plant. 
However, the discussion above regarding the structure of electricity trading arrangements in the 
UK suggests that there are significant institutional barriers to achieving economies of scope. In 
some cases these barriers have incentivised operators to invest in private wire networks.  
As a system expands, economies of scale can be achieved in heat provision by balancing and 
sequencing a diverse set of loads, thus achieving more efficient fuel utilisation than would be 
the case with individual boilers which often operate at part load (Roberts, 2008). In order to 
improve capacity management and achieve these economies of system, schemes need to connect 
to a diverse set of customers and particular types of loads which can help to smooth out the 
peaks in demand, thus allowing the operator to size the system more efficiently. Examples 
include theatres and other entertainment venues with evening and night time demands, along 
with swimming pools and ice rinks which will have a consistent demand throughout the winter 
and summer months and which will reduce the requirement for investment in expensive back-up 
boilers.  
Proximity to loads and knowledge of the locality are key competitive advantages which the 
operators of local schemes can develop, however, there is often a lack of long term strategic 
thinking taking place prior to large scale investments as schemes often develop on an ad-hoc 
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basis.  A more strategic approach, e.g. through using heat mapping and zoning of the city, 
would enable the most suitable types of loads to be identified and flows of heat to be directed 
towards sites of demand in the expectation that revenues can be maximised and more informed 
investment decisions regarding how best to decarbonise energy use within a locality can be 
made. This can be through the expansion of a CHP-DH network or other energy efficiency 
measures e.g. loft insulation (interview - 36). This more strategic approach to local energy 
planning, which is currently being carried out by a small number of councils, e.g. Woking who 
have embedded CHP-DH within their long term climate change and sustainability strategies, is 
illustrated in the diagram below.  
Figure 6.9: An emerging strategic approach to CHP-DH within cities 
 
As one interviewee notes, the fact that local energy systems are fully integrated across the value 
chain from generation through to end use, allows the focal organisation to impose a long term 
carbon constraint across a locality; ‗interlinking all of these buildings it gives you the 
opportunity to draw in whatever energy you want because you have already got the 
infrastructure in place and the network in place and whatever happens in the future you can put 
it in‘ (interview - 30), making the system future-proof. 
6.4.2 Relational Dimension 
The relational dimension address the issue of ‗independent but autonomous organisations, each 
controlling important resources‘ and the role of institutions is ‗to coordinate their actions to 
produce a joint outcome which is deemed mutually beneficial‘ (Jessop, 1995). From the 
preceding discussion it is evident that despite the development and expansion of a small number 
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of successful schemes, the broader institutional framework for the development of CHP-DH in 
the UK is currently underdeveloped.  
Developing Local Energy Institutions 
At the local level it was described how distinct ‗multi-organisations‘ are being created in order 
to coordinate a range of actors with the aim of delivering energy services at the local level. 
These institutions can vary in terms of the technologies deployed, the types of interactions 
taking place between both public and private actors, and different approaches to the financing of 
schemes. Within these local institutional arrangements, local authorities, as focal actors who 
typically coordinate a network of actors, take on a number of roles from directing investment 
strategies to promoting a scheme within a particular locality.  Increasingly LAs are seeking to 
utilise CHP-DH infrastructures in order to meet their long term strategic economic and 
environmental aims and are increasingly engaging with a wider array of parties in order to 
achieve this.  
In the case of CHP-DH, what has been observed is that following the liberalisation of the energy 
sector in the UK, councils were initially motivated by efforts to achieve energy efficiency 
within their own council buildings. However, in the context of concerns over climate change, 
rising energy prices, and resource security, councils have begun to expand the scope of their 
energy management programs to more explicitly consider social housing units and the wider 
locality involving a more diverse set of customer and building types. As systems begin to 
expand and expectations behind decentralised energy grow, local authorities are taking a more 
long term perspective where CHP-DH becoming a key component in cities‘ climate change and 
energy strategies (interviews – 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41). As a result, 
with the development of ESCOs, there is a trend towards some local authorities becoming a 
‗strategic deliverer‘ (interview - 38) of energy services rather than a direct service provider, 
similar to a traditional utility. This reflects Wilson and Game‘s (1998) observation that there has 
been an ongoing trend towards local governance i.e. away from a more hierarchical, direct 
service provision model. As a result councils ‗find themselves increasingly working alongside a 
range of other service-providing agencies in their localities‘ (Wilson and Game, 1998: p.82).  
This change ‗from provider to commissioner‘ (Wilson and Game, 1998: p.83) is manifested in a 
number of areas across the different cases surveyed: 
 Reducing investment and fuel price risk by tendering contracts to private sector parties 
who act as statutory utilities within a locality. 
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 Attracting and working with developers in order to meet building standards and 
requirements for ‗allowable solutions‘. Allows them to implement planning policies 
which are increasingly required to take into account energy and carbon. 
 Attracting private sector/commercial customers who are seeking to increase their energy 
efficiency by incentives such as the CRC. 
Using these relationships, LAs are seeking to act to purposively shape local energy institutions 
by coordinating an increasingly diverse network of actors, rather than merely act as sites where 
private actors can shape the energy transition within a locality. They coordinate these local 
institutional arrangements by using their (formal) role as a local service provider and enforcer of 
statutory legal obligations (e.g. street-work licences), by exploiting their own position as a large 
energy customer, using local knowledge to identify suitable loads, using public procurement 
mechanisms to develop a public sector customer base (interview - 30) along with using their 
ability to leverage investment funds such as publically funded capital grants. These local 
institutional arrangements rely on the local authority as an anchor tenant both in terms of 
creating demand for CHP-DH output but also in coordinating a network of actors and providing 
legitimacy for the development and expansion of schemes. 
Developing Sector Level Institutions 
The CHP-DH sector in the UK can be characterised as a patchwork of localised spaces of 
agency which, through a process of structuration, are beginning to form a more coherent 
organisational field at the national level. This fragmented sector structure can be attributed to 
the fact that heat networks are by their nature organised on a local basis, but also due to a lack 
of national level coordinating institutions e.g. little regulation of small scale energy systems and 
a fragmented policy environment with the EST, Carbon Trust, Ofgem, DECC and DCLC all 
governing aspects of the CHP-DH regime. As a result, the interactions and knowledge sharing 
activities taking place within the organisational field tend to be informal professional links 
between individuals – often the technical or political champions of a scheme. In many cases, 
this lack of sector level institutions has been a barrier to the development of CHP-DH as local 
authorities often lack the necessary in-house capabilities (technical, institutional/legal and 
organisational/financial expertise) and are therefore reliant on expensive consultancy firms to 
provide such services (interview – 27, 36).  
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Although a number of organisations - the CHPA
121
, LGA
122
, the Decentralised Energy 
Knowledge Base (DEKB)
123
, the Core Cities Group (interview - 37), and DECC‘s Community 
Energy Online website
124
 - are beginning to create more formalised sector structures and 
provide forums for interactions and knowledge sharing to take place, this is in its infancy. The 
following quote from a local authority employee outlines the need for more formalised sector 
structures and the rationale for setting up the DEKB, which is an association of a number of the 
larger city-wide district heating schemes in the UK: 
―We felt that we didn't really have a voice collectively, a political voice. 
You've got the CHPA but there is a sort of feeling, and no disrespect to them, 
they were sort of the widget makers if you like, they were the people who 
made micro-CHP and stuff like that, but we weren't really voicing the district 
energy market (...) So we have sort of come together collectively to establish 
an association that will give us a lobbying voice in government to DECC. So 
we can say this is Nottingham, [this is] Southampton and this is Birmingham 
[this] is Sheffield [and] Aberdeen, we have been talking collectively and this 
is what we say government should be doing‖ (interview - 30) 
The structuration of the CHP-DH organisational field, as represented in the schematic below, is 
also being enabled by the expansion of Cofely DE (Southampton, Manchester, Leicester, 
Birmingham, London) and Thamesway Energy (Woking, Milton Keynes) who have begun to 
develop and operate schemes in a number of localities by replicating a successful business 
model. 
Figure 6.10: The Emerging CHP-DH sector 
 
Source:  Adapted from (Coenen et al., 2010) 
                                                     
121
 Combined Heat and Power Association: http://www.chpa.co.uk/ 
122
 Local Government Association: http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=1 
123
 http://www.dekb.co.uk/ 
124
 http://ceo.decc.gov.uk/ 
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National-Local Interactions 
As the diagram below illustrates; local energy schemes are part of a triumvirate of regimes 
including national level policy frameworks which influence planning and energy policies and 
the existing energy regime including regulations and market structures, which are instituted at 
the national level.  
Figure 6.11: National-Local Regime Interactions 
 
It has been observed that increasingly a number of local authorities are seeing CHP-DH as a 
technology which can align their long term strategies and interests with national level policy 
drivers in relation to the promotion of local governance, achieving emissions reductions targets 
and complying with new planning guidelines. However, as has been discussed in the 
interventions and interactions section, significant barriers to the development and success of 
CHP-DH emerge as they encounter incumbent energy regimes such as regulations and markets, 
which are institutionalised at the national level. Therefore, although government policies may 
seem to favour the development of CHP-DH, the reason why this is failing to stimulate a greater 
degree of investment in heating infrastructure is because energy policies and regulations 
continually reinforce the incumbent, largely centralised energy regime rather than promote 
alternative solutions such as local energy infrastructures (Mitchell, 2008). 
For example; the focus on achieving the decarbonisation through supply side measures e.g. the 
all-electric future, the use of macro-economic modelling techniques which do not take into 
account local circumstances and opportunities (Speirs et al., 2010), and incentives for energy 
efficiency which are based on a market failure arguments and which treat customers on an 
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individual basis, thus neglecting the potential economies of scale and scope which can be 
achieved through CHP-DH. This reinforces the argument that policies designed to support 
energy efficiency and heat tend to funnelled through this energy policy paradigm (Mitchell, 
2008). For example, although the RHI may incentivise fuel switching in a small number of 
existing schemes, it will not provide the ‗uplift to pay for the pipe network‘ (interview - 39) 
which is necessary to develop heating infrastructure more widely across the country. The 
following quote from a district heating developer summarises these concerns regarding the 
introduction of the RHI: 
―The government has proposed the RHI (…) that would be fine if there was 
already a highly developed distributed heat network capability within the UK, 
but there isn't. Going from no heat incentive to a renewable heat incentive is 
absolute nonsense because this technology is starting to get developed around 
the place but it is a sustainable technology. If they went to an RHI 
immediately I would get levied on the gas that I have used, which is complete 
nonsense. So what they should do is go to a HI [heat incentive] to start with, 
then go to an SHI [sustainable heat incentive] after about five years, I'd go to 
a renewable after about maybe 10 years (…) At the moment is there is a 
disincentive [for] me to invested heat network because I am going to get 
clobbered by the RHI, it is absolutely crazy‖ (interview - 31) 
It will be proposed in the final chapter that more specific policies which support the 
development of local energy infrastructures and CHP-DH sector level institutions are required.  
6.4.3 Structural Dimension 
Network logics represent the underlying rationality behind the system which shape field level 
interactions and act as a source of legitimacy for action. Two ‗ideal type‘ network logics were 
identified; the competitive model – where competition and prices promote efficient system 
planning and operation and the primary goal is to deal with the market externalities - and the 
public services model - where utility services are seen as a social good and risks are socialised. 
Similar to the electricity distribution case study, each of these network logics have influenced 
the various interventions and interactions which were described in the previous sections.  
At the local level, the rationale behind the development of CHP-DH largely draw from a public 
services model as local authorities seek to address issues such as fuel poverty and the provision 
of public goods such as sustainability and energy security within their localities. The ‗well-
being‘ role and the introduction of prudential borrowing following the 2003 Local Government 
Act has given some scope to LAs to invest in local energy infrastructure. Although the means 
by which they go about achieving these goals are different and context dependent, in each of the 
schemes councils are drawing legitimacy from the view of energy services as a public utility 
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and the need for local authorities to take on a greater degree of responsibility for dealing with 
climate change and sustainability issues within their localities. Also, in a number of the cases, 
interviews cited concerns of over the long term sustainability of the liberalised energy regime in 
the UK as a motivation for developing low carbon infrastructure (interview – 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 37, 38). 
However, as has been discussed above, as decentralised energy increasingly comes under the 
radar of mainstream energy policy and regulation, a number of conflicts have emerged between 
the competing network logics. For example, the technology and fuel blind approach to the 
design of electricity markets at the national level means that small scale decentralised 
technologies face high transaction costs and their environmental  and system benefits largely go 
unrecognised (Mitchell, 2008). Also, as CHP-DH increasingly comes under the regulatory 
spotlight there is a mismatch evident between the regulator‘s agenda of promoting short term 
retail contracts and customer switching, and the necessity of long term contractual arrangements 
for investment to take place in low carbon infrastructure.   
6.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This case study discussed the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in the 
emerging CHP-DH sector in the UK. The nationalisation of the energy sectors in the UK after 
WWII saw the end of direct provision of energy services by local authorities, and although 
liberalisation encouraged local authorities to develop more sophisticated energy management 
plans for their own estates, councils have largely taken a minor role within the mainstream 
energy regime. This chapter has shown how in more recent years a relatively small number of 
local authorities have begun to engage more directly in energy services provision, in particular 
by (re)investing in local district heating infrastructure. This has been occurring in the wider 
context of a national policy regime which is seeking to promote low carbon energy supply, 
sustainable development in the built environment, and efficient end use of electricity within 
businesses and domestic dwellings. Also, recent legislation regarding the relationship between 
national and local government has granted a degree of autonomy to local authorities to address 
‗well-being‘ and sustainability issues within their localities.  
Individual local authorities have begun to articulate these national level policy drivers in the 
context of their own localities with responses being shaped by their own resources, capabilities 
and longer term energy and climate change strategies. In the cases surveyed, CHP-DH has 
become a key response which can negotiate between local and national policy drivers and is an 
increasingly important tool to achieve longer term strategic aims such as addressing fuel 
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poverty, promoting sustainable development and ensuring long term energy security within the 
locality. Due to the fragmented and unstructured nature of the emerging CHP-DH sector in the 
UK, schemes differ greatly in how they are organised and financed and the nature of the 
interplay between public and private actors. The more advanced schemes are taking a strategic 
approach where CHP-DH is but one element of a long term energy and climate change strategy 
within the locality. The nature of the interaction between these dispersed niches and the energy 
regime has been a significant factor in their social shaping.  
However, similar to the electricity distribution case study, conflicts and mismatches are 
observable between the governance regime and efforts to develop a more substantial CHP-DH 
sector in the UK. Regime structures such as the electricity markets and energy regulations tend 
to be instituted at the national level which means that there are higher transaction costs for small 
scale CHP plants relative to large scale centralised technologies, while at the same time energy 
policy and regulation tend not to provide an overarching supportive framework for investment 
in local energy infrastructures. Specific issues include the difficulties in transacting in the 
national level electricity markets, uncertainty surrounding the regulation of decentralised energy 
schemes and private networks, the lack of financial support for district heating, and poor 
coordination and coherence in the wider governance regime which is spread across a number of 
policy areas and government departments. Unlike electricity distribution however, these 
tensions and have not emerged in recent years but have been a feature of the sector throughout 
the nationalised and privatised periods (Russell, 1994, Russell, 1986). 
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7 An analysis of the interplay between actors, institutions 
and technologies in infrastructure sectors 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to look across the two case studies to seek out generalizable 
theoretical insights about the process of change in energy distribution networks. Although the 
cases differ in a number of important respects (types of technologies, institutional composition 
of the sectors), it is proposed that a comparative analysis which is sensitive to these differences 
can help to develop more generalizable knowledge regarding the contemporary dynamics of 
distribution networks. As was discussed in chapter three, a case study method allows for the 
identification of causal mechanisms or ‗recurrent processes generating a specific kind of 
outcome‘ (Mayntz, 2004: p.237) which influence the dynamics between actors, institutions and 
technologies. The aim of this chapter is to identify and elucidate the most significant causal 
mechanisms which illuminate various aspects of this dynamic in each of the cases with a view 
to informing the existing literature and developing novel theoretical insights. The first part of 
the chapter discusses the outcomes of the empirical section through the lens of the existing 
literatures on infrastructure dynamics which were introduced in chapter two.  Following this, a 
number of additional causal mechanisms are discussed which were identified using the 
analytical framework outlined in chapter three.  
7.2 A Discussion of Causal Mechanisms from the Literature 
Chapter two introduced the existing literature which broadly addresses the main research 
question regarding the changing relationships between actors, institutions and technologies in 
contemporary energy infrastructures. Two strands of theory were discussed; institutional and 
evolutionary approaches which highlight the importance of institutions - both as mechanisms of 
coordination and as sources of inertia in technical systems – and perspectives from the science 
and technology studies literature which, to different degrees, stress the role of actors and the 
interplay between agents and structures in processes of technical change. Table 2.2 summarised 
these different approaches by identifying the key causal mechanisms which describe various 
aspects of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in these sectors. Using this 
as a platform, the following section explores some of the main concepts in these literatures and 
discusses how each illuminates processes of change in the case studies.  
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7.2.1 Vertical dynamics 
As discussed in chapter 2, analysing vertical dynamics between different parties along an 
infrastructure value chain has been a key theme in the different literatures. In particular, the NIE 
approach proposes that vertical dynamics along a value chain can be analysed in terms of the 
relative costs of organising transactions through markets or hierarchies (Williamson, 1985). 
This has been criticised by economic sociologists amongst others on the grounds that it neglects 
the fact that agents are socially embedded (Nee, 2003, Granovetter, 1985). Also, new-
institutional sociologists propose that such notions of economic efficiency or rationality are in 
fact socially constructed and context dependent (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). By applying the 
analytical framework described in chapter 3 to the case studies, it was found that although there 
were instances where vertical dynamics seem to be in the interests of achieving system 
economies, they more often than not were shaped by broader political and societal influences 
rather than purely techno-economic notions of rationality or efficiency.  
It was observed by a number of interviewees that in the case of electricity distribution networks, 
the unbundled structure of the sector has in some instances acted as a barrier to the utilisation of 
information regarding demand side behaviour and the ‗efficient‘ control of flows within the 
network (interview – 5, 12, 16, 20). Smart grid and ANM concepts and visions have re-opened 
debates regarding the most ‗efficient‘ form of sector organisation and the potential trade-offs 
between short term asset sweating, achieved through specialisation (unbundling) and market 
based incentives, and notions of overall system efficiency which are achieved through 
integration and closer coordination. More complex flows of energy (for example due to the 
connection of DG) and revenues along with the growing importance of information flows are 
undermining traditional sector boundaries. However, rather than seeing a smooth and 
predictable governance transformation involving a new set of vertical relationships, institutional 
change is more complex and influenced by the interpretations, motivations and strategies of a 
range of actors at the organisational field level. Debates surrounding the smart metering roll out 
and their functionality illustrate how notions of efficiency can be defined and interpreted by 
electricity retailers and distribution companies in entirely different ways.  According to many of 
the distribution companies interviewed, a regulated roll out process which would involve a 
hierarchical institutional arrangement with a distribution led process designed to achieve 
economies of system is a technically ‗rational‘ way to proceed. On the other hand, the retail led 
approach views rationality in terms of enabling ‗efficient‘ customer behaviour by facilitating 
switching between suppliers. What emerged was a hybrid solution involving some levels of 
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hierarchical coordination but the approach is underpinned by the prevalent network logic of 
competition, switching and unbundling.   
For the case of CHP-DH, there tended to be less debate surrounding the vertical dynamics 
taking place as the schemes operated in an integrated fashion with no separation of retail, 
distribution, and generation. This is because the heat sector is a largely unregulated space 
therefore there is no licensing regime which would compel the unbundling of different system 
functions. This points to the view that, rather than being a process where actors choose the most 
efficient governance arrangements, unbundling is largely a political choice based on ones notion 
or framing of a networks logic (Graham and Marvin, 2001). By considering the influence of 
broader network logics one can see how framings of efficiency and how to govern vertical 
relationships within an infrastructure sector draw from competing values and ideas of what a 
network should be whilst involving a process of political negotiation as these compete - rather 
than solely concerns over efficiency and transaction costs.  
7.2.2 Innovation 
The evolutionary based literature emphasises the importance of innovation in processes of 
economic change. This is theorised at the sector level – where industries are characterised by 
different types of innovation processes –and at the firm level – where organisations possess 
unique capabilities and are constituted by sets of organisational routines which are difficult to 
change. For each of the cases, these issues relating to innovation at both the firm and sector 
level have been an important explanatory factor in processes of technical and institutional 
change. 
Prior to the period of this study the electricity distribution sector could have been categorised as 
a typical Schumpeter Mark I type sector with ‗large established firms and the presence of 
relevant barriers to entry‘ (Malerba, 2002). During the period of study a number of 
developments have altered this to some degree. For example, politically motivated efforts to 
promote DG challenged existing sector boundaries and prompted a series of institutional 
realignments designed to adapt existing sector or regime structures (Smith et al., 2005) e.g. 
changing the charging regime for the use of distribution networks by DG operators. Also, 
uncertainty surrounding how to utilise demand side information from smart metering 
technology have challenged to some extent the structure of the sector which emerged following 
the processes of liberalisation and privatization during the 1980s and 1990s. These examples 
show how the diffusion of potentially disruptive technologies such as these need to be 
considered in a dynamic or co-evolutionary way where sector structures adapt to a changing 
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selection environment whilst also seeking to shape new technologies. Within highly 
institutionalised organisational fields such as distribution sectors, potentially disruptive 
technologies which alter value networks (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995) can be in a sense 
pacified (perhaps to a greater degree than conventional, non-regulated industries) as sector 
structures and institutions, rather than firms, adapt and incorporate them. At a firm level, 
although firms do not possess dynamic capabilities due to the mutual interdependence between 
the regulator and the companies and the resulting incremental nature of regulatory change, their 
routines tend to be shielded from external shocks and harsher selection environments. Also, the 
asset specific nature of the transactions taking place grants a degree of power to network 
operators which otherwise would not be the case.  
The failure of the RPZ scheme can be partially attributed to the fact that the incentive was 
aimed at the firm level, rather than at the sector level where, as discussed above, many of the 
barriers to innovation persist. The innovation systems literature emphasises innovation as an 
interactive and complex process involving a range of public and private actors, and stresses the 
importance of collaboration and learning processes. Although the LCNF program does address 
some of the deficiencies of RPZ, in particular by de-risking innovation and actively promoting 
collaboration, it is questionable whether it alone can be adequate to address the systemic 
barriers which are deeply entrenched in field level interventions and interactions. The regulator 
must show a long term commitment to promoting technological innovation through incentive 
schemes which can develop capabilities at the firm level, whilst also incorporating innovation 
into the wider selection environment for innovation, rather than simply as a means to achieve 
CAPEX efficiencies. This may change the short-term efficiency and price focused field level 
rationality which pervades. 
The analysis of CHP-DH schemes showed that, as one might expect, a less institutionalised 
organisational-field is more receptive to new innovations and practices. In the electricity case, 
although the RPZ and LNCF schemes have begun to bring about some differentiation amongst 
the different firms, it is difficult to distinguish between firm strategies and capabilities in this 
regard. Because CHP-DH systems are not interconnected and operate in a less structured 
selection environment, each of the schemes is unique in the technologies and practices being 
adopted and manner in which a scheme is organised. A potential explanation for this difference 
in the nature of the sector innovation system is that when designing and developing schemes, 
local authorities are more concerned with context specific local priorities and issues, and 
because they operate in an emerging field, their resources and capabilities are more 
differentiated. For example, the scheme in Woking has developed in isolation from the wider 
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national level energy sphere but within its own context the scheme can be categorised as an 
architectural innovation; private wire in this respect is a disruptive innovation. Therefore, as will 
be discussed in a later section, the notion of a selection environment should be considered in a 
more multi-dimensional or multi-scalar way than has previously been the case and a lack of 
coherence between selection environments, e.g. at the local and national scale, can be a 
significant barrier to the diffusion of innovations in certain circumstances.  
7.2.3 Path Dependency and Lock-in 
Path dependency refers to a view of institutional and technical change where previous events 
within a system influence contemporary decisions and can result in a lock-in which results in 
potentially sub-optimal outcomes and development trajectories. Paul David (David, 1985) has 
argued that actors cannot simply switch between alternatives in order to achieve an efficient 
outcome and, developing these insights, Gregory Unruh proposes that large scale technical 
systems such as energy infrastructures are prone to inertia as technical and institutional systems 
coevolve due to increasing returns to produce lock-in (Unruh, 2000).  
 
For the case of CHP-DH, processes of path dependency must be viewed as a process of ‗lock-
out‘ rather than ‗lock-in‘ to a certain trajectory. Russell‘s study of CHP-DH in the pre-
privatisation period highlights two key reasons for this; 1) the failure to interact with the 
electricity markets in an effective way because ‗producer industries have generally sought to 
consolidate and maintain the structure of the sector in vertically integrated chains‘ (Russell, 
1993: p. 48) and 2) the fragmented nature of the CHP-DH sector and its failure to pursue its 
interests and become institutionalised at the national level. It is interesting to observe that these 
issues which have been present since the nationalised period have been largely unresolved for 
the CHP-DH sector, therefore implying that decisions made in the nationalised and pre-
nationalised periods are shaping the trajectory of the sector in the UK today. This is highlighted 
by the difficulties that different schemes have encountered transacting in the wholesale 
electricity market and the fact that policies which seek to promote a low carbon energy system 
often neglect or under-explore the potential role that CHP-DH can play (Speirs et al., 2010). The 
development of private wire can perhaps be seen as a strategy to break-out of this path by 
disengaging from the national level energy policy regime and promoting local autonomy.  
 
Unsurprisingly the electricity distribution case shows signs of significant lock-in and path 
dependent institutional and technical change. Dominant modes of governing (‗sweat the assets‘, 
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‗open access‘, ‗protect the customer‘) which emerged from the liberalisation and privatisation 
processes have been a significant factor in shaping responses to demands for the networks to 
facilitate DG and more flexible demand side behaviour. Also, it is questionable whether the 
current unbundled and fragmented structure of the sector which was designed to exploit the 
large capacity margins which were built during nationalisation, is necessarily the ‗optimal‘ 
configuration for the transition to a low carbon electricity system where distribution networks 
will need to play a more active role in system operation. This perhaps illustrates a form of 
political (Pierson, 2000) or regulatory path dependency where the pace of change is incremental 
and paradigmatically structured rather than adaptive and responsive to contemporary needs 
(Mitchell and Woodman, 2010, Mitchell, 2008).  
7.2.4 Processes of Social Construction  
Constructivist approaches emphasise the contested nature of technical change and view 
innovation as a process involving interpretive flexibility and conflicts between different actors 
and groups of actors (Edge and Williams, 1996). Although actor based approaches such as 
SCOT and ANT have been criticised for having a shallow ontology which underplays the 
influence of structures and institutions in long term change (Geels, 2007, Russell, 1993), 
constructivist approaches provide a useful toolbox of theories and concepts which can be 
utilised to analyse the relationship between technologies and actors. 
One such concept which describes the electricity distribution case is that of closure. In their 
famous bicycle example, Pinch and Bijker (1987) outline how, following a process of 
negotiation between different social groups, closure was reached as actors converged on a 
shared interpretation or meaning of a particular technological configuration. A similar process 
has taken place in the evolution of the ESI throughout the 20
th
 century where a centralised 
system based on AC technology emerged as the dominant design following competition 
between a number of alternatives (David and Bunn, 1988). However, it has also been noted in 
the literature that closure is not permanent as conflicts and interpretive flexibility can re-
remerge (Murphy, 2006b). The analysis of contemporary dynamics in the UK electricity 
distribution sector suggests that this undoing of closure is occurring to some extent where the 
stable system configuration of passive distribution networks which emerged following 
nationalisation is being undermined by a range of technical and institutional changes relating to 
the connection of DG and integrating with the demand side. This is opening up the system to 
interpretive flexibility as different groups of actors e.g. DNOs, the regulator, suppliers etc., seek 
to understand the implications for their particular interests. In this respect visions and scenarios 
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of the future play an important role in this negotiation process and often represent the interests 
and values of the actors who forward them (Berkhout, 2006). The different visions of a smart 
grid future which have emerged illustrate how actors are seeking to make sense of the future; for 
example many of them propose to situate a low carbon energy system within a liberalised 
context.   
The CHP-DH case illustrates examples of conflicts and processes of interpretive flexibility 
which are taking place as less established technologies and approaches emerge and seek to gain 
legitimacy. The example of private wire clearly illustrates how different groups of actors view a 
particular technology in different ways. This is illustrated in the following quotes – the first is 
from a consultant who works in the electricity distribution sector and throughout the interview 
tended to be a strong advocate of liberalisation and market based incentives. The second is from 
a local authority official who has been closely involved for many years in developing one of the 
largest CHP-DH schemes in the UK: 
―I would feel unhappy if genuine private wire systems emerge, that‘s a sign of some 
inefficiency somewhere (…) or uneconomic pricing of the public wires‖ (interview – 19) 
―Putting in a private wire (…) makes a lot of sense. The council gets lower electricity 
costs, a guaranteed lower electricity cost than we are getting (…), and [we] make more 
profit off the sale of that electricity because they have no use of system charges‖ 
(interview - 34) 
As the quotes suggest, the issue of private wire is contested with some seeing it as a threat to the 
established order or a sign of inefficiency, whilst others, who frame the issue within their local 
context, see it as a rational and economic investment which can make a particular CHP-DH 
scheme more economic as the revenue from electricity sales can be increased. 
7.2.5 System Evolution 
Systems approaches stress the interconnectedness of the social and technical components of 
large scale infrastructures. The approach developed by Thomas Hughes in his analysis of early 
electricity networks highlighted how the technical systems interacted with their external 
environment and over time developed momentum as dominant technologies and practices 
became institutionalised (Hughes, 1983). Hughes outlines a number of concepts and analytical 
tools for the analysis of the socio-technical dynamics of infrastructures such as a reverse salient 
– a breakdown in system momentum due to a critical problem – technical styles – the context 
dependent diffusion of technology - and system builder – influential actors who shape systems 
in their early stages, similar to engineer sociologists in ANT.  
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The electricity distribution case in particular highlights the relevance of the reverse salient and 
technological momentum concepts. Throughout the periods of nationalisation and privatisation 
the ESI in the UK has displayed significant technological momentum with the persistence of a 
supply side dominated system and passive distribution networks. However, developments in DG 
and DSM provide examples of technologies which have challenged this momentum and have 
created critical technical problems on an area of the system which was not designed to be 
managed in an active manner – the distribution networks. These examples show how 
developments in the generation and demand side are creating bottlenecks in the networks areas 
of the system and this has been amplified by the fact that different parts of the value chain 
operate under different governance regimes with natural monopoly and competitive segments. 
Because Thomas Hughes‘ work focused on early stage and expanding systems which were by 
and large vertically integrated, many of the reverse salients he pointed to tended to be technical 
in nature, however, in a liberalised context the evolution of a system as a whole can no longer 
be treated as a unified entity with a singular system goal. The DG issue in particular shows how 
reverse salients do not only involve technical solutions (changes to the energy flows) but also 
institutional realignments such as changing revenue streams and regulatory incentives (revenue 
and information flows). Also, within highly institutionalised sectors such as electricity supply, 
responses to reverse salients and associated outcomes are more likely to be shaped by 
incumbent institutions and organisations such as large energy companies (Stenzel and Frenzel, 
2008) and regulators, rather than individual technologists or entrepreneurs as Hughes suggests.  
The CHP-DH case does however show that the Hughesian model of system building and actor-
network concepts remain relevant. The development of local energy schemes undoubtedly 
provides individual actors with more autonomy to shape systems and enrol other actors thus 
developing their own technical styles e.g. different approaches to interacting with electricity 
markets. The case also showed how the organisational ‗style‘ or model that is adopted is also a 
key differentiator between schemes. If and when the sector becomes more structured and 
institutionalised it is likely that dominant designs and more powerful actors will emerge who 
begin to influence and shape CHP-DH schemes in other localities. There are already early signs 
of this with the emergence of Cofely DE and Thamesway Energy who are both operating a 
number of schemes and looking to expand their influence over the evolution of the sector as a 
whole. The CHP-DH case also shows that for a scheme to be successful two types of individual 
system builder are necessary – a technical and a political champion. This dual role is required in 
CHP-DH schemes due to the politicised nature of energy networks which require actors to show 
long term commitment and to address a number of institutional barriers. The function of the 
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political champion is to enrol influential actors within the council to provide resources to the 
technical champion who operates in a similar way to a traditional Hughesian system builder. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the systems approach is less applicable to contemporary 
energy systems because Hughes ‗credits the system-builders themselves with too much 
authority‘ (Winskel, 1998: p.282). However, the selection of two sectoral case studies of 
networks which are at different stages of development – electricity systems being mature and 
institutionalised with CHP-DH at an earlier stage – shows that systems approaches can be still 
relevant and the role of the system builder is not redundant. It is argued that rather than reject 
the systems approach, a more dynamic perspective to the analysis of infrastructures based on a 
lifecycle approach allows one to form a better understanding of the interactions between 
structure and agency as systems evolve. The figure below draws from Arne Kaijser and Thomas 
Hughes‘ work on the evolution of large technical systems over time (Kaijser, 2004, Hughes, 
1983). This lifecycle model is a stylised account of the temporal evolution of infrastructures and 
represents a novel heuristic framework to think about the interplay between structures and 
agents over time as a system evolves.  
Figure 7.1: The Infrastructure lifecycle 
 
This avoids the pitfalls of an over emphasis on structures or agency as explanatory variables; 
rather it shows that both actor-centric/constructivist and more structural or institutionally 
orientated approaches need not be mutually exclusive but each provide useful tools to analyse 
the dynamics of energy systems at different stages of their lifecycle.  
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7.2.6 Landscape, regime and niche interactions 
Transitions theorists argue that structural changes in production and consumption systems can 
be explained according to the multi-level perspective with different types of interactions taking 
place at the landscape, regime and niche levels. The multi-level framing is similar in many ways 
to the analytical framework which was developed as part of this thesis as it not only considers 
agency and practices at the micro-level but also how this is shaped by institutions which are 
structurally embedded at the regime and landscape levels.  
The CHP-DH case in particular illustrates the utility of such a multi-level framing (Geels, 2004, 
Verbong and Geels, 2007). As has been previously noted, the application of solely actor-centric 
approaches - such as ANT - to the analysis of CHP-DH has been critiqued on the grounds that 
they fail to describe the structural preconditions and context for agency (Russell, 1994). The 
MLP allows micro-level activities within niches, such as the development of local energy 
schemes, to be analysed in the context of sector level structures – which are predominantly 
instituted at the national level in the UK – and external landscape influences such as concerns 
over international resource security. To illustrate these multi-level dynamics the following two 
quotes from local authorities illustrate how ongoing developments at the landscape level have 
influenced their approach to the provision of local energy services: 
 ―And then you have got the political issues [if] Mr. Putin or whoever decides to turn 
your gas off (…) If we get to a stage where we are self-sufficient in terms of energy, that 
we are not importing all of this energy which is having a massive export in terms of our 
economy‖(interview - 30) 
―(...) yet we are entirely reliant on deals that are struck for the supply of gas and coal 
and oil at a national level, and yet we also recognize that we have got significant 
natural resources in the city, and man-made resources that we can exploit far more 
effectively‖ (interview - 37) 
These examples show how perceived threats to energy security and the long term sustainability 
of the current energy regime are prompting new forms of response where cities and localities 
seek to ‗strategically protect ―themselves‖ from climate change and resource constraint‘; this 
has been referred to as ‗urban ecological security‘ (Hodson and Marvin, 2011). The evolution of 
the CHP-DH niche in the UK should therefore be viewed within this broader context.  
The electricity case highlights changing regime dynamics as a result of landscape (e.g. climate 
change) and niche (e.g. DG) pressures. Transition theory outlines three patterns of regime 
dynamics; reproduction – where dominant actors reinforce regime structures through 
incremental innovations – transformation – where incumbent actors change and adapt by 
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developing modular innovations – and transition – where new variations become 
institutionalised and replace the incumbent regime. It is clear in the electricity distribution case 
that a transformation pattern is currently taking place as existing modes of governing are being 
adapted rather than fundamentally reformed. The RPI-X@20 and RIIO proposals, where 
fundamental reform to sector structures was ruled out before the process began, illustrates how 
incumbent actors such as Ofgem are seeking to strategically select new variations which 
conform to their interests and existing sector structures (through innovation incentives aimed at 
DNOs) whilst ruling out radical alternatives. Within such a regulated sector it is highly unlikely 
that a transition pattern will be observed due to the natural monopoly characteristics of networks 
and the strong independencies between the regulator and network companies.  
7.2.7 Scalar Dynamics 
The Splintering Urbanism literature argues that the socio-technical dynamics of infrastructure 
networks should be viewed within the wider context of the post- Keynesian state which has seen 
a move away from nationally integrated energy systems towards more spatially disaggregated 
forms (Graham and Marvin, 2001). As a result, new types of dynamics are likely to emerge 
between different spatial scales resulting from processes of de-nationalisation, de-statization and 
internationalisation (Jessop, 1997). Although it was argued in chapter 3 that the Splintering 
Urbanism literature tends to downplay the role of the nation state in infrastructure governance, 
its emphasis on scalar dynamics does shed some light on the processes of institutional change 
that have been observed across the two cases.  
In the electricity case, due to the liberalisation of the generation and retail markets and efforts to 
promote DG and demand side integration, a process of the localisation of flows can be observed 
across the networks. The traditional passive/one way flow model of distribution networks is 
being supplanted by a more complex and dynamic set of energy, information and revenue flows 
and this is necessitating more site-specific responses to issues such as voltage imbalances and 
fault levels. Emerging from the nationalised era, network planning and operation had tended to 
be carried out at a highly aggregated level and components were bought ‗off the shelf‘ from 
large scale multi-national manufacturers and rolled out across the networks (interview – 6). The 
diffusion of DG in particular has created problems both for the incumbent operators and the 
governance regime for electricity networks because the resulting localisation of flows is 
requiring innovative and location specific solutions depending on the geography, and the 
location and density of loads on the different networks. Issues surrounding smart metering and 
uncertainty over how system economies can be achieved in a highly fragmented sector are also 
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challenging the centralised model where electricity markets and network oversight take place at 
the national level whereas emerging issues on the distribution networks increasingly require 
decentralised decision making at the sub-network level (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011). The 
development of cost reflexive pricing regimes for new connections and incentives for 
innovation which are giving autonomy to companies to solve particular issues on their networks 
show that scalar dynamics are an increasingly important aspect of institutional change.    
The CHP-DH case shows how dynamics between scales clearly affect the interplay between 
actors, institutions and technologies in energy systems and how incoherencies between scales of 
governance influence infrastructure dynamics. The failure of national level markets to properly 
value the electrical output of CHP is creating uncertainty around the economic viability of CHP-
DH (interview – 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 36). Depending on the context, a number of different 
responses have emerged from this scalar dynamic between local energy systems and national 
level electricity markets - drawing from Coutard and Rutherford  (2011) two such responses can 
be characterised: The first is going off-grid which Coutard and Rutherford (2011) describe as 
being ‗based on a deliberate policy or strategy of bypassing to some extent traditional 
centralised networks and developing services on a local level, increasingly over decentralised, 
local infrastructures. Such policies or strategies are founded on desires or obligations of 
autonomy or independence‘ (P.112). A prominent example in the UK CHP-DH case is that of 
Woking Borough Council which uses a private wire electricity network thus by-passing the 
public distribution network and creating a sense of independence from the incumbent regime. 
The second response is feed-in to grid where there is more interaction between the local scheme 
and the centralised energy system. Rather than using private wire electricity networks, these 
schemes feed electricity back into the distribution network and sell the heat locally - examples 
include Aberdeen, Birmingham and Nottingham.  
These cases of scalar dynamics show how selection environments are multi-dimensional and 
can differ across scales with certain technologies such as CHP-DH and ANM benefiting from 
circumstances and opportunities which are specific to a geographical location or a particular 
local context but do not align with the broader national governance regime.  
7.2.8 Summary of key findings 
The purpose of this section was to explore the interplay between actors, institutions and 
technologies across the two cases through a number of different theoretical lenses which were 
introduced in chapter 2. Throughout the discussion it was found that, to different degrees, these 
theories and concepts can illuminate different aspects of this interplay.  Therefore rather than 
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present them as being in conflict or as mutually exclusive, it is more useful to allow room for a 
number of approaches and models to help explain these complex socio-technical processes. This 
is particularly important for large scale infrastructure systems as they involve technologies and 
institutions which are embedded in broader societal and political structures with processes of 
path dependent change and multiple interactions taking between a wide array of both public and 
private stakeholders who have different and sometimes competing motivations and strategies. A 
similar conclusion was arrived at by Winskel in his analysis of technical change in the ESI 
during the early years of privatization: 
―… No single model or conceptual framework has proved capable of a fully-satisfying 
explanation. Electricity generation technologies are the result of the complex interaction 
of a range of technical, economic, institutional, regulatory and political forces, 
operating at various level of social aggregation, whose analysis ultimately requires a 
broad based social shaping perspective. As the British ESI case demonstrated, 
technological dynamics retain a distinctive quality and an essential unpredictability 
within the broader process of economic and social change. In exploring these relations, 
the insights offered by technology studies concepts and models, whilst being necessarily 
limited, are of continuing value.‖ (Winskel, 1998: p.310) 
A key insight was that perspectives which emphasise structures and institutions need not be in 
conflict with more actor-centric perspectives, particularly if one considers the long term 
evolution of infrastructures in terms of a lifecycle where the relative importance of each changes 
over time. It is argued that the analytical framework which was developed in chapter three of 
this thesis proved to be a useful and ontologically coherent platform whereby a number of 
models and concepts could be deployed to elucidate the transformation and reproduction of 
distribution networks. In particular the analytical separation between the physical and relational 
dimensions helped to elucidate the emerging vertical and horizontal relationships that are 
between actors within meso-level organisational fields, but also how these dynamics are 
grounded in the micro-level physical realities of the system. Contextualising this using the 
macro-level network logic concept enabled a critique of notions of efficiency as the sole driver 
for institutional and technical change because actors draw from these logics in different ways to 
legitimise their actions.  
7.3 Additional Causal Mechanisms 
Having discussed the similarities and differences across the two case studies with respect to the 
literatures introduced in chapter 2, the second section of this chapter explores in more detail a 
number of additional causal mechanisms which it is argued can further elucidate the underlying 
processes of technical and institutional change in infrastructure sectors. These mechanisms have 
been identified as significant contributors to the socio-technical dynamics of energy distribution 
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sectors in each of the case studies and thus represent novel theoretical and/or empirical insights. 
Three such underlying causal mechanisms and their influence on each of the cases are 
discussed. 
7.3.1 Strategic Selectivity of the State 
In chapter three it was proposed that the influence of state transformation is a neglected aspect 
of the infrastructure governance literature. Following Jessop (2001, , 2007b, , 2009) it was 
argued that the governance of energy networks is institutionally embedded within national level 
socio-political dynamics such as the evolution from a Keynesian welfare state towards a 
Schumpeterian competitive state. These macro-level dynamics bring about a ‗tendency for 
specific structures and structural configurations to reinforce selectively specific forms of action, 
tactics, or strategies and to discourage others‘ (Jessop, 2001: p.1224).  For the case of energy 
networks, it was argued that this can be analysed in terms of national level governance regimes 
which in turn influence meso and micro level interventions and interactions within 
infrastructure sectors.  
This section explores in more detail how specific modes of governing energy networks which 
are situated at the national level have influenced the uptake of different technologies and 
practices and shaped the nature of interactions taking place within organisational fields. To 
illustrate the influence of this strategic selectivity on the evolution of the electricity distribution 
sector the following table shows a sample of technical and organisational innovations which 
were encountered during the case study. It shows the level of ‗fit‘ between the innovation and 
the modes of governing electricity distribution networks which constitute the governance 
regime in the UK (- is a poor fit or a conflict, 0 is neutral, + is a good fit or an alignment). 
Table 7.1: Strategic selectivity in the Electricity Distribution Sector 
Innovation Sweat the assets Open access Protect the customer 
Smart metering + + + 
RIIO 0 + + 
Innovation incentives - 0 - 
DG  - - - 
What can be seen is that the introduction of smart metering technology to the UK ESI is 
unsurprising as it aligns well with existing modes of governing the sector. Smart metering 
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reinforces the dominant liberalised rationality which underpins the current governance regime, 
in particular it promotes the idea that prices and incentives can promote efficient and rational 
decision making by individuals regarding their own energy use. Ofgem have proposed that this 
will facilitate competition in the retail market which will promote more efficient dispatch of 
generators and further reduce capacity margins. Smart metering has also become central to 
debates surrounding the smart grid i.e. as key enabling tool for the development of more active 
distribution networks. However, as the debate surrounding the smart metering roll out has 
shown, there remains a degree of uncertainty as to how coordination can be achieved between 
customers, retailers, DNOs, DG operators and the system operator. 
RIIO, seen here as a regulatory innovation, also aligns well with the governance regime. The 
proposals reinforce a number of overarching trends which have been taking place in regulation 
since 2000-2005. For example, the fourth and fifth price control reviews have begun the 
introduction of output based incentives as a means of avoiding a damaging trade-off between 
incentives to reduce costs and the end customers‘ quality of service. RIIO has expanded this 
agenda in an effort to promote stakeholder engagement and transparency and efficiency in the 
delivery of network services e.g. connections. This further reduces the autonomy of network 
operators in determining how they achieve efficiency savings.  Also, due to the recognition that 
CAPEX expenditure will rise in the future, RIIO has extended the price control period and 
proposed more detailed scrutiny of companies‘ business plans. RIIO is an evolution of the 
previous RPI-x framework which is broadly in line with existing regulatory practices and modes 
of governing. 
One significant area where the governance regime for electricity distribution networks has 
largely failed to adapt is in efforts to promote innovation within the sector. Although there is a 
recognition that innovation incentives will need to be removed over time, the RIIO proposals 
continue the approach to innovation set out in previous price controls i.e. having a separate 
incentive mechanism which operates outside of the mainstream regulatory process. This 
difficulty stems from the fact that the original rationale behind RPI-x was that the job of the 
regulator was to incentivise efficiency and that innovation would be an outcome of the process. 
Although this was largely the case for OPEX, the short term time horizons that the process 
engendered negated against significant technological innovation and throughout this process the 
regulator has promoted risk averse strategies. Although the LNCF is likely to be more 
successful than RPZs in promoting the deployment of new technologies because it covers the 
majority of the upfront capital costs for the DNO, thus reducing the risk, it is as yet unclear how 
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innovation can become embedded into the wider regulatory regime – the final chapter contains a 
proposal on how this might be achieved.  
The final example in the electricity distribution case is that of the connection of distributed 
generation. As outlined in the case study chapter, the integration of DG into existing modes of 
governing within the sector has been a difficult process and has largely been a piecemeal 
process. DG has led to conflicts within the sector as it undermines the traditional approach to 
network operation that has prevailed since nationalisation i.e. that distribution networks are 
passive systems and any generators that wish to connect can be accommodated through 
reinforcing the network, thus placing a large upfront capital cost on DG developers and 
increasing the costs of running the networks. Efforts to increase the levels of DG connected to 
the networks have necessitated changes to the charging and connections regime. However, 
because these responses have been shaped by the existing paradigm of short term and piecemeal 
solutions and within the confines of existing sector structures, there are few examples of a 
coordinated approach being taken with regards to DG which would see the more active 
management of distribution systems. 
Table 7.2: Strategic selectivity in the Electricity Distribution Sector 
Innovation Local Governance 
Sustainable Built 
Environment 
De-carbonise Heat 
Investment in heat networks + + - 
Private wire networks 0 + - 
ESCO contracts + + - 
The table above outlines a number of innovations associated with local energy schemes in the 
context of the broader governance regime for CHP-DH in the UK. As discussed, investment in 
heat networks has formed part of a number of leading councils‘ strategies to address well-being 
and sustainability issues within their localities; thus forming part of an emerging local 
governance agenda in the UK. The changing nature of the relationship between the national and 
local tiers of government is evident in a number of key areas, e.g. the ‗well-being‘ function and 
climate change mitigation, and this has created spaces of agency for local authorities and 
enabled them to invest in low carbon infrastructure. Similarly, changes to the building codes 
and planning regulations are enabling LAs to develop Local Development Frameworks which 
promote the expansion of low carbon infrastructure within their areas and allows them to work 
with developers to provide allowable solutions in order to comply with the code for sustainable 
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homes.  This virtuous circle (see figure below) between local autonomy, efficiency incentives 
for companies, building and planning regulations and the development of district heating 
networks is evident in a number of the leading councils such as Woking who have begun to 
develop a specific local energy policy and embed it within a wider set of strategies relating to 
sustainability and climate change. Also, depending on the context of the particular scheme, 
laying private wire networks and developing long terms ESCO contracts can enhance the 
financial and economic viability of CHP-DH by a) allowing operators to get the full retail price 
for their electrical output and b) securing long term stability which reduces risk and allow 
infrastructure investments to take place.  
Figure 7.2: Example of virtuous circles in the development of CHP-DH 
 
However, in each of the three innovations listed in the table above, there are incoherencies with 
national level decarbonisation policies. For example, measures which have recently been put in 
place to promote renewable heat, the RHI, fails to take into account the upfront capital cost of 
investing in distribution pipes. Also, issues surrounding the interaction between CHP-DH 
systems and the electricity markets have been discussed above, along with the ambiguities 
-262- 
 
 
 
surrounding private wire networks and ESCO contracts. Both private wire networks and long 
term ESCO contracts directly conflict with current regulatory practice, particularly in relation to 
facilitating customer switching; this in particular has been interpreted by Ofgem as central to 
their primary duty to protect the interests of customers.  
The central reason for this viscous circle between many of the UK decarbonisation policies and 
the development of CHP-DH is that policies which are designed to promote renewables and 
other low carbon energy technologies along with demand side energy efficiency are typically 
channelled through the incumbent energy regime which is dominated by a small number of 
vertically integrated energy companies and governed by Ofgem, who, it has been argued, tend 
to implement policies and design regulations which engender a conservative approach to the 
evolution of the energy system in the UK and favour incumbent actors rather than  new entrants 
(Mitchell, 2008). Looking at it from a CHP-DH perspective, this points to a second underlying 
mechanism which is shaping change within infrastructure sectors – structural overlap between 
governance regimes. 
7.3.2 Structural Overlap 
Thornton and Ocasio see structural overlap as occurring ‗when individual roles and 
organizational structures and functions that were previously distinct are forced into association‘ 
(2008: p.116). They identify this as a key source of institutional change as it can expose 
‗competing institutional logics‘ which has the potential to lower ‗constraints and embededness 
of actors‘ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: p.116). Raven and Verbong (2007) and Konrad et al. 
(2008) have argued from a transitions perspective that similar processes, which they term multi-
regime dynamics, are at play in infrastructure sectors. Raven and Verbong discussed the 
interactions which took place between the natural gas/heating and electricity regimes in the 
Netherlands which influenced the successful diffusion of CHP technology since the 1970s. They 
outline four interaction types (2007: p.503); competition – ‗when regimes start fulfilling similar 
functions‘ – symbiosis – ‗where two regimes can reap mutual beneﬁts from cooperating‘ – 
integration – ‗when previously separated regimes more or less become one‘ – and spillover – 
‗refers to the transfer of rules from one regime to another‘. In the case of the Netherlands, 
during the 1970s there was little uptake of CHP-DH as the gas and the highly fragmented 
electricity regimes were in competition; however, following liberalisation, there was a 
consolidation within the electricity industry and this (combined with the introduction of energy 
efficiency legislation) led to a more symbiotic relationship between the two regimes and over 
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time resulted in integration with the large scale uptake of industrial CHP and CHP-DH to a 
lesser extent.   
In the case of CHP-DH in the UK it is clear that there has been little symbiosis or integration 
between the gas/heat and the electricity regimes. The current regulatory structure for electricity 
and gas in the UK treats the electricity and gas/heat regimes as silos and there is little scope 
within the institutional framework to explore how different forms of integration such as CHP-
DH could support decarbonisation. This governance regime for energy networks has largely 
been reinforced by decarbonisation and energy efficiency policies which are underpinned by a 
rationale that the provision of price signals and incentives to individuals will promote an 
efficient and optimal decarbonisation pathway. The result is that although individual 
components of the system may change (incremental and modular innovations), there has been 
little consideration of how changes to the structure of energy systems and the role of networks 
in particular can support long term decarbonisation (architectural innovation).  
Two particular examples of structural overlap from the case studies highlight this. The first is 
from the CHP-DH case study where the electricity and heat regimes have been shown to be 
incompatible. It is widely recognised that the CHP and CHP-DH in particular can offer 
environmental, economic and system benefits if deployed in locations with appropriate load 
types (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010), however, unlike countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, 
this is not explicitly recognised in the electricity governance regime. Instead, there has been a 
competitive dynamic between the emerging niche level regime of CHP-DH and the incumbent 
electricity regime since the days of nationalisation (Russell, 1993). This is largely due to a lack 
of strong sector level institutions for decentralised energy which has a loosely coupled and 
fragmented governance regime.  
Structural overlap has also been a feature of the electricity distribution case, particularly in 
debates surrounding the active management of distribution systems. ANM requires the 
operation and management of the networks to become more closely aligned with other segments 
of the value chain (demand, DG and the system operator) in order to achieve system economies. 
This however has clashed with incumbent institutional arrangement and modes of governing 
which are based on isolating the networks from the competitive segments of the value chain in 
order to deal with the market failure of natural monopoly. This means that existing regulatory 
structures are largely incapable of distributing the risk and benefits of investing in such 
architectural innovations. Once again, this siloed approach to energy governance often does not 
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take into account the potential environmental and system benefits of achieving greater vertical 
and horizontal integration in infrastructure sectors.  
These two cases highlight that structural overlap in energy infrastructures often reflects power 
imbalances between the niche and regime levels which can close off avenues for radical 
institutional and technical change and also highlights the inherent inflexibility of the UK 
governance model for energy networks.  
7.3.3 Institutional entrepreneurs 
The socio-technical systems literature which was introduced in the literature review chapter 
highlighted the role that individuals can play in shaping infrastructures in their early phase. It 
was argued that the concept of the system builder, which was proposed by Thomas Hughes to 
describe the important role that influential individuals have had in shaping systems, is still 
relevant with technical and political champions in UK local authorities influencing the 
development of CHP-DH. However, there is little understanding of the role of agency in 
shaping change in incumbent infrastructure sectors such as electricity distribution. Within 
incumbent organisational fields such as this, it is clear that there is much less scope for entire 
systems to be reshaped through the action of motivated individuals because actors are 
constrained within an existing techno-institutional complex (Unruh, 2000) - Granovetter (1985) 
refers to this as embedded agency. Within institutional theory the concept of the institutional 
entrepreneur has been forwarded as a means to explain the role of agency in more structured 
organisational fields (Garud et al., 2002, Leca and Naccache, 2006, Tracey et al., 2011). An 
institutional entrepreneur, although embedded within highly structured organisational field, ‗can 
play a critical role in perceiving institutional differentiation, fragmentation, and contradiction by 
virtue of the different social locations they may occupy in the interinstitutional system and in 
taking advantage of the opportunities it presents for institutional change‘ (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008: p.115). Thus by exploiting perceived inconsistencies and conflicts between competing 
network logics for example, institutional entrepreneurs can affect change in incumbent 
infrastructure sectors.  
It is evident from the electricity distribution case that within infrastructure sectors with natural 
monopoly characterises, network companies will not engage in innovative or entrepreneurial 
activities without an incentive to do so, and this incentive must come from the regulator. The 
empirical case shows that efforts to incentivise focal organisations, such as DNOs, to become 
institutional entrepreneurs have been problematic because it runs contrary to the competitive 
network logic which has shaped the organisational field. In particular, the DNO specific RPZ 
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incentive did not promote significant deployment of ANM solutions.  This is because 
innovation and change is by and large not in the interests of focal actors in established 
organisational fields who benefit from the status quo. An interviewee who has worked both 
within the industry and as a regulator notes that entrepreneurial activity can only come about 
through collaboration. 
" These ideas are going to come up from other companies, they‘re going to come from 
the entrepreneurs who are never too interested in getting that long run marginal cost 
down, they want to see their idea working don‘t they - completely different set of drivers. 
And I think what we have got to get smarter as a country and a sector in linking, making 
the relationships with universities and industry, manufacturers and industry, and trying 
to get that kind of food chain working because then the incentives can align" (interview - 
6) 
This is why the LNCF has been welcomed within the industry because apart from providing a 
large fund which reduces much of the innovation risk for DNOs, it seeks to promote 
‗collaboration between DNOs and other parties in the energy supply chain [a]s a central 
objective of the LCN Fund‘ (Ofgem, 2010a: p.46). Although concerns have been expressed 
regarding the fact that the fund is DNO-centric (only DNOs can apply) (interview – 2) and it 
remains to be seen whether the projects will lead to meaningful learning outcomes, making 
collaboration a central criterion for funding is to be welcomed. This is because it is highly 
unlikely that regulated network operators will adopt strategies which radically reshape their 
institutional environment and become institutional entrepreneurs in the conventional sense.  
Evidence from the RPZ scheme has shown the importance of more peripheral actors within the 
organisational field, i.e. small scale engineering consultancies and equipment manufacturers. 
These companies such as Econnect, Smarter Grid Solutions and EA Technology have 
specialised in developing site specific solutions to different network constraints, for example 
brought about by DG. This supports claims made in the literature on institutions and transitions; 
that entrepreneurship is ‗more likely to emerge from less embedded organizations at the 
periphery of a field‘125 (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005). As was discussed in the empirical 
chapter, these companies have an increasingly important role to play in aligning incentives as 
distribution systems become more active, and also in enabling DNOs to develop more 
innovative relationships with a wider range of equipment manufacturers.  This example points 
to the potential role that small, flexible, and specialised companies can play in influencing 
institutional and technical change within increasingly complex organisational fields.  
                                                     
125
 Greenwood and Suddaby note that ‗Central organizations do, sometimes, act as institutional 
entrepreneurs‘ however this is ‗not typical‘‘ (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005: p.30). 
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In the CHP-DH case, many of the local authorities who have successfully been involved in low 
carbon infrastructure projects have developed partnerships with external parties on a formal 
basis in order to benefit from their knowledge and capabilities. For example, in the early stages 
of their project Woking council partnered with the Danish company, Xergi, by incorporating 
them into their ownership structure. Of particular influence within the emerging CHP-DH sector 
in the UK is the specialist decentralised energy company Cofely DE
126
 who have entered into 
contracts with a number of councils to operate and extend their schemes on a long term basis 
(interviews – 25, 27, 30). Such firms have a key role to play in diffusing new knowledge across 
this fragmented sector and act as ‗mobile‘ carriers of knowledge between cities. Cofely DE, in 
particular is emerging as a key actor in shaping the emerging sector due to the fact that many of 
the local authorities do not possess either the resources or capabilities to develop projects on 
their own.  
Referring back to the functions of innovation systems that were introduced in chapter two
127
, the 
role of these specialised firms or innovation intermediaries – actors who act as institutional 
entrepreneurs by mediating between a focal actor and an innovation - is highlighted for each of 
the cases: 
Table 7.3: The role of intermediaries in shaping energy network innovation systems 
System Function Electricity case Heat case 
‗The creation and diffusion of 
‗new‘ knowledge‘ 
Intermediaries can act as a bridge 
between the ambitions of the 
regulator in incentivising innovation 
and the capabilities of the network 
companies 
Intermediaries can bring 
knowledge and experience from 
different contexts to the UK, 
particularly Scandinavian 
countries where CHP-DH is 
more developed 
‗Guide the direction of the 
search‘ 
Smaller more specialised firms can 
identify value chain dynamics and 
help to spread the risks and benefits 
of innovative network investments  
By offering a well developed 
business model, specialised 
CHP-DH companies can 
encourage reluctant LAs to 
develop schemes within their 
                                                     
126
 Formerly Utilicom 
127
 ‗The creation and diffusion of ‗new‘ knowledge‘, ‗Guide the direction of the search‘, ‗Supply 
Resources‘, ‗create positive external economies‘, ‗formation of markets‘ (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) 
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localities 
‗Supply Resources‘  
- 
Local authorities can outsource 
the development and operation of 
schemes to intermediaries thus 
reducing risk and helping to 
secure financing 
‗Create positive external 
economies‘ 
Mobile intermediaries can apply 
knowledge to different locations 
across the networks, thus helping to 
create linkages and reducing 
uncertainty    
Intermediaries can work across a 
number of different schemes thus 
helping to bring coherence to a 
fragmented organisational field. 
This will help to reduce 
transaction costs and in bringing 
about economies of scale in the 
procurement of equipment  
‗Formation of markets‘ Intermediaries can help to identify 
opportunities and ‗find the value‘ 
for DNOs in investing in innovation 
Specialised CHP-DH firms can 
identify load dynamics and use 
more sophisticated modelling 
techniques to plan network 
investments 
In each of the cases these innovation intermediaries have helped to create virtuous circles in 
infrastructure innovation systems. 
7.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter identified a number of underlying causal mechanisms which help to explain the 
interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in each of the cases. It was found that to 
various degrees the existing literatures can help to illuminate different aspects of these 
processes. For example, it was found that vertical dynamics across the electricity value chain are 
as much influenced by politically motivated decisions which were made in the past as notions of 
marginal technical or economic efficiency. It was also found that ongoing debates within the 
literature regarding the relative weight which should be attached to structure and agency in 
processes of technical and institutional change in technical systems can be reconciled if one 
views the nature of this interaction as changing in different phases of an infrastructure lifecycle. 
In the early phases of development, such as CHP-DH in the UK, influential and motivated 
individuals can play a key role in shaping change, however, as systems grow and become 
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institutionalised this scope for agency diminishes. The electricity distribution case shows 
however that over time, systems enter into a new phase where subtle windows of opportunity 
open up for agency which pose challenges to incumbent actors and present opportunities to 
actors such as small, specialised equipment manufacturers to have an increasingly influential 
role. These types of actors have been identified as institutional entrepreneurs; unlike the 
conventional framing of system builders these are not focal actors within organisational fields 
but can play a key role in developing sector innovation systems and developing value networks 
for innovations. Identifying this dynamic relationship between different types of agents of 
change and their environment was aided by the choice of case studies; with electricity 
distribution being a highly institutionalised organisational field and CHP-DH being less 
structured.      
Additional causal mechanisms which were identified focused on the structural determinants of 
change in infrastructure sectors. In chapter 2 it was argued that existing literatures tend to down 
play or under theorise the role of the nation state in the governance of energy systems. Using 
insights from the governance and governmentality literatures it was shown how structures at the 
nation-state level strategically select certain types of technologies and practices. For example, in 
the case of CHP-DH it was found that decarbonisation policies which tend to be channelled 
through incumbent energy institutions tend to act as a barrier to investment in local energy 
infrastructures. In the electricity case, network regulations which emerged from a market based 
logic and political program of liberalisation and privatisation have favoured short term 
investment time horizons and incremental change. It was also shown that interaction between 
different governance regimes, or structural overlap, can play an important role in enabling and 
constraining change. This has been highlighted by the case of active electricity distribution 
networks which involve interactions between different segments of the value chain, this has not 
been facilitated due to the fact that networks are governed as non-competitive natural 
monopolies which are separated from the retail and generation functions, this creating a barrier 
to ANM.    
The table below summaries each of the explanatory causal mechanisms which it is proposed 
provide generalizable insights into the nature of the interplay between actors, institution and 
technologies in contemporary energy distribution networks – thus addressing the main research 
question: 
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Table 7.4: Synthesis of Literature Review and Identification of Causal Mechanisms 
Causal Mechanism Insights from the case studies 
Vertical Dynamics: The nature of transactions 
taking place determines the dynamic between 
integration (hierarchies) and de-integration 
(markets) in a network industry value chain  
Governance transformations are not smooth and 
predictable, rather institutional change is path 
dependent and political in its nature. 
Innovation: The nature and pattern of technical 
change - whether this is incremental or disruptive 
- and the response of firms strongly influences 
sectoral dynamics 
The institutional density and adaptive capacity of the 
organisational field in question influences the pattern 
of innovation and whether new technologies are 
likely to disrupt existing structures.  
 
Path Dependency and Lock in: Institutional 
change is not a process of optimisation at the 
margin but is influenced by the historical 
trajectory of change. 
The governance regime which emerged from 
privatisation and liberalisation during the 1980s has a 
strong influence in shaping responses to the 
decarbonisation of the electricity and heat sectors. 
Social Construction: Technical change is a 
contested process which is characterised by the 
multiple framings and interpretations of different 
actors and groups of actors. 
The process of technical change is characterised in 
particular by conflicts between the competitive and 
the public services network logics which actors draw 
upon in different ways to frame and legitimise their 
actions.   
System Evolution: Technical systems evolve with 
their environment initially being shaped by 
influential system builders but over time develop 
momentum and become prone to inertia.  
The infrastructure lifecycle heuristic can be used to 
frame the interplay between actors and institutions as 
a system evolves.   
Multi-level dynamics: Interactions between 
niche, regime and landscape levels lead to 
different types of socio-technical patterns or 
pathways – reproduction, transformation or 
transition. 
Patterns of reproduction, transformation and 
transition are taking place in energy distribution 
sectors. Incumbents sectors are more likely to 
undergo processes of transformation while niche 
level sectors draw on landscape dynamics to develop 
radical and architectural innovations but face barriers 
at the regime level.  
Scalar Dynamics: In the context of liberalisation 
and globalisation the notion of nationally 
Scalar dynamics are an increasingly important feature 
due to the localisation of flows and changes in the 
-270- 
 
 
 
integrated infrastructures has been diminished 
and new spaces of agency are being opened up at 
different scales  
governance regime. Different selection environments 
at different scales are emerging leading in some cases 
to inconsistencies between local and national 
priorities. 
Strategic Selectivity of the State: Macro level 
processes of state transformation act as a 
selection environment for meso and micro level 
sector dynamics. 
The re-emergence of long term energy policy goals is 
beginning to change the governance regime of 
infrastructure sectors. In incumbent sectors 
regulatory change is a slow process due to the price 
control review process. In niche sectors this has 
opened a window of opportunity but existing 
decarbonisation policies tend to favour incumbent 
technologies and actors. 
Structural Overlap: Interactions and overlaps 
between different governance regimes can  
influence institutional change 
Sector structures which emerged from liberalisation 
are proving to be inflexible and often act as a barrier 
to radical and architectural innovation in incumbent 
and niche sectors. 
Institutional Entrepreneurs: Motivated actors 
draw on broader institutional logics to reshape 
organisational fields and influence technical 
change. 
Institutional entrepreneurs play an important role in 
both incumbent and new sectors. They can help 
incumbent actors to adapt their organisational 
routines and to build capacity within niches by acting 
as innovation intermediaries. 
The next chapter will draw upon these insights to answer the research questions outlined in the 
introductory chapter.  
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8 Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked across the two case studies in order to identify similarities and 
differences along with the causal mechanisms which have characterised the dynamics of change 
in each of the sectors. This final chapter of the thesis will draw upon these insights and answer 
the research questions which were outlined in the introductory chapter. Following this, there is a 
discussion of the policy implications of the research and recommendations for future work in 
this area. The chapter begins by outlining the empirical and theoretical contributions of the 
study.  
8.2 Contribution of the Thesis 
The contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes has been to uncover the socio-technical 
characteristics of energy distribution systems which tend to receive less attention than the 
generation and demand sides, and in doing so the thesis develops a conceptual understanding of 
the dynamics of these sectors which have unique technical and institutional characteristics. This 
contribution can be divided into its empirical and theoretical parts: 
Empirical Contribution 
On the empirical side, the key contribution that has been made is in understanding the complex 
socio-technical dynamics of two energy distribution sectors in the UK. In the introduction it was 
argued that the network component of energy systems – the pipes and wires – are often black-
boxed or treated as purely technical objects in analyses of energy system transformation. As the 
development of more flexible systems of energy distribution become increasingly important in 
enabling the diffusion of low carbon forms of energy generation and more efficient end use 
practices, it is argued that by making the networks central to the analysis the study provides 
novel insights for the broader transition to a low carbon energy system more broadly. 
The empirical chapters outlined that in a liberalised environment networks have been treated as 
natural monopolies and largely separated from the competitive areas of the energy value chain. 
In the electricity case the underlying rationale behind this was to reduce the costs of operating 
the networks and to discourage large scale capital investment. While this may have been 
appropriate in the phase immediately following liberalisation when long term energy policy was 
not a significant part of the political agenda, it is clear that a more integrated and long term 
perspective is required in order to achieve system economies and to develop smarter and more 
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intelligent ways of planning and operating the distribution systems. The UK case in particular 
highlights that although technologies such as CHP-DH offer potential environmental and 
economic benefits in certain circumstances, they tend to have different attributes and 
requirements than incumbent systems and therefore face a number of structural barriers to their 
wider scale diffusion. It is proposed that in developing and adapting our distribution networks, 
current regulatory and energy policy frameworks need to take into account in a more systematic 
way the distinct financial, regulatory, institutional and technical characteristics of infrastructure 
networks. This is necessary in order to develop more coherent and synergistic relationships 
between infrastructure networks and other parts of the energy value chain.  
Theoretical Contribution 
The introductory chapter outlined the general characteristics of infrastructure networks – natural 
monopoly, public good features, technical complexity and scale – which mean that these 
systems do not operate as conventional market based sectors. This posed a number of 
conceptual challenges which needed to be addressed in order to uncover the socio-technical 
dynamics of distribution networks in a theoretically coherent manner. In order to do so two 
main avenues of theoretical discussion were explored and elucidated: 
 The nature of institutions and institutional change in shaping energy networks became a 
central concern in developing the analytical framework. Following the literature review 
it was proposed that a more ontologically coherent perspective on the role of institutions 
in shaping socio-technical change in infrastructure networks is required. Using insights 
from the science and technology studies and new-institutional literatures, a framework 
was developed which showed how institutions are embedded in the physical, relational 
and structural dimensions of infrastructures, rather than being a variable which 
facilitates or acts as a barrier to technical change in a linear fashion. 
 The second theoretical area that was highlighted was how the socio-technical dynamics 
of energy systems are influenced by and aligned with the changing role of the state in 
the governance of the economy. It was pointed out that due to the public good 
characteristics of infrastructure networks, the state will always have some form of 
influence whether this is direct ownership or is outsourced to a quasi-independent sector 
regulator; however this is often under-represented in the literature.  Drawing on the 
governance and governmentality literatures it was argued that the role of the state 
should not be thought of in binary terms such as ‗interventionist‘ vs. ‗non-
interventionist‘ or ‗markets‘ vs. ‗hierarchies‘, because this masks the true nature of the 
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state which should be viewed in relational terms; reflecting different strategies, interests 
and capacities.  
These theoretical insights were incorporated into a coherent analytical framework which was 
outlined in chapter three and was then operationalised for the empirical sections. In each of the 
cases a governance regime was characterised where it was shown how specific policy tools and 
regulatory instruments have been shaped by the re-emergence of energy policy and the changing 
relationships between local and national tiers of government. The chapters discussed how these 
broader governance regimes influence meso and micro level interventions and interactions and 
explored the outcomes in terms of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies. 
The choice of two contrasting case studies – a regulated and a non-regulated sector – enabled 
the study to capture the broad range of these socio-technical dynamics occurring in both 
incumbent and developing infrastructure sectors. Across the two cases it was observed that 
technologies and practices which align with the broader governance regimes tend to be favoured 
and reinforced whilst other options are often marginalised. Chapter seven outlined how the 
empirical results and approach adopted could inform existing literatures but also lead to novel 
insights regarding the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in infrastructure 
sectors. 
8.3 Answering the Research Questions 
The research questions are answered in turn below: 
1. What is the nature of the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in 
reproducing and transforming contemporary energy distribution systems? 
In chapter three, an approach to the analysis of infrastructure networks was developed which 
distinguished between the physical, relational and structural dimensions of infrastructure 
networks. In particular, an analysis of interactions between the physical – where institutions 
coordinate physical flows within a network which can be measured, monitored and controlled – 
and the relational – where institutions coordinate interactions between actors ‗to produce a joint 
outcome which is deemed mutually beneficial‘ (Jessop, 1995) – dimensions have helped to 
elucidate the interplay between actors, institutions and technologies across the two cases.  
In the electricity distribution case it was found that mechanisms which have been identified in 
the literature on infrastructure governance, namely path dependency and techno-institutional 
lock-in, provide a good overarching description of the sources of inertia in contemporary energy 
systems. The ex-ante/price-cap regulatory regime which has been in place since liberalisation 
has incentivised network companies to adopt short term investment time horizons and achieve 
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operational efficiencies rather than develop innovative network solutions to problems such as 
the connection of DG and integration with the demand side. The failure of the RPZ scheme to 
lead to a significant deployment of innovative technologies and practices has highlighted how a 
conservative approach to network planning and operation has become deeply embedded in the 
organisational routines of large scale energy companies.  
In addition to firm level barriers to the uptake of innovations which has been addressed in the 
existing literature on energy systems (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008), this analysis has shown that 
the incremental process of change within the sector can also be attributed to the structure of the 
sector itself and the nature of the company-regulator interactions. The inherent inflexibility of 
the governance regime for monopoly electricity networks in the UK means that architectural 
innovations such as ANM and smart grids, which require new types of interaction between 
different actors across the value chain, have not been facilitated. The structure of the 
organisational field and the rationality which underpins it has been based on a competitive 
network logic which means that energy systems are siloed into competitive and non-competitive 
segments in order to enable the creation of wholesale and retail markets. This has meant that 
new types of physical flows of energy, information and revenues are not aligned with existing 
institutional arrangements which govern incentive structures and regulator-company 
interactions. The regulator‘s job, which is broadly to balance the interests of shareholders and 
customers (present and future) in investment decisions, and to distribute economic rents, has 
traditionally been achieved through reducing the marginal costs of operating the networks and 
aligning this with a pricing regime. However, it is increasingly apparent that the need for 
networks to facilitate the broader transition to a low carbon energy system will require the 
regulator to embed innovation into the mainstream regulatory process, recognising that it will 
become increasingly difficult to set prices in an ex-ante fashion due to the uncertainties involved 
in innovation – this will require a more flexible approach. The nature of the price control review 
process which brings about incremental change has to date precluded this from happening.  
The analysis does show however that there are spaces for agency within this highly structured 
organisational field. As physical flows within the networks become more localised and specific 
to geographical location, the role of specialised and flexible engineering companies who can 
work with DNOs to create the value proposition of investing in radical and architectural 
innovation has been highlighted. Unlike incumbent network operators these are potential 
institutional entrepreneurs. 
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In the CHP-DH case, it was observed that a number of local authorities have begun to reshape 
local energy institutions by investing in and expanding district heating within their localities. 
This has been in response to local level drivers such as a desire to reduce fuel poverty and to 
address broader concerns regarding the long term sustainability of centralised energy provision. 
District heating has (re)emerged as a key technology which can negotiate between these local 
and national level issues and is increasingly being seen by LAs as a way to achieve their 
strategic long term aims. In order to develop and operate schemes, councils coordinate a 
network of actors, both public and private, and have adopted financial and organisational 
arrangements according to their own strategic aims, resources and capabilities.  
As one might expect, due to the unstructured nature of the organisational field there has been a 
greater degree of scope for variation and a more prominent role for system builders than in the 
electricity distribution case. This has led to the development of increasingly complex and 
diverse physical flows within these networks as CHP-DH schemes begin to expand and interact 
with other infrastructures such as waste and bioenergy. It was found however that this scope for 
agency and innovation is largely confined to localised selection environments because when 
CHP-DH systems begin to interact with the broader energy regime (incumbent electricity 
regulations and markets which are instituted at the national level) they face structural barriers to 
their diffusion and expansion. Therefore, while technologies and practices such as private wire 
electricity networks and long term ESCO contracts may make sense in the context of the CHP-
DH scheme, if viewed from a more structural perspective, they conflict in a number of ways 
with incumbent institutions and practices. These scalar dynamics and structural overlaps in the 
evolutionary process of technical and institutional change have played an important role in 
constraining the CHP-DH sector in the UK. As has been argued in chapter three, in analysing 
transitions in infrastructure sectors it is therefore important to consider the wider governance 
regime within which processes of change are contextualised.  
In order to synthesise some of the above insights which were drawn out in the previous chapter, 
the infrastructure lifecycle diagram was proposed as a useful heuristic to think about the 
interplay between actors, institutions and technologies in energy networks. It was argued that 
this framing can address the deficiencies of approaches which emphasise the role of agents in 
shaping change rather than structures and institutions, and vice versa.  
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2. How do the liberalisation and climate change agendas interact to influence this 
interplay?  
The purpose of asking this question was to explore how the dominant liberalisation paradigm 
which has influenced energy governance since the 1980s is shaping and being shaped by the 
climate change agenda. The analytical framework outlined in chapter three proposed that 
network logics are the organisational principles behind infrastructure sectors and are drawn 
upon by actors within organisational fields in order to frame and legitimise their actions. It is 
clear that in the electricity distribution case a number of areas of conflict have emerged between 
competing network logics or conceptualisations of how an energy system should be configured. 
A key rationale behind the competitive/unbundled logic which emerged following the 
privatisation of the ESI in 1989-2000 was to isolate the natural monopoly segments of the value 
chain in order to allow competition in the wholesale and retail markets and to promote the 
efficient exploitation of the networks asset base. Beginning with the issues surrounding DG 
connection and later DSM, the ridged sector boundaries which resulted from this logic have 
begun to be challenged as efforts to promote the active management of distribution networks 
have encountered structural barriers. It is apparent that due to the importance of electricity 
distribution networks to enabling low carbon production and consumption practices, networks 
can no longer be isolated from the mainstream energy policy. However, to date decision making 
by Ofgem continues to be framed according to a competitive logic and in particular measures 
which improve competition in the markets tend to have more legitimacy. 
In the CHP-DH case, the emergence of the climate change issue has prompted a number of local 
authorities to invest in and redevelop district heating schemes. A key legitimating factor behind 
this has been a desire to provide a public good e.g. reduce fuel poverty or ensure the long term 
energy security of a locality. This public services network logic is rooted in the view that local 
authorities have an obligation to improve the well-being of residents and increasingly they feel 
obliged to take a lead on reducing carbon emissions and contribute to the national level targets. 
In a number of ways these schemes, which are in the early phases of development, need to 
isolate or protect themselves from the competitive arena as they require long term contracts and 
upfront capital investments which have a long payback period. It has been shown that a conflict 
between this rationale and the competitive logic have surfaced following the emergence of 
institutional issues surrounding the legality of private wire networks and questions over the 
future regulatory regime for decentralised energy and local infrastructures.   
These conflicts between competing networks logics are likely to become more prominent in the 
future and will shape the evolution of infrastructure sectors. This is because decarbonisation is 
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largely a public good where the time horizon of policy outcomes tends to be decades, while the 
rationale behind liberalisation was to promote economic efficiency at the margin and to design 
pricing regimes which would incentivise private actors and individuals to behave in an 
economically rational manner.  
3. What is the role of the state in the governance of energy networks and how is this 
changing? 
The role of the state in the governance of energy networks has been cited in chapter two as a 
neglected or under theorised aspect of the literature. It was argued that the role of the state 
should be viewed as fluid and dynamic rather than in binary or linear terms and that micro-level 
policy instruments and tools of regulation are not neutral but reflect and reinforce broader 
political rationalities. The design and application of RPI-x regulation is a case in point. 
Emerging from a neo-liberal political rationality, price based regulation was seen as an 
apolitical and mathematical way of governing networks by framing natural monopoly as an 
externality which can be priced. The RPI-x model was designed to discourage investment in 
capital assets (CAPEX) and shift the focus of licensed network operators towards short term 
operational efficiencies (OPEX) whilst maintaining open access to the networks, thus enabling 
competitive retail markets according to the liberalisation agenda.  
However, in more recent years, energy policy and demand for investment are once again 
becoming part of the political agenda due to concerns over energy security, an ageing asset base 
and the need to decarbonise energy supply. The institutionalisation of long term energy policy 
goals has seen the formation of a new department of energy, DECC, along with proposals to re-
regulate wholesale electricity prices to provide a stable investment environment and attract 
international capital. Ofgem is increasingly taking on the function of an implementation body 
for the longer term orientated energy policy goals of the state i.e. decarbonising the electricity 
supply industry. An example of this is efforts to promote innovation through competitive funds 
which are designed to incentivise network operators to engage in experimentation and learning 
and to overcome some of the institutional barriers to the deployment of smart grid technologies. 
This strategy allows the sector to proceed along its current trajectory of avoiding substantial 
capital investment whilst facilitating low carbon generation and new types of demand side 
behaviours. Under the RIIO framework these adapted regulatory instruments are seeking to 
strategically select collaboration across the value chain, integration with the demand side, real-
time active management of distribution systems and innovation - as opposed to the conventional 
network planning and management techniques. Also, an extension of price control period to 8 
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years (from 5) reflects the wider changes in state strategy towards providing longer term 
stability for investors in the electricity sector.  
Using the infrastructure lifecycle heuristic, the figure below outlines the evolving role of the 
state in the governance of electricity networks. It is argued that the main functions of network 
regulation since privatisation have been to improve the rate of return on investments and to 
promote OPEX efficiencies, this led to the formation an independent regulator whose decisions 
have been framed and legitimised by a neo-liberal/market based rationality. What has been 
observed in this study is that although recent changes to the regulatory framework still draw 
from this logic, there is an increasing emphasis being placed on experimentation to deal with 
uncertainty and the provision of a stable and long term policy framework to attract private 
capital. However, there remains uncertainty as to how incentives for investment in innovative 
networks technologies can be embedded within the mainstream regulatory regime.  
Figure 8.1: The roles of the state in the infrastructure lifecycle 
 
Of course, CHP-DH is in the system building and establishment phase. Experience of district 
heating in Scandinavian countries and the early stages of electricity systems in the UK show 
that the state has a key role to play in developing sector level institutions; e.g. reducing 
transaction costs by promoting standardisation and interconnection and by consolidating 
fragmented systems. Analysis of CHP-DH in the UK shows that central government is seeking 
to promote localism and greater levels of autonomy for local authorities in bringing about 
sustainable development. However, it is largely the case that in the energy sphere agency at the 
local level and amongst small scale actors is being constrained due to the state strategy of 
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achieving long term energy policy goals through incumbent actors (vertically integrated energy 
companies) (Mitchell, 2008). The following remarks made by Russell in his history of CHP-DH 
in the UK during nationalisation largely hold true today:  
―Most state policy and action has been concerned with primary energy 
supply; intervention in energy use and conservation has been weak, and 
mostly achieved through prices. This structure, reinforced by relatively closed 
decision-making and a powerful and coherent ideology‖ (Russell, 1993: p.48) 
In order for CHP-DH to become a more prominent part of the energy sector in the UK clear 
direction and support from state level institutions is required as it is likely that local level 
initiatives will remain fragmented and uncoordinated.  
4. How are socio-technical transition processes in energy systems likely to be affected 
by the specific dynamics of distribution networks? 
This study has shown that in a liberalised energy environment energy networks should be 
treated as sub-systems of an overall socio-technical system which have unique institutional 
characteristics e.g. network regulation, system complementarities, and natural monopoly. It was 
argued that in many cases the literature on the governance of transitions in the energy field tend 
to treat energy systems as a whole and typically concentrate on the supply and/or demand side 
whilst neglecting infrastructure networks. As a result the focus of much of the transitions 
research in the energy field tends to be at the national level and focusing on supply side 
technologies. Policy recommendations emanating from this research therefore run the risk of 
neglecting a key aspect of energy systems.  
This is particularly the case for the electricity sector in the UK due to the highly unbundled 
structure of the ESI. Since privatisation the governance of networks have largely been treated 
separately from the generation and demand sides. As a result, there is a risk that the networks 
will become a reverse salient (Hughes, 1983) which holds back the transition to a low carbon 
energy system e.g. by failing to adequately integrate DG. This is likely to be amplified because, 
due to market forces, the competitive segments of the value chain will change at a different pace 
than the regulated segments. This thesis argues for a move away from the siloed approach to 
energy governance where networks are black boxed, instead a more integrated and long term 
transformation agenda is required – this is expanded upon in the policy recommendations 
section. 
Analysis of district heating showed the potential that local distribution networks can have in 
promoting energy efficiency and delivering a more flexible energy infrastructure which can 
produce synergistic relationships between a range of generating technologies e.g. CHP, 
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biomass, EfW, micro-generation etc. A key governance challenge is to develop infrastructure 
networks which can promote flexibility and which are future proof against new developments in 
low carbon generating and demand side technologies and practices. District heating has these 
attributes however is neglected in the UK as it does not sit well with the incumbent regime as it 
is an inherently local technology which gives a central role to new entrants i.e. local authorities. 
Also, policies aimed at decarbonising heat supply such as the RHI do not take into account the 
need for significant upfront capital investment to develop infrastructures in their establishment 
phase such as low carbon heating networks. A number of policy recommendations aimed at 
addressing these issues are made in the section below.  
8.4 Policy Recommendations 
The main aim of this thesis was to open up the black box of distribution networks in socio-
technical transition processes in energy systems and in doing so to propose a number of useful 
policy recommendations. In an overall sense it has been argued that the UK‘s energy 
infrastructure policy is deficient in a number of respects: 
The primary focus of energy infrastructure governance in the UK over the past twenty has been 
on reducing the marginal costs of operating incumbent gas and electricity networks. The 
analysis of electricity distribution networks shows that although there have been efforts to bring 
about more innovative approaches to planning and operating the networks with longer term 
decision making horizons, this has largely been shaped by the liberalisation agenda and has yet 
to be integrated into the mainstream regulatory process. Also, because the focus of energy 
policy and regulatory attention has been on incumbent networks at the national level, the 
development of local heat infrastructure has remained on the fringes. The strong emphasis on 
privatisation and liberalisation in UK energy policy has left a legacy where energy networks 
have largely been black boxed and siloed off, resulting in a situation where policies which seek 
to promote the transition to a low carbon and sustainable energy system tend to treat networks 
as afterthought or secondary to the main business of negotiating between different energy 
generation technologies. 
In order to value the contribution that more flexible distribution networks can make in enabling 
the diffusion of low carbon generation and achieving demand side efficiencies, the analysis of 
both incumbent and non-incumbent sectors highlights that two broad governance strategies 
should be pursued – this draws from the infrastructure lifecycle heuristic presented in figure 8.1.  
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The first is concerned with reorienting incumbent systems which are entering into a system 
renewal and transition phase. This thesis has argued that government can no longer outsource 
the governance of sectors such as electricity distribution to an economic regulator which is a 
legacy institution of the liberalisation programme - rather a more integrated and long-term 
orientated approach is required for this phase. As is shown in figure 8.1, this should involve a 
closer alignment between the functions and strategies of the regulator and the broader set of 
energy policy goals, particularly decarbonisation targets. This can provide a clear and long term 
regulatory/policy environment for investors and will help to overcome the institutional 
mismatches which are a result of incoherencies between the liberalisation – emphasising cost 
reductions and marginal efficiencies - and climate change - emphasising long term 
transformation - governance agendas.  Aligned with this there needs to be a means of 
incentivising innovation in these non-competitive sectors and incorporating this into the 
mainstream regulatory process. In the sub-section below, a more specific policy 
recommendation is made in this regard which argues for the formulation of long term network 
transition plans.  
The second governance strategy which should be pursued addresses how to facilitate the 
expansion of new low carbon infrastructures which are at the early stages of the infrastructure 
lifecycle (see figure 8.1). As has been illustrated in the CHP-DH case, this process of emergence 
tends to take place in specific local contexts with fragmented and dispersed systems developing 
in niches which are removed from mainstream energy institutions. The consolidation and 
interconnection of such fragmented systems will not only require resources and capacity 
development within local authorities, but also the development of a more coherent set of sector 
level institutions which promote standardisation, expansion and the diffusion of best practice. In 
the section below a proposal is outlined for the development of heat planning involving a 
statutory role for local government in developing local energy strategies - this draws from 
experience in front-runner Nordic countries.  
8.4.1 Specific Policy Recommendations 
Network Transition Plans 
A key issue that was encountered during the electricity distribution case study was how to 
extend the time horizons of investment decision making. The proposal here is to place a 
requirement on network operators to publish Network Transition Plans for the next 25-30 years 
where the DNO outlines their expectations for the future evolution of the network in their 
particular region. Although the price control review period will be extended from five to eight 
-282- 
 
 
 
years from 2015, it is still relatively short in the context of the long life of network investments. 
The presence of price control reviews acts as a disincentive for companies to make long term 
risky investments. Under the proposal a new category of investments would be created which 
are shielded from the normal price controls and can be assigned an increased cost of capital by 
the regulator. This would see a de-linking of these long term investments from the WACC
128
 
which would allow network companies to raise finance on terms which reflect the greater risk of 
these longer term investments
129
.  
Network investments are of course dependent on a number of variables such as economic 
growth, future population dynamics and the likely demand for DG connections; therefore a 
central aspect of the proposal is that the network plans would be developed and reviewed in 
consultation with range of stakeholders such as DG developers, local authorities, consumer 
advocacy groups, energy suppliers and transmission operators. The job of the regulator would 
remain to balance the interest of shareholders and customers and to distribute economic rents, 
however, this would be achieved by providing a transition arena (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008) 
or a platform whereby a range of actors can negotiate on as equal terms as possible. Plans 
should be formulated and revised in line with the higher level policy work of DECC and the 
CCC. The criteria for selecting this category of investment would need to set by the regulator 
and this should include a requirement to deploy innovative technologies and practices, to 
connect renewables in an integrated way, produce learning outcomes, and to develop long term 
collaborations – similar to the LNCF criteria. In order to protect customers, the performance of 
these investments would be assessed against the outputs incentives which have been laid out in 
the RIIO proposals.  
Local Heat Planning 
As has been noted, the nature of heat demand is tightly coupled with the built environment and 
as such differs in each building, street and area. For example, the nature of demand in densely 
populated inner city districts will be quite different from outer suburban areas; it therefore 
follows that the most suitable low carbon heating solutions will differ also. This local dimension 
of heat decarbonisation is currently not recognised in UK energy policy as it places all of the 
emphasis on incentives for individuals to become more energy efficient or invest in particular 
                                                     
128
 WACC sets an average cost of capital for financing existing and new investments 
129
 Similar arguments regarding investment ahead of need have been made by Baker et al. (2010) who 
propose that ‗Network owners could be offered an enhanced rate of return in cases where investments 
undertaken without full user commitment ultimately proved to be fully justified, but a reduced rate of 
return if those assets remained under-utilised‘ (p. 32) 
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technologies; this does not take account of the economies of scale and scope which can be 
achieved through local energy service provision. In fact recent changes to regional policy have 
actually diminished the obligations on LAs to reduce emissions in their areas
130
 (Travers, 2011). 
It is proposed that local authorities need to be given a greater implementation role for the 
decarbonisation of heat due to their greater knowledge of localities and their potential to take up 
a coordinating role. It is proposed to place a statutory requirement on local authorities to 
develop heat decarbonisation strategies for their areas. This would begin by characterising the 
nature of loads in an area by developing detailed heat maps and identifying opportunities. By 
coordinating a local heat planning forum consisting of the DNO, suppliers and community 
groups, the local authority could zone an area and identify suitable low carbon heating solutions 
in line with their own planning guidelines and the building codes and standards. If necessary, 
contracts could be tendered through the public sector procurement process.  
It is not proposed that heat networks be regulated as natural monopolies; however some degree 
of national level coordination is necessary to enable sector level structures to evolve. As CHP-
DH is currently in a system building/establishment phase, a learning-by-doing approach will 
likely be the most effective route to developing sector institutions such as technical standards 
and legal and contractual arrangements. This would eventually lead to an appropriate licensing 
and regulatory regime as systems begin to expand across cities. DECC‘s proposal for a national 
heat market forum
131
 would be a suitable arena for actors to come together and develop a more 
coherent governance regime for CHP-DH. Experience from the success of district heating in 
Denmark also shows that strong legislation which imposes a ban on waste heat and mandates 
connection to a heating network where it exists is also important
132
. A more coherent national 
and local framework for heat decarbonisation, along with changes to the electricity market 
trading arrangements which reward CHP for its environmental and system benefits, will likely 
improve the ability of local authorities to access finance and reduce their cost of capital. This 
should be supplemented by the inclusion of premium payments for distribution pipes in the 
RHI.  
                                                     
130
 In 2011 Comprehensive Area Assessments (CAAs) have been abolished and ‗The existing local 
government performance framework, which contained a number of provisions on local action on carbon 
reduction and environmental protection, has been abolished. The Government has not yet demonstrated 
how its new system will deliver on legally binding commitments such as the Climate Change Act‘. 
‗According to DECC, in July 2008 101 out of 152 local area agreements (LAAs) contained targets against 
the then-existing National Indicator 186 (NI 186) on reducing per capita emissions in their communities, 
while 35 LAAs also included targets against National Indicator 185 relating to reducing emissions of CO2 
from local authority operations‘, however many of these have been abolished (Travers, 2011) 
131
 The proposal was made in the 2010 ‗Warm Homes, Greener Homes‘ strategy (DECC and DCLG, 
2010) 
132
 The Danish ‗Heat Law‘ was introduced in 1979 
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8.5 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Concerns were expressed in the research design section relating to the sector level approach 
which was adopted in this study. It was decided not to take a firm or project level approach so 
as to capture the influence of structural and political processes which are institutionalised at the 
national level. On reflection, while this level of aggregation provided valuable insights into the 
meso-level governance processes taking place in the two cases and has been a useful starting 
point for transitions related research in this area, it perhaps has down-played the influence of 
micro-level agency. This was particularly so in the electricity distribution case where there was 
relatively little discussion of the differences between network operators in terms of capabilities 
and strategies. Through the semi-structured interviews it was found that as flows on the 
networks become more complex and geographical differences between networks become more 
prominent, it is likely that companies will develop more divergent strategies and approaches to 
issues such as innovation and collaboration with other actors. These emerging network operator 
strategies and potential changes to their business models could be analysed in more detail by 
perhaps paying closer attention to the LNCF projects as they become materialised over the next 
number of years. In order to do this an analysis of the relational dimension of infrastructures 
would have to pay closer attention to specific actors rather than the sector as a whole and trace 
the changing relationships between focal and peripheral actors within an organisational field in 
more detail, for example by using social network analysis tools. 
An issue was also raised regarding the functional equivalence of the case studies and whether 
this would limit the generalisability of the findings. It was found that the strategy adopted has 
been justified as choosing cases at different stages in the infrastructure lifecycle made the 
findings more relevant to an analysis of a long term transition process in the UK and illustrated 
the depth and range of interplay between niche and regime level actors, institutions and 
technologies in infrastructure sectors. However, the policy related empirical findings along with 
the analytical framework itself could be further developed and refined by making a comparison 
between the evolution of energy networks in different countries. Suggestions include a study of 
how smart grid developments in the UK compare to those in less liberalised jurisdictions such 
as France or certain states in the US. Also, a study of the institutional context within which 
CHP-DH became successful in Scandinavian countries and exploring what this might mean for 
the prospective decarbonisation of heat supply in the UK would be relevant. Another suggestion 
would be to analyse in a more systematic way the emerging scalar dynamics which are 
increasingly beginning to influence energy network governance in the UK, particularly the 
changing role of the EU energy and common market policies. Also, during the course of the 
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study a number of important areas, which were not explored in any great detail, warrant further 
study; for example how to improve access to capital for low carbon infrastructure projects, how 
synergies between different infrastructure networks can be promoted, and how demonstration 
projects and trials on the electricity networks can be evaluated. A final area for future work 
would be to explore how the framework which has been developed in this thesis could be 
operationalised as part of a wider interdisciplinary project. Of particular relevance would be 
whether researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds could draw on it to address real 
world problems relating to the transition to a low carbon energy system. This would be a true 
test of the validity and robustness of the approach which has been developed in this thesis.  
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10 Appendices 
Appendix A: Summary of Policy and Regulatory Documents Reviewed 
Document Name 
BERR (2008a) Current Technology Issues and Identification of Technical Opportunities for 
Active Network Management. 
BERR (2008b) UK Renewable Energy Strategy consultation document  
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE (2008) Building a low-carbon economy – The UK‘s 
contribution to tackling climate change 
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE (2010) The Fourth Carbon Budget Reducing emissions 
through the 2020s. 
DCLG (2000) Local Government Act 2000. 
DCLG (2006) Building A Greener Future: Towards Zero Carbon Development - consultation 
document. 
DCLG (2008a) The Community Infrastructure Levy. 
DCLG (2008b) Improving the energy efﬁciency of our homes and buildings Energy Certiﬁcates 
and air-conditioning inspections for buildings. 
DCLG (2008c) Sustainable Communities Act 2007: A Guide. 
DCLG (2011a) A plain English guide to the Localism Bill, Update  
DCLG (2011b) Planning, building and the environment 
DECC (2009a) A Consultation on Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas 
DECC (2009b) A Consultation on Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas.  
DECC (2009c) Extending the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target: Consultation on a CERT 
framework for the period April 2011 to December 2012. 
DECC (2009d) Heat and Energy Saving Strategy Consultation. 
DECC (2009e) Smarter Grids: The Opportunity.  
DECC (2009f) The UK Renewable Energy Strategy. 
DECC (2010a) Allowing Local Authorities to Sell Electricity. 
DECC (2010b) Consultation on the provision of third party access to licence exempt electricity 
and gas networks. 
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DECC (2010c) Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2010. 
DECC (2010d) Implementation of the EU Third Internal Energy Package: Government Response  
DECC (2010e) Renewable energy: Statistics used for the EU 2020 renewables target.  
DECC (2010f) Smart Metering Implemnentation Program Prospectus. 
DECC (2010g) Warm Homes, Greener Homes: A Strategy for Household Energy Management 
Supporting Paper VIII: An Enabling Framework for District Heating and Cooling. 
DECC (2011a) Consultation on Electricity Market Reform. 
DECC (2011b) Renewable Heat Incentive. 
DECC (2011c) Smart Metering Implementation Program: Response to Prospectus Consultation. 
DECC & DCLG (2010) Warm Homes, Greener Homes: A Strategy for Household Energy 
Management Supporting Paper VIII, An Enabling Framework for District Heating and Cooling. 
DEFRA (2007) Analysis of the UK potential for Combined Heat and Power   
DTI (2004) Class Exemption Order: Explanatory Memorandum.  
EGWG (2001) Report into Network Access Issues Volume 1: Main Report and Appendices. 
ENSG (2009) Electricity Networks Strategy Group: A Smart Grid Vision. 
HM GOVERNMENT (2001) The Electricity (Class Exemptions from the Requirement for a 
Licence) Order 2001: Explanatory Memorandum. 
HM GOVERNMENT (2010a) The Coalition: our programme for government. 
HM GOVERNMENT (2010b) The Sale of Electricity by Local Authorities (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2010 
OFGEM (2001a) Embedded generation: price controls, incentives and connection 
charging: A preliminary consultation document. 
OFGEM (2001b) Ofgem‘s strategy for metering: A consultation paper. 
OFGEM (2002) Electricity (Connection Charges) Regulations: A consultation documen. 
OFGEM (2003a) Innovation and Registered Power Zones Discussion paper  
OFGEM (2003b) Introducing Comeptition in Smart Metering. 
OFGEM (2004) Electricity Distribution Price Control Review: Final Proposals. 
OFGEM (2005) Further Details of the RPZ Scheme: Guidance Document   
-307- 
 
 
 
OFGEM (2006) 'Our Energy Challenge': Ofgem's response. 
OFGEM (2007) Distributed Energy - Initial Proposals for More Flexible Market and Licensing 
Arrangements. 
OFGEM (2008) Distributed Energy - Further Proposals for More Flexible Market and Licensing 
Arrangement. 
OFGEM (2009a) Distributed Energy - Final Proposals and Statutory Notice for Electricity 
Supply Licence Modification. 
OFGEM (2009b) Electricity Distribution Price Control Review: Final Proposals  
OFGEM (2009c) Innovation in energy networks: Is more needed and how can this be 
stimulated? Regulating energy networks for the future: RPI-X@20 Working paper 2. 
OFGEM (2009d) Next steps in delivering the electricity distribution structure of charges project. 
OFGEM (2010a) LCN Fund Governance Document v.3. 
OFGEM (2010b) Low Carbon Networks Fund winning projects: Second Tier decision. 
OFGEM (2010c) Regulating energy networks for the future: RPI-X@20 Emerging Thinking. 
OFGEM (2010d) Reports by Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) on Innovation Funding 
Incentive (IFI) and Registered Power Zone (RPZ) activity for 2008-2009. 
OFGEM (2010e) RIIO: A new way to regulate energy networks, final decision. 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
133
 
Interview 1: Energy policy researcher, July 2009 
Interview 2: Energy policy researcher, July 2009 
Interview 3: Professor of electrical engineering, July 2009 
Interview 4: Head of business modelling for an R&D subsidiary a ‗big six‘ energy supplier, July 
2009 
Interview 5: Electrical engineer with an R&D subsidiary of a ‗big six‘ energy supplier134, July 
2009 
Interview 6: Director of network innovation at an energy consultancy, Aug 2009  
Interview 7: R&D manager with a transmission operator, August 2009 
Interview 8: Strategy manager with a transmission operator, August 2009 
Interview 9: Strategy manager with a power engineering consultancy, 2009 
Interview 10: Managing Director of an engineering consultancy who specialise in grid 
connection, Jan 2010 
Interview 11: Electrical engineer with an R&D subsidiary of a ‗big six‘ energy supplier and 
technical advisor to a DNO, Feb 2009 
Interview 12: Managing Director of UK operations of a large multi-national energy technology 
manufacturer, Feb 2010 
Interview 13: Low Carbon Projects Manager at a DNO, Feb 2010 
Interview 14: Technical advisor to the UK energy regulator, Feb 2010 
Interview 15: Renewables Development Manager at a DNO
135
, March 2010 
Interview 16: Strategy Manager at a DNO, March 2010 
Interview 17: Technology Manager at a DNO, March 2010 
Interview 18: Operations Director at a consultancy specialising in ANM solutions, March 2010 
Interview 19: Independent consultant specialising in network regulation and connections, April 
2010 
Interview 20: Head of future networks at a DNO, May 2010 
Interview 21: Policy Manager at a DNO and ‗big six‘ energy supplier, May 2010 
Interview 22: Policy advisor at DECC specialising in electricity networks, Nov 2010 
Interview 23: Regulation manager at a DNO, Jan 2011 
Interview 24: Utilities consultant specialising in business models and network innovation
136
, Jan 
2011 
Interview 25: Sustainability Manager at a local authority, June 2010 
Interview 26: Chief Executive of a local authority, June 2010 
Interview 27: Head of new business and economics at a government housing agency, June 2010 
Interview 28: Consultant specialising in carbon management and local energy systems, July 
2010 
Interview 29: Services Manager with a district energy utility company, June 2010 
Interview 30: Sustainability/Energy Manager at a local authority, July 2010 
Interview 31: Managing Director of a council owned ESCO, July 2010 
Interview 32: Principal Designer & Energy Engineer of a local authority (retired), Aug 2010 
Interview 33: Director of environmental services at a local authority, August 2010 
Interview 34: Energy manager for a local authority, August 2010 
                                                     
133
 Interviews 1&2 covered both cases, interviews 3-24 covered the electricity distribution case and 
interviews 25-41 covered the heat distribution case 
134
 I was unable to record this interview due to a technical issue with the recorder. Extensive notes were 
taken however 
135
 Interviews 13-15 were conducted as part of a group discussion held over two hours 
136
 I was unable to record this interview due to a technical issue with the recorder. Extensive notes were 
taken however 
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Interview 35: Deputy Head of community-led policy making at DECC, August 2010 
Interview 36: Senior policy officer at a lobbying organisation for local government, August 
2010  
Interview 37: Director of Sustainable Development at a local authority, Sept 2010 
Interview 38: Head of Sustainable Development at a local authority, Sept 2010 
Interview 39: Deputy Director of a lobbying organisation for the CHP industry, Dec 2010 
Interview 40: Head of community energy for a ‗big six‘ energy supplier, March 2011 
Interview 41: Head of Decentralised Energy Delivery at a local authority, March 2011 
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Appendix C: A coded extract from an Interview 
The following are extracts from an interview from the CHP-DH case. For each of the interviews 
across both cases relevant sections of the interview were highlighted and assigned a code with 
additional explanatory notes added. Codes that were used to analyse the interview were as 
follows: 
- A: Local Authorities role, background, organisational change, motivation, strategies 
- B: Structural issues @ the regime level: Regulation, contracts, incumbency, lock-in, 
history & path dependency, constraints 
- C: The CHP-DH Sector: Links between councils, knowledge development, interactions 
between council and stakeholders, CHP-DH advocacy 
- D: Governance regime, policy and transitions: Energy policies, national-local 
interactions, grants, scales,  policies , grants, schemes, the future 
- E: Technology Choices: Generation, scheme design, loads, fuels, carbon abatement, 
benefits, modelling techniques 
- F: Capital and Finance: Issues surrounding the funding of schemes 
 
- In this excerpt we are discussing the different ways councils structure their schemes. 
The interviewee begins by outlining the advantages of  councils having direct 
ownership – 
Q: That gives you more flexibility? 
R: Yes, because we can decide ... the investment rate, the minimum investment rate of return is, 
the council can decide what its minimum rate of return is, so if the Council is borrowing money 
of 3.2% let's say, on a fixed interest 50 years from the public works finance facility, they can 
decide to have a trigger rate of 4% on investment... and because we have thet the delivery 
capability we are not looking for an external commercial company to come in who would want 
to see a return much higher than we are prepared to accept, under which the infrastructure can't 
deliver that rate of return on investment, because sustainable infrastructure doesn't return money 
at that level of investment. So there are two things; you have got to get finance right, it has got 
to be either long-term low interest rate, and obviously all local councils have that capability, or 
it has got to be short term project finance which you then roll over when the time comes into 
asset finance, but most banks even on asset finance won't look beyond a seven-year horizon 
even at commercial rates. So there is a big fight between commercial money and the capability 
of debt for local councils. And then within the political bubble debt is bad!! So councils need to 
go into debt to be entrepreneurial and they can do at low interest rates for 50 years fixed but 
electorally debt is bad. So they are between a rock and a hard place, they know that they have 
got to spend money, they have access to cheap funds, but electorally it is dangerous to borrow 
money and go into debt. 
F: Risk and 
ownership 
F: Public vs. 
private debt 
F: Politics 
& debt 
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[The ESCO]  is setup so that all the profits of the … group can only be spent within the borough 
on sustainability, that is the very reason on which they are set up. And that money, those profits, 
are bounded, so they are not used to subsidize lower council taxes, that is the basis on which the 
… group is setup. So the profits are spent within the borough, with negotiation between 
stakeholders within the Borough, on improving energy efficiency. On energy efficiency in 
residential property, what we have done is matching government grants so that they are virtually 
free grants for people to upgrade their houses, we have achieved from what we have put in 
about a 21%'s CO2 emission reduction on housing throughout the borough, and we have had 
contact with between five and 6000 households within the borough on energy efficiency and 
that there is 26,000, no 36,000, households in the borough, so [the] profits and help engender 
sustainability within the borough and that is all it is intended to do. [The ESCo] is a CO2 
reduction entity - not a profit-making entity for the purpose of Council tax reduction. 
Q: Very different business model from Utilicom? 
R: oh yes. Totally. 
Q: You mentioned stakeholders what kind of groups? 
R: [The] Council is a stakeholder in the outcomes of expenditure. You have the church groups, 
the faith groups, you have place making groups, you have community groups, so they are 
stakeholders, and you have climate change groups that includes all of those stakeholders; that is 
chaired by one of the counsellors and the idea is that effectively spends [the group‘s] profits on 
sustainablity within the borough. It is the same scenario as Utilicom in that [the ESCo] is a 
commercial entity but what is done with a profits is completely different... the other thing is that 
[the council] is obviously very attractive to developers because we are half an hour outside of 
London, we know what kind of development which is going to occur here, is going to be high-
rise's and mixed-use office accommodation buildings. We know roughly where developers are 
going to be interested over the next 25 years, there are parcels of land where we have existing 
old property that is not going to be redeveloped; and so we want to open up a dialogue between 
developers as early as possible, so that first of all they don't pay too much for the land, so that 
there is still a margin available for them to spend on sustainability, and that we are going to get 
holdings that we are not going to be embarrassed about in 100 years time. So we interact very 
early what the developers, as soon as they walk through the door …they get one of these things 
that says; this is what we would like to see the developments look like … and if you do this, in 
inverted commas, you might get through planning easier - so it is not a statutory thing, but it is 
encouragement to developers; saying to them that these are the kind of buildings that we want 
and we will do our best - a) to make sure that you build them and we can support you in 
building i.e. that we can have sustainable energy facilities available to you to support your 
A: ESCO 
aim 
D: Efficiency 
policies 
A: ESCo aim 
A: ESCO aim 
C: 
Planning, 
developers 
& energy 
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development, and then we have got the ESCO that will be around for at least 25 more years in 
order to support those sustainability technologies... so it is an integrated whole. 
- In the next excerpt from the same interview we discuss the issue of regulating local 
energy schemes – 
Q: What is your best case scenario? 
R: Our best case … is that it is the situation that it is. That if you are regulatory open, if you 
model yourself on a current utility in terms of the ability to protect their networks and 
customers, which is what we do, we are just as friendly or unfriendly as your local utility 
company, then status quote reins and that would be ideal for me. If Ofgem do not constrain the 
ability of the utilities to flex their prices below what I can meet, then I have got problems, 
because I can only take my retail margin down to a point and below that I lose money. 
- In the next excerpt from the same interview the respondent describes the scheme and the 
technologies being deployed – 
R: … This is the town centre energy station; that provides heating cooling and electricity within 
the CBD. And also we provide electricity to carparks, advocacy and heating to the Holiday Inn, 
conference centres etc. etc. This is the technology we use; marine diesel modified to run on gas, 
and the reason why we used that technology is because a) you can put the machines anywhere in 
the because there is a good gas grid, and b) within 15 years we hope to be putting them on 
anaerobic digestion gas that has been injected into the gas network; so that a sustainable gas. 
  
B: Private 
wire and 
regulation 
E: Scheme 
technologies 
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Appendix D: Map of the GB ESI 
Figure 10.1: The Electricity Supply System in Great Britain in 2009  
 
 
Source: (DECC, 2010c) 
